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Iraqi Cabinet Approves Security Pact with US

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All smiles in public, as agreement mark an end to a sour chapter in relations.

Almost one year after the signing of a declaration of principles between US President George Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, governing long-term cooperation and friendship between the two countries, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was finally passed by Iraq’s Cabinet.

The draft agreement, overwhelmingly endorsed by Cabinet members, was later signed by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari and U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker, in a showcase ceremony, aimed at emphasising a common bond and vision between both sides.

The final draft, encompassing a series of amendments requested at the end of October by Iraqi government, ended months of protracted and at times tense negotiations, that was fast becoming a thorn for both allies. More critically the belated signing of the pact avoided a nightmare scenario for both sides.

The preceding draft, originally earmarked for approval by Iraqi politicians in October, was perceived by key figures in both administrations as the final text to be voted on by Iraqi parliament. That draft was already the subject of much dilution, owed mainly to Iraqi anxiety around sovereignty and the level of legal immunity afforded to US forces.

On the back of broad-endorsement by the Iraqi Cabinet, the draft is widely expected to win the necessary number of votes in Iraq’s parliament, which is expected to vote next week, marking the last step in negotiations.

However, as Iraqis celebrated the end of an era, the reality of the obstacles that lay ahead could not be better demonstrated than the deadly terrorist bombings that coincided with Iraqi approval.

Sweet end to a bitter debacle?

In many ways, the signing of the pact marked a sweet end for both sides, of what was fast become a bitter debacle.

The target date for the signing of the Sofa agreement was the end of July, however in spite of negotiations spanning much of 2008, agreement proved elusive and for a while unlikely before the end of this year.

The agreement was essentially perceived as a pact on the withdrawal of US forces by the Iraqi government. The US had long resisted setting a firm timetable for the withdrawal of its estimated 150,000-strong forces in Iraq. The Bush administration had always insisted that any specific reduction of forces (let alone full withdrawal) could only be linked with security gains on the ground, and had only loosely adopted a roadmap for withdrawal.

However, with the Iraqi government under fierce public pressure to assert a sense of nationalism and ‘control’, a fixed-timetable for withdrawal became a core aspect of any agreement.

Under the signed pact, US forces are committed to leaving streets of Iraqi towns and villages by 30th June 2009 and leaving Iraq altogether by December 31, 2011.

Without a doubt, the setting of such a timetable on the surface represents a major negotiating victory for Iraq. Clearly, no matter how well dressed any agreement would have been in Iraq’s favour, it would have represented a symbolic failure, predominantly for Arab sections of the population, if withdrawal of US forces was not stipulated in such clear terms.

For the first time, Iraq’s government, at least on paper, is given authority over US troops. Furthermore, serving more of a symbolic importance than a practicality, US soldiers could be tried under Iraqi legislation but under very tough conditions.

The US viewpoint

Although, the US administration had insisted that the bar to changes to the previous draft was very high, in reality it had little choice but to adhere to the new round of amendments requested by Baghdad.

The US presence since shortly after the toppling of Saddam in 2003 has been governed by UN Security Council backed mandates, which has not been without its share of controversy from the beginning. The final UN mandate expires on 31st December 2008, meaning that a lack of a greater strategic framework agreement with Iraq would render US presence in Iraq as affectively “illegal”.

Such a scenario would have resulted in the stark possibility of a US suspension of activities in Iraq. More importantly, such a scenario just days before Bush’s tenure at the helm comes to an end, would have been capped as somewhat of a humiliating end to what was already a highly-contentious US adventure in Iraq under the auspices of Bush.

The Barrack Obama card in the agreement was indirectly a huge factor. Iraqi politicians were hesitant to sign any agreement prior to the US presidential elections without assurance that the next US President would honour the agreement. From that perspective, the appointment of Obama over presidential-rival John McCain was significant as Obama had highlighted the importance of withdrawal from Iraq within a set period (16 months of his appointment).

The US would clearly have advocated a strategic agreement affording a much stronger role in the execution of operations in Iraq and a more prolonged influence on the future direction of Iraq.

The Iraqi viewpoint

The agreement was certainly advantageous from an Iraqi perspective. A more forceful approach towards their US counterparts has been witnessed over the last year or so, and perhaps the agreement is a culmination of that.

