Category Archives: Iraq

U.S.withdrawal: End or beginning of Iraq?

As the last convoy of US troops trickled over the desertous southern-Iraqi border, the move was met with contrasting emotions, much like the overall US experience little shy of 9 years.

For many in Iraq, the image of seeing their “occupiers” leave became a long-time nationalist dream.  Fast forward 9 years, 4500 lost lives and an expenditure fast approaching trillion dollar that has crippled the US foreign policy image and dented the US economy, the US were arguably as keen to leave as they were to enter.

Many placed direct blame on much of the unfolding crisis over the years in Iraq on America but as the future will prove the US is not responsible for every Iraqi misfortune and that perhaps America did well to stave off so many obstacles.

The downfall of Saddam and subsequent invasion of Iraq only opened a hornets nest, the nest was placated many decades before with the artificial creation of Iraq. The lid was simply held firm by the iron grip of Saddam and once opened, the Americans struggled relentlessly to keep grip whilst under immense international spotlight.

It is time for the Iraqi political actors to take accountability and responsibility for the current situation in Iraq. Iraq has had a sovereign government for many years, has now held two national elections, implemented a national constitution and has a large security force at its disposal that has been in practical control of the streets long before the US withdrawal.

History will prove that America never really got the credit it deserved. It made huge sacrifices whilst Iraqi politicians have constantly failed to deliver. It pulled Iraq from the brink of all-out sectarian war in 2007 with the promise of thousands of more troops as part of the surge strategy but the Iraqi leaders again failed to keep their promises and their end of the bargain.

It is by no means to say that the US adventure in Iraq should be marked as a shining glory. The two Washington administrations, particularly that of George W. Bush, will be the first to admit that Iraq was an achilles heel and in the case of Bush the hammer blow to the credibility of the his tenure. In hindsight, the US is more than likely to have done things differently and will have a bitter taste in their mouths as some events backfired.

However, as the old saying goes, you can take a horse to water but you cannot make it drink. Iraq has had many historical milestones and achievements but has successfully failed to capitalise on any positive motions created.

The bottom line is that deep sectarianism, a clear ethnic divide and above all profound historical mistrust and animosity have severely handicapped any chance of national reconciliation and genuine progression in Iraq.

As soon as the US forces formally withdrew, fierce debate ensued about the legacy that they left behind. One thing for sure is that the positive picture of the current climate in Iraq that the US was hoping to promote did not take long to shatter.

A day later, Iraq become embroiled in a new sectarian and political crisis as an arrest warrant was issued for Iraq”s Sunni Vice-President, Tariq al-Hashemi and a number of other Sunni figures, on terror related charges. This is in addition to controversy around Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak whose criticism of Maliki”s dictatorial tendencies left him clinging on to his position as Maliki sought a vote of no confidence against him.

People have warned about the fragility of the current coalition, however, the coalition has been anything but stable and harmonious since its much delayed inception. Over a year later and key ministries still remain in so-called temporary hands. Iyyad Allawi, the head of al-Iraqiya, has had an ongoing political rift and escalating war of words with Maliki accusing him of monopolisation of power and reneging on the Erbil agreement.

As the current crisis has escalated, an already bewildered al-Iraqiya decided to boycott parliament. Renew sectarian bloodshed coupled with a collapse of the current government may place Iraq in a point of no return and without a bail-out from the US this time around.

It is easy to overlook that Sunni Sahwa councils were a significant factor in the decline of violence and they still remain a localised Sunni tool rather than a national possession. Without a balanced security apparatus, Iraq will have three different armies guarding each of the major factions of Iraq.

The Sunni-Shiite power struggle is also exhibited in the increasing ploy of largely Sunni provinces to manipulate constitutional clauses and seek regional autonomy to place Maliki in a difficult bargaining corner and to safeguard their powerbases.

While much of Iraq has been stuck in a rut, Kurdistan has enjoyed unprecedented progression much to the regular dismay than applaud from Baghdad. More than any other group, the Kurds were most disappointed by the US exit and left them feeling anxious at hostile parties around them.

Renewed sectarianism and friction in Baghdad will see the Kurds embroiled in a fresh nightmare that will only blight the attraction and evolvement of the region. Furthermore, the Kurds have been so busy helping construct successive governments in Baghdad and then help papering over the cracks that they have seemingly overlooked that Baghdad has seldom kept their end of the bargain and has gotten away without any real political repercussions.

Kurdistan has waited for almost a decade for the return of Kirkuk and disputed territories and has waited many years for key laws such as a national hydrocarbon law to be adopted. In reality, unless Kurdistan takes matters into their own hands and pushes Baghdad in no uncertain terms, they will wait yet another decade for the return of their lands.

As kingmakers, Kurds have taken a tough-line position in negotiations over successive government formations, while Baghdad has dragged their heels in the commitments they have agreed to as part of the initial wooing of Kurdish blocs.

Just as the jostling of power between Sunni and Shiites will come to the boil at some point, especially if the proviso of parliament and politics is seen as an insufficient forum, then the increasing bitter relationship between Erbil and Baghdad will take similar suit if it indefinitely becomes stuck in a detrimental cycle.

While much of how the proceedings play out is in the hands of the Iraqi leaders, the difficulties already inherent are only exasperated by the influence of neighbouring countries. As the US formally withdraws, the battle for influence in Iraq will only heighten.

The Shiite-led government of al-Maliki openly sways towards Tehran and has defended the Allawite and fellow Shiite Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, while most of the Arab world has turned increasingly against him. All the while, Sunni neighbours such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia looks anxiously at the alliances formed by Baghdad.

As the Middle East has evolved greatly as a result of the Arab Spring, Iraq will need to greatly alter the relations with its neighbours.

At the same time, Kurdistan which is already under great constraints due to the weary eye of its neighbours, strives for good relations with all sides and must not rely on the sentiments of Baghdad in achieving its nationalist ambitions.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Interview with British Consul General Chris Bowers

There are huge opportunities, people should come and explore it for themselves because they will find a real welcome here and find a region that is on a dash for modernity” – Chris Bowers

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel of the Kurdish Globe spoke with the British Consul General to Kurdistan, Chris Bowers, on the historic relationship between the Kurds and UK, the ever developing economic ties between the UK and Kurdistan, Kurdistan”s new strategic role within the Middle East and future relations between the UK and Kurdistan amongst a number of other local and regional issues.

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel – First of all, thank you very much for your time with the Globe. Let us start with how do you view the current relationship between KRG and the UK government?

Chris Bowers - Great. We are in a really good phase at the moment. You would expect me to say that but it is actually true. We have enjoyed very close working relationship with the KRG. I think it is a very warm relationship and that warmth enables us to speak clearly and openly I”m delighted that recently we have really improved the commercial element – 70 British firms in the Erbil Trade Fair is a fantastic result. And that now shows that people and businesses in the UK see Kurdistan as a place to do business and I think that says a lot for Kurdistan, says a lot for the KRG and specifically says a lot about the activities of KRG”s representative in London who I believe has done a fantastic job.

One thing that is really going to change the economic relationship between the UK and Kurdistan is the huger merger between Genel and Tony Hayward”s investment vehicle, that has now launched as a FTSE100 company which will mean that all the analysts in London covering the pension funds, the investment funds, the tracker funds and the like will all have to know about the Kurdistan Region.

A year or so ago, you could be an analyst in the city and not need to know about the Kurdistan Region. That has now changed and that is a very big development.

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel – The Kurds have a deep affection with the UK that began with its role in the creation of the 1991 safe haven, for Kurds anxious about their future fate based on their past, how does the UK government reassure them about an ongoing partnership and relationship going forward?

Chris Bowers - Well, I think the best defence for the Kurds is that the KRG continues to be a prosperous, effective and democratic region. That is the best defence. Also the region has relations with Baghdad that have in the past been difficult and I think it is never going to be the easiest of relationships but I think it”s a relationship that can work and the Kurdistan Region needs to do what it can to make it work. So these are the key factors in terms of security for the Kurds and of course relations with their neighbors.

