Tag Archives: PKK

Turkey’s peace initiative – ensuring that once rebels drop weapons, they are not picked up again

The turn of the year has created a unique environment and momentum in Turkey for solving the age-old Kurdish question, better than any time in the history of the Turkish republic, culminating in Abdullah Ocalan’s Newroz ceasefire declaration and an on-going peace process.

While the current progress and general rhetoric is certainly positive, many obstacles lie head and the initiative can be easily derailed.

It has taken bold steps from both sides to get this far and settling a three decade armed struggle cannot be achieved without courageous steps, determination and real compromise and desire. While many in Turkey continue to believe there is no Kurdish question and what remains to be resolved is a “terrorist” problem, true resolution and reconciliation will only come with the acknowledgement that the Kurdish question and the PKK problem are one and the same.

The details of peace talks and agreements, other than through leaked press reports, have been generally concealed. The government needs to be clear and transparent in the negotiations and with practical steps it is willing to take.

These steps must mean wholesale gestures to the Kurds through parliamentary measures and not via a piecemeal carrot and stick approach.

The current debate about the withdrawal of PKK rebels within Turkey highlights the current sensitivity that continues to plague Turkey. The AKP government has refused demands to enshrine the disarmament and withdrawal of PKK rebels into legislation. It remains conscious of nationalist reservations or giving the PKK nemesis credibility or acclaim through any “public” withdrawal.

In the grander scheme of things, dropping of guns will not be an issue and it is likely that in Ocalan’s latest letter to be announced that he will push the rebels to disarm before withdrawing. It is ensuring that these guns are not picked up gain that is the issue.

If Turkish government concessions fail to materialise or appease the greater portion of Kurdish society, the process can easily unravel. Furthermore, without long-term peace and democratic measures, reflected in a constitution that deliver true rights for the Kurds and a level of regional autonomy enveloped with economy growth and investment in the south east, another armed group may simply fly the flag.

With new democratic channels, a constitution that protects Kurdish identity and new jobs, much needed public services and an improved standard of living, a new natural political climate can take hold in the Kurdish regions of Turkey.

Indeed the onset of a new Turkey is a win-win for Turks and Kurds, but for the PKK it has to realise that an end of violence is also win-win for all parts of Kurdistan. The new Kurdistan Region of Syria was hampered by its association with the PKK and a harsh line of Turkey. Peace in Turkey will also result in constructive steps by Ankara with Qamishli.

The anti-Assad stance of the Turkish government led to a somewhat predictable reinvigoration of Damascus ties with the PKK serving to “punish” and destabilise Turkey. The influence of PKK peace negotiations on the PYD can arguably already be seen with escalating tensions between YPG Kurdish forces and regime forces.

Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who for many is staking his political career in the rapprochement with Ocalan, is seeking to make a number of gains in one move.

It cannot ignore the onset of Syrian Kurdish autonomy which raises the nationalist stake for all Kurds and in the fast changing Middle East and surrounded by all four parts of Kurdistan, it can risk animosity with the Kurds at its peril.

Last but not least, peace with the PKK removes one remaining thorn in the already strong and prosperous relations between the Kurdistan Region and Ankara. With expanding energy ties with Erbil and unprecedented trade volumes not to mention the importance of strategic and political alliances with the Kurdistan Regional Government, Ankara can ill-afford to let out-dated nationalist principles mark the growing reality of a new middle Eastern order and with it the rise of the Kurds. Ankara can either ignore the Kurdish nationalist reality to its detriment or harness it for the betterment of Turkey’s regional and strategic goals.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

In the new Turkey, how happy is the one who says “I am a Turk or a Kurd”

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The Imrali peace process in Turkey has created an environment, support base and sense of expectancy that has never been seen before. There is great hope that the new bridge building initiative will lead to the ultimate quest of long-term peace, laying down of arms and a new chapter in the history of the Turkish republic.

Public opinion both within Turkish and Kurdish circles indicate that people are fed up with decades of war and suffering and yearn for peace. Even the staunchest Turkish nationalist has come to terms with the limits of military power. How many billions of dollars of lost expenditure and sheer resources been consumed by one of the largest armies in NATO, yet almost 3 decades on and the loss of thousands of lives of later, the cyclic battle has only served to deepen the divide and inflame tensions in Turkey.

The open keenness of the AKP government and official support for talks with imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, long-time public enemy number one and now seemingly the key facilitator to peace, speaks volumes about changing sentiment.

The lack of a genuine desire for talks, absence of real concessions and common mistrust have in the past quickly clouded any prospects of real peace. Indeed only sincere and bold efforts will realise a new dawn.

In a second visit by a Pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) delegation since the turn of the year, deputies Sırrı Süreyya Önder, Pervin Buldan and Altan Tan visited Ocalan in the island prison of Imrali to discuss and outline the next steps in the peace process.

Although, the roadmap rumoured to have been agreed between Ocalan and Hakan Fidan, the head of National Intelligence Organization (MİT), was not revealed or the specific details of the delegations meeting with Ocalan was not known, according to the three BDP members, Ocalan had referred to the new peace process as a historic step and emphasised on all sides to show “care and sensitivity.”

There were also indications from the BDP delegation’s statement that Ocalan and the PKK were ready to release captives, likely in exchange for release of KCK prisoners, as part of the initial steps.

The roadmap and next steps are likely to be publicised shortly by both sides, although the sense of caution is understandable. Current hopes and expectations have to be put into perspective. It has taken years and much suffering to even reach this juncture, both sides will maneuverer carefully, but what is clear is that if the chance for peace is missed this time around, Turkey may regret it for many years to come.

The whole unnecessary and largely irrelevant argument over which BDP members would visit Ocalan in the latest round of talks shows the sensitivity and wariness of the Turkish government. It wants to be seen to have the upper-hand in this process and that it is calling the shots. The AKP government as ever have the difficult job of appeasing all sections of society, especially nationalists hawks, who have often put a spanner in the works.

The Turkish government must also expect some responsibility for the lack of Kurdish interlocutors on the ground. The PKK has continued to dominate the Kurdish landscape and Ocalan, in spite of his virtual isolation for 14 years, still holds the largest sway and reverence amongst the Kurds. BDP politicians are the very people voted by Turkish citizens in a legal and transparent way and who have seats in the Turkish parliament, and yet the BDP has been blighted by both the governments’ tendency to undermine their influence and PKK’s continuing dominance of Kurdish hearts and minds. The 10% parliamentary threshold has hardly helped the Kurdish political and democratic movement.

The Kurdish rebels are willing to initiate a ceasefire and withdraw beyond the Turkish borders, after all “ceasefires”, albeit unilateral ones are not new. But it is whether the rebels can be adequately appeased. Are rebels just going to simply lay down their arms after decades of battle and thousands of sacrifices? Of course, as part of any precondition, Turkey must take bold and historic steps.

There is no better place to start then the very political and social blueprint of the country, its constitution. A new constitution that recognises the Kurds and enshrines their rights, including a level of autonomy, is of paramount importance. The new Turkey must embrace a partnership between Kurds and Turks, Turkey will always comprise of two components but who live, work and prosper together hand-in-hand and side-by-side. This new Turkey must be a bi-national state based on equality and brotherhood.

Public surveys are important gauge of government performance and public opinion but any decision on the Imrali process cannot and will not satisfy all parties. Sometimes politicians must make decisions not to just appease the present constituents but to also safeguard the future wellbeing of a nation.

