Category Archives: Iraq

As weeks quickly pass, Iraqi politicians inch towards government formation

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As months have quickly accumulated since the national elections were held in Iraq, in contrast politicians only inch towards the much elusive milestone of forming a new government.

Whilst it is possible to provide a detailed overview of the current situation in Iraq and the key socio-political characteristics that have hampered a sense of nationalism let alone national unity since its inception, the facts provide the best summary.

Any government formation effort that breaks all previous records in terms of the time expended highlights the complicated social, ethnic, political and sectarian composition of Iraq.

Although hope of a breakthrough in government formation was prematurely conceived when Moqtada al-Sadr lent an arm of support around incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on his quest to hold on to the premiership, a plethora of hurdles, permutations, mistrust and personal agendas remain that have actually blighted the process even further than before.

With the Kurds now enjoying the decisive “kingmaker” role they have been afforded, at least in theory all that is left for the Kurds to do is “make their king” and break this impasse. However, this is Iraq and seldom are things as straight forward as this.

Not only does Iyad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya group which holds 91 seats stubbornly refuse to accept “defeat” to what has now become a highly entrenched and bitter rivalry with al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, but it still continues to actively and eagerly tout for support to attain the premiership, far from reluctantly taking part in a loose nationalist alliance with all other parties or assume the role of the opposition.

Further to the ongoing jockeying that leaves the race for the premiership at least in practice wide open, it is perhaps the lack of buy-in from the weary Americans and a host of neighbouring powers, each with their own distinct agenda that has prevented Iraq from going past the elusive post.

As negotiations have unfolded, it has become increasingly evident that al-Maliki’s alliance is more leaning to the acceptance of the 19 key Kurdish demands.  However, the US is far from happy to firstly see the pro-Iranian Sadrist’s inevitably receive a whole host of key posts in the new government as a reward for their support and secondly to see a repeat scenario of the last major elections in Iraq, the sidelining of the Sunnis leading to devastating consequences that took years to heal.

It is almost certain that Washington has waned heavily on the Kurds to ensure that they do not enter an exclusive government with Sadrist and al-Maliki as partners. Conversely, Tehran is putting increasing pressure on Ammar al-Hakim to loosen his steadfast resistant of al-Maliki with viewing to solidifying a Shiite stranglehold in Baghdad.

With the influential positions of Turkey and Iran in particular, Iraqi politicians have seemingly met with their neighbouring counterparts as much as their fellow Iraqi political competitors.

Almost inevitably the majority of Sunni dominated neighbours want to prevent a strong Iranian hand in Iraqi affairs and a sidelining of al-Iraqiya. While in theory the Kurds could still be sidelined if al-Iraqiya and State of Law were more inclined to work together, the Kurds could simply threaten to secede from Baghdad altogether. However, the danger is that if the Sunnis are sidelined what affective options would they have? They can hardly threaten to secede in the same way as the Kurds, meaning taking up of arms would be perceived as their only option.

The problem in Iraq has always been the same. How do a number of warring and embittered groups that have been essentially stitched together share a piece of the Iraqi cake?

If this cake could be shared exponentially based on a population breakdown then the solution is logical. However, the Sunni’s who in theory can muster around 20% of this cake would never accept a minority status under the Shiite shadow who in comparison can demand 60% of this cake. While the Shiites clearly warrant a bigger slice of this cake on paper, the Sunnis would never accept anything less than equal partnership.

By the same token, although the Kurds only form 20% of the population, they would passionately and vigorously resist any attempts that will ever see them as minors encapsulated by a Shiite majority or a pan-Arab alliance. For the Kurds, it is simply equal status within Iraq, an equal partnership to decide matters in Iraq and an equal say in the direction of the country or they would decide to opt with no partnership at all and pursue their own independent path.

So how affective can democracy become in a country where regardless of numbers all parties demand their share of power and representation? Or where no party will refuse to be sidelined, even if by the very nature of a healthy democracy that may be the case if another alliance outmuscles them in coalition efforts?

Even if al-Maliki holds onto power with the support of the Kurds, which has emerged as the most likely scenario, Allawi will refuse to play second fiddle in Baghdad especially when he considers himself as the real victor of the polls.

Furthermore, any al-Maliki deal with the Kurds would effectively be played on the al-Iraqiya doorstep. Would the Sunni nationalists in Kirkuk and Mosul, already at loggerheads with the Kurds over disputed territories, watch as they are firstly sidelined from power and secondly perceived to be cast off by Shiite-Kurdish deal making?

As arduous and painful the government formation has proven to be, any hailing of a new government once the dust finally settles will be premature as the real work begins.

Once coalitions have been formed, the next task which acts as the platform for the real tussle for power is the formation of the cabinet. This where the real key to power lies. Each group within a ruling coalition would need to be appeased sufficiently for their support by getting their returns on the positions of authority.

The real gauge on the political health of Iraq will be once the new government starts to work. As much as there was numerous permutations to forming power that have lengthened the process, there will be an equal number of permutations which may see the government become shaky, untenable and susceptible to stalling.

This is particularly true if a government is formed that is all inclusive and contains all major powers as the US and some Iraqi sides hope. The sharing of power will be tentative at best and decision making will be ineffective, quarrelsome and prone to divides. In other words, on paper an Iraq would exist that would look united with equal national representation, while in practice will hold back and hamper real economic and political progression.

Any inclusive government would not only result in a delicate balance of power within the cabinet, but would also see the power of the Prime Minister greatly diminish. The hands of the Prime Minister would be affectively tied by the consultation and necessary appeasement of all other “powerful” hands around his table.

As the political bandwagon stumbles on, the real people that suffer are not wealthy politicians in fortified enclaves but the very people that democracy is designed to sever and whom the politicians have been elected by – the people.

It is becoming increasingly common that politicians are more determined to serve their own goals than the goals of their people.

Not only does the Iraqi economy continue to decline and the standard of living suffer but the real threat of a new dawn of insurgency and terrorism grows by the day.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

After eight months of intense political tussling to form a government, the real work has yet to begin

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Whilst the advent of democracy in Iraq has often been hailed as historic, politicians embroiled in an ongoing and tense stalemate to form the next government, continued to set other unwanted records with the longest period of time taken to form a government after an election.

Fast approaching eight months since the Iraqi national elections were held, politicians gripped with deep mistrust and personal grudges have failed to negotiate their way to a new government, desperately needed to bring stability and security to Iraq.

With a closer view of the Iraqi track record, this is hardly a surprising or unexpected phenomenon, even if Iraqi politicians have outdone themselves by their own standards.

The national elections were first delayed by two months, followed by results that took another two months to ratify, and since then another five months or so have passed for Iraqis to make somewhat of an inroad into selecting a prime minister to spearhead government formation. Before the US or Iraqis get ahead of themselves, it may take well into 2011 to agree on the formation of a cabinet.

Democracy in Iraq has been painstaking at the best times owed largely to the fractured and historically tainted nature of the Iraqi socio-political horizon. However, with the promise of a first fully sovereign government in light of the US withdrawal and the need to plug the security gaps that the might of the US army have crucially covered at great expense for so long, these elections and a successful national unity government which has been a reoccurring and elusive pillar of Washington policy, were understandably seen as a major barometer of the things to come.

With Ayad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya list narrowly winning the majority of seats to incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, the scene was already set for a turbulent battle in the Iraqi political chambers.

As soon as the final votes were ratified, the jockeying for political alliances and coalitions began. The very arduous, bitter and intense nature by which political groups have failed to find common ground speaks volumes about the very characteristics that have continually blighted the Iraqi transition to democracy.