The relations with Turkey have been very good recently and we are delighted about that.  We see ourselves as one of Turkey”s biggest supporters and friends – obviously Iran is another kettle of fish. We see a growing number of commercial ties between the Kurdistan Region and the UK.  . One of the best things for the future is also the higher education links. We have had a very successful outreach with the Kurdistan Region and with the Kurdish people and Kurdish students. I think now the Kurdish students who are thinking about where they should study abroad under the Human Capacity Development Programme think about UK as a first choice destination, and we are thrilled about that. My ambassador stated when we were starting to assist the programme, that if we cannot help educate the next generation of Kurdish leaders then we should go home. Well, we are still here!.

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel – As someone with oversight of the Middle East and Iraq, what role do you see Kurdistan playing in Iraq and the greater Middle East moving forward?

We see the Kurdistan Region as a place where Iraq can road test initiatives. The Kurdistan Region is in the fortunate position of being more stable and secure. I think it is more committed to market economy and has a clear vision for the future. If you were living in the rest of Iraq, say you are a governor and you want to know how you can build an airport,   how you can attract  businesses, how can you provide a safe environment, how you can provide an accountable government – where would you go to learn that? You would come to Kurdistan. So that”s a tremendous asset to the whole of Iraq, and it is something which the government here can promote. I believe it is a very important role. It”s really noticeable as well that this is a part of the world that has a great commitment to tolerance.  That is another important lesson for the whole region.  If you look at the broader region there are not that many countries in the Arab world in the Middle East which have a functioning federal structure. Arab states have tended to be unitary and centralized and if Iraq can show how an effective functioning federal system can work then that is a great message for the whole region. Of course a federal structure implies a relationship which is why we think the relationship between Baghdad and Kurdistan is so important.

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel – Taking that a step forward, people mention Kurdistan but for the Kurdish people Kurdistan geographically stretches a lot further. In terms of its role as a partner to Iran and Turkey and as a major nationality in the region, do you see it as a strategic power?

The best role and function for the Kurdistan Region is to make the region as effective, successful and prosperous as possible. To create a beacon is the best support for the Iraqi Kurdish people and I think this is exactly what the government and the Kurdish people are trying to do.

As for neighboring states have their own policies and their own functions.

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel – One thing we have seen in the PKK and PJAK struggle, that there is now a notion that the KRG can play a mediator role whereas before Tehran and Ankara were quick to say “you are the problem”. Do you believe the KRG can be the solution providers in the internal affairs of these countries?

Firstly, the PKK is a terrorist organisation. It is classified as such by the UK and EU.  We call upon the PKK to lay down their arms. The leadership in this region thinks the era of fighting is over, that it is now a time for discussion and negotiation and I think that is very true. The government here has done a great job in reaching out to Turkey and making a clear distinction between the PKK and the KRG. I think that is a vital distinction and my sense is that the Turkish leadership now understood that and that is a huge progress which is to the credit of both governments.

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel – What is your view of the Arab Spring and the ever-changing sociopolitical dynamic in the Middle East that even today is raging in Syria?

Where we see people demanding their rights this is hugely positive. It seems that we are still part way through the process of the Arab spring. Of course we support people”s struggle for greater accountability. That is what we hear – people want governments that are accountable and effective, governments that really speak for ordinary people. That is a tremendous thing. Wherever possible, we would like to see this happen in a peaceful basis. As you know, the UK and EU have been very clear in their belief that it is the time for Assad to go and we are sticking by that position.  The sanctions in place reflect the seriousness with which the international community sees the situation in Syria.

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel – Recently the 7th Erbil Trade Fair took place, what was your general overview of this?

It was great – a tremendous event. I”m thrilled by the UK participation in the fair with 70 companies and you know there were more people, more businessmen on the delegation which came to Erbil than went with the last delegation to China. Why was that? Mainly because of the opportunities here and the pro-business climate the KRG has created here.  Erbil is a City of Possibilities in a Region of Opportunity. There has been a lot of hard work that has gone into that, a lot of hard work from the KRG representative in London, from the MEA and from our side as well.  And, of course, getting them here is half of the story, the response they got from Kurdish companies was very warm and the buzz around the delegation was very encouraging and very positive.  Many companies said that they had lots of positive meetings, lots of contacts and even some signed contracts. Like any business, they now need to follow up these leads and make sure that they really get the benefits. The trade fair provides the platform for people to meet other people and opportunity to make those contacts and in that sense from a UK perspective it was an absolutely great event.

We were in particular pleased with the Northern Ireland element – there is a real synergy between Northern Ireland and the Kurdistan Region. Both are former areas of conflict that are now emerging with a new dynamism and new commitment to engage with the outside world. Both are conscious that because their image in the international scene has been one of conflict, the regions have to make extra effort and go the extra mile to convince people to do business with them.

Bashdar Push Ismaeel – Looking at foreign companies that have taken the plunge or risk, there are a number of British based companies such Gulf Keystone Petroleum, Heritage Oil and Sterling Energy. What is your view?

Right now, UK companies are managing 12 blocs making us a leading hydrocarbon partner for the KRG and we are delighted by that. In the last six months UK oil companies have invested something like 3 billion US dollars into the Kurdistan Region. That is a really significant vote of confidence in the Kurdistan Region.

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel – With the huge success of the so-called minors, is the time ripe for major oil players such as BP and Shell to enter the fold?

What is becoming clear is that we are entering a new phase in the development of Kurdish hydrocarbon development and I imagine that there will be further consolidation in the markets in the next year. The significant reserves here are going to attract any major company and the companies can speak for themselves but of course assets that like that are interesting. What I would to say about UK companies is that when they come in, they come for 40 years which is their general investment timescale.

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel – If you had a message for potential foreign investors everywhere who may still be unsure or tentative regarding Kurdistan, what would you say to them?

Come and take a look. There are real opportunities here; there is a premium to being British. There are huge opportunities, people should come and explore it for themselves because they will find a real welcome here and find a region that is on a dash for modernity, it”s a region wants to catch up for the time it has lost and a region which is committed to developing its international engagements and that is very positive.

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel – The historic British Film Festival in Kurdistan was intriguing and exciting to say the least, tell us more.

Chris Bowers - We were thrilled by the success of the British Film Festival in the Kurdistan Region, the first of its type. We showed 15 films from the 26th to 28th November at the Saad Palace with free entry, open to all. We even had a 100 metre red carpet and popcorn!  It felt like a real film experience.  Why did we do? Firstly, because they are great films and we wanted people to see Britain through the eyes of film-makers. The films were entertaining and watching films is a fun and sociable part of life. Secondly, it shows the profile of Erbil, that it is the kind of city where you can hold a film festival. This will help change people”s perceptions internationally and shows people that Kurdistan has a secure environment where people can go out on the streets and watch a film festival. Thirdly, we brought British film makers over to speak to young Kurdish film makers because the Kurdistan Region”s story has not been told yet and it can be told through film. It is partially about identity and telling the world your story.  We want to see a new generation of Iraqi Kurdish film-makers showing their films in KR and in international festivals around the world.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Latest disappointment with oil draft gives Kurds spur to break an already fragile coalition

Oil has unenviably proved as the paradoxical treasure and curse of the Mesopotamian plains. With the third largest oil reserves in the world, Iraq has the potential to become one of the most solid and prosperous economies in the world and bring with it a great standard of living for it people.

However, the gift of nature has seen it empower and finance brutal dictatorial regimes and facilitate a centralisation of power that has been used to forcefully bind Iraq’s disparate social mosaic. Whoever controlled oil had the keys to the gates of Iraq. In this light, the Sunni’s used their control of oil revenues to underpin their power and influence.

Kurdistan was severely affected by policies of exclusion and systematic negligence that saw a very limited amount of its legitimate portion of Iraq’s oil revenues spent on infrastructure. Free from the clutches of dictatorship, the Kurds were able to progress from a standing start by building new roads, hospitals, universities and various facilities.

Given a unique chance to shape the new Iraq, Kurds and Shiites were keen to leave their imprint on the Iraqi oil sector. Ironically, while Sunni’s used oil to consolidate power, the majority of Iraq’s oil wealth is actually located in the Kurdish and Shiite regions, one of the contributing factors to a sense of Sunni despair in post-Saddam Iraq.