It was of high-importance for Iraqi politicians to safeguard their reputations, as the negotiations became a case of national honour. The importance not to be viewed as yielding to US pressure and expectation to stand up to what many still perceive as “occupiers”, became a fundamental factor in the approach to negotiations.

Evidently, the finer details of the agreement were not clear to all Iraqis, and the significance for the Iraqi government became the overriding public perception of ‘victory’. In that perspective, nothing speaks more volumes of victory for most of the Iraqi population than the idea that they are under full control of all affairs and that their sovereignty is safeguarded.

The difficulty in incorporating such a spectrum of views across the across the Iraqi social fabric was iconic of the difficulties of the new democratic Iraq. On the one hand, the Kurds have overwhelmingly supported a decisive strategic agreement with the US from the outset and have long campaigned for a long-term US military presence. Conversely, the Sadrist bloc and other hard-line Shiite and Sunni groups on the other hand, have staged demonstrations marking their opposition to any deal with the US and have openly battled US forces at various intervals.

The aforementioned factors, coupled with the vital provincial elections scheduled for Iraq in early 2009, swayed the stance of Iraqi politicians.  With the upcoming provisional elections threatening to change the socio-political landscape of Iraq and thus endangering the position of many key personnel in the current Cabinet, the standpoint and perception of Iraqi politicians was under as much individual, as collective scrutiny.

The last round of amendments to the draft was designed to appease skeptical Shiite lawmakers and particularly Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who threatened to use his immense influence to “veto” support for the draft. It is likely that final adjustments to the draft, was the result of a direct trade-off with al-Maliki and ensure the public ‘silence’ of al-Sistani on the draft agreement.

With Iraqi politician’s witling down the pact beyond original expectations, Iraqi government spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh statement that the agreement was “the best possible, available option” could not be truer.

Greater strategic agreement

Part of the security pact, is a draft framework agreement underlying the future shape of Iraqi-US relationships in a number of spheres. The framework is designed to define future cooperation and friendship in the areas of economy, culture, technology and a number of other areas, between both countries for years to come.

However, clearly the agreement became so dominated around withdrawal and sovereignty, that understanding and cooperation on other important levels became secondary.

However, for the both Iraq and particularly the US, the overall relationship must go beyond the next three years when US forces withdraw altogether. The US can ill-afford to abandon their Iraqi or Middle Eastern project without some surety that they can continue to influence proceedings in Iraq and the surrounding region.

In the long-term, in many ways this greater framework agreement, mapping out the relationships between both parties, was just as significant as the Sofa agreement.

Iraqi repercussions

Although the bold stance of the Iraqi government in negotiations marks an increasing aura of confidence, especially in light of dramatic security improvements, the road ahead for Iraq remains as tentative as ever.

The simple fact is that in spite of the tough position adopted by Iraqi negotiators, Iraq is not ready politically and certainly not as a force, without US assistance. A suspended US ‘presence’ on 1st January 2009, may have been welcomed by large sections of the population, but would have been catastrophic for Baghdad.

There are a key number of political milestones that must be achieved in the aim of great national reconciliation, with the cushion that the US forces can present.

The pressure is certainly on Iraqi politicians to build fragile security gains into concrete achievements. The landmines that dot the path ahead must be negotiated as successfully as the perceived security pact with the US, if Iraq does not transcend into a far worse position in three years time without the US, than the uncertainty of today with a world super-power at its disposal.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Further Stalling by Iraqi Politicians, Leaves Great Danger of US Suspension in Iraq

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After Iraq’s Political Council for National Security stalled in successive days to approve, the presumed ‘take it or leave it’, final draft of the SOFA agreement, US officials once again pressed their Iraqi counterparts to accept the deal. 

It is hoped that if approval is obtained by the council, which practically brings together key political heads across Iraq, from presidency to the heads of major blocs in parliament, ratification by parliament would be a formality.

However, in Iraq where finding broad political agreement is notoriously painstaking, this may be easier said than done.

Dramatic Consequences

In a stark warning, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, stated that without the Status of Forces Agreement (Sofa), then the US activities would be effectively suspended.  Such “dramatic consequences” noted by Gates, should give the Iraqi political process a firm jolt.

However, Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh had earlier claimed that leaders were “still hesitant to approve or reject” the deal, placing uncertainty on the chances of a fast turn-around, if not rejection of the draft altogether.