The will and desire of the Kurds and Turks must not be broken by minorities who will continue to insist on violent means of achieving their goals or by those who hold onto imperialistic ideals. There are many parties within Turkey and the surrounding region who seek to derail peace.

Surveys on whether Kurds and Turks can live together detract from the bigger picture, Kurds and Turks have lived together, largely peacefully, for hundreds of years.

The time for violence and armed rebellions is certainly over but so is the time for out-dated ethos and a society based on inequality. In the new Turkey, how happy is the one who says I am a Turk or a Kurd.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Reality versus ideology – approaching the Kurdish question

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The great shifts in the political and strategic landscape of the Middle East was merely accelerated by the Arab Spring, it had begun long before that. The much repressed Kurds who long lived in the shadows of other nations were at the forefront of this new Middle East.

The Kurdish renaissance has begun and while the many historic wrongs against the Kurds cannot be merely rewritten overnight, the Kurds are escaping from the chains of misfortune and are no longer the inferior components of the policies of states they were forcibly subjected to.

With near independence, a booming economy and new strategic and political clout, the Kurdistan Region has grown from strength to strength. With the Arabian earthquake in Syrian, Kurds have broken from decades of shackles with new autonomy. While, expectations of Kurds in Turkey are growing all the time.

Due to nationalist ideologies of respective countries, the Kurds were denied basic rights or even outright existence. The policy of nationalist idealism was an ignorant and elitist approach that such states could adopt due the political climates of yesteryears and the imperial and colonial mentality that plagued the Middle East.

No matter how entrenched your nationalistic ideology, how strong your nationalist propaganda or how wide your assimilation policies may stretch, all that they merely do is mask reality. The reality is that Kurds are a historic nation with an existence that stretches back thousands of years; they are the fourth largest nationality in the Middle East and the largest ethnicity in the world without a state. The crimes committed against them and their misfortunes since been cruelly carved in pieces, warrants volumes rather than a single article.

However, the point is that after policies of repression and decades of denial, this does not mean that the Kurds should suffice on scraps that governments deem suitable to provide and forgo human rights such as self-determination enshrined in UN charters.

The same dilemma of reality versus ideology now threatens to hit Turkey hard. Turkey after years of tough rhetoric and threats finally realised that the Kurdistan Region or the de-facto Kurdish state was not going to go away. It eventually came to terms with accepting and benefiting from this reality, rather than wasting valuable energy denying it based on historical fears and outdated nationalist ethos.

Turkey and the Kurdistan Region are now natural allies and have a mutual benefit that is growing at a rapid rate. Turkey needs a stable, secular, prosperous and friendly Kurdistan in the turbulent sectarian shifting of the Middle East and Kurdistan Region relies on Turkey for its economic growth, strategic influence and the path to Europe that it provides.

Turkey has now got a unique opportunity to strike long-term peace with the PKK and mend the broken bridges with its Kurdish community. Neither of these tasks is impossible but it needs new endeavour, trust, practical measures and acceptance of inevitabilities.

These inevitabilities entail that the Kurdish question or the PKK dilemma will not go away, but on the contrary as the Kurdish standing increases in the Middle East, so will the power and prominence of Turkey’s Kurds.

Real peace will not be achieved if Turkey believes that is sufficient to simply give Kurds rights that they should not have been deprived of in the first place. Kurds are now looking beyond basic rights and towards real concessions from the Turkish government.

A rewriting of the constitution is a must. The Kurdish status as the second ethnicity in Turkey and their respective rights must be enshrined in law. A prosperous partnership, increased employment and rebuilding projects in the south east will bring the Kurds closer not further from Ankara.

If the Kurdish question can be truly resolved, then this naturally opens new doors for Turkeys EU aspirations. Turkish Kurds can enjoy EU benefits, as well as the Kurdistan Region knowing that it will have the EU on its door step.

The Kurdish question and the PKK question are one and the same. Provide greater rights to Kurds, implement new economic motions in the Kurdish regions and open new doors for the Kurds and support for the PKK will dwindle. The PKK have been the champions of Kurdish rights and their flag bearers, but careful and sincere state overreaches can slowly alienate the PKK.

Kurds are also tired and fed up of fighting, destruction of their areas and the vicious cycle of been stuck between a repressive state and rebel violence.

Overreaches start from above and the latest peace initiative has new momentum and real promise. In this regard, appointments such as Muammer Güler as interior minister, with roots in the Kurdish areas, replacing the unpopular and hawkish Idris Naim Sahin, is just the right tonic.

Turkey’s parliament also passed a symbolic law on Thursday which gave right to Kurds to use their own language in court.

The “Democratic Openings” of previous years stalled as Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan become invariably stuck between the past and the future, becoming pinned down by the need to appease nationalist voters and media pressure.

A similar inconsistent or stop-start approach will simply delay the process by a few more years, but Kurds and Turks have no choice but to return to the negotiating table. As the slaying of Sakine Cansiz and other female PKK members showed, there are plenty of sides that seek to destroy peace.

It’s time for Turkey to brave in its actions and break the status quo for the benefit of a new Turkey based on true brotherhood.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

In light of tragic murders, PKK and Turkish state must hold firm to unique peace passage

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In the same vain as previous hopes and initiatives to end Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) hostilities and resolve Turkey’s age old Kurdish dilemma, any step forward has often been met with two steps back. The Turkish failure to acknowledge its Kurdish reality and its instance on a military solution has left this dilemma in somewhat of a vicious cycle. An insurgency nearing almost 3 decades, deaths of over 40,000, the destruction of villages, not to mention the billions of dollars of military expenditure and the considerable polarisation of Kurds and Turks, tells its own story.

Previous attempts at achieving elusive peace with the PKK were thwarted by Turkish nationalists unmoving on Kemalist ideology and out-dated policies, and Kurdish rebels unwilling to back down on what they saw as minimal demands.

It is no surprise that with the prospect of peace growing between the Turkish government and the PKK and the announcement in the Turkish media of an agreed roadmap between imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and the Turkish interlocutors, a great cloud was quickly placed on the talks by the tragic assassination of Sakine Cansız in Paris, one of the founding members of the PKK, along with two colleagues, Fidan Doğan and Leyla Söylemez.

Any recent air of optimism or aura of hope was quickly overshadowed by the cold-hearted murders as sentiments soon turned to anger, mourning and outrage.

While the question of the culpable and the motives behind the killings naturally dominate the topic, the timing of the incidents speaks volumes. Whether instigated within the PKK or by Turkish nationalist wings, the end goal is the same, to disrupt and derail the peace process.

Unsuccessful Oslo based talks between the Turkish Intelligence Services (MIT) and the PKK were shrouded with an element of secrecy, but the fact that the latest initiative to break the deadly stalemate was openly discussed and acknowledged by Turkish officials, offered fresh hope and signalled that Turkey was willing to present true overtures and solutions this time and not just rhetoric.

Behind the scenes, Turkey will have always known that cutting the branches of the Kurdish struggle would have been fruitless without cutting the root. However, Turkey remained obstinate on its out-dated ideologies and could not differentiate the Kurdish problem from what it deemed as a terrorist problem.

The armed struggle may have been a tool that has allowed the Kurds a voice at the negotiation table, but it has failed to adapt to geopolitical realities. In the midst of the Arab Spring, grassroots of democracy in the Middle East and a rapidly changing national and strategic outlook for the Kurds, the climate has drastically shifted.