The maths in principle is easy. A coalition with 163 seats is needed to form the next government. With al-Iraqiya on 91, State of Law on 89, Iraqi National Alliance on 70 and the Kurdistan list on 57, the permutations are varied but the denominations required to obtain the key threshold clear.

Once the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) and State of Law joined forces in the aftermath of the elections to create a seemingly new Shiite super party, at least on paper the formalities seemed obvious. Their combined total gave them 159 seats, thus leaving them only 4 seats short.

However, this is easier said than done with many personality clashes, historical animosity and different agendas even within existing alliances to factor in.

With the surprising decision of Moqtada al-Sadr’s list to back al-Maliki for the premiership, it was widely but prematurely hailed as the breaking of the deadlock.

However, as Iraq often takes one step forward and two back, the Sadrist’s stance all but fractured the Shiite coalition, with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (SIIC) and Fadhila hesitating to follow suite and grant al-Maliki a second term that many Shiite actors deeply oppose.

Much like pieces of a chessboard, the permutations and tides of power shifted once again.

The Sadrist’s move and the breaking of the Shiite coalition have more or less left the door widely open to the Kurds. With the SIIC still in the frame to form a counter coalition with al-Iraqiya, this has left the balance very finely in the Kurds favour with either of the major groupings.

There was initial hope that Allawi and Maliki could work together but given the ill feelings and growing disillusionment between the arch rivals, the chances of a direct al-Iraqiya and State of Law coalition remains bleak. This is increasingly leading to two entrenched camps with the yet undecided Kurds waiting on the wings to decide their fate.

From a Kurdish point of view, not only is this a position they have become accustomed to but also alleviates the danger that they could have been sidelined by a pan-Arab alliance. Given the strained nature of relationships between Erbil and Baghdad over the past years over a number of key issues including article 140, the status of disputed territories, oil sharing and revenue distribution, factors that are from a Kurdish perspective augmented with a bitter taste of broken promises emanating from the last Kurdish and Shiite alliance, this provides a valuable opportunity for the Kurds to tips the scales towards Erbil once more.

Many of the 19 points put forward by the Kurdish alliance as their key demands are hardly new and stem from the Transitive Administrative Law period as well as from the first coalition in 2005. Yet it begs the question why after all these years have these key demands, largely accepted in principle from the outset and reflected in the constitution, been continuously neglected?

The Kurds find themselves in a powerful bargaining position again and no matter how long it takes or what pressure they come under from the US, Baghdad or neighbouring countries to back down and compromise, their key points should be firmly etched in the political chambers.

After all, the Shiites bickered amongst themselves for many months were compromise was scarce, so why shouldn’t the Kurds be as ardent and persistent in their own goals?

Although, the Kurds could still strike accord with an Allawi boosted by an theoretical backing of SIIC and Fadhila, the chances of a Kurdish alliance with al-Maliki seem more likely.

It must not be forgotten that a number of al-Iraqiya political parties vied aggressively with the Kurdish parties in the key disputed territories including Kirkuk and the opposition to article 140 became almost one of the cornerstones of Allawi’s campaigning.

However, assuming al-Maliki musters the required majority to lead Baghdad once more, any Shiite deal with the Kurds particularly over the disputed territories at the doorstep of al-Iraqiya will hardly be the right tonic to soothe Sunni sentiments.

In fact, this is Iraq and regardless of electoral results, coalitions and agreements, any motion that does not cater for the appetite of all major groups will spell disaster.

Iraq is a disparate and historically scarred nation and any sharing of the Iraqi cake that does not satisfy all parties will almost certainly implode in violence.

Therefore, regardless of any future coalition, any sidelining of Allawi’s party will unleash certain doom. In the same way that if the Kurds were sidelined with a more unlikely Allawi and Maliki partnership, the Kurds could well have withdrawn from Baghdad all together.

This effectively means that while any agreement on the candidacy of Prime Minister would be a key milestone, it is essentially just another step. The actual formation of a cabinet will be even more delicate, as al-Maliki will almost certainly have no choice but to cede a number of key cabinet positions to al-Iraqiya and the Sunnis. Simply put, the chances of Allawi’s party accepting to play second fiddle to the main Shiite bloc having ironically been victors at the polls is next to zero.

To placate the stance of al-Iraqiya, they still firmly believe according to their interpretation of the constitution that they have the right to attempt to form government first as the party with the most votes.

On top of this, the Sadrist’s vote of confidence for al-Maliki will hardly come cheap and that they may yet demand at least 6 of the 34 positions on offer.

If the jockeying for the premiership was hard enough, getting the balance right in the sharing of the cake will be even more perilous.

Eventually a new government will be formed, but one with crumbling foundations, bitter taste in the mouth of politicians or parties who believe their returns were disproportionate, and the new Iraqi government will only stutter into a new political chapter. Such delicate alliances are always susceptible to problems and disintegration.

As political tussling, personal battles and ill feelings continue to run rife, politicians have seemingly forgotten the very people they have been elected to serve.

Violence in Iraq is steadily on the rise, reconstruction has all but been stagnant and much essential work to resuscitate Iraqi from years of sanctions, insurgency and economic ruin continues to linger.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

With the numbers game so prevalent in Iraq, the national census will rock the political horizon

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The upcoming national census due to be held on 24th October 2010 holds additional significance for an Iraq that almost seven months after the staging of national elections has still failed to form a new government. The importance of this elusive and milestone national census, the first across all of Iraq since 1987, can not be underestimated.

Iraq is a disparate nation where statistics have huge significance. While in most places this event would be a question of numbers and not politics, in an Iraq that encompasses an enthralling and tense mosaic as a result of its artificial formation by imperial powers, it’s almost impossible to discount the huge significance of this census in shaping and influencing the political arena.

The conducting of a census has proved controversial for a number of reasons, none more so than its undoubted direct affect on the status of disputed territories. Under article 140 of the constitution the implementation of the census is the milestone step before a referendum can be held in Kirkuk and other areas fiercely contested between Kurds and Arabs.

As Baghdad has dragged its heels on the implementation of article 140, clearly for fear of seceding power and territory to the Kurds and due to strong pressure from neighbouring countries, the census in turn has been delayed a number of times.

At a time when the formation of a new government has proved painstaking at best and security is deteriorating exponentially, voices from predominantly Arab circles calling for yet another postponement of this elusive census was predictable.

In reality, if the census was to be held without the three Kurdish provinces as was the case in 1997, Baghdad would not hesitate to hold the census even under the current tense climate. Simply put, the census directly pits Kurds against Arabs in the fierce political stakes, hence the long-term apprehension of holding this critical national poll.

While the principle of a census itself is not politically driven, in Iraq numbers means power and power is a prelude to wrestling as much influence and share of the national cake.

Those who believe that a census would be the source of the polarisation of Iraq are simply wide of the mark. This census does not lead to a polarisation of Iraq, for it merely confirms the extent of the existing polarisation of Iraq.

No matter how the matter is viewed, Iraq is a bitterly divided country that houses a number of ethnic and religious groupings who existence under the Iraqi banner has been fraught with historical mistrust and animosity.

Furthermore, although masked under a different light, this is hardly the first post-Saddam census in Iraq. With the fragmented nature of the social horizon, each of the national elections held thus far have been nothing short of a high-level census.

The formula is simple. Kurds vote for Kurdish parties, Arab Shiites for Shiite parties, Arab Sunnis for Sunni parties and so on. There are of course general exceptions to this rule in Arabic circles with more cross-sectarian political coalitions in the last elections but the post-ballot patterns remain essentially the same.