According to al-Dabbagh, ministers would meet in the days ahead for consultation and put forward suggested amendments.  It is hoped that the amended draft can then be sent back to the negotiation table. With US expressing “great reluctance” to renegotiate, the table may remain bare.

Intense Negotiations

After months of negotiations and compromise, an agreement in principle stretching as far back as late 2007 and a missed target of the end of July originally earmarked for the approval of the strategic framework agreement, hopes for a swift pact evaporated.

After months of tense, protected and at times controversial negotiations and over 5 years of what should now in theory at least represent a blossoming partnership between the US and Iraqi governments, the absence of the strategic agreement strikes a blow to future cooperation and will undoubtedly undermine ties.

The original perception from the both governments was that the draft agreement, after concessions from both sides and a multitude of meetings, was now in its final format and can only be accepted or rejected by the Iraqi parliament. US certainly believe that they have done all they can to appease Iraqi anxiety over its sovereignty.

Fragmented Iraqi Landscape

After pushing US compromise to the limit, there is a general consensus amongst some Iraqi parliamentarians that the current form of the deal is the best they can attain.

However, even this reality may not be enough to enforce agreement. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that in the diverse ethnic fabric that is Iraq, establishing such an agreement with the Americans has proved a thorny national issue and the source of much debate.

The fragmented nature of the Iraqi landscape is best depicted, when one-side of the Iraqi divide, namely the Sadrist block are dead against an agreement in any form with the American “occupiers”, whilst conversely for the Kurdish Coalition, a long-term US hand in Iraq is strongly advocated and actively supported.

Only this weekend, thousands of supporters of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr demonstrated against the security agreement.

After deadly-conflicts between the Mehdi Army and US forces in past years, Sadrist opposition is hardly surprising. However, rising voices of discontent from the main Shiite coalition, United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), has clouded the chances of concord.

Iranian meddling in this affair is more than likely. After all they will certainly use all their “friends” within Iraqi government circles, to drastically dilute, if not revoke such an agreement affecting their sphere of influence, and at times of such animosity with the Bush administration.

US Reassurance

At the pinnacle of Iraqi concern, and the main cause of delays, is the issue of sovereignty. A growingly confident Iraqi government has continually strived to assert its dominance in recent times. The primary question, for sceptical Iraqis is who will really call the shots in Iraq, the Iraqi government or the US administration?

US Ambassador Ryan Crocker once again defended the draft agreement and tried to provide reassurance that Iraq will assume its sovereignty in full.

US officials had pressed hard not to include a definitive timetable for withdrawal, but under the watered-down agreement still to be published, it is envisaged that US forces will leave Iraqi cities by June 2009 and withdraw from Iraq altogether by the end of 2011.

The other Iraqi obstacle to agreement is wording around the liability of US troops and contractors from Iraqi prosecution. Phrasing on the conditions for immunity has been drastically altered, but has still failed to strike the right sentiments with the main Shiite alliance.

The key message from the US administration is that the security pact was always designed with Iraq’s best interests in mind, and based on a voluntary Iraqi endeavour to request continuing US assistance, rather than a forcibly-applied US presence.

What now for the security agreement?

If chances of renegotiation of the draft are slight, then the probability of major concessions at this stage is almost certainly out of the question. However, something must give in this impasse.

If no agreement is reached by the end of this year, when the ‘final’ UN mandate ends, either the current powers afforded continue under a new mandate, which by Gates own admission is not a “clean” option, or the US leave altogether. Ironically, Iraqis do not seem to want both these scenarios.

In recent times, the much-pressurised Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, has tried hard to be portrayed as a strong nationalistic leader, rather than a tool of the US administration. Al-Maliki has expressed his desire to see the draft pass by a two-thirds majority in parliament, to win wider national endorsement.

But such a contentious issue, and the diversity of opinion across the Iraqi social mosaic, means that pleasing all sides is always going to be impossible no matter how agreements with the US are dressed.

High-stakes

Clearly, the US can ill-afford to hastily cut their losses in Iraq, after 5 years of sacrifice and much effort to establish stability and elusive national reconciliation. Security achievements remain brittle and certainly gains are reversible as quickly as they were yielded.

The US administration must ensure that a minimum they keep a strategic-hand, albeit in less-militaristic terms, for years to come, to prevent their Iraqi and more importantly their greater Middle Eastern project, from dramatically falling to pieces.