Kurds have new tools and new ways to promote their cause and Turkey can fail to listen at its peril. The Iraqi Kurds, now key strategic political and economic partners of Turkey, have newfound prominence and practical independence while the Syrian Kurds are afforded opportunities that were unthinkable merely a few years ago.

The admission by French President Francois Hollande that he had regular contact with one of the slain, much to the dismay of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, resonates loudly. The Turkish Kurds whether officially or not, enjoy relatively good support from the European communities. The PKK may be on the EU blacklist, but no doubt European politicians in some form or another have symphasised with their cause, if not their tactics. Simply put, the Kurds have more than a strong diplomatic platform now to lay down their arms and end unnecessary violence.

Peace, a resolution to the Kurdish question and a true reconciliation between Kurds and Turks can only serve both nations and the greater good of Turkey.

The Kurds have come a long way and must seize the initiative as much as Turkey must match intent with practical deeds and real compromise. Half-hearted measures suit no side, and any delay to the peace process will merely mean more years of fighting and an eventual return to the negotiation table.

Whether today or tomorrow, the Kurds and Turks have no choice but to sit down and enter dialogue. Anything else simply delays the inevitable.

The tragic death of Sakine Cansız and others need urgent answers; none more so than from the French government on whose soil the crimes were committed. But both the PKK and Turkish government must ensure the voices of moderation prevail.

It is very easy to swing back to the realms of violence and shy away from peace at this sensitive conjecture but this is exactly what the perpetrators of the murders want. The peace process is not at the stage of fully-fledged ceasefire negotiations and can easily evaporate before any real substance is built.

Cansiz did not have an active role in the PKK command, although she continuously supported the rebel cause. He death was more symbolic as a female revolutionary, an icon of resistance and determination and of course as a founding member. It was designed to stir emotion more than deprive the PKK of a leader or handicap the movement.

Elements within both the PKK and Turkish state have reasons to derail the peace process. Ocalan is without a doubt the most influential figurehead of the PKK, but he has not been in active command for almost 14 years. Like any rebel movement, the PKK has its divergent branches and differing ideological and political stances, and Ocalan will not necessarily hold sway over all components.

After nearly 30 years of fighting and countless sacrifices, elements within the PKK will be weary of “selling out” to the arch enemy. For every willing negotiator and moderate voice in the PKK, there are those that prefer to fight to their last breath.

As for Turkish nationalists, the PKK has been a card that they can use to justify the outdated policies of the state, repression of the Kurds and to label the Kurds as the “bad guys”. The PKK has been a means by which Turkish military hawks can justify billions of dollars of expenditure and keep intact Kemalist foundations.

Certain elements within both the PKK and Turkish state have more to lose in peace than in war.

Even Iran and Syria, potential suspects that should not be discounted from the murders, have plenty to lose with peace between PKK and Turkish state. The PKK has been like a wildcard used by various regional actors. The best example is how the PKK struggle was significantly revived as both Damascus and Tehran were keen to punish the influential support of Ankara in the Syrian uprising.

The PKK even has political roots in Syria via the PYD, which has alarmed Turkey, as Syrian Kurds rise to prominence has hit the international spotlight. Peace with the PKK not only gives Turkey reassurances from within but also outside its borders. For the PKK, peace may safeguard and even enhance political gains of their brethren in Syria.

It is of extreme importance that as well as the French government, the Turkish government show their willingness to carry out a thorough and transparent investigation into the killings. The Turkish government must show its hands are clean before it resumes its position at the negotiating table.

The PKK must refrain from accusations and any harming of the peace process while the picture around the murders become clearer and should conduct its own investigations.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Globe interview with Saleh Muslim, Co-leader of the Kurdish Syrian PYD

Link to Interview in KurdishGlobe-2012-39-13 (English)

Link to Interview Hawler newspaper (Kurdish) – 18.12.12 Printed in Kurdistan Region (Kurdish Translation)

Syrian Kurds with new found autonomy and historic opportunity find themselves in the limelight and key actors in the Syrian struggle. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) is at the centre of the Kurdish struggle in Syria and in the Kurdish quest to capitalise on their new dawn. With rumours and scrutiny facing the party, Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel of the Kurdish Globe spoke exclusively with Saleh Muslim, Co-leader of the PYD on a number of issues to set the record straight.

Globe: At times the PYD is portrayed negatively, as a PKK-affiliated party who has not abided by power sharing agreement with other Kurdish parties, does not tolerate other Kurdish armed forces and has even allegedly collaborated with the Assad regime. What is your answer to that?

Muslim: The PYD is a political party established in 2003 and of course we have our way and our philosophy and our strategy for the works. I mean if our philosophy or strategy was the same as classical Kurdish parties, there would be no reason to establish a new party. We established PYD which is different from the classical parties inSyria. We have the philosophy of Mr. Ocalan and his ideas are adapted to the condition and situation ofWestern Kurdistan. Our works is different from a radical party or the philosophy of classic parties. So it’s usual for people who promoting the interest of regional and global powers to attack our party and to blame it, because we are promoting and working for the interest of the people in Western Kurdistan and all Syrians.

In 50 years the Kurdish parties could not submit anything to Kurdish politics or to the Kurdish people ofWestern Kurdistan. They could not organise themselves very well and especially for the critical duration facingWestern Kurdistan. So everything belonged to the PYD, all the responsibilities including defending the people and organising the people fell to the PYD. PYD is doing everything and because of that, we are been attacked not only by the classic Kurdish parties but also other sides that are against the Kurdish people and their struggle.

They are enemies of the Kurdish people. So we are under attack from all of them. There are many rumours and sayings, trying to affiliate us with the PKK where other than the general philosophy we are completely different from them. We have our own leadership, strategy, and work forWestern Kurdistan, we do not have any organic relations with the PKK or affiliations with them. But we support each other like any party, our relation with them is no different to our relations with the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) of Massaud Barzani or PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) of Jalal Talabani.

Globe: Do you have any problem working with other Kurdish parties or power sharing?

Muslim: No, not at all. We would like to share the power with all Kurdish parties. We can do everything together. We have been seeking the co-operation with them since we were established in 2003, where we knocked on all their doors, we met them one by one to build relations and to work together and to make agreements with them but we could not achieve this.

Globe: In terms of the Kurdish forces, do you have any problem in working with other Kurdish forces specifically the “Syrian Peshmerga” trained in Kurdistan Region? Is the force in Syrian Kurdistan, a PYD force or a national force for all Kurds?

Muslim: We have no problem to unite all the armed forces for the sake of the Kurdish people. InWestern Kurdistanyou can have many political parties, many organisations but when it comes to the armed forces, there should only ever be one armed force for the region. Otherwise if you have intra-fighting it’s a massive problem. Because of that, as part of the Kurdish Supreme Council we decided to unify all of the armed forces, including those Kurdish forces inSyriaor those trained inSouthern Kurdistan. We are trying to unify them and this is no problem as the forces belong to the people. They are protecting people ofWestern Kurdistan. Everybody has a right to join it to defend his family and relations. This is never a problem for us. But importantly, any force should only be under one commander.