Analysis of the previous election results will broadly determine the nature of the outcome from the census. For example, the recent national elections in Kirkuk were a direct contest between Arabs and Kurds jockeying for power. The current distribution of seats in the Iraqi national assembly is affectivity a snapshot of the demographic breakdown of Iraq.

The census will have by far the greatest implication on the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. With the normalisation process incomplete to say the least, there is a great chance that Kurdish ranks will be swelled further. In this case, the census essentially becomes the de-facto referendum that most Arabs and Turkmens have long feared and proactively attempted to stall.

The results of the census merely confirm the results of a referendum in Kirkuk and disputed territories. In this respect, even if article 140 is stalled further and referendums are never held in Kirkuk, a census that clearly shows a Kurdish majority naturally provides the best political ammunition possible for the Kurds.

A census that shows a Kurdish majority in the disputed areas can almost be taken as the will of the people to become annexed with the KRG as opposed to remaining under Baghdad control.

One of the reasons why the census pits Kurds versus Arabs as opposed to promoting inter-Arab friction is the fact the census omits sectarian based questions. It will show how many Arabs there are but crucially it steps a major landline in not providing a breakdown of Sunnis or Shiites within Arabic sphere.

Ironically, the census does propose the Yezidi’s and Shabbak’s as separate groupings so there is a danger this may harm Kurdish representation.

In addition to the all important step of deducing a rundown of Iraq’s ethnic identity, the census will also ascertain many other keys answers from the nation such number of widows, disabled people and orphans and those who have been forced to move.

While most parties point to the census as something that will further stoke tensions at a delicate tenure in the new Iraq, it is often forgotten that the census can actually be a factor for reconciliation.

After all, as long as the census count is vigilantly analysed and prepared by Iraqis with representation from all major groups and with key UN input and monitoring, facts do not lie.

Kurds and Arabs have bickered at length over the distribution of the national budget with the KRG receiving a portion that they deem equal to their numbers in Iraq which Baghdad has ubiquitously contested. However, no politician should doubt this breakdown on the back of clear evidence from the census.

In a similar vain, if the census shows clearly how the vote is going to be swayed in any future referendum on disputed territories, this provides no excuse to delay the implementation of the constitution forever.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Will Iraq experience ‘withdrawal symptoms’

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A sight of departing US forces was a long-time dream for sections of the Iraqi population opposed directly and indirectly to the American occupation. However, as the remaining US combat forces trickle over the desertous border, ahead of the 31st August deadline as per their strategic agreement with Baghdad, what kind of an Iraq will they be leaving behind?

Back in April 2003 amidst short-lived euphoria, the ambition and vision for the new Iraq was bold and inspiring. Not only did the US overthrow a brutal dictator but aimed to induce a sense of western values and democracy to Iraq that at the same time would serve as a model for the greater Middle East. 

Seven battle-hardened years later with over 4,400 troops dead, 30,000 wounded and not to mention war costs that now run into trillions of dollars, the Iraqi adventure will always remain a blot on US foreign policy and one that will symbolise the contentious tenure of George W. Bush.

While the US was seemingly bogged in a quagmire and stuck in a vicious cycle between insurgents on the street and bickering politicians in parliament, the situation in Iraq was averted from a total failure with Iraq finally turning a corner, the appeal of sectarianism slowly waning and security improving dramatically.

However, the situation in Iraq is by no means irreversible and the crunch period for the stability and future of Iraq is yet to be seen. No better way sums up the continual frailties that remain than the current circumstances that encompass the US withdrawal.

Almost six months after the milestone national elections that was hoped to foster the first genuine post-war national government, Iraqis still bicker on the choice of prime minister lest forming a new government to deal with the decisive issues that loiter on the parliamentary shelf.

While Iraq may not necessarily make the front pages of the news as it used to, this shouldn’t mask the fact that Iraq is still tentative and has great strides to make. As such, even as Washington can breathe a sigh of relief after almost a decade of two brutal wars that stretched even the might of the world’s greatest army to its very limits, Iraq is far from a “job done”.

While certain circles have been all too frequently keen to highlight US deficiencies in Iraq, Iraqi politicians must take a lion share of the blame for protracted progress and slow reconciliation. The US is hardly responsible for every Iraqi misfortune and the controversy over the US occupation merely masked key issues on the ground that was tapered for decades by totalitarian rule.

The huge US presence particularly in the aftermath of the surge campaign was designed to offer Iraqis crucial “breathing space” that was hoped to cement political progress. However, much of the benchmarks set by the US failed to be achieved by the Iraqi government.

Even as Baghdad has progressively moved towards full sovereignty in recent years and become more confident to stand on its own feet, the same fundamental handicaps continued to undermine the Iraqi mission.

Iraq is a disparate nation with a deep history of mistrust amongst its ethnic and sectarian mosaic. Too often direct US influence in the Iraqi political chambers allowed key legislation and government forming to ensue. More strikingly, whilst progress and milestones were often hailed over the years to showcase Iraqi path to success, many achievements could only be ushered by brushing key political hot-potatoes under the political rug.

For example, seven years later, enmity and ideological divides on the running of the country plague relationships between Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite camps. The Iraqi oil industry, which on paper has the power to propel Iraq to great economic heights, continues to linger behind with a lack of a census amongst groups on a true way to share its immense oil wealth.

Years after the onset of the constitution, the implementation of key terms such as article 140 continues to gather dust. While for many years, the spotlight was on the Sunni-Shiite showdown resulting in almost all out civil war, the strategic differences between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad were not as relevant. However, one of the greatest dangers that continue to gather pace is the simmering tension in the disputed border regions in the north, particularly in Kirkuk.

Although, relatively calm for now, the growing issue is yet to bear its full fruit owed to years of foot-dragging in resolving key standoffs between Arabs and Kurds.

In reality, the US has invested too many lives, money and foreign policy to wave good bye just yet. Far from the end of an era, the presence of 50,000 full armed US soldiers is hardly a meagre figure. The US with its eyes on the growing menace of Iran and its ongoing war in Afghanistan, can not afford an Iraq that slips into deeper infighting and insurgency and drags the rest of the Middle East down with it.

In essence from the 1st September 2010 under its new label of Operation New Dawn, all that may be happening is a rebranding of the American escapade. Remaining “non-combat” troops have the legal jurisdiction to continue counter-terrorism operations, assists Iraqi forces and act in self defence.

Owed to the fractured nature of the state, Iraqis are very much susceptible to foreign meddling and without a strong government in Baghdad Iraq may well play a role of a client state for neighbouring countries in the years to come. Iran continues to exert strong influence on Shiite parties, Turkey continues to build and strengthen its ties with Kurdistan and Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan observe diligently to ensure that Sunni interests do not succumb to a new wave of Shiite revolutionaries on their eastern borders.

Political frustrations aside, security in Iraq is hardly clean-cut. One only has to point to the notion that there are now “only” 50 or so deaths a week. That is still 50 lives too many that Iraqi families have to endure. Although, Iraqi forces numbering over 600,000 are formidable on paper, by their own admission they are not ready to assume full responsibility for all aspects of security without US assistance.

Furthermore, just where loyalties lie within the forces is open to question. Until the security forces broadly comprise all three groups, sentiments will be cautious to the effectiveness and impartiality of the forces.