Sharing of the cake

Iraq has had a number of significant political handicaps to overcome as it has stumbled on the transitional path to democracy. The format of a new hydrocarbon oil law has proved the most strenuous of laws to agree.

The sharing of the Iraqi cake amongst a number of diverse and embittered groups has had ramifications in a number of spheres, but none more so than in the oil law that has come to epitomise the difficult challenge of keeping all sides happy.

Striking concord on the law oil law has implications on a number of other thorny issues plaguing Iraq such as federalism, balance of power and status of disputed territories

Over four years since the original draft was rejected amidst a highly charged and animated parliament, the task of formulating a draft that would appease all parties appears as elusive as ever.

Kurdish rebuke of new law

Any hope for ratification of the new oil draft that was passed by the Iraqi cabinet and submitted to parliament, were quickly dashed as the presidency of the Kurdistan region condemned efforts to usher the new draft in parliament.

Discussions around the oil law continue to place Kurdistan and Baghdad at loggerheads with the Kurds denouncing the current draft as contradicting the principles of the constitution.

Baghdad has refused to relinquish its historic grasp on the oil industry while the Kurds are keen to explore and develop their immense hydrocarbon potential. According to the Iraqi constitution there is a clear delineation between control of new oil fields and existing oil fields.

As a largely unexplored entity, almost all of Kurdistan’s newfound wealth can be considered as newly discovered.

As the gulf between both parties has grown over oil sharing, Kurdistan has continued a unilateral development of its oil sector with the awarding of dozens of oil contracts to foreign firms to the annoyance of Baghdad that has repeatedly deemed any deals without its consent as illegal.

The stalemate has gathered pace as a number of smaller oil exploration companies have struck black gold in spectacular fashion. As further oil wells are drilled, more flow tests prove successful and more seismic data is undertaken, the strength and potential of Kurdistan swells by the day.

Gulf Keystone Petroleum (GKP) is one British company that has benefited hugely from its eagerness to jump the queue. The potential recoverable resources has seemingly increased by billions of barrels as each new well has proved a success and GKP alone stands to have anything between 7-11 billion barrels of oil on its books. Other companies have included DNO, Genel Energy, Western Zagros and Heritage Oil with degrees of success.

While Kurdistan’s rise as a respectable oil power has been historic, its quest is greatly restricted by the noose that is Baghdad.

Issues over payments to third parties, revenue sharing, transportation of oil and Baghdad’s refusal to recognise any oil contracts signed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) threatens to derail Kurdish aspirations and at the same time deepen the animosity between Arabs and Kurds.

Kurdistan has been allowed to make limited exports but payment issues have quickly limited throughput.

Whilst Kurdistan is enjoying increasing attention from major global oil giants, threats by Baghdad to blacklist firms signing contracts with Kurdistan have deterred many parties. Only recently Iraq’s Oil Ministry excluded U.S. oil firm Hess Corp from competing in the 4th round of its auction of oil fields.

Basis for political concord

Such is the Kurdish sentiment on the enactment of a balanced oil law that it has formed a key prerequisite for Kurdish support of the current coalition.

However, much like the many promises over the implementation of article 140, the lack of reconciliation on oil law has served to only antagonise the Kurds.

While Baghdad has criticised the Kurds over the awarding of oil contracts, it has continued to encourage development of its oil industry with a number of contracts already signed and a fourth round of bidding currently on the table and scheduled to be finalised by January. This is in addition three major natural gas fields that were auctioned to foreign firms last year.

Baghdad has continued to encourage major oil films while at the same time the national oil draft has gathered dust. Iraq currently produces around 2.7 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) and has an ambitious target to multiply this to 12 million bpd in less than 6 years.

Grapple for power

Although pluralist governance and federalism was a key cornerstone of the constitution, Baghdad’s attempts of solidifying central control and diluting regional powers have been evident in recent years.

As the autonomy of the Kurdistan Region has continuously strengthened, one of the remaining ‘sticks’ to wane Kurdish advancement is Baghdad’s hegemony over oil.

Many countries have welcomed the potential role of Kurdistan as a core supplier to the long-awaited Nabucco gas pipeline but it was ironically Iraq that condemned and jeopardised such motions.

Potential deals by the Iraqi oil ministry to supply gas to Europe places a further cloud on Kurdish ambitions.

At the end of the day, billions barrels of oil are facts that speak volumes. As the economic and wealth of Kurdistan expands so does its influence and strategic power. One of major factors that saw the once unthinkable visit of a Turkish prime minister was the growing economic ties between Turkey and Kurdistan as much as a political thawing.

The likes of Turkey may have been weary of Kurdish oil been used to power its independence in the past but the reward as many foreign investors have discovered is too good to miss.

In the meantime, it could be a while yet before a draft oil law is passed by parliament. The new dispute over the hydrocarbon law may at the same time strike a fatal blow to an already sick political alliance in Baghdad.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd, Various Misc.

Recent attacks show the fragility of the situation

It is Ramadan in Iraq. A month of humility, peace, forgiveness and charity. However, a number of deadly coordinated attacks in the past week shattered any hope that even hard-line groups in Iraq may show some semblance of remorse or humanity.

Ironically, al-Qaeda, the group widely believed to be behind the spate of bloodshed, is the self-proclaimed flag bearer of Islam.

The 42 attacks this week did not discriminate its target. It was designed to induce maximum carnage and kill anyone and everyone within its radius.

The attacks that killed at least 89 people and wounded over 300 more evoked a chilling echo of the recent past and provided a stern reminder that in the current fragile and tentative political climate and with Iraq’s painfully slow healing from historic and deep rooted ailments, the dark days of sectarian civil war and mass bloodshed may not just be a tale of the past.

The proof that al-Qaeda is alive and kicking and with eyes firmly  on derailing any chance of a positive American withdrawal at the end of the year, is worsened by growing tension, ethnic killings and evictions in the disputed regions between Kurdistan and Iraq.

Too often deep lying problems in the Iraqi framework have been covered by so-called symbolic milestones and ceremonial political achievements.

The key issues that continue to blightIraqremain as intense as ever. The Sunni population in spite of successive years of reaching out by Baghdad and Washington, still feel marginalised and after  a high-profile fall from grace, look with great suspicion and resentment at their Shiite counterparts who control Baghdad and who they believe is been manipulated by Tehran.

The Kurds, whose existence under the Iraqi banner has been tainted with tears, repression and bloodshed, continue to view Baghdad with animosity and scepticism that has only grown by constant foot-dragging over the implementation of constitutional articles.

Several years after its legal enshrinement, article 140 of the constitution continues to gather dust. Despite decades of Arabisation and forced eviction of Kurds from their ancestral homes, thousands have been denied justice. Ironically, Arabs continue to accuse the Kurds of attempting to change the demography of the disputed regions, for wanting to correct the wrongs of the past.

With the provision of security such a core pillar of the newIraq, Kurds in the disputed regions demand their defence and protection from theKurdistanregional forces. The growing crisis in the Diyala province and surrounding areas has underscored the vulnerability of the Kurdish population under the protection ofIraqnational forces.

Peshmerga forces left the Diyala province in 2008 under an agreement with Baghdad but recent events prove that they are needed more than ever.

Continued reports of murders and the eviction of thousands of Kurds is a stark warning to the KRG. It is the responsibility of the KRG to protect the Kurds wherever they may be. Protection of Kurdish rights and livelihood has no boundary. The lands may be so-called disputed but there is no dispute that the Kurds have every right to live in their homes with full safety and assurance.

While deportations and ethnic cleansing may have been a common part of Saddam’s regime, this is supposedly the new democratic and all inclusive Iraq and a far cry from the dark days of the past.

Escalating tensions between the Kurdish forces and the Iraqi forces was only partially papered-over by U.S. mediation. As the foot-dragging continues over Kirkuk and the disputed regions and as the safety of the Kurdish population is endangered, it would be a great detriment for Kurds to remain idle and hope that one day Arabs will soften their nationalist stance and embrace Kurdish aspirations.