We don’t refer to such forces trained inSouthern Kurdistanas Peshmerga, they are simply part of the Peoples Protection Unit, the defence units. It’s the same to us and we do not differentiate on the type of forces by referring to these specifically as “Peshmerga”. Those forces are in Syrian right now. Most of them are Kurdish soldiers who had defected from the Syrian Army and they are simply the army of the Kurdish people inWestern Kurdistanprotecting them. An important point, they do not belong to any political party, nor the PYD or even Democratic Society Movement (Tev-Dem). They are established by (Tev-Dem) but they belong to the Syrian Kurdish people, because they take orders from the Kurdish Supreme Council.

Globe: Some have accused you of collaborating with Assad’s regime in Kurdish areas, can you set the record straight on that?

Muslim: We have been fighting this regime since we were established in 2003. We have had our people killed under torture, when the Syrian uprising started in March 2011 we had about 1,500 people under arrest and tortured by Assad’s security apparatus. Because of that we cannot say we have relations with them. But because our strategy is different from other organisations and other parties, they try to find a reason to blame us. Only because we refused to become soldiers for the others as on many other occasions in Kurdish history. Kurds have always been soldiers for others, fighting for them, dying for them and at the end they receive nothing. So we refuse to follow that historical trap. Now they point the blame at us as we refused to be their soldiers. We have no relations with the regime at all, nor would we ever open the hand of the gladiator that is killing us.

Globe: Turkey has been closely observing the new found Kurdish autonomy in Syria with great unease. Do you have any contact with the Turkish authorities? Do you see any threat in a direct Turkish invasion?

Muslim: We are on the side of dialogue with anybody, not just Turkey. Anyone involved in the Syrian conflict or the Kurdish case, we are open to negotiations with them and we do not have any objections. Today, we don’t have any contact with the Turkish authorities but we don’t refuse contact or meetings with them, if the Turkish regime accepts us. As for any invasion, I don’t think international conditions make sense for any invasion, they will not allow such an invasion nor is it convenient for any military intervention inSyria. But the Turkish hand is clearly inSyriafrom the beginning of the uprising. They are trying to be involved and are supporting armed groups to destabilise relatively peaceful Kurdish region and the Turkish intervention has succeeded in turning the peaceful uprising into an armed uprising against the regime. This was only possible with Turkish support of armed groups.

In the Kurdish case, we have already seen what happened inAleppo, Afrin and Sere Kaniye where armed groups have invaded the Kurdish areas fromTurkey. They are supporting them and they are sending them to mix the Kurdish areas and to destroy peaceful situation of the Kurdish areas. Groups such as Al-Nusra Front and Ghuraba al-Sham are all related to the Turkish regime, affiliated, supported and sent by them.

And even in Sere Kaniye when they were going to escape to get back toTurkey,Turkeyclosed the border and said to these armed groups you either have to fight or die. So they didn’t allow them to go back and still those forces are there. Just yesterday there was an air attack by regime forces on those armed groups, but they have nowhere to escape becauseTurkeyclosed the border and they are unable to move out, so they are hemmed in. More than 20 of them were killed yesterday by that air attack.

Globe: What is your message to Turkey?

Muslim: Turkey must step away from their Kurdish phobia. Kurds can live together with the Turkish people, we have no problem with any Turk. We are friends and neighbours with Turkmen inSyriaand the same with the Turkish people. We have no problem with the Turkish people and we can co-exist peacefully. The Turkish government should understand that and build on the brotherly ties between the two nations, instead of been driven by a phobia of Kurds.

Globe: Recently, there has been much violence between FSA, particularly their Islamist wings and PYD forces in Sere Kaniye and within Aleppo itself. Why such hostility and general animosity? What must happen before you will work with the FSA?

Muslim: If they leave us alone, then we don’t have any problem with the Free Syrian Army. They are mostly compromised of soldiers defecting from the Syrian Army and to protect the civilians. But it is only specific armed groups that are fighting and attacking the Kurdish areas even when there are no regime forces in such areas. They are attacking civilians and such groups do not belong to the FSA at all and even the FSA have issued declarations that they are not affiliated with them. They are different groups to the FSA and they are only using the name of FSA, but nobody recognises them as FSA. They belong to the Turkish regime. Especially, in Aleppo, Afrin and Sere Kaniye, these groups were clearly supported by Turkey with weapons, with facilities of movement and they are coming from across the Turkish side.

Any Kurdish peoples captured, such as the leader of YPG who was captured in Aleppo, are taken to Turkey for interrogation by Turkish authorities. Even in Sere Kaniye, the injured and captured people were taken to Turkey and investigated by Turkish authorities. We may not be fighting Turkish soldiers directly, but they are proxy forces instigated by Turkey.

In Syria, you have Kurds, Arabs and other nationalities. If everyone liberated his place then all of Syria is liberated. Kurds cannot go to Damascus and liberate Damascus but we can liberate our part where we live. And that’s what we have done. There are no regime soldiers or forces in Kurdish area, so why would rebel forces attack here?

Globe: What is the wait to liberate Qamishli and all of Syrian Kurdistan from Assad’s forces? What is the next step in your struggle to liberate all of Syrian Kurdistan?

Muslim: For us it’s not a case of liberation. If we push away the Syrian forces, then we are simply living with Syrian people and all Syrians within the Syrian state. For Qamishli, the situation is very sensitive. We are not fighting the Arabs but the Syrian regime. Our liberation is not from Syrian people but from Assad forces only.

While we are concern of fighting between the Kurds and Arabs, in sensitive places like Qamishli and Sere Kaniye and to prevent this sectarian war, we could not afford to attack to regime, as we are worried that some Arabs may side with the regime. We don’t want to end up in a conflict between Arabs and Kurds, as opposed to fighting the regime.

Qamishli is a Kurdish city and the capital of Western Kurdistan and the city is a hub for Kurdish activities. The plan is still to eradicate Qamishli of regime forces. But at the same time we never reject to live side-by-side with Arabs in Qamishli and we don’t want Qamishli to be a place of fighting between Kurds and Arabs. When the conditions are right and when the Arabs in and around Qamishli leave with those that are against the regime, we will also extend our control to Qamishli.

Globe: The Kurdistan Region is your neighbour and brethren, with growing strategic power and regional influence. Can the Kurdistan Region leadership do more to help the Kurds and political parties in Syria?

Muslim: The Kurdistan regional Government is doing what it is doing in their areas and they are controlling their areas in South Kurdistan. But our conditions are very different. We are not looking for a system like in Southern Kurdistan. So we can have very good relations but we have different conditions and our solution is different from them. Their governance is based on federalism whereas what we strive for is democratic self-governing which is different. We don’t have to draw the border between Syrian Kurdish areas and the Arab areas.

A Kurd can always do more for a Kurd in terms of support. We are one nation, whether in the south, west, north or east. But for each part we have different conditions. We can help each other in the spirit of brotherhood and build our future strategy. What we are looking for in future is Kurdish parts to be unified in a democratic confederation in the Middle East. The Kurdish parts can be a reason to unite the Middle East, much in the same way as Europe came closer together through a union whilst slowly eroding their common borders. Today we have 27 countries all living together. Why can’t we the same thing in the Middle East?

At the point we have the Middle East united in a democratic confederation, at the same time all of Kurdistan will become united. This is our long-term strategy for the Kurdish people.

Globe: What is the absolute minimum that the PYD will settle for in a post Assad Syria?