Above all else, as at least a phase of the US adventure comes to a close, people have lost sight of the overall picture. The new Iraq and foreign actors must realise that a brutal dictator, who killed thousands of his own civilians with chemical weapons, launched deadly wars, drained national resources and repressed three quarters of the population was removed thanks to the US. Just ask the Kurds in north at their gratitude towards the Americans.

The new Iraq can in theory excel economically and strategically. However, as the US has come to terms over seven years, they can only push Iraqis so far, the rest of the journey only Iraqis can assume whilst Americans anxiously watch. Iraqis must start to look at key differences that continue to blight progress and realise only they can muster a new dawn. There is nothing the US can do but hope that their grand and costly excursion in Iraq comes to fruition.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Epoch Times, Peyamner, Various Misc.

Balancing the ethno-social political triangle in Iraq

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Four months after the much anticipated national elections in Iraq that was hoped to foster the first all encompassing government in Baghdad, Iraqi politicians continue to jockey, debate and pursue tense negotiations with view to assembling the required majority to form government. Giving the Iraqi track record, a lengthy period of government forming is hardly surprising. However, the process was exasperated with contentious delays to the election itself, controversy over banned politicians on eve of political campaigning and then bitter disputes over the final election results.

In many ways, Iraq has made a lot of progress since the previous elections marred by Sunni boycotting, not least on the security and sectarian front. However, as the democratic process has become stalled in recent weeks, this has afforded a chance for insurgents to relay the road of instability and sectarianism. 

The critical government forming process has been giving added bite with the expected withdrawal of U.S. combat forces by the end of August. While the departing of foreign forces may have been a welcome sight for many Iraqis, the presence and influence of the U.S. all too often masked political and security cracks, and this has now become more evident than ever.

At critical times over the past several years Washington has used its substantial sway on Iraqi politics to ensure the Iraqi democratic bandwagon rolled on. Stability and success in Iraq shortly after the nightmare that ensued post-2003 became an American obsession. After all, in such an aftermath, anything short of peace, relative democracy and stability in Iraq would have catastrophic consequences, especially with neighbouring predators already circling with intent.

U.S. military presence will drop significantly from a peak of 170,000 just a few years ago. While the sheer U.S. military expenditure and involvement in Iraq may have been taken for granted in recent years, as the democratic journey continues to remain frail, the readiness, loyalty and impartiality of Iraqi security forces will be put to a firm test.

Government shaping has been further complicated with the lack of a clear winner at the polls. Although Ayad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya group won the most seats, it was marginally ahead of incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, and debate continues to rage on the party that has the legal jurisdiction to attempt to form government. Although Maliki did not win, he strengthened his claim to form government with an alliance with the religious based Shiite Iraqi National Alliance, meaning that his party was only seats away from attaining the majority needed to form a new government.

The Kurds, who continue to hold a key card in the formation of the new government, have taken their time over the selection of any alliance this time and aim to seek written guarantees on nationalistic issues before committing to bring another power in Baghdad. The natural and preferred alliance of the Kurds will be to work once more with their Shiite counterparts. However, persistent foot dragging on key Kurdish interests by Maliki put doubt in the minds of many a Kurd, especially as Maliki’s dominance and political standing solidified. However, the predominantly Sunni umbrella of Allawi is hardy the tonic that weary Kurds seek either. Al-Iraqiya was direct in competition to the Kurds in the tense oil-rich province of Kirkuk and has often voiced its intent against Kurdish attempts to annex disputed territories.

If Kurds do join the mainly Shiite coalition of Maliki, there is a danger that they may not receive their first choice government posts, as may have been the case a few years ago. However, more critically a Kurdish-Shiite alliance without the key Sunni parties and the ultimate victor of the polls, Allawi, will sow a new chapter of democracy in Iraq on shaky foundations.  After all, it was the sidelining of Sunni’s after their decades of near dominance that triggered Iraq to the brink of civil war. For years Baghdad and particularly the U.S. have sought to appease Sunni’s and bring nation reconciliation in Iraq.

While in theory US Vice President Joe Biden’s comments this week that Iraqi politics was “not a lot different” from other countries, may speak true on the surface. Unlike some other countries, democracy in Iraq produces brittle results. This is owed to the ethnic and sectarian disparity of Iraq. Regardless of election results, Kurds, Sunni or Shiites will still demand power in government. The ‘triangle’ can not always be massaged based on election results. Shiites will always form a majority in Iraq and Sunni’s will always refuse to succumb to all-out Shiite dominance, especially with the proviso of a strong Tehran hand in Baghdad. At the same time, Kurd will never submit to Arab dominance and influence, due to their autonomous existence, history and national interests.

This means that key posts must be divided carefully regardless of the election outcome. The sidelining of any major group will only spell trouble.  The elections themselves are generally formulaic, Kurds will always vote for Kurds, Shiites for Shiites and so on, even if the elections this time around swayed from a sectarian underpinning compared to before.

The triangle became more interesting in recent weeks with the thawing of relations between Allawi and Maliki, raising the prospect of what seemed an unlikely political marriage. A coalition of such proportions may seem a dramatic gain for democracy but this may also mean that key positions such as President and Prime Minister will go to Shiites. Furthermore, this has raised anxiety in Kurdistan that they lose political sway and key posts in Iraq to Arab coalitions.

The US has largely stayed out of the political manoeuvring this time around. However, Biden’s visit was a clear indicator that Washington is getting itchy feet. While their forces may withdraw, their high stakes in Iraq will not dwindle. Stability and prosperity in Iraq has become a keynote health gauge of the Middle East.

As for the political process itself, it is still better to endure more months of protracted progress and frustrations in hope of genuine gains, than short-term achievements under US pressure as witnessed too often, that may lead to shaky coalitions and more fundamental Iraqi issues been swept under the political rug.

It is these real issues such as oil sharing, broadly represented security forces, federalism and resolving of disputed territories that often become sidelined for the sake of progress on the surface. Any new government must make firm commitments to these aforementioned principles and critically to the implementation of the constitution that is after all meant to be the blueprint of the democratic existence in Iraq.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

As kingmakers, ensuring the right king is made is paramount to the Kurds

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Months of painstaking preparations for the national elections and weeks of the controversial counting of the votes are finally over. However, before the Iraqi political bandwagon ponders a breather, the real work starts now.

The final election results encapsulated an enthralling, tense and close contest. This was a crucial milestone for the new Iraq and even more so as all sides of the Iraqi ethno-sectarian mosaic turned out in good proportion, striving to make a difference from years of frustrating post-war turmoil, instability, sectarianism and lacklustre living standards. The elections provide hope of a declined sectarian divide in Iraqi politics and the possibility of the establishment of the first all encompassing coalition in Iraq housing the embittered groups.

In reality however, the process of government forming will prove protracted and could well linger for many months longer.

None will be more weary of the future political shape and eager to strike the right alliance than the Kurds. The Kurds will likely be kingmakers again, as the only other distinct ethnic group with power, their support to the remaining Arab political rivals in Iyad al-Allawi, Nouri al-Maliki and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim will hold crucial sway to surpassing the all-important 163 seat mark to form government.

As such, their role as “kingmakers” carries enormous responsibility on Kurdish aspirations and the Kurdish people. Been kingmaker is one thing, ensuring the right king is “made” is another.

In the aftermath of the last elections, Kurds were in a more powerful bargaining position than in today. After a Sunni boycott and a larger allocation of seats per population for the Kurdistan region, the Kurds decided to side with Maliki’s Shiite alliance in what initially seemed to good affect.