The deadly attacks by al-Qaeda and the growing incapacity of Iraqi forces to provide peace and stability in the disputed regions continue to place al-Maliki under a firm spotlight. As the already fragile political shape in Baghdad is tested further, continued bloodshed will continue to undermine al-Maliki’s grip on power and increase Sunni influence.

Analysts often tie the perseveration ofIraq’s security with an extended American stay.Iraq’s security forces are a far cry from the early post Saddam era. The soldiers and police forces now number in the hundreds of thousands, all armed and trained.

Iraqis security forces are not affective as they are still plagued by sectarianism, distrust, lack of direction, coordination and sense of duty to all of Iraq, not because they are small in numbers or do not have weapons to provide protection. 

Al-Maliki yearns for a U.S. troop extension not because Iraq needs more firepower but because Washington’s continued hand in Iraq fortifies his grip on power. The appointment of a member of his governing coalition as acting defence minister in the aftermath of the recent attacks was seen by many as a move by al-Maliki protect his authority.

Several months after the coalition government was formed, al-Maliki has failed to appoint ministers for the defence and interior portfolios, with rival groups accusing him of harbouring security agencies. Furthermore, the Erbil agreement that ushered an uneasy alliance has not been implemented.

Owed to the fractured nature of Iraq, providing a true national army has been difficult. Sunni Awakening Councils continues to represent a large bulk of the Sunni defence forces. The thousands of Awakening forces have not been properly integrated into the national security makeup and Sunnis continue to look at the predominantly Shiite national forces with unease.

As for Kurdistan, they have rightfully refused to reduce their forces under pressure fromBaghdadand the Peshmerga forces continue to function as the only true representatives of the Kurds.

In reality, until there can be a comprehensive and true national coalition government in Baghdad that somehow appeases the fractured socio-ethnic mosaic, American presence for another 10 years won’t make a difference.

All Washington has done is buy time for successive Iraqi governments and Iraqis have reacted by wasting this time and failing to build bridges. As long as the unity of Iraq, common trust and the political climate continues to be fragile, the security situation will be unstable at best.

As for Kurdistan, Baghdad has squandered years of opportunity in resolving the issues of disputed territories and enacting national hydrocarbon laws through constant failed promises.

Kurds cannot wait for several more years of dithering and inaction by Baghdad especially if the violence against the Kurds continues. Keeping lid on such emotive issues cannot be achieved indefinitely, sooner or later the situation between Kurdistan and Baghdad will come to the boil. As U.S. departs sooner or later, it will become clear that Iraqi misfortune is much more down to Iraqis than Americans, in fact in losing America Iraq loses the glue that has bound Iraqis however loosely in recent years. 

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

The constitution is more than simply a piece of paper

In 2003 after the downfall of Saddam Hussein, Iraqis had a historic opportunity to rebuild their country, national identity and basis for co-existence but above all placate this in a broad and inclusive new constitution.

The Transitive Administrative Law (TAL) in 2004 was followed by a new constitution in October 2005, on the back of months of gruelling negotiations, intense jockeying and fervent pressure from the US, the result of the arduous tasks of satisfying Iraq’s vast socio-ethnic mosaic.

Significance of a constitution

Just why is a constitution perceived with so much significance? A constitution is a set of decrees, principles and ideals that govern a country. It is the blueprint of the governance of the country and the essential building-block for all political, democratic and legislative particles that formulate a part of that country. As the political heartbeat or DNA of the governance of any country, the constitution is the hallmark and distinction of a country. In other words if any aspect of a constitution is denied or overridden then very basis for the existence of the political and official governing entity in that country is also denied.

For this reason, across the Middle East from Egypt, Libya, Syria and Turkey, real reform is synonymous with popular demands for fundamental changes to the respective constitutions. For example, the real acceptance of the Kurds in Turkey is not through electoral manifestos or mere political rhetoric, it can only be achieved by changing the legal blueprint of that country.

Clear roadmaps in place

For all its critics, the Iraqi consultation is comprehensive and provides a roadmap for many of the major aspects that continue to fuel dispute and animosity today. There is a guideline for the extent of federal powers, regional authority, and powers afforded to executive entities, the sharing and development ofIraq’s immense hydrocarbons and above all else dealing with the issues of disputed territories.

Article 140 clearly outlines timelines, formulas and responsibility for resolving the status of Kirkuk and other associated disputed territories. This made the basis and the method for resolving the Kirkuk dilemma a clear building block of the new Iraq. It is contained in the constitution of the country, the essential framework of its existence, so there can be no clearer argument for the legality and prominence placed on this issue.

This makes the reasons behind the non implementation of a legal, valid and key component of the makeup of the country all the more pertinent.

Simply Arab factions, particularly the Sunnis and neighbouring powers have put more obstacles than solutions to prevent these articles from been implemented and thus thwart what they see as a strategic strengthening of Kurdish hands. It is now almost six years since the constitution was voted in and clearly the appetite for resolving Kirkuk is as lacking as ever.

You may dislike or disagree with articles within the constitution, but this doesn’t make the articles any less legal, clear or enshrined in the makeup of the country. 

Baghdad foot-dragging

Baghdad foot-dragging over article 140 was designed to ensure that the deadline for its implementation of 31st December 2007 would be missed. Yet the same entities that prevented its implementation, now ironically complain that the article is void as the deadline has been passed.

While the Kurds have patiently persisted with the status-quo, the KRG would be unwise to let constitutional articles fester indefinitely and see articles that potentially benefit them to be at a   constant source of obstruction by the Arab and Turkmen sections of the population.

Limiting of Kurdish gains has been the same theme for the lack of a national Hydrocarbon law inIraqand the successive postponement of the census.

The fear with approving Kurdish oil contracts and resolving the status of disputed territories is that Baghdad would lose the little sway it has remaining over Kurdistan and Kurdistan could develop economic, foreign relations and politics unilaterally.

However, the breaking of the constitution is akin to cutting an artery to the heart. There currently exists a voluntary union in Iraq underpinned by constitutional principles. Without these, the legal basis for tying all parts ofIraqis effectively eroded.

Outside interference

Once the deadline for the implementation of article 140 inevitably passed at the end of 2007 and without much progress, the UN was tasked with the responsibility of diffusing tensions, or in the words of UN special envoy to Iraq at the time, Steffan di Mistura, “…stopping the ticking time-bomb”.

Over three years later, the US and UN continue to highlight the dangers that Kirkuk entail to Iraqis future but their commitment has been lacking in breaking the deadlock. The UN in particular was tasked to look at solutions and alternatives to resolving disputed territories. The continued insistence of an international body to bypass a country constitution is remarkable. The mechanism for resolving the status of Kirkuk has long been decided. Ultimately, like any true democracy, it’s the people that should decide their fate, not Ankara, Baghdad, the UN or the alike.

With the Kurdistan government growing increasingly tired and frustrated, top Kurdish leaders have recently warned on the dangers of any bypassing of the constitution.

Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani recently stated, “If this article is dead it means the constitution is dead. And if the constitution is dead it means Iraq is finished.” Such similar sentiments were echoed by Nechirvan Barzani and Kurdistan Parliament Speaker Kamal Kirkuki in recent weeks.

Kurdish warnings

Successive Kurdish warnings must be matched with key timelines and actions. Waiting for Baghdadand regional powers to bolsters their aims and proactively resolve issues that favour them will only end in disappointment. If the constitution is ignored by Baghdad, then the very foundations of the state are in turn ignored.

The Kurds have been persistently pressured by Washington and the UN, amongst others to compromise.  Whilst 250,000 Kurds were kicked and beaten without remorse from their historical homes, “compromise” was not a word uttered by Baathist forces. Now those same Kurds, wishing to return home, are been told their legally-enshrined demands constitute overreaching and they must compromise.

For the Kurds, this is a historical juncture. This is a chance to correct the wrongs of the past in a democratic and legal manner. If Kurds were unwilling to compromise in 1975 overKirkuk, then any deal in the “new”Iraqof 2011 not involving its rightful return would represent a huge setback.