Muslim: There are two points. One is constitutional recognition of the Kurdish people in Western Kurdistan. And secondly, guarantees for our democratic rights that is included in the constitution. In terms of self-governance model, the name is not important; it could be termed self-governance or democratic federalism. As part of democratic rights, there should be provision of self-protecting defence units such security units, essentially civilians protecting the areas.

The Kurdish case in Syria is different. Everybody is assessing the Syrian situation and talking about the Syrian problem, but nobody is looking at the Kurdish side of it. We are part of the Syrian people, we have our rights and any solution for the Syrian people must also contain a solution for the Kurdish conflict also. It is impossible to have democracy in Syria without solving the Kurdish problem. Everybody should be clear that once there is a solution of the Kurds, only then can democracy be attained in Syria.

Globe: It cannot be overlooked that the majority of Syrian oil is in Kurdish areas and Western Kurdistan is oil rich. Do you have any control over the oil fields at the moment and what’s your view on natural resources that Kurds have never benefited from?

Muslim: Those oil wells are protected by our people over there. And we are still getting fuel from the refineries in Homos and Baniyas, so we protect. Of course in a future Syria, such natural resources need agreement with benefit for local community and a portion of revenues should be spent on the local areas. Revenue sharing will need negotiation and agreement, but it will be managed centrally for all Syrians.

Turkish fears of Syrian Kurdish autonomy already a reality

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As the bloody uprising in Syria intensifies by the week, Syrian Kurds have tried to keep a distance from the ever violent conflict by safeguarding the region from fighting and consolidating their newfound autonomy.

Control over parts of the Kurdish region sees a remarkable turn of fortune for Kurds in Syria but has been viewed with great suspicion by Turkey, whose leadership yet again warned that they will not tolerate Kurdish self-rule.

Owed to great distrust between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Kurdish forces predominantly of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Kurds have largely stayed out of the Arab-Sunni revolution, and have prevented the FSA from entering Kurdish controlled areas. The Kurds have in the main tried to leverage strategic positions by cutting deals with both rebels and Assad forces.

However, as the rebel control of areas within Aleppo and the greater Aleppo region grows and with it the supply routes from the Turkish border to key rebel held areas, it naturally trespasses grounds of Kurdish forces and thus the seeds of conflict are evident.

With deep animosity that underscores both camps, Kurds fearing a second marginalization when Sunni rebels assume power and rebels accusing the Kurds of supporting Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the situation was always on a knife edge.

Fighting that erupted in Aleppo’s Kurdish districts and later in the village of Yazi Bagh and near other Kurdish towns close to the Turkish border, threatened to open a second unwanted front in an already complex and increasingly brutal civil war.

Kurdish Autonomy

With the Kurds suffering more than any other group in Syria and natural components of any anti-Assad movement, it is ironic that the Kurds feel like a marginalized part of the Syrian National Council (SNC) or the uprising on the ground. This is partly owed to shrewd manipulation by Assad by bolstering Kurdish power, sowing disunity amongst Kurds and driving a wedge in the opposition but is also down to the failure and lack of significant efforts within the SNC to entice the Kurds.

The Kurds continue to look beyond the present, with the future posing the greatest dilemma. What role will the Kurds be afforded in a post Assad era and what mechanism will be in place to protect Kurdish rights? Can Kurds be sure that they won’t suffer the same fate under Sunni Arab rule?

Some elements of the SNC and the FSA have openly opposed the idea of establishing a Kurdish autonomous entity, while certain groups within the FSA have openly threatened to turn guns on the Kurdish forces once they are finished with Assad.

A stronger Kurdish buy-in and reassurance to the Kurdish community would have certainly expedited Assad’s downfall. And Turkey, a flag bearer of the Syrian opposition, must take some blame for the current friction between Kurds and Arabs. Turkey’s remarks, anxiety and threats against Kurdish autonomous development, that naturally weights on SNC sentiments, has alienated the Kurds further. It has left the Kurds stuck between Assad, FSA and Turkey.

Unless strong reconciliation efforts takes place between Kurds and Arabs, not only will the “Lebanonisation” of the Syria conflict became ever nearer, but Syria will be finding itself fighting another deadly war after Assad’s downfall.

Erdogan’s warning

Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, warnings amidst the increasing power and autonomy of Syrian Kurds is hardly new. He warned previously that Turkey would “not allow a terrorist group to establish camps in northern Syria and threaten Turkey”.

This week Erdoğan warned that Turkey would not allow the formation of a Kurdish autonomous region in Syria, in the same way as it has for Iraq. “We cannot let playing of such a scenario here [in Syria]. We told this to Barzani too. We wanted him to know this,” stated Erdoğan.

In spite of the Turkish stance, Syrian Kurds have already attained de-facto autonomy and although not enshrined in legislature, Syrian Kurds are unlikely to revert back after tasting self-rule.

Erdogan’s and Turkey’s clear concern is the PYD and the growing re-emergence of the PKK influence in Syria and Turkey. However, the issue goes much deeper than the PYD and narrow-minded policies of Turkey fail to comprehend the bigger picture in Syria.

There are dozens of Kurdish parties, many with representation in the SNC and who Turkey have enjoyed dialogue, and while the PYD has the upper hand at present, control of Kurdish regions is not exclusively in the hands of the PYD.

More importantly, what can Turkey, or for that matter the Kurdistan Region, do to prevent Kurdish autonomy in Syria? Of course the Kurdistan leadership has strong influence on the Syrian Kurds, but the fact of the matter is that Syria Kurds under democratic rights cannot have rules or conditions imposed on them from inside Syria let alone from Turkey.

Kurdish autonomy in Iraq was also a frequent Turkish red-line but Turkey had no choice but to succumb to geopolitical realities on its doorstep. In one way or another, Turkey will have to accept also a Kurdish region in Syria.

Aside from the rhetoric, there is little Turkey can do to prevent Kurdish autonomous advancement in Syria. If it intervenes directly both now and in the future, it will spark a deadly cross border battle with Kurdish forces. The PKK in particular would work hard to safeguard Kurdish gains in Syria, and solidify its growing influence. Any war in the Kurdish areas of Syria would mean even greater violence in Turkey.

It makes Turkey’s position all the more ironic, on the one had it supports the rebels against dictatorship and promotes a free Syria, and on the other hand it tries to subdue the pluralistic dimension of Syria.

Turkey must work harder to entice Kurdish moderates and stop its exclusive focus on the PYD. There are dozens of Kurdish parties and with an autonomous Kurdish entity an unavoidable reality it should build relations with parties and individuals that it can work with and trust.

The starting point should be Turkey’s strong denouncement of growing Arab-Kurd violence, to reassure Syrian Kurds of Turkey’s support and build more alliances with Syrian Kurdish parties.

When you cannot directly prevent a reality, you should do your best to influence it to your advantage. For this Turkey must lean heavily on the Kurdistan Region leadership. Barzani can have a strong influence on the PYD and the autonomous Kurdish region in Syria and dilute the PKK influence on the region.

If the Kurds become stuck between distrusted Sunni rebels, an unbalanced SNC, a hostile Turkey or a distant Kurdistan Region, then their natural protectors become the PKK.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?

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As ever, there is a fine line between a terrorist organisation and freedom fighters. As the old saying goes, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.

Perception and the country in question is key as are geopolitics and the context within which the struggles arise.