However, the popular belief that US will remain under any circumstance is misleading. Growing US public discontent, a daunting economic recession, rampant unemployment, a global credit crisis and the impeding change of president, coupled with the billions of dollars spent every month in Iraq, will mean that the US will want to cut back their Iraqi adventures sooner rather than later, without leaving civil anarchy behind.

On the hand, the security agreement represents the best terms that the Iraqi government can get. They have won major concessions and can ill-afford to see their US counterparts leave the country in haste at such times of deep national vulnerability. It is true that Iraqi politicians will aim to be viewed as strong national leaders and thus try to surmount a tougher stance, least to be seen to succumb to US “occupiers”, but they need the US more than ever.

Growing frictions between the KRG and Baghdad, the lack of a hydrocarbon law, bitter disputes over Kirkuk and the implementation of the constitution, and not forgetting the potentially disastrous ramifications if the incorporation of the Sunni Sahwa councils is not treaded with utter caution, all highlight the dangerous road ahead in Iraq.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

The Enduring US Presence in Iraq

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Long-term US occupation in the “midst of a frail Iraqi landscape” was always likely

As Iraq and the U.S. continue negotiations, long-term strategic ties have never been more critical for both parties.

Five years of a contentious occupation, thousands of US casualties, billions dollars of expenditure, and unabated battles against insurgents mixed with ever-elusive national reconciliation, paints its own picture. 

However, despite the heavy price that the US has continued to pay, their vision of Iraq as a pluralistic, stable and democratic bastion to act as a model for the volatile Middle-East is far from been realised.

In truth, amidst all frequent calls amongst some Iraqi factions, Iraqi neighbours and rivals in the US Senate to end the occupation, the long-term presence of US troops in Iraq has never been more inevitable.

Simply, a significant troop cut let alone complete US withdrawal at the current time would spell disaster. The US is far from executing its project in Iraq and the short-term goals alone may require 7-10 year of active US military presence. Indeed, any hasty withdrawal in the next 24 months would undo much progress that US has painstakingly attained.

The US without a long-term legal foothold in Iraq, is in danger of seeing the pack cards it has implemented with immense sacrifice, topple at a glance.

Critical issues remain as tentative as ever. Despite, the losses inflicted on al-Qaeda and the small but sturdy strides towards national unity, Iraq remains a magnate for foreign terrorists. The general animosity within the patchwork that is Iraq runs high and radical figures continue to execute influence. More importantly, Iran, Syria and its proxy forces throughout the region continue to pose the greatest danger to the strategic-objectives of the US, its national security and to undoing all the hard-work in Iraq.

Declaration of Principles

In late 2007, George Bush and Nouri al-Maliki signed a somewhat controversial “declaration of principles” to serve as a basis for current talks with view to defining the legal basis for the long-term relationship between the two countries.

The proposed agreement to be completed by a deadline of July 31st, is designed to augment the final UN mandate for the presence of multinational forces which expires at the end of 2008.

The framework of the initial deal included the basis for deterring foreign aggression against Iraq, assisting Iraq against terrorism, and encouraging much-needed foreign investment, primarily American, into Iraq.

With an insurgency fuelled by the presence of “foreign occupiers” and a battle, sometimes violently by Iraqi groups to end the occupation, the idea of such a deal naturally caused much of a stir. 

Ongoing Negotiations for Security Agreement

Negotiations have been ongoing between the Bush administration and the government led by Nouri al-Maliki on two key accords, with view to reaching a final framework which will take affect from 2009.

The first accord is referred to as a “status of forces agreement” (or SOFA), which will serve as a legal framework for the status of the US military in Iraq. As part of this accord, it would allow US forces to launch unilateral military operations, to detain Iraqis and would provide immunity to US contractors from Iraqi law.

The scope of agreements on these articles is unclear. Iraq has in the past month, stressed the need for US compromise on “sensitive issues”.

Although, it is was agreed that specific troop numbers will not be stipulated as part of any accord, it is expected that negotiations will indirectly determine how many of the existing 160,000 troops will remain in Iraq. Giving the current plight of the Iraqi government and future reliance of Iraqi forces, it is likely that at least 50,000 troops will be needed in the years to come. As such, it is unlikely that the agreements will contain timetables for the withdrawal of US forces, which is sure to fuel sentiments in some Iraqi circles.