Dispute over oil contracts

The issue over Kirkuk has only been matched by the highly contentious disputes over oil sharing and the rights of regional administrations to develop their own oil fields. The Kurdistan Region has signed over 35 Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) and Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) with foreign oil exploration companies in recent years in what they deem as a natural right under the constitution. This has been hotly contested by Baghdad and particularly former Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani who has frequently labelled such deals as illegal.

Only recently has the deadlock been broken with Baghdad endorsing the oil contracts and authorising limited exports through Iraqi national pipelines. However, the bottom line remains that Baghdad does not want to see the Kurds drive on unhindered with their own national program. The recent pact by Shahristani with the EU to export gas through the southern corridor to Kurdish surprise is testament to this. Kurdistan was long earmarked as a pivot to the proposed Nabucco pipeline in the north, which would have guaranteed it strategic standing and lucrative returns.

Simmering political tension in Baghdad

The nineteen post-electoral demands of the Kurds were explicitly accepted as a condition for their support of the new government. Furthermore, a number of other critical points were agreed between Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis that allowed several months of bickering and jockeying to end.

However, the problem inIraqis that often the agreements are not worth the paper they are printed on. The lack of implementation of the Erbil agreement of last autumn, has led to entrenched camps of Iyad Allawi and Nouri Maliki, with relations all but beyond repair. Key points in the agreement including the formation of  Higher Strategic Policies Council that was to be headed by Allawi and the naming of key ministries has continued to falter.

Recent heated exchanges between Allawi and Maliki, underpin the common mistrust and animosity that continues to blight the new Iraq. Allawi accused Maliki of been “a liar, hypocrite and misleading”, who came to power with “Iranian support”, in retaliation for the State of Law of  Maliki aiming to reprimand Allawi for abstaining from parliamentary sessions.

The laboured progress in Baghdad and the ongoing sectarian battles that impinge progress is all the more reason for Kurdistan not to wait, to be held back and destabilised by the south, but to continue in the interests of Kurds and Kurdistan unabated.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Primary Sources of Republication: eKurd, Various Misc.

The mutual necessity of extending the US stay in Iraq

Owed to the great commotion surrounding the second Gulf war and the subsequent public fall-out, the US liberation of Iraq may always be remembered as a dark moment of US foreign policy akin to Vietnam. However, in the midst of the hostilities, violence, squabbling amongst Iraqi factions and stumbling steps towards democracy, the significance of theUSinvasion is often forgotten.

As the US suffered a tainted foreign policy image and a general deterioration of perception amongst the Muslim community whilst becoming vilified for its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is easy to paper over the failings, deep-rooted animosity amongst Iraq’s socio-ethnic patchwork and misdealing and underperformance by successive Iraqi governments as US errors of judgment.

Iraq became an Achilles heel of George W. Bush and a great handicap for the US at home and abroad and both politically and economically. However, as the months wind down towards the end of 2011, where the remaining 45,000 or so US troops are set to withdraw from Iraq as part of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), there are increasing voices within the Iraqi political spectrum calling for an extension of this deadline, realising the stability that the US presence provides and the fragile nature of Iraq.

Whilst Iraq’s transition from brutal dictatorship to democracy has not been perfect, it is nevertheless a remarkable milestone. Iraq has made great strides in recent years particularly in the field of security but reconciliation has been as difficult as ever owed to the fragmented Iraqi socio-ethnic mosaic and the entrenched mistrust amongst disparate groups that has made the sharing of the Iraqi cake all that more difficult.

It is often overlooked that not only did the current government formation set a world record but that the cabinet is still not formally concluded months after the deadlock to form government was broken. Whilst politicians entered the agreement through gritted teeth and under a cloud of compromise there are growing signs of fractures amongst the current alliance. Simply put Iraqi politicians have spent more time squabbling within the political chambers than delivering services to the people on the streets.

Ayad Allawi of Al-Iraqiya, who won the majority vote at the elections, has made a number of threats to leave government and has been critical of been treated “not as a partner but as a participant.” Allawi refused to take the post as the head of National Council for Strategic Policy owed to disputes with Nouri al-Maliki around powers that he would be afforded, with al-Iraqiya demanding more than just symbolic posts with no real power but with al-Maliki unwilling to relinquish his executive decision making status.

The current predicament in Baghdad is overshadowed with a number of disputes with the KRG which have festered over many years through constant foot-dragging, side-stepping and half-hearted approach to resolution from Baghdad.

Kirkuk continues to be at the top of the contentious issues over disputed territories. In spite of a clear road map for the resolution of Kirkuk and other disputed areas, it has been continuously put on the shelf and the constitutional articles have not been implemented. Furthermore, althoughKirkukwas a key condition ahead of the agreement of Kurdistan parties to back a new coalition in Baghdad, in reality practical steps have not been undertaken to finally diffuse this long-time ticking time-bomb.

Devastating bombings in recent weeks have highlighted the tentative nature of Kirkuk. Al-Qaeda and insurgent groups continue to try and ignite ethnic strife and fuel animosity amongst the Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens. The sensitive climate was further highlighted with the Arab uproar when Kurdish Peshmerga forces were deployed to Kirkuk in March under the pretext of protecting the Kurdish inhabitants ahead of mass protests that were organised. Whilst the situation was quickly diffused, it showed how sentiments can explode at any time and where ethnic loyalties clearly lie.

The US has highlighted Kirkuk as biggest danger toIraq’s stability post withdrawal. Friction between the Erbil andBaghdad, fragile coalitions, a loose national partnership and with questions around the effectiveness and logistical readiness of the Iraqi security apparatus, this has bolstered the case for a US stay beyond 2011.

The Kurdish support for such long-termUSpresence and indeed permanent bases inKurdistanis nothing new and where recently reaffirmed by Jabbar Yawar, secretary general of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.

However, al-Maliki’s openness to extending the US stay is a sign of the importance most Iraqi’s increasingly pin to an extended US presence on their soil. Officially, al-Maliki has stated that he will proceed with national dialogue with rival blocs to reach consensus on extending the SOFA agreement, but almost certainly secret talks have been ongoing behind the scenes for several months with US military officials.

The top officer of the Iraqi army, General Babaker Zebari, previously stated that US forces will be needed until 2020.

Clearly, after the enormous sacrifices in preserving a stable Iraq and indeed a stable Middle east, the US will not want to walk away all too easily.Iraq was never a short-term project, regardless of the presence of troops on the ground. Influence and interest in a region or country is not just about the number of troops, the web of intelligence and entanglement is much deeper. The US will want to be seen to respect Iraqi sovereignty from a public perspective but in the background will be pressuring to maintain a strong hand in the direction of the Iraqi government, defeat of radical forces and ensuring equilibrium in the region not least because ofIran.

US Defence Secretary, Robert Gates has openly admitted that other than maintaining stability inIraq, the priority for troop extension is to send a strong warning toIranthat the US will not pull out of the Middle East. Iranian and to a lesser extent  Turkish and other Sunni Arab meddling in Iraq is already a key handicap for reconciliation and any hasty US withdrawal when the Iraqi project is clearly not complete will only enlarge the ethnic and sectarian divide and increase interference by neighbouring countries.

Iranian influence on Baghdad is evident and has somewhat contributed to the divided political lines. The US hand in Iraq, is not just designed to keep the Iranians at bay in Baghdad, but to ensure Iranians are hampered in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and beyond.

It is somewhat unsurprising that the main group who vehemently oppose US presence is the pro-Iranian group of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr who has threatened to recommence violence if US forces stay beyond the deadline.

Aside from providing critical security over the years, Washington has had an instrumental hand in forcing the Iraqi hand to end a number of political impasses. In fact many symbolic agreements where only achieved with frantic American jockeying in the background.

It is increasingly acknowledged that the same mediation will be needed to ensure political stability inIraq, especially if the current government breaks down. Whilst progress has been achieved at a painstaking pace, it can unravel and unwind at a much faster pace. Progress inIraqis very much reversible.

Keeping US troops in Iraq will not only have repercussions in Iraq. It will also highlight a major u-turn for US President Barack Obama, whose key election pledge was to withdraw forces fromIraqas quickly as possible.

