All smiles in public, as agreement mark an end to a sour chapter in relations.
Almost one year after the signing of a declaration of principles between US President George Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, governing long-term cooperation and friendship between the two countries, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was finally passed by Iraq’s Cabinet.
The draft agreement, overwhelmingly endorsed by Cabinet members, was later signed by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari and U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker, in a showcase ceremony, aimed at emphasising a common bond and vision between both sides.
The final draft, encompassing a series of amendments requested at the end of October by Iraqi government, ended months of protracted and at times tense negotiations, that was fast becoming a thorn for both allies. More critically the belated signing of the pact avoided a nightmare scenario for both sides.
The preceding draft, originally earmarked for approval by Iraqi politicians in October, was perceived by key figures in both administrations as the final text to be voted on by Iraqi parliament. That draft was already the subject of much dilution, owed mainly to Iraqi anxiety around sovereignty and the level of legal immunity afforded to US forces.
On the back of broad-endorsement by the Iraqi Cabinet, the draft is widely expected to win the necessary number of votes in Iraq’s parliament, which is expected to vote next week, marking the last step in negotiations.
However, as Iraqis celebrated the end of an era, the reality of the obstacles that lay ahead could not be better demonstrated than the deadly terrorist bombings that coincided with Iraqi approval.
Sweet end to a bitter debacle?
In many ways, the signing of the pact marked a sweet end for both sides, of what was fast become a bitter debacle.
The target date for the signing of the Sofa agreement was the end of July, however in spite of negotiations spanning much of 2008, agreement proved elusive and for a while unlikely before the end of this year.
The agreement was essentially perceived as a pact on the withdrawal of US forces by the Iraqi government. The US had long resisted setting a firm timetable for the withdrawal of its estimated 150,000-strong forces in Iraq. The Bush administration had always insisted that any specific reduction of forces (let alone full withdrawal) could only be linked with security gains on the ground, and had only loosely adopted a roadmap for withdrawal.
However, with the Iraqi government under fierce public pressure to assert a sense of nationalism and ‘control’, a fixed-timetable for withdrawal became a core aspect of any agreement.
Under the signed pact, US forces are committed to leaving streets of Iraqi towns and villages by 30th June 2009 and leaving Iraq altogether by December 31, 2011.
Without a doubt, the setting of such a timetable on the surface represents a major negotiating victory for Iraq. Clearly, no matter how well dressed any agreement would have been in Iraq’s favour, it would have represented a symbolic failure, predominantly for Arab sections of the population, if withdrawal of US forces was not stipulated in such clear terms.
For the first time, Iraq’s government, at least on paper, is given authority over US troops. Furthermore, serving more of a symbolic importance than a practicality, US soldiers could be tried under Iraqi legislation but under very tough conditions.
The US viewpoint
Although, the US administration had insisted that the bar to changes to the previous draft was very high, in reality it had little choice but to adhere to the new round of amendments requested by Baghdad.
The US presence since shortly after the toppling of Saddam in 2003 has been governed by UN Security Council backed mandates, which has not been without its share of controversy from the beginning. The final UN mandate expires on 31st December 2008, meaning that a lack of a greater strategic framework agreement with Iraq would render US presence in Iraq as affectively “illegal”.
Such a scenario would have resulted in the stark possibility of a US suspension of activities in Iraq. More importantly, such a scenario just days before Bush’s tenure at the helm comes to an end, would have been capped as somewhat of a humiliating end to what was already a highly-contentious US adventure in Iraq under the auspices of Bush.
The Barrack Obama card in the agreement was indirectly a huge factor. Iraqi politicians were hesitant to sign any agreement prior to the US presidential elections without assurance that the next US President would honour the agreement. From that perspective, the appointment of Obama over presidential-rival John McCain was significant as Obama had highlighted the importance of withdrawal from Iraq within a set period (16 months of his appointment).
The US would clearly have advocated a strategic agreement affording a much stronger role in the execution of operations in Iraq and a more prolonged influence on the future direction of Iraq.
The Iraqi viewpoint
The agreement was certainly advantageous from an Iraqi perspective. A more forceful approach towards their US counterparts has been witnessed over the last year or so, and perhaps the agreement is a culmination of that.
It was of high-importance for Iraqi politicians to safeguard their reputations, as the negotiations became a case of national honour. The importance not to be viewed as yielding to US pressure and expectation to stand up to what many still perceive as “occupiers”, became a fundamental factor in the approach to negotiations.
Evidently, the finer details of the agreement were not clear to all Iraqis, and the significance for the Iraqi government became the overriding public perception of ‘victory’. In that perspective, nothing speaks more volumes of victory for most of the Iraqi population than the idea that they are under full control of all affairs and that their sovereignty is safeguarded.
The difficulty in incorporating such a spectrum of views across the across the Iraqi social fabric was iconic of the difficulties of the new democratic Iraq. On the one hand, the Kurds have overwhelmingly supported a decisive strategic agreement with the US from the outset and have long campaigned for a long-term US military presence. Conversely, the Sadrist bloc and other hard-line Shiite and Sunni groups on the other hand, have staged demonstrations marking their opposition to any deal with the US and have openly battled US forces at various intervals.
The aforementioned factors, coupled with the vital provincial elections scheduled for Iraq in early 2009, swayed the stance of Iraqi politicians. With the upcoming provisional elections threatening to change the socio-political landscape of Iraq and thus endangering the position of many key personnel in the current Cabinet, the standpoint and perception of Iraqi politicians was under as much individual, as collective scrutiny.
The last round of amendments to the draft was designed to appease skeptical Shiite lawmakers and particularly Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who threatened to use his immense influence to “veto” support for the draft. It is likely that final adjustments to the draft, was the result of a direct trade-off with al-Maliki and ensure the public ‘silence’ of al-Sistani on the draft agreement.
With Iraqi politician’s witling down the pact beyond original expectations, Iraqi government spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh statement that the agreement was “the best possible, available option” could not be truer.
Greater strategic agreement
Part of the security pact, is a draft framework agreement underlying the future shape of Iraqi-US relationships in a number of spheres. The framework is designed to define future cooperation and friendship in the areas of economy, culture, technology and a number of other areas, between both countries for years to come.
However, clearly the agreement became so dominated around withdrawal and sovereignty, that understanding and cooperation on other important levels became secondary.
However, for the both Iraq and particularly the US, the overall relationship must go beyond the next three years when US forces withdraw altogether. The US can ill-afford to abandon their Iraqi or Middle Eastern project without some surety that they can continue to influence proceedings in Iraq and the surrounding region.
In the long-term, in many ways this greater framework agreement, mapping out the relationships between both parties, was just as significant as the Sofa agreement.
Iraqi repercussions
Although the bold stance of the Iraqi government in negotiations marks an increasing aura of confidence, especially in light of dramatic security improvements, the road ahead for Iraq remains as tentative as ever.
The simple fact is that in spite of the tough position adopted by Iraqi negotiators, Iraq is not ready politically and certainly not as a force, without US assistance. A suspended US ‘presence’ on 1st January 2009, may have been welcomed by large sections of the population, but would have been catastrophic for Baghdad.
There are a key number of political milestones that must be achieved in the aim of great national reconciliation, with the cushion that the US forces can present.
The pressure is certainly on Iraqi politicians to build fragile security gains into concrete achievements. The landmines that dot the path ahead must be negotiated as successfully as the perceived security pact with the US, if Iraq does not transcend into a far worse position in three years time without the US, than the uncertainty of today with a world super-power at its disposal.