The Kurds were able to assume the posts of President, Foreign Minister and Vice Prime Minister. However, as the months and years rolled by, while the Kurds dug their heels in at times to the desired affect and many bills reflected Kurdish jockeying, the key disputes and national goals of the Kurds become increasingly distant and stagnant in resolution.

As Maliki’s influence and credibility slowly rose, especially in light of improving security conditions from the brink of civil war, the Kurds who supported Maliki at key times, become increasingly despondent with the more hard-line government stance and Baghdad’s laboured approach to the implementation of key articles of the constitution.

However, this should not come as a great surprise. While Maliki may hardly be first choice for a Kurdish partner based on the tenuous political marriage, Allawi is hardly the flavour of the month either. The same foot-dragging was employed by Allawi as Interim Prime Minister of Iraq prior to the 2005 legislative elections, which saw slow progress on Kurdish-sided disputes. The growing nationalist stance of Allawi’s al-Iraqiya group, particularly concerning Kirkuk and other disputed territories is hardly an ice breaker either. Although a secular Shiite, the tough nationalistic tone of Allawi and his non-sectarian basis saw his alliance as a new logical platform for the Sunni voice.

This places the Kurds into a difficult predicament, which in theory has been made more challenging by the structure of the elections this time around. Firstly, disunity within Kurdish ranks with Change Movement (Gorran) running on a separate list to the KDP and PUK, potentially cost the Kurds a number of seats. Gorran won over sixty-thousand votes in Kirkuk but ultimately did not meet the necessary threshold to gain seats.

The other crucial factor was the Kurdistan Region receiving a modest rise in the number of national assembly seats which were increased from 275 to 325, with the rest of the south picking up the majority of the allocation of extra seats. Furthermore, bigger Sunni turnouts in the north and north-western provinces also contributed to a dilution of Kurdish power in these mixed provinces, which they had assumed almost by default in the last elections.

Kurdish support should not come cheap, and if its means that the coalition building process drags on for another few months, then so be it. It is better for Kurds to get firm and written guarantees this time around even if they are perceived as stalling the political process and pressured by Baghdad and Washington to “back down”, rather than to wait another four years for the resolution of key issues impacting the Kurdistan Region to be further sidelined and become stale.

The Kurdish alliance won 43 seats with other Kurdish parties claiming another 14 seats in total. The voting was generally well-spread with no party coming through as clear winners. Ultimate victors were Allawi’s al-Iraqiya group with 91 seats but this was only two more than Maliki’s State of Law coalition. As a result, this means that the permutations for coalitions are more ajar and thus the negotiation and bartrering process will be as delicate as ever.

Certainly, marginalising any bloc will come with its own headache, while attaining a broad reconciliation will still prove to be a bitter pill to swallow for the new Iraq.

Adding to the heated mix is the tricky allocation of the key ministerial posts. While the Kurds enjoyed a fair share of key positions in the past government, distribution of key posts to appease Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni sentiments will not be so straightforward. The running for the next President, held by Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, is already gathering heat with some Arab sides proclaiming that the President as a representative of the Iraqi nation should be an Arab. However, more crucially, the Kurds need to focus on positions that will ultimately hold influence and sway within Iraq itself. For example, the posts of Ministry of Oil or the Interior Ministry will be a lot more beneficial to the Kurds than positions that are high on paper but may do little to directly favour Kurdish interests in reality.

Meanwhile, as credible as the newfound opposition is to the Kurdistan Region, this will almost certainly have negative connotations if Kurds enter Baghdad divided. With the rise of Arab nationalist parties, Kurds can ill afford disharmony on the national stage. Disputes over article 140, national budget, status and funding of Peshermarga forces and not to mention the oil sharing, are only going to get fiercer before any resolution becomes more likely.

Attempts by Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani to ensure a united front in Baghdad, and pledges by Gorran leaders to maintain unity on Kurdish national issues is an absolute minimum if Kurds expect any fruit from any prospective alliance they strike.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Hewler Post (Kurdish), Peyamner, Various Misc.

The Iraqi political machine’s tricky path

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As the painstaking election process stumbles to a close in Iraq, the intricate political work has just begun.

Resolution of Iraq’s issues not without their “perils and dangers”

Arranging and preparing for the national elections in Iraq was complicated enough. The elections finally held on 7th March 2010 were hailed by western powers and generally observed as successful, however, this was after much wrangling over the election law that saw the elections postponed, a highly contentious decision to ban hundreds of alleged ex-Baathist weeks before the elections and not to mention deadly suicide bombings on Election Day designed to deter would be voters.

However, the convoluted and tricky path for the Iraqi political machine is very much ahead. If the holding of relatively successful elections in the face of a number of challenges was painstaking itself, the formation of a new government to appease embittered Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites against a backdrop of mistrust will be an even tougher task that  will drag on for months longer.

Political jostling, with only handful of ballots left to be counted, has already commenced with the key parties vying for power already well on the path of seeking coalition partners, with no group alone likely to win the 163 seats required to form government. The power for government is augmented with the fight for the key positions of President, Prime Minister and Parliament speaker. The position of President for example has already become heated by remarks in some nationalist circles that since Iraq has an “Arabic” identity, the post should be held by an Arab.

However, even before tiresome negotiations ensue, the Iraqi High Independent Electoral Commission (IHEC) will have its work cut out to address claims and counter-claims of voter fraud and irregularities, particularly in Kirkuk. The IHEC is already under-fire for the laboured nature of announcing the votes, which has aided to claims of electoral mishaps and even to calls for a full recount in some circles.

A different flavour

At least on paper, the elections present a good prospect of facilitating cross-national reconciliation. The political parties attempted to undercut the sectarian divides, with Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition and his closest contender and former premier Iyad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya, encompassing a number of political parties across sectarian lines.

With the Sunni turnout showing a marked increased from the boycott of 2005, the competitive nature of the elections was evident with divisions present within traditional Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish alliances.

The race for the hotseat

Whilst Maliki’s hard-line leadership alienated a number of groups, he was equally heralded for installing security in Iraq and possessing the right credentials as the nationalist leader that Iraq required. On the back of the highly successful showing at the 2009 provincial elections, results revealed to date put Maliki in prime position to win a majority once all votes are tallied up.

State of Law coalition is ahead in the symbolic Baghdad constituency, which remarkably represents one-fifth of the overall seats on offer. Al-Maliki was ahead in another several Shiite-dominated provinces with the predominately Shiite Iraqi National Alliance (INA) a close second in a number of these provinces, as well as leading in three southern provinces.

Against the popular view that religious parties have not fared as well, the Sadrist bloc of the INA has gained a credible number of seats and their influence as well as that of neighbouring Iran may well dictate the shape of the future coalitions. A strong showing by Moqtada al-Sadr is particularly bad news for Maliki, who instigated the infamous and bloody crackdown of his militia in 2008.

Whilst Maliki may be a leading contender, his quest to reassume power in Baghdad is far from sealed. His old foes and newly created adversaries will almost certainly jokey ardently to ensure that he does not win a critical second term in office.

In contrast, the surprising contender for the hot seat is Allawi. Results show that the secular and nationalistic agenda of al-Iraqiya bode strongly amongst Sunni voters in north and western provinces, many who remain sceptical at Maliki’s Iranian connections and Shiite control of security forces. Al-Iraqiya gains include Nineveh, which has the second highest number of seats up for grabs. As a result of the strong electoral showing, Allawi is neck-to-neck in the votes counted to date with Maliki. Allawi could well strike a coalition agreement with the Kurdish groups or the INA, as well as other smaller parties.