The top priority of the US should no longer be security but ensuring the establishment of a strong political and economic foundation. Pushing for the implementation of roadmaps for resolving disputed territories, sharing of natural resources, affective power sharing formula and bridging sectarian divides is the only long-term answer.

The US needs to apply pressure to finally force the Kirkuk issue and seek long-term resolutions to the increasing tensions between Erbil and Baghdad. Too many critical differences have been too often brushed under the political rug for the sake of short-term gains at the time.

It must not be forgotten that the significant US surge strategy was to only provide Iraqis with “breathing space” to reconcile their difference and find political concord. However, this was far from achieved with many of the measurements set by the US all those years ago still not met.

Without resolving the true underlining issues that continue to plague Iraq and the establishment of am affective power-sharing system via loose federations, US presence for decades more will not solve core issues.

 While the US was a long-time scapegoat for the Iraqi downward spiral, it is time for Iraqi politicians to shoulder the responsibility of tackling corruption, unemployment and security and build rebuild their house for the future.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

The end of the beginning as the Iraqi government gets to work

After nine months of intense political jockeying and instability as major Iraqi factions struggled to reach a consensus on power-sharing, lawmakers finally approved the new cabinet headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in a special session, which is hoped to foster a new path towards rebuilding Iraq’s shattered economy and infrastructure and promoting national unity.

Bridging together deep mistrust and animosity amongst the socio-ethnic mosaic was never going to be a simple undertaking. However, inconclusive results from the national elections in March of this year made the task an even tougher nut to crack.

After a heated race for the right to form the next government, al-Maliki proved triumphant thanks to the key support he mustered from the Sadrist bloc and the Kurdistan Alliance.

This left the challenging task of convincing the al-Iraqiya list, headed by Iyad Allawi and the victors of the polls, to grudgingly join the new government. The critical task in the Iraqi political sphere remained ensuring that the Sunnis were not sidelined once again for fear of returning to the dark days of the past.

However, as the actual bargaining to form the government produced tentative results and was marred by resentment and mistrust, there was a great danger that the cabinet formation would be tainted by the same connotations.

Faced by a constitutional deadline to announce his new cabinet, al-Maliki only presented 29 permanent nominees which were all approved, with the remaining 13 filled by temporary stand-ins.

This was to give al-Maliki vital breathing space to assess the candidates for these roles that would have overall support of parliament.

With an air of distrust that stills looms over the political chambers, finding suitable candidates to fill key security based positions that would fit the criteria of all sides is a difficult undertaking. As such the influential positions of Ministers for interior, defense and national security are still undecided.

With the security forces often accused of sectarian favouritism, any controversial candidates in these positions would only fuel further suspicion and unrest.

The tough predicament that has often handicapped the Iraqi transitional road to democracy, was perhaps best highlighted by al-Maliki’s speech before parliament – “the most difficult task in the world is forming a national unity government in a country where there is a diversity of ethnic, sectarian and political backgrounds.”

Simply put, this cabinet or government does not satisfy all sides and under the wide-spectrum of agendas, objectives and viewpoints amongst the embittered groups it is ultimately impossible to appease all parties.

Therefore, this government is a “best fit” against the current backdrop of pressures, delays and common disunity.

There was always going to be a sectarian flavour to the makeup of the cabinet and this is next to impossible to avoid. Whether in the streets and villages, the national assembly or the cabinet, the disparate and fractured nature of the Iraqi landscape is difficult to evade.

The notable appointments include former Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani as Deputy Prime minister for Energy, which was viewed as a great relief as it provided some comfort that contracts signed under his stewardship would be honoured in the absence of a national hydrocarbon law.

Abdul Kareem Luaibi as the new Oil Minister will provide further reassurance to would be investors having played a key role in negotiations with international oil giants.

Rafie Al-Esawi was named Finance Minister with Hoshyar Zebari maintaining his long-held role as Foreign Minister. There was plenty of Sunni representation with a total of 11 posts, with Saleh al-Mutlaq, who ironically only several months ago was banned for alleged ties to the former Baath party, named as one of the Deputy Prime Ministers.

Finding the formulas for short-term concord and stability has been difficult enough. Finding a formula that will allow long-term national harmony and peace where Iraqis work towards a greater common vision will take much longer.

The current cabinet may close a lid on the ethno-sectarian cracks for now but this will likely be at the expense of an effective government.

As strenuous as it proved to glue the pieces of the political jigsaw together, the pieces are susceptible to falling off at greater ease.

Allawi gave his crucial backing to the new government which was seen as a major boost for instilling positivity but it is still unclear how much power he will be afforded as leader of the new National Council for Strategic Policies.

In the realm of executive decision making, it waits to be seen how much sway al-Maliki will endure if there are attempts at curbing his power.

Much in the same way, the support of influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr was critical in allowing al-Maliki to stand a second term. However, his support is far from unconditional and thus not only did he demand a key number of ministries but he will have a firm eye on the candidates enlisted for key security positions.

This has been one of the key reasons in delaying the announcement of the remaining 13 posts as negotiations ensue to find compromise candidates.

Away from the sectarian fault lines, the biggest danger to the stability of the new government is the long-term relationship between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad. The Kurds, whose support with the kingmaker status was crucial in sealing victory for al-Maliki, have been at loggerheads over many articles that have been allowed to brew and fester over the years and are now reaching boiling-stage.

The key areas of contention include the implementation of article 140 concerning Kirkuk and other disputed territories and ratification of oil contracts signed by the KRG.

The Kurds have been weary of more failed promises and submitted a 19-point precondition for joining the government, which was approved primarily by the National Alliance.

It remains unclear whether this will be explicitly signed by al-Maliki as the Kurds demand, and how legally binding it will prove in practice. It is more uncertain how al-Maliki may trade-off his partners in their respective goals. It may well come to the stage, where al-Maliki will have to decide which partners support is more crucial.

It is next to impossible, to satisfy all parties long-term without greatly forsaking another. The status of Kirkuk is the best example, where any agreement with the Kurds would be on al-Iraqiya’s doorstep.

Although, Luaibi as the new Oil Minister enjoys good relationships with the Kurds, al-Shahristani, may well maintain similar hard line rhetoric with the Kurds.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Online Opinion, Various Misc.

 

Let Iraqis stand up and be counted – enough of foot-dragging over the census

In most countries, the conducting of a national census would be a logical and straightforward periodic exercise that provides governments with key data pertinent to its citizens, facilitating affective socio-economic planning, improved delivery of public services, forecasting of future growth and generally providing a better understanding of the very people they are elected to serve.

However, much owed to the disparate and fragmented nature of the Iraqi socio-ethnic horizon, the numbers game has huge significance in Iraq in more ways than one. Where normally a census would be a question of numbers and not politics, in an Iraq that houses a diverse and historically tense mosaic, results of any census are just the fuel for the political platform.

With each group entrenched in deep mistrust, numbers means power and a way for one side not become sidelined or subjugated by another. 

With the valuable substance that the census promises to provide, it has invariably become one of those elusive constitutional principles that have continually been sidelined for one reason or another in the new Iraq.

It was perhaps of little surprise when the Iraqi government announced its latest delay on the conducting of the census set for 5th December 2010. This was the fourth such postponement since its original date in 2007, where it was first canceled due to the crippling sectarian violence at the time.

While Iraqi leaders met this week to discuss the very issue, a new date has yet to be confirmed. As Iraqi President Jalal Talabani stressed the importance of carrying out this census in the soonest possible time, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki admitted that there were no longer security constraints in the way of implementing the census.

The leaders agreed to form committees with view to resolving the current issues.

The timeline for the census has been stretched for its undoubted effect on the status of disputed territories. In fact, as a key step under article 140 of the constitution, the census is a milestone step before a referendum can take place.

The crux of Baghdad’s discomfort is the undoubted ammunition that the results of the census will provide in the fierce political stakes, namely distribution of oil reserves and the status of Kirkuk.