Many independent countries have come to the fore as a direct result of military uprisings by the people through rebel movements. Two recent examples are Kosovo and South Sudan, both of which their respective rebel movements formed a key part of achieving their nationalist goals.

The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Hamas are other groups who have sought to secure rights and goals through use of force and have tip-toed a fine line between nationalist struggles and terrorist activities. In the case of Hamas, they are in political power, have foreign relations and are even supported by a number of regional counties, yet many have denoted them as a terrorist organisation.

Now the Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebel movement in Syria, albeit not on the grounds of seeking statehood but nonetheless symbolic freedom akin to other rebel groups, has tremendous international support as did the Libyan rebel movement prior to the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi.

Ask the respective governments that these groups sought to overthrow, and the terms “terrorists mercenaries”, “armed gangs” etc come to mind. Yet ask those who supported the rebel movements, and they will have heralded as revolutionaries, democracy seekers and brave men who stood up to tyranny.

In Kurdistan, the Peshmerga are without a doubt a nationalist icon of the Kurds. Without standing up to the brutality of Saddam, the Kurds would never have achieved their freedom. For the Kurds, the rebel movement was about honour, self-sacrifice and bravery. Yet for Saddam, it was the Kurds and not his barbaric policies that were to blame.

Even the Americans rose up in arms against their British occupiers in the name of freedom as have many other nations throughout history.

The point is depending on what lens the world is viewed, the situation is perceived and treated completely differently and often hypocritically.

Murky definitions

It goes without saying that people often brand terrorism depending on a number of general factors, such as the mode of operation used to seek goals, motivations and characteristics of the group.

An important element here is the popularity and backing of the group. There is certainly difference between a popular national struggle that is waged through a national liberation movement and terrorism that is spurred on by a small minority whose goals is to be recognised, infamy and to generally strike a higher bargain from governments.

Generally speaking nationalist struggle seek to acquire often freedom and rights, while terrorist movements seek to destroy. Yet at the same time, terrorists still try to acquire through destruction, fear and violence.

In any case, the so called credibility and mode of operation of national struggles is a blurred line. How often have we seen bombings of buildings and use of IED’s and hit and run tactics in Syria and Libya, that result in civilian casualties? Rebel movements are no match for the sheer firepower of their adversaries and thus urban guerrilla warfare is almost a necessity.

The key thing is whether there is a purposeful and direct intent to harm the civilian population, which is the case with classic terrorism to gain media coverage and to strike fear. But such terrorist movements often lack true public following and are rarely representative of a large segment of society.

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)

Turkey has fought a bitter war with the PKK that is a little shy of 30 years. Throughout this time, Turkey has been unable to crush the “terrorists” that it has continuously labelled.

Just what are the PKK? A national struggle or a terrorist organisation? Again, it comes back to the argument of perception. Turkey and most of the west in strategic support of its key allies have been quick to blacklist the PKK as a terrorist organisation.

Others have merely jumped on the new “Assad is supporting and arming the PKK” bandwagon.

All this simply masks reality. The PKK have been around for much longer than the current revolutionary era in Middle East and the situation in Turkey is far from new.

This is not to doubt that the PKK has received backing from Assad or Tehran, indeed the PKK has been used and manipulated effectively by even the US and Turkey.

A life of any human being, Kurdish or Turkish is sacred and as much as a Turkish mother mourns the pain of the loss of her son, it is no different for a Kurdish mother. By no means whatsoever can violent struggles be condoned and in this new era the PKK must ultimately give up its armed struggled, but Turkey has seriously miscalculated the PKK issue and continuous to do so to its detriment.

The PKK started their operation in 1984 on the back of the military junta that gripped Turkey between 1980 and 1983. This was at a time when repressive policies against the Kurds were at their peak.

Now imagine, for one minute that there was never an Abdullah Ocalan or a PKK organisation in existence in Turkey, would there be peace today or would the situation be any different? The simply is an overriding no.

The PKK was born out of the situation, and the situation was not born out of the PKK. In simple terms, if there was no Ocalan or PKK, there would simply have been another leader and another Kurdish group that would have filled the vacuum.

More importantly, the PKK have merely continued the legacy of previous Kurdish revolts, uprisings and armed struggles. Only two years after the proclamation of the republic, Turkey crushed a revolt in 1925. This was just a flavour of what was to come.

Throughout Atatürk’s rule, conflict in the southeast of Turkey was a common feature. The last revolt of that era in Dersim was quelled by sheer force and use of chemical weapons.

It is Turkey that ultimately created the PKK and until this realisation hits home, there will never be peace, brotherhood and harmony in Turkey.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, in an apparent u-turn from his original stance of blaming Assad for rise in PKK violence, summed it up perfectly:

“Terror in Turkey did not appear as a result of the developments in Syria, it is a problem that has lasted for 30 years.”

Is the issue really 5000 or so PKK guerrilla’s or the 15 million Kurds? Lets say that Turkey was able to achieve its long-term goal of eradicating the PKK and 5000 rebels perished, can they guarantee under the current climate that another 5000 would not readily replace them?

Mere branding of the PKK as “terrorists” only services to mask the nationalist struggle that continues to plague Turkey.

Kurdish Rights in Turkey

There is no doubt that the situation of the Kurds in Turkey is a far cry from yesteryears but it has a long way to go, and although inconsistently employed the government has taken a number of bold steps. However, the polarisation of government policies and the military struggles runs too deep for wounds to easily heal.

Ankara has made a number of symbolic strides in addressing its Kurdish issue, but it has seemingly deemed these as sufficient to believe that there is no longer a “Kurdish issue”.

Ironically, the Kurdish issue if anything with the revolutionary winds in the Middle East has increased. Kurds in Turkey see Arabs and even their ethnic brethren achieve rights and yet how can they be expected to settle for the rights that Turkey deems “fair” to provide?

The bottom line is fear. Ankara has always feared the Kurds and for decades was able to effectively subdue them in line with the policies of neighbouring governments against their portion of Kurdish populations.

The more that Turkey continues along the lines of fear, the more that what they fear will come to light.

The violent struggle in Turkey serves no side and most Kurds are fed up of war, impoverishment and lack of investment in their region. Money is an important language and if the Kurds were able to enjoy employment, better standards of living, first class status then Turkey would see just how much the PKK would be supported.

Through the history of the Turkish republic, there have hardly ever been any significant Kurdish parties in parliament and most have been hastily shut down.

Now the BDP is facing the same plight as their predecessor. As violence has escalated in Turkey with August experiencing some of the highest level of confrontations since 1984, a BDP encounter with some PKK rebels caused inevitable uproar. Strangely, there were politicians, rebels and even the media but no state presence.

It is no secret that the PKK has a large support base amongst Kurds in Turkey but for many Kurds the PKK is their FSA, PLO or KLA. For them the PKK represents their national struggle. Not all Kurds agree with violence means but certainly see the PKK as their flag bearer, especially as the voted for AKP in large numbers but grew increasingly frustrated.

Whether open or private, it is not illogical that the PKK would have sentimental support from the BDP. After all they share the same cause and nationalism, if not the same platform.

Only when the grassroots support for the PKK is cut and Kurdish moderates are embraced can Turkey tip the balance against the PKK.

The end game

Most Turks are fierce nationalists and the mere idea of negotiating with the PKK or surrendering to their demands is a major red-line. The battle between the PKK and Ankara has become a question of pride and with sides are as entrenched as ever. No side is willing to cede with fear of their call for peace been perceived as a sign of weakness.