In this respect, the coalition opportunities on the table have far greater significance than ever before. Depending on who can be enticed into the political fold, a number of coalitions can be struck and thus the jockeying promises to be as intensive as ever.

Kurdish wildcard

The Kurds are widely acknowledged to assume the role of kingmakers once more. With the Kurds looking to achieve between 60-65 seats, this will have significant bearing on who ultimately assumes the premiership in Baghdad.

As far as the Kurds are concerned, if you have the power to make a king, then you have to ensure the “right” king is “made” at all costs.

Any future coalition will almost certainly require the support of the Kurds, and this places great leverage on the Kurdish bargaining position. The Kurdish support for Maliki at crucial times arguably helped to salvage the Baghdad government, especially when Iraq was on a fierce downward spiral between 2006 and 2007.

A number of Kurds grew increasingly sceptical of Maliki, but with al-Iraqiya vying directly for power with the Kurdistan Alliance in Nineveh and especially in Kirkuk, where they have based their support on promises to ward off Kurdish attempts to annex Kirkuk, Allawi is hardly a firm favourite either. Comments from al-Iraqiya liking Kurdish attempts at wrestling control of Kirkuk to Israeli settlements was hardly the right tonic to sweeten the growing bitterness.

Either way, the Kurdish aspirations of peacefully implementing article 140, resolving the issue of disputed territories and agreeing a national hydrocarbon law, will certainly hold fundamental importance to any prospective Baghdad partnership.

With growing pressure from the Kurdish public and political competition at home, the KDP and the PUK under the Kurdistan Alliance umbrella can ill afford to leave Baghdad without Kirkuk and the key Kurdish demands.

Kurds must stay as close as they can to the throne of power to safeguard Kurdish interests and may well support any legislation and lobbying further south, as long as their status quo is maintained and ultimately enhanced.

Race for Kirkuk

If the hotly-disputed race for Kirkuk needed any incitement, the close race between al-Iraqiya and Kurdistan Alliance for the province is increasing in intensity all the time. If the Kurds assume a majority as they did in 2005 and as they anticipate once more, this will aid their claim to annexing Kirkuk to Kurdistan, with many eying the elections in Kirkuk as a de-facto referendum.

While the final figures may well be disputed under contentious guidelines outlined in the election law specific to Kirkuk, the planned census in October 2010 will ultimately serve as the real battle to secure the future status of the city.

Change in Kurdistan

The three provinces that officially make up the Kurdistan Region had the highest turnouts across Iraq. With the new Kurdish opposition Change Movement (Gorran), entering the fray in dramatic circumstances in 2009, the race for votes in Kurdistan took on additional importance.

As expected Gorran faired well in the province of Sulaimaniya, but the contest with the PUK was as close as ever, with the PUK performing strongly in Kirkuk where Gorran was expected to make inroads.

It is too early to say to what extent the fractious nature of the Kurdish vote this time around hindered their quest for influence in Baghdad, but what is clear is that without a united Kurdish voice in Kirkuk and particularly Baghdad, the new political competiveness within the Kurdish scene may well hamper Kurdistan.

Gorran may well use their newfound leverage in Baghdad to indirectly pressure the Kurdistan Alliance for the much hyped “changes” they propose in Kurdistan itself.

Furthermore, with the much higher turnout of Sunnis than in 2005 and with increased number of seats in parliament not resulting in the anticipated number of seats in Kurdistan in proportion to the population, the Kurdish position becomes more tentative as the dust settles on the new political climate in Iraq.

American Withdrawal

Months of protracted negotiations and heated discussions will take place, all the while as the US increases its demobilisation efforts in anticipation of its iconic withdrawal by the end of August 2010.

While the next government will be the first under full Iraqi sovereignty and under relative blanket of security, this does not mask the key constraints and challenges that may hinder Iraqi progress once more.

Progress is very much reversible in Iraq and with emotive and historically entrenched angles on critical national issues, the resolution of these issues will not be without their perils and dangers.

Regardless of any election outcome, entities in Iraq will still decree a significant share of the Iraqi cake. While the system of proportional representation is designed to reflect the overall will of the electorate across the mosaic, the common policy of appeasement will be evident. For example, to keep Sunnis on the political stage, the expectation is they will still assume key posts, key percentage of the armed forces etc. This appeasement policy was a key reason for the decline in Sunni insurgency and the newfound security in Iraq, not necessarily just strong handed tactics by al-Maliki.

The greatest danger for America is that while Iraqis bicker and the US military arsenal wanes, this may yet give the encouragement for insurgents to reassume centre stage.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Not to save the day alone

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As the US aims to save the day again in Iraq, the reality is that further underlying issues are being swept under the political rug.

All too frequently democracy and reconciliation in Iraq has been hampered with the reality of taking one step forward and two steps back. Throughout the past several years US meddling and intervention have played a crucial part in ensuring key political and constitutional breakthroughs as Iraqis struggled to overcome their historical differences.

However, while pressure and influence is nothing new, it does however mask the cracks that continue to undermine long-term Iraqi unity. For the US, which has expended billions, lost thousands of lives and tirelessly sought an elusive exit strategy, the perception of Iraqi concord, national stability and democratic progress has become an obsession.

This has meant that while the Iraqi political chambers have become accustomed to bickering, jostling and protraction, the US has often been racing from group to group to find compromise. But the long-term strength of many of those agreements is open to question – often real issues have been swept under the political rug, rather than the establishment of compromise and harmony between the embittered groups.

The US was yet again tirelessly jostling in the background these past weeks to resolve another potential political landmine ahead of the national elections. Not only was the election delayed by almost two months, and the election law grudgingly passed with US handing out promises and carrots, but before Iraqis could breathe a sigh of relief yet another row threatened to derail the elections.

Washington at stake

For the US, what is at stake in Iraq is clearly extortionate. While it can not indefinitely keep the same level of commitment and sacrifice that it has in the past several years, it can ill afford to leave an Iraq on the brink either. The regional ramifications alone are too grave to even contemplate.

Security and political gains these past few years have not come easy and unless comprehensive national elections can be held on March 7, 2010, where all parties and sects keenly participate, there is every chance that Iraq may end up back at square one, along with the US goals of withdrawal by August of this year.

Baathist banning row

US knows a repeat of Sunni bitterness, boycotting and anger that blighted the last elections in 2005, will undo much of their hard work of the past five years, which has been aimed specifically at enticing Sunnis into the political fold and ensuring they receive a reasonable piece of the Iraq cake to appease sentiments.

Therefore, a decision to ban some 500 candidates from parliamentary elections by the Justice and Accountability commission, for suspected links with Saddam Hussein’s former Baathist regime, rang alarm bells in Washington.

A new raging debate just weeks after the US and UN were catching their breath from the last furor to save elections in Iraq, threatened to pit the Sunni population and the Shiite majority just weeks from the elections with campaigning still not underway.

While the list of banned candidates was not exclusively Sunni based, with many being Shiites and some Kurds, it was drummed up and manipulated by certain parties as a direct attack to undermine Sunnis ahead of the elections.

External meddling evident

While Iraq has been technically sovereign for a long while, it is clearly hampered by regional jockeying and foreign interference. US meddling has been clear to see but with Iran throwing its weight around as a regional superpower, along with neighbours such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria who are more akin to support the Sunnis, it becomes evident that these neighbours have become entrenched in the Iraqi machine, both directly and indirectly.

The Accountability and Justice commission itself is spearheaded by several prominent Shiite figures, with the one time US darling, Ahmad Chalabi, in particular with close ties to Tehran.