As such, the census has become the staging ground for the struggle between Kurds and Arabs, as opposed to promoting any real inter-Arab friction. Simply put, there is a great fear that the census will make the Kurds the masters in their current disputes with Baghdad and firmly tip the scales in their favor.

If a census was to be held tomorrow without the three Kurdish provinces as was the case in 1997, there would be no hesitation, highlighting that that the reluctance in holding any census is fuelled at curbing Kurdish aspirations.

The US, Turkey and Baghdad have persistently tried to thwart the census, labeling it as a product that will dilute a sense of nationalism and unity. However, why should a principle widely conducted throughout the West be postponed only because it would appear that results would benefit one side and not another?

At this moment in time, the exact composition and nature of Iraq’s socio-ethnic framework is based on much guesswork. For example, due to immense Arabisation policies of the past and a process of ongoing normalisation with Kurds returning to Kirkuk, it is simply unclear who commands what portion of the Kirkuk cake. At various intervals, Turkomen, Arabs and Kurds have all claimed to be the majority.

A census would finally answer many burning questions about the countries breakdown. As much as it would be hard to stomach for the “losers” of the census, facts are facts. A census is an analysis of the reality on the ground and this reality whether confirmed officially or otherwise is still in fact reality.

Those who fear that the census will lead to the polarization of Iraq are short-sighted. Iraq was polarised from the moment it was artificially stitched together at the time of its creation.

Any census will only confirm the extent of the polarization of Iraq.

Furthermore, due to the segmented nature of the Iraqi landscape, the application of democratic values over the past several years has only serve to highlight this clear fragmentation.

In this light, the national elections are nothing short of a national census as opposed to a classic democracy. The Kurds will vote for the Kurds, the Shiites for the Shiites and so on. There are always going to be slight variations to this rule but the underlining facts remain the same.

One look at the victors of the recent polls in each province along with the breakdown of the provincial council seats will already indicate the ethno-sectarian breakdown of that region.

The Iraqi national assembly is another clear gauge of the makeup of the Iraqi mosaic. The number of seats won by each major group is generally reflective of the population breakdown.

This clear disparity was one of the major reasons in the great delay in forming a government that satisfied the different the agendas of each group.

For the Kurds, one of their greatest fears was joining another coalition that would not fulfill its promises. The nineteen points that formed the terms of alliance were agreed by in full al-Maliki but it is not clear how keen Baghdad would be to implement certain measures, especially in light of the risk of upsetting the sectarian balance with their Sunni brethren who are on a collision course with key Kurdish demands relating to oil and disputed lands.

The holding of the census is the first crucial litmus test of the new coalition’s appetite to fulfill their vows. The Kurds may well be the main gainers from the census but this is no reason to indefinitely postpone constitutional principles.

It should not be forgotten that facts that the census will clearly portray can also be a factor for political reconciliation, for example, the allocation of the percentage of the national budget can be settled in a transparent way.

Clear statistics can also help Baghdad in formulating affective planning in the spheres of education, housing, public health and transportation, which are all essential for the government to serve its people in the best possible way. In addition, it will answer many key questions such as the number of orphans, widows and people forced to relocate.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Once bitten, twice shy

While Kurds bring warring Arabs together, Kurdistan must ensure that the principles of co-existence are not sidelined

For a disparate country fuelled by common mistrust and a diverse ethno-social mosaic, finding a formula to satisfy all sides is never going to be plain sailing. How the Iraqi ‘cake’ is essentially shared and the mechanisms for doing so remain at the heart of Iraqi disputes. While analysts often talk about the distribution of power between the Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish counterparts, the basis for their respective “demands” is at times misunderstood.

There are essentially two deriving factors for the distribution of power in Iraq. The question around the division of power and key responsibilities between Shiites and Sunnis is essentially an Arab and sectarian based issue and a greater problem for Baghdad. There are of course various agendas for the balance of power and national ranking between Sunnis and Shiites, not least the great foreign interest in ensuring one side gets the upper hand over the other.

However, the Kurdish issue must not be judged on the same basis as the “Arab” problem. As far as Kurdistan is considered, it is a separate federal entity and as such the issue of ensuring equal representation and distribution of power should be based on ethnic grounds and on the basis of a voluntary union between the two main nationalities in Iraq.

Some Arab parties and foreign powers misapply the importance of dividing the top seats in Iraq. There was immense pressure from Washington and Ankara for the Kurds to relinquish their demand for the Presidency. This is democracy and normally electoral representation and thus the seats attained speak volumes. However, by the same token this is Iraq and democracy can never be applied on the basis of such simple mathematics. In theory, the Kurds came fourth in the election and thus top seats can be guzzled up by the so called victors of the polls. However, ultimately the argument is simple. As the second nation in Iraq, who affectively opted to become a part of a new federal Iraq on a voluntary basis, the importance of equal representation for the Kurds in Baghdad must not be mixed up with a quota based strictly on election results.

As such, when it comes to the distribution of power and key posts in Baghdad, the Kurds warrant a share of powerful positions based on equal partner status in Iraq and based on the plurality of the country. The Kurds warrant key roles that have influence in shaping the external character of Iraq and therefore the Kurds must hold onto the position of Foreign Minister. Then there are the key posts that decide the internal strategy and makeup of Iraq such as the ministries of oil, interior and security.

If the Kurds are denied positions that define and highlight the plurality of Iraq to the outside world or internal roles that define the direction of Iraq then this would provide evidence that age-old mentalities are hard to shake-off in Iraq and would certainly have the Kurds asking what direct benefit would they have  in any connection to Baghdad.

It would be ironic and somewhat contradictory if foreign powers and particularly Arab politicians assume that whilst constitutionally Kurds are the second nation in Iraq and in a voluntary union, that they would be happy with backroom political roles, especially to appease the likes of Allawi and al-Maliki.

This is the intrinsic nature of Iraq and no matter how you look at it, classic democracy can never be applied to Iraq. Regardless that they are outnumbered by Arabs in the greater Iraq, Kurds refuse to buckle to decisions imposed on their region or on their people by Arab politicians, lest some Arab chauvinists that prevail. Much in the same way that even though the Sunnis are far outnumbered by their Shiite rivals, they refuse to succumb to Shiite rule and moreover the majority of Western powers refuse to allow this reality to bear fruit. Ironically, the idea that Allawi and al-Iraqiya were triumphant at the elections is somewhat misleading. Firstly, Allawi is another Shiite using the Sunni bandwagon in his quest to reestablish power and secondly if all the Shiite parties combine, they have by far the most votes and could politically outmaneuver the Sunnis at ease.

Thus the new political mission in Iraq of distributing posts and forming a new cabinet will be based on the ideals of appeasement and a quota based system. The price extracted by political parties for supporting this new government will never be proportional to the number of seats attained at the polls, but based on meeting demands of political counterparts to keep them content and thus keeping the fragile political framework glued together.

As such, the perquisites of al-Iraqiya support hinge on them attaining powerful positions such heading the new National Council for Higher Strategic Policies. The contradictions are obvious, this council does not have constitutional support but based on the ‘goodwill’ of the leading Shiites and specifically al-Maliki when it comes to affording it executive decision making ability. As the head of the government, by far the largest coalition in the country and the overwhelmingly majority in Iraq, how far would al-Maliki go to share power with the Sunni’s purely based on the desire to appease their minority brethren who are yet a key component of the Iraqi framework?

The political uncertainty and instability can be best highlighted in the so called national army. The Sunnis distrust the national security forces that have a predominantly Shiite flavour, while the Kurds are not adequately represented and thus will always rely on their substantial and experienced regional Peshmerga forces, while other key Shiites such as the Sadrist fear that without their powerful militias that they would become sidelined militaristically by the likes of al-Maliki. Hence, Moqtada al-Sadr’s precondition for supporting his onetime nemesis in al-Maliki was that his Sadr forces obtain 25% of key positions within the security. Finally, there is the grand issue of fully integrating the Sunni Sahwa council forces into the official security apparatus.

Each of the aforementioned military factions is loyal to none but their political, sectarian or ethnic affiliations. Simply put, no side will accept a quota based on their populist representation in Iraq. Fuelled with great mistrust and a tainted history, no party will be willing to see another side with great military prowess assume the ascendancy.