Turkey continues to reassure Kurds on the one hand and battle Kurds on the other, whilst trying to demarcate between a group of rebels and the general Kurdish population. Unfortunately, it is not about a group of rebels. If it was that simple the PKK would have been destroyed a long-time ago. It’s about addressing the root of the issue as opposed to cutting the branches of your problems.

It begs the question of just why Turkey has allowed the struggle to straddle for so long. Without a doubt the PKK has benefited many in the Turkish hierarchy as it has provided fuel to maintain the status-quo.

Times have dramatically changed and as the Middle East unravels, Turkey must either address new realities and influence the present or become swept as history is made.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd.net, Various Misc.

PKK enjoys new lease on Ankara-Damascus conflict

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The Kurdish question is manipulated by Syria as it turns to their old PKK allies to undermine an increasingly hostile Turkey and simultaneously divide the potentially decisive Kurds back home.

The Arab Spring may have stormed through a number of countries but for Syria it has not been such a straightforward transition.

Syria is not a clear-cut arithmetic as the popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt or even Libya. Syria finds itself at the crux of the complicated and intertwined web that is the Middle East and has a hand in a number of historic tensions that continue to plague the region.

It finds itself inhabited by a disenfranchised Sunni majority under the iron fist of minority-Alawite rule for successive decades. It has a powerful hand in the socio-political equation in Palestine and Lebanon and is a major ally of Tehran. To put the icing on the cake, it houses a significant Kurdish minority that has borne the brunt of government brutality and that makes the unfolding of a post-Assad era all the more sensitive.

Over a year since the uprisings first began and Bashar al-Assad continues to cling on to power. Even though the revolt against Assad enjoys popular support from Sunni Arab countries, most Western powers, the UN and particularly Turkey, the fall of the regime is not yet a forgone conclusion.

The Syrian opposition may receive funding and overlying diplomatic support but the Syrian rebels continue to lack real firepower, cohesion and a long-term ability to capitalise on any gains.

It is easy to forget that it was not Libyan rebels that overcame the rule of Muammar Gaddafi but the sheer might of NATO air power.

The prospect of foreign intervention remains the only real game changer in Syria. This looked unlikely with the stern opposition of both veto-wielding Russia and China at the UN table but this could all change as Turkish-Syrian relations take a nosedive with Turkey becoming increasingly engulfed in the Syrian hostilities.

Turkey already plays host to the Syrian National Council, the Free Syrian Army, and thousands of Syrian refugees and is embroiled in a bitter conflict with Syria’s new friends, the PKK.

The Kurdish card

Aside from regional proximity and Sunni majorities, both Turkey and Syria share a historic Kurdish problem that has been long been a thorn in the sides of the respective countries. Turkish Syrian relations greatly improved after a deal in 1998 whereby Syria withdrew its key support of the PKK and signed the Adana Agreement to preserve cross-border peace. Now with an ever increasing hard-line rhetoric and opposition from Ankara towards Assad’s ongoing rule, Syria has once again turned to the Kurds as a way of hitting back at Turkey, knowing fully well that this is one of the most emotive and sensitive bullets that Damascus can fire at Ankara.

By providing renewed support and rekindling ties with the PKK, Assad gains a key leverage against Turkey whilst simultaneously weakening the Kurdish voice back home.

One of Assad’s and Baathists key strengths has been the manipulation of sectarian sentiments in Syria to consolidate power both in the midst of the current uprisings and over the past decades. Along the same lines, Assad quickly reached out to the Kurds while the uprising was still in its infancy, knowing fully well that a united Kurdish opposition to his rule and active Kurdish participation in the revolt could easily break the back of the regime.

What the Syrian Kurds have been striving for decades, Assad promised in days as he vowed to resolve the case of stateless Kurds and increase freedoms.

The Kurds in Syria now find themselves at crossroads. The ill-fated treatment of the Kurds under the hands of the Baathists is something that the Kurds will hardly forget. However, at the same time, the Kurds are not convinced on their destiny in what will still be an Arab dominated post-Assad era.

Many Kurds feel that the Syrian National Council (SNC), with strong ties and backing from Ankara, is under pressure from Turkey to curtail Kurdish demands, particularly that of autonomy. The SNC has so far resisted key clauses demanded by the Kurds much to the dismay of Kurdish parties.

At the same time, the Kurds are mindful that they may suffer in the hands of Sunni Arab hardliners in a post-Assad era for a lack of direct support to the opposition.

It appears that under the new Syrian-PKK lease of life, the Democratic Union party (PYD), the PKK offshoot in Syria, has been given a platform by Damascus to operate and enhance its influence.

Meanwhile, a swathe of Kurdish parties united under the Kurdish National Congress (KNC) umbrella which is backed by Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), but in spite of their agenda to promote their demands and support the overthrow of Assad, action has not gained significant motion on the ground.

A more sincere reach out to the Kurds by Western powers, Arab League members and SNC could easily tip Kurdish scales in the battle to overthrow Assad.

The UN peace plan

The six-point plan that was brokered by the UN-Arab League envoy, Koffi Annan that should have led to a withdrawal of Syrian troops and firepower and a subsequent ceasefire, has been tentative at best.

Even if the UN plan, which has already been violated, was to work in the short-term it is always at risk of collapsing. Regardless of any such peace plans, the respective end goals of Assad or the opposition doesn’t change. The opposition and international powers will not rest until Assad leaves, while Assad will not go down without a fight or succumb to Western pressure.

Furthermore, both sides can easily manipulate the current peace plan and breach the peace. Assad forces will use the smallest of provocations to justify the notion of self-defence, while rebels will hardly want to see their hard work undone and return unarmed to their homes. The opposition know that large-scale demonstrations are the easiest and most sensitive way of testing government appetite for peace.

In truth, this is just the beginning of the conflict in Syria and UN peace plans are nothing more than preludes to justify stronger action in the future.

The current situation that awaits Assad is not too dissimilar to that of Saddam Hussein in 1991. In spite of strong opposition within Iraq and fierce diplomatic pressure at the time, a lack of real practical steps by foreign powers meant that the opposition petered out and Saddam lasted another 12 years. This is a scenario that the West is unlikely to want to repeat and the end-game is the quick downfall of Assad one way or another.

While the UN aims for peace, paradoxically there are attempts to arm the rebels and provide significant funding.

Prospects of a buffer zone

The likely scenario that would tip the scales and shatter the current picture in Syria is direct Turkish intervention. Ankara has threated to take action a number of times but hawkish voices grew as Syrian forces killed a number of civilians in Turkey in a cross-border fire exchange, including Turkish nationals.

The idea of a buffer zone has been touted for a while but owed to regional sensitivities and a number of risks were put on hold. However, it is becoming a more realistic possibility with a current spate of events that have angered Turkey and with Ankara’s lack of conviction that Assad will abide by the current peace-plan.

The creation of a buffer zone inevitably involves military deployment on Syrian soil and thus the possibility of direct confrontation with Syrian forces. Such moves may appear unilateral on paper, but will have the full backing of most neighbouring governments and Western powers with Russia likely to remain neutral.

The purpose of creating a buffer zone may appear humanitarian in nature but is intended to achieve nothing but the overthrow of Assad. How Assad or their PKK allies will react in such an event may lead to intensified hostilities.