US political arm-twisting by both Vice President Joe Biden and US Ambassador Christopher Hill was heavily behind the decision by the Iraqi Appeals Court to overturn the ban on the candidates until after the elections.

Divisions within Iraq were discernible as uproar ensued in the Baghdad government, which deemed the overturning as “illegal and unconstitutional”. As emergency parliamentary sessions were hastily arranged, clearly the goal was one of overriding the decision of the appeal courts. The US was rather predictably overjoyed with the decision of the appeals court, to a motion that they themselves had promoted. However, this motion itself was plagued with contradiction – specifically, what would be the affect if after the intended post-election review a candidate was removed against the wishes of the electorate?

Twist in the tale

If the current situation was not marred by enough controversy, this was further clouded by an announcement that effectively meant that all but 37 of the appeal candidates had their cases disqualified as it was deemed that they did not submit their cases properly.

During the ongoing row, a lot of banned candidates were duly replaced by their parties while some had their bans lifted, which had left 177 cases in the appeal process. Sceptics would point to government manipulation of the appeal processes to dilute the chances of banned candidates participating.

Bitter after taste

Regardless of moves to find compromise and allow a number of banned candidates to participate, this episode hardly leaves a sweet taste in the mouth ahead of a critical national milestone.

Key Sunni politicians and Shiite rivals of current premier Nouri al-Mailki have pointed to a ploy to undercut their support ahead of decisive balloting and mask inefficiencies and negative sentiment towards the current Baghdad government.

Baathism, an ideology of pan-Arab nationalism, was not purely embraced by Saddam Hussein. It has popular weight in Sunni circles in the region and contrary to some opinions its support is not exclusively Sunni based. Naturally many have pointed to Iran’s Shiite hands in Iraq, with the apparent aim of stifling Sunni Arab renaissance, as the reason behind Maliki’s stance.

Baghdad has in turn blamed many of the recent deadly bombings in Iraq squarely on ex-Baathists and their affiliates.

Keeping problems in perspective

As problems in Iraq typically get blown out of all proportion, it is easy to lose sight of the argument. The first de-Baathist commission was actually setup by the US provincial powers in 2003 and was later formerly superseded by the current legal entity. The idea was to formulate a new Iraq based on justice and democracy that would never allow previous perpetrators of the brutal regime a chance to return or hold power in any capacity.

On the surface, such a motion should allow for historical wounds to heal and for politicians to build a new national unity away from the dark chapters of the past. It is only right that having waited decades to expel the evil, and with thousands of mass graves later, that they would never allow a chance for such roots to regrow.

For those with proven links to the Saddam apparatus, they should not be allowed to participate in any shape or form. Cries of injustice by such individuals are ironic as they denied the same rights and freedoms to thousands of Iraqis.

However, the process should be clear and transparent, and not riddled with contention. For example, why did the relevant legal bodies wait until just weeks before the election to ban such a large number of candidates? Why weren’t those candidates banned well before? The criteria for the banning and associated evidence to underpin such decisions should be undisputed.

Such publicity over this debacle threatens to turn this political charade into a sectarian showdown. With wounds just healing from the previous civil war, Iraqis can ill afford another two steps back.

As for the US, its pressure and influence should be all about the future of Iraq. While it can clearly jumpstart the Iraqi political vehicle at key times, why the US hasn’t directly supported article 140 and other key constitutional articles is questionable.

Continuous feuding in the political chambers has merely masked the other fundamental milestones that have not been achieved – the settling of disputed territories with the Kurdistan Region; the advent of a national hydrocarbon law; and cross-sectarian mix of the security forces including long-term integration of the Sunni “Awakening Council” militias.

Whatever government is installed next in Baghdad, without resolving these historical handicaps, Iraq will weave from side to side but will struggle to move forwards.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

New controversy over election law drowns short-lived euphoria in Iraq

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After the brief scenes of jubilation in the aftermath of the passing of the election law on November 8th 2009, some predicted that a tough road still lay ahead in Iraq. What many didn’t expect is that that tough road would come merely two weeks later.

The veto of the election law by Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, an act followed closely after Kurdish leaders expressed their own strong discontent over the law and threatened to boycott the elections over the distribution of votes, left the election process in disarray and meant an almost certain postponement of the elections past 31st January 2010, voiding a key stipulation of the Iraqi constitution and dampening US hopes of a symbolic withdrawal of troops by August 2010.

It appears likely that the elections will be held a month after the Shiite religious festival of Arbain at the earliest. Any shift from the timelines outlined in the constitution sets a benchmark for future political manipulation, particularly from any strongman intent on “hanging-on” to power in the future.

The latest round of disputes yet again highlights the fragile nature of the Iraqi political mosaic. Whilst the US surge strategy has helped to dramatically improve security, ominously this has not been able to mask the fractured nature of the Iraqi ethnic and sectarian framework with the key goal of national reconciliation appearing as elusive as ever.

Vice Presidential veto

The election veto by al-Hashemi, causing a public stir, was due to what he deemed as an insufficient number of seats reserved for Iraqis living abroad, with al-Hashemi keen to see this increase from 5 to 15, predominantly benefitting Sunnis who were dispersed in large numbers at the height of the insurgency.

al-Hashemi appears anxious to win credibility ahead of the national elections amongst the Sunnis and has dug his heels to seemingly safeguard Sunni interests. 

Election law rework

Subsequent rework of the election law by the Iraqi parliament failed to produce a draft that appeased Sunni lawmakers. In contrast, the latest version was backed by the Kurds with an agreement on revising the format for the allocation of additional seats.

Iraqi population increase estimates, which the additional 48 seats in the parliament (from 275 to 323) were based on, used the 2009 ration data from the Iraqi Ministry of Trade.

This led to a strong rebuke from the Kurds, who based on the rationing card system, received only 3 additional seats out of a total of 48, whilst remarkably the province of Nineveh received 12 alone.

The Kurds suspected a conspiracy to undermine their power and issued a strongly-worded statement threatening to boycott the elections.

The stance of the Kurds is understandable. First of all the ration data from the Trade Ministry is widely considered to be corrupt and incorrect. Over the past few years, there has been wide abuse of the rationing system and to compound matters millions of Iraqis have been displaced internally. Furthermore, many Kurds may not necessarily claim rations in the more prosperous north, which has avoided much of the volatility of the south.

Sunni backlash

A frequent theme of successive Iraqi governments and the US administration has been enticing the disgruntled Sunni population into the political process. Much of the reconciliatory initiatives have been centred on encouraging Sunnis to participate in government via a number of concessions.

After a boycott by Sunnis in the first major election of 2005, when insurgency and Sunni anger was high, the Sunnis have steadily joined the political sphere culminated in much hope that the upcoming elections would finally result in real representation across the Iraqi divide that would prompt progression.

However, the latest round of changes on the election law has failed to attract Sunni support and this has led to a threat by al-Hashemi that he will veto the bill a second time.

While parliament can override a second veto with a three-fifths majority, with Kurds and Shiites able to muster enough of the required votes, this places serious risk of stoking Sunni anger. Sunnis are unlikely to boycott any vote in 2010 as this would yet again deprive them of political clout, however, this pushes national reconciliation further away and ominously sets a dangerous precedence to force other legislation at the expense of other parties at a later date.

In addition to the changes on the distribution of additional seats in parliament based on population growth, the election law was also amended so that Iraqis living abroad will have votes count towards their province of origin, rather than allocation of specified seats for voters outside Iraq as requested by al-Hashemi.