As far as the Kurds are concerned, whilst they may have ironically helped Baghdad achieve a new government by acting as a strategic balancing body, of what benefit is seeing a strong and prosperous Baghdad and cross-sectarian Arab harmony if the key demands that form the underpinning of the voluntary union are continuously ignored?

Arabs have been dragging their heels over the implementation of the constitution particularly relating to Kirkuk and disputed territories and promises have been ignored countless times in the past. There is a great danger that Kurdish demands may be sidelined for greater Arab reconciliation somewhere down the line where Baghdad grows politically stronger. For example, all of nineteen Kurdish preconditions for support have been agreed by al-Maliki, which serve as a major victory on paper for Kurdistan. However, whether al-Maliki will be willing to underwrite some of these implementations in the backyard of al-Iraqiya is unclear. Most Sunnis within al-Iraqiya have been openly bullish in their opposition to potential KRG expansion. This will likely leave al-Maliki with a dilemma, stall the Kurds further or upset the Sunnis.

The Kurds must be unmistakably clear. The constitution is the basis for their co-existence and thus the Kurds are asking for nothing more than what is legally enshrined in legislature. If the Arabs pull together to thwart Kurds over the constitution demands or the principles of co-existence is sidelined once more, then the Kurds must stop working to establish unity and stable governance in Baghdad and resign from Iraqi politics altogether.

The signs this time around suggest the Kurdish leadership will not tolerate small talk or empty promises. However, it waits to be seen if the latest episode of Kurdish intervention between Sunnis and Shiites and their role as a key balancing force leaves them with their key goals and objectives distanced – once again.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Now deadlock is over but hard tasks are ahead

A political breakthrough is finally reached but after eight months of tiresome political jostling, in what shape does the new government get to work?

It was an arduous, protracted and tiresome journey at the best of times, but Iraqi politicians finally brokered a deal to form a new government. The announcement came as a result of days of intricate negotiations both in Baghdad and Erbil, were an elusive power-sharing formula that satisfied all sides was finally reached.

As it has became widely expected in recent weeks, Nouri al-Maliki would retain his position as Prime Minister, with the Kurds retaining the presidency. Iyad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya would assume the Speaker of Parliament position, along with the heading of the newly established National Council for Strategic Policy.

Although the basis for the new government is crucial, distribution of key ministries and the makeup of the new cabinet are still to be confirmed. Either way, the likes of al-Iraqiya and the Sadrist will exact a price for their support of al-Maliki with key roles in the new cabinet.

With a new journey that weary and dejected politicians must now assume, the crucial milestone of agreeing on the basis of a new government may soon be eroded by the many political cracks that Iraq will need to taper. The maintaining of such a delicate balance may prove more difficult than the onset of any agreement itself.

Facts speak louder than words. Any country that sets the world record for the longest period of time without a government after an election speaks volumes about its socio-political handicaps.

Eight months and twenty parliamentary session minutes later, the MPs have plenty of work to get started on. For every day the MPs bickered and the government forming stalemate ensued, the very people that these politicians were elected to serve suffered. Much progress remains to be made in Iraq and as far as the government is concerned the real work has yet to begin.

The problem in Iraq, a disparate country fuelled by historical mistrust is the thirst for power. No side is easily willing to relinquish power to another. And finding a power-sharing solution that will satisfy each side is much easier said than done as the facts clearly prove.

Amidst the current political frenzy, it is often forgotten that protracted negotiations and political stalemates is hardly a new phenomenon in Iraq. Often at critical junctures in the past, fervent pressure from the US ensured political progress and compromise amongst the main factions. As much as the US has encouraged and attempted to help muster an inclusive government, their lack of influence this time round is clear, as Kurds, Shiites and Kurds stuck to their guns.

As kingmakers, the Kurds had clear demands for their inclusion in any coalition and if all their preconditions have been met, then this serves to solidify the Kurdish strategic standing both in Iraq and the Middle East. In recent weeks, the Kurdish leadership has played a key role in facilitating negotiations and acting as the political raft in a gulf of political tension. This illustrates the vital role that the Kurds play, both in terms of commanding a share of seats that affords them the role of kingmakers but also as the key balancing piece in the jigsaw between the Sunnis and Shiites.

In theory, the biggest breakthrough for the Kurds was the commitment of other parties to the constitution. Whilst Baghdad often look to find solutions to political rifts, the constitution which already provides a roadmap for resolving a number of key issues such as disputed territories, hydrocarbon law and federalism is sidelined.

Simply put, as long as Baghdad abides by the constitution and acts on its promise in practical terms, then the vast majority of the Kurdish wish list is already covered.

Although, a number of breakthroughs had been prematurely announced in recent weeks, it became increasingly clear that Nouri al-Maliki had won his challenge to retain the premiership. His pan Shiite alliance already made formidable reading on paper and the strategic enticement of the Kurdish coalition was all that was needed to cross the line. With the Kurds mustering a tight grip on the demand for the presidency, it left al-Iraqiya with the Speaker of Parliament position.

The heart of the problem ultimately lies with the appeasement of the al-Iraqiya group and the idea of establishing an all inclusive government. Allawi held the view to the last moment of negotiations that as the victor at the polls, his group should play the lead role in government formation. In light of this stance, convincing him firstly to accept a role under al-Maliki and secondly as a “second” party was not going to be easy.

Ultimately, the application of democracy to Iraq is often like applying square pegs to circle holes. Regardless, of the elections results and the number of seats that parties are afforded, no side is happy to take proportional power in line with the seats attained.

Although on paper, al-Iraqiya came out on top at the polls, it was under a misleading reading. State of Law only came second as the major Shiites groupings initially failed to form a coalition. Once the Shiites groups announced a new alliance to create a Shiite super-party, this sent ominous danger signals to the Sunnis. However, the timing of Moqtada al-Sadr’s backing of al-Maliki was the real hammer blow to Allawi. Thus Allawi’s instance on a government which reflects the results of the elections is not so accurate, once the real votes in parliament are tallied up.

Whilst foreign powers have tried to push Iraqis along and have lamented the time taken to form government, ironically they have been at the core of the problems. Turkey, Iran, America and Sunni neighbours have each had their own ideals on a future vision of Iraq and the basis for power-sharing. For neighbouring Sunni countries and the Washington administration, a new Sadrist backed al-Maliki premiership tipped the scales firmly in Tehran’s favour, and they worked tirelessly to readdress this balance.

It may well have been pressure from Tehran above all other external parties that led to the current deal between the main parties.

The real question for a parliament who will get to work based on power-sharing and national unity on an undoubted bitter taste, where do politicians with an over flowing “in tray” of tasks go from here? Any compromise or power-sharing formed on delicate foundations or through gritted teeth will be prone to future splits and ultimately collapse. For example, one of Allawi’s conditions was that no political decision could be made without its agreement.

As a price for his inclusion, Allawi wanted roles with real power but this is in many ways in contradiction to the constitution. Any position that can rival the role of prime minister in executive powers spells trouble. However, the backdoor manoeuvring that has taken place to appease Sunnis comes from an evident desire to avoid a return of the dark days of insurgency. By the same token, although Allawi remained steadfast on his quest for power, other elements within his ranks could clearly see the reality of a new al-Maliki leadership and wanted to avoid the bare-cupboard nature of political exclusion that they witnessed before and as a result showed increased willingness to work with al-Maliki.

Either way, it appears that Allawi and al-Iraqiya commanded a high price for their endorsement. The presidency of the National Council for Strategic Policy was designed to keep Allawi in the frame as a key Iraqi leader. However, Allawi was far from happy with consultative or ceremonial roles and demanded real power in this role. It is still unclear how much authority this council will really have.

How al-Maliki will fare in an environment were his wings are essentially clipped will make interesting reading, especially as al-Maliki has often been criticized in the past for monopolising power and having too much of a direct influence on the security forces.

One thing is clear. The new government of 2011 will certainly be weaker and not stronger than the government of 2006, and in reality this new national partnership may pose more questions than answers.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd, Online Opinion, Peyamner, Various Misc.