The second agreement is seen as a long-term “strategic framework”, which will outline US cooperation in the key fields of security, politics, culture and economy.

It is widely believed that the Iraqi government accepted the accord on the basis of certain conditions. The US would need to recognise Iraqi right to secure deals with other countries, US should avoid using Iraqi territories for military campaigns and no large scale bases should be established.

In the coming years it is likely that the US troops will be out-of the public limelight but will serve to support and train Iraqi troops.

Permanent Bases

The idea and in-turn definition of ‘permanent bases’ has caused much debate. The majority of Iraqis have frequently objected to the idea of a full-time military presence in Iraq.

However, although a much looser definition of the word ‘permanent’ will be adopted in the agreements, in all likelihood the agreements that both sides hope to sign envisage just that.

In the same manner as Japan and South Korea in the past, it is unlikely that the US would have cut all its military ties in Iraq and withdrawn all forces. In fact, for the US it would have been a little short of strategic suicide.

Despite, the US seemingly in search of an exit strategy once Iraq has stabilised and democracy has been established, in reality US dreams in Iraq, let alone the Middle East, will take decades.

The US was never likely to wash its hands all together. Iraq is part of a wider picture that is crucial for long-term security and regional stability. Giving the scenario that US forces leave, in the current climate with sectarian tensions high and lack of a strong national army, Iranian agents would have a field day. The country will be at the mercy of its neighbours, with Turkish aggression only exasperated in the north and Syrian elements keen to complement Sunni influence.

US backing in the long-term is intended as a message to neighbouring countries that the US sees Iraq as a vital factor in regional stability. However, the risk is that this will induce a vicious cycle – the US are in Iraq to keep Iranians and other foreign forces in check, whilst foreign agents will not leave Iraq until such Western “occupation” has ended.

Even if no military presence was advocated in the rest of Iraq, in the Kurdistan Region the idea of fermenting long-term US bases would have been highly-popular and a strong possibility. The Kurds strongly encourage US presence and protection, to safeguard their hard-fought gains.

Iraqi Objections

Unsurprisingly, the onset of such deals with the Americans was bitterly opposed in some Iraqi circles. The idea of a long-term US presence, for groups such as the Sadr Movement who based their following on ending foreign occupation, is a testimony to their claims that US wants to “colonise” Iraq.

It seen as a move that would violate the countries sovereignty and would put the country under de-facto US hegemony.

Senior clerics, including Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Haeri and Iraq’s most revered Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have strongly objected to a ‘security accord’ between the US and Iraq. According to some sources, the Grand Ayatollah has insisted he would not allow Iraq to sign such a deal with “the US occupiers” as long as he was alive.

The Sadr movement, fresh from deadly battles against government forces, accused the government of unnecessarily turning Iraq in a battle front with many countries.

Objections at Home

The elusive battle for stability and success in Iraq has turned Iraq as a centre stage for growing US public discontent. Clearly, the presidential race has been by-far dominated by the Iraq war blamed on sky-high fuel prices and economic recession.

With President Bush under the firing line for tying the hands of the next administration by passing his mistakes, the long-term arrangements have been criticised by Democrats and some Republicans and raised fear amongst the public.

Although the deals, claimed as ‘non-binding’ by the Bush administration, are within the executive powers of the president, congressional Democrats have called for Senate ratification.

U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker moved to dampen fears by describing the framework as a “political document” and reassuring Congress that they will be fully briefed on all negotiations.

The Bush administration have emphasised, that any deal will not tie the next US administration or commit the US to defend Iraq, as either side could cancel the deal at any time.

However, some members of Congress, criticised the administration for making obligations without understanding the consequences of not fulfilling assurances, regardless of whether they are legally binding.

Conclusion

Despite the focus and controversy such security deals may receive, in reality it was a necessity for both the US administration and particularly the new Iraq.

Although, conspiracy theorists will be working overtime, long-term US occupation in the midst of a frail Iraqi landscape, the current regional mire and the greater US Middle-Eastern project, was always very likely.

Although, the US have tried to played down the agreement by pledging it will not stipulate specific U.S. troop numbers or “permanent” military bases, reality and not definition of terms, will determine their future role in Iraq.

With an already volatile and disenchanted nation who has suffered immensely, the provisions of the agreements were always going to be introduced with a degree of ambiguity, as transparency would have fuelled an outcry at the worst possible time for the Iraq regime.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.