Sunni lawmakers deemed the latest round of amendments as unconstitutional. However, by the same token one must acknowledge that allocating 3 seats out of 48 to the Kurds, whilst Sunni-dominated provinces were to receive 24, was hardly constitutional.

Under the original proposal to allocate the additional parliamentary seats, Kurds would have competed for only 38 seats of a total of 323, in stark contracts to 2005 when they had 57 seats, seriously diminishing their power in Baghdad.

Moreover, how can Sunni seats increase so dramatically in line with population figures if 2 millions Sunnis fled abroad in the same time period? There were obvious signs of some sides aiming to increase Sunni influence at the next elections.

Fair and equitable

The problem in Iraq is that parties often refuse compromise on a fair and equitable basis. For example, while Sunnis are happy to deprive Kurds of political influence in the Nineveh provincial council, the same lawmakers demand a fixed quota of seats in the Kirkuk council.

Reaching out to all groups via concessions and compromise is an important and natural part of democracy but this must be as fair as possible.

In Iraq, even when the elections are successfully held in 2010, parties will still refuse to succumb to the will of the majority vote. For example, the Sunnis will still expect a large share of the Iraqi cake and with the US and Shiites keen to keep the current stability in Iraq it makes a policy of appeasement difficult to avoid.

Difficult road ahead

Ironically, if Iraqis can not agree on an election law that is meant to be a prelude to the serious political business in parliament then what chance does Baghdad have of political progress once the real contentious issues come to the fore.

The onset of a national hydrocarbon law and resolution of disputed territories will provide a sterner test of Iraq’s political resolve.

At least the problems have not been swept under the political rug quite in the same way as before. It is better to endure delays, anger and frustration in the short-term, rather than make progress under foreign pressure, only to leave the problem to fester and grow in years to come.

As the Sunni Vice President refused to back the revised election law, ironically the Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, expressed his optimism for an election law that he believed catered for all sides.

All this begs the question of why the election process fell apart after only two weeks. Clearly, the original election law which focused on other pressing disputes was rushed through and made guidelines around the distribution of additional seats ambiguous at best.

Ambiguity and democracy in Iraq do not go hand in hand. To win the trust of all factions, every stipulation should be explicitly clear otherwise it would be susceptible to manipulation even before the ink has dried.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Iraqi election law passes as hard task remains ahead

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Whilst this election law is a prelude to US withdrawal, it does not necessarily signal the end of a tough road for Iraq

After weeks of protracted debates and intense political wrangling, the Iraqi election law was finally passed after elusive compromise was decisively reached on the hotly-contested province of Kirkuk.

Perhaps no other individual would have breathed a more literal sigh of relief than US Ambassador to Iraq, Christopher Hill, who worked tirelessly running between the main Iraqi factions in the parliament chambers to ensure progress, while his compatriot and US Vice President, Joe Biden, probably had a frequent engaged-tone as he was tied on the phone to Iraqi leaders.

This important election law meant that Iraq could hold elections in 2010 (now scheduled for 21st January) notably under an open candidate list system as many figures had demanded. While Iraqis expressed relief and satisfaction, public hailing a compromise that has often been lacking in Iraq, for US it had far more significant short-term ramifications.

US pressure

Behind-the-scenes US pressure in Iraqi politics is hardly something new. On numerous occasions, political motions have been passed after direct exertion from the White House with the belated passing of the symbolic Iraqi constitution in 2005 as one such example.

However, this time around the passing of the election law held direct sway to US plans to withdraw all combat troops by August 2010.

Although agreement was finally reached, the much delayed manner of passing the law was an ominous signal of Iraqi appetite for reconciliation and collaboration.

Whilst democratic progress ensues on paper, the election law is another example of where fierce stalemates have been broken for sake of progress at the expense of brushing the real key issues under the political rug.

It is these flashpoints such the resolving the issue of disputed territories, the onset of a national hydrocarbon law and how much power federal regions should be afforded (namely that of the Kurds) that prompt the real health checks for the new Iraq.

Kirkuk dilemma

While compromise was struck over voting in Kirkuk, it doesn’t deal with the real issue of the long-term status of the city and the much-delayed implementation of article 140 of the Iraqi constitution.

Even as elections will go ahead in Kirkuk inline with the rest of the country, it is still conducted under a “special status”. Although, 2009 voter rolls will be used as demanded by Kurds, the results will essentially be provisional and subject to review if deemed that unusual fluctuations in the voting registrar were apparent.

Crucially, the terms and consequences of this proposed electoral review were vague. With Arabs still determined to ensure that Kirkuk does not fall into the hands of the Kurds, “officially” or otherwise, the election results may yet open another can of worms.

Although, Kirkuk is an Iraqi matter and certainly the most relevant litmus test of Iraqi unity and democracy, regional interference has been a major handicap in implementing constitutional articles. Some parties in negotiations over the election law may have used regional forces as a leverage to ensure Kirkuk status quo.

Fencing-off the Kirkuk conundrum

This leads to the critical issue of the long-term status of Kirkuk. While U.S envoy Hill was adamant that the election law agreement on Kirkuk would not be used as “a leg up” in negotiations over its future jurisdiction, in reality it is not so easy to fence-off the holding of elections in Kirkuk from the debate over the long-term status of Kirkuk.

If elections highlight a strong Kurdish majority then Arab and Turkmen parties may well use the voter review clause to dampen Kurdish gains with view to ensuring that any subsequent Kurdish claim on Kirkuk is not so clear-cut.

By the same token, inevitably a Kurdish majority in the January elections will simply highlight a certain Kurdish majority if any referendum is held in Kirkuk as per article 140. In other words, whilst Baghdad may dig its heels even further, the Kurds will see their legal overtures towards the oil-rich province add vital momentum.

Next phase of democracy

Regardless of any successful elections in January 2010, this will certainly not mark the end of friction between the Kurdish administration and Baghdad. The developments of the election law may be promising but the hard-work is all to do in 2010.

Although, the Kurds may well find themselves in the role of kingmakers again, the future makeup of alliances in the Iraqi National Assembly will make interesting analysis. With the Sunnis likely to turn out in much larger numbers this time around, political jockeying will be as delicate as ever.

The Kurds will choose there alliance wisely, likely forming a coalition with sides that may incline to succumb to their demands in return for gaining more power and influence in Baghdad. A stronger Sunni-Shiite bond capitalising on Arab nationalist sentiment at the expense of Kurdish aspirations can not be discounted. If such Arab unity can be established then tensions over Kirkuk may well increase to the next level.

Important milestones

As much as the election is an important milestone, it can only be termed in such a way as a means to an ends. With the crucial absence of agreed federal borders, dispute over how natural resources will be shared and long-term power balance in Baghdad and the security forces, the real milestones are yet to be achieved.

Add to the mix ubiquitous calls for amendments to the Iraqi constitution and the recipe for future strife is evident. While a one-off revision to the 2005 constitution is probable, how this will be administered is a massive test of how far Iraq has come since 2003 and possibly how far it will go in years to come.

Cross-faction agreement on changing constitutional articles will be difficult and any significant change at the expense of other parties is a dangerous prelude. Although, the formation of any review committee may well be based on the proportion of votes at the elections, such voting principles do not always hold water in Iraq.

Regardless of election results, sides will not succumb to the rule of the majority, so ironically compensatory seats in one form or another is an inevitable feature of democracy in Iraq. A good example is enticing the Sunni elite into the political makeup, although Sunnis form a minority in Iraq, they will still demand fundamental power and influence in Baghdad as well as within the security forces.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.