Either way, Ankara has go to come to terms with a post-Assad era that invariably means that the Kurds will be granted new freedoms in Syria in one form or another.

With the PKK or Kurdish nationalist question unlikely to disappear in either an Assad or post-Assad era, Turkey may find itself forced to adopt a new long-term hand in Syria.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Withdraw without condition

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As Turkey enters Iraq for “revenge”, the wider context is overlooked once more

A chilling and coordinated attack by PKK rebels that led to the death of at least 24 Turkish soldiers and many wounded sent shockwaves throughoutTurkey.

Such was the determination for a harsh response that the Turkish army quickly launched a massive ground invasion of Kurdistan on yet another quest to defeat the rebels. “A large-scale land operation, backed by air strikes, has begun in five separate spots insideTurkeyand across the border with 22 battalions,” the military general staff said in a statement.

Turkish president, Abdullah Gul had vowed “revenge” and a stern response under a watchful and enraged public eye. The harsh Turkish reprisal may benefit the PKK as it means a renewed straining of ties between Ankara and Erbil, places the Iraqi Kurds into a difficult corner and simultaneously diminishes the chances of a political resolution to the Kurdish problem inTurkey.

The President of the Kurdistan Region, Massoud Barzani, strongly condemned the latest attacks while labeling the event as a “crime”. With Nechirvan Barzani already inAnkara, the common theme was to soothe Turkish tensions and reinforce brotherhood betweenTurkeyand the Kurdistan Region. However, ultimately Ankara would not be swayed from its intent to show the PKK and possibly even Erbil just who calls the shots in the region.

Clashes between troops and rebels have intensified in the aftermath of the recent national elections inTurkey, resulting in significant aerial bombardment and shelling by Turkish forces in the border regions in recent months. However, the manner of the recent attacks, which coincided with the establishment of a committee to oversee the rewriting of the Turkish constitution, sent alarm bells ringing in Ankara and under a cloud of public anger forced the Turkish government to respond with strong measures.

The attacks by rebels resulted in the biggest military death toll since 1993 and were met with international wide condemnation.

As many political powers renewed their support for the Turkish quest to eradicate the rebels, there is a great danger that once againTurkeyand its allies are overlooking the wider context of events.

Such was the nature of the attack that none would expect Turkey remain idle but it is easy for foreign powers to look at this as an individual incident rather than with the framework that the issue deserves.

This is a deep-rooted, emotively-charged and bloody 27-year war that has cost in excess of 40,000 lives, billions of dollars, destruction of villages and caused immense mental scarring. This is the not the first attack and certainly not the last. History has clearly proved the limits of military power even for the second largest army in NATO.

As long as the Kurdish political actors in Turkey remain weak and the Kurds are deprived of real political representation, the PKK will continue to act as the default flag-bearer of the Kurds, even if it does not necessarily represent the greater will of the Kurdish population. The growing focus on PKK as the source of the Kurdish problem and the ongoing energy consumed by the government to defeat the rebels as a way to overcome the Kurdish issue places the Kurds into a difficult predicament.

The greater Kurdish population yearns for peace and not violence and is tired and frustrated from decades of political, social and economic handicaps that the ongoing conflict has caused.

Turkey has acted against the PKK and this is a natural retaliation for any government, however, it needs to urgently employ a dual approach whereby it also reassures the greater Kurdish population of the Turkish will for fraternity, to solve their age old Kurdish dilemma, that the democratic opening remains a priority and that the government does not intend to punish all Kurds for the actions of a few.

The era of violence in the pursuit of political goals has certainly diminished but Turkey must also prove that it has turned the page not just in words but also in practical steps.

The Turkish state belongs to both the Kurds and Turks and this is a fact that nothing can mask. Only true reconciliation and brotherhood can propelTurkeyto the heights it intends to achieve and mentalities and policies of the past can never exclusively disadvantage the Kurdish populated south eastern part ofTurkey.

The Kurds can be factor that fuels a new strategic strength of Turkey in Europe and Asia or it can be factor that will indefinitely blight and drag the whole of Turkeyas a “sick power”.

As emotions run dangerously high inTurkey, it is of paramount importance that the US, European and regional powers act as a blanket of comfort to both Turks and Kurds. Obliterating the Iraqi Kurdistan regional areas with a show of firepower will never achieve Turkish goals. If a military solution was such a viable reality all these years, why wouldTurkeywait until 2011 and thousands of lives later to resolve this issue?

US President Barrack Obama, whilst harshly condemning the attacks inTurkey, emphasizes that “…the Turkish people, like people everywhere, deserve to live in peace, security and dignity.” While Obama’s statement is valid, there should not be hesitation by world powers to utter the word “Kurds” in the same breath.

There should be a distinct emphasis on the equal rights of the Kurdish population to live in peace, security and within the framework of international charters. While Turkey has made a number of strides in this regard, it is by no means at the level expected for a global power that is actively seeking to expand its sphere of influence.

Turkey continues to live under fear of its significant Kurdish minority rather than embracing them as a true and integral component of the state. At the same time, the Kurds look towards Turkeywith distrust and lack of conviction.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon emphasised the necessity for both Iraq and Turkeyto work together to end what he deemed as “unacceptable” cross-border attacks by Kurdish PKK rebels. Ban’s insistence that the sovereignty of both Turkey and Iraq must be respected was a welcome step. This matter is not simply about appeasing angry or nationalistic sentiments inAnkara, the matter has far greater ramifications across the region.

Within Turkey itself, the much maligned BDP found itself engrossed in the cross fire yet again. It has been subject to heavy criticism by the Turkish government which has culminated in an all time low for relations between both parties as a result of the Kurdish boycott of parliament and the subsequent unilateral declaration of democratic autonomy in the Kurdish areas.

BDP co-chairpersons Gülten Kışanak and Selahattin Demirtaş called for peace as the only solution in a written statement, “We say ‘enough’ to this war and these deaths. The painful picture today once again shows that Turkey urgently needs peace…”

In spite of calls for unity and reconciliation by the BDP, the AKP government quickly poured water on any air of sincerity or warmth generated by such overtures by once again branding the BDP and the PKK with the same brush.

The AKP, which still received a large portion of Kurdish votes, should not renege on its promise to implement its democratic opening or to focus on developing the south eastern region. The idea that there is no longer a Kurdish problem but a terrorism problem is wrong. The so-called terrorist issue comes from the Kurdish problem the Kurdish problem does not come from the terrorism issue.

One of the main reasons for the stalling of the democratic opening was the increasing nationalist resistance inTurkey. The rising hawkish voices ensure that the hands of the government become restrained and progress reverses rather than making any significant strides forward.

As Turkey answers Kurdish rebels with a strong fist, it must also show the Kurds that it will not forsake their rights, demands and voices for the sake of the appeasing only the Turkish sentiments.

More importantly, Turkey should do all it can to respect the sovereignty of the KRG and withdraw without condition.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Hewler Post (Kurdish), Online Opinion, eKurd, Various Misc.

Growing polarisation of Turkey deepened by a policy of no-peace and no-war

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The promise of progression in the Kurdish opening and a true resolution to Turkey’s age old Kurdish dilemma has slowly disintegrated.

Rather than a positive climate that should been created by AKP’s historic success at the recent elections with anticipation of democratic reform and a new constitution combined by a record number of Kurdish PM’s elected to parliament, the last few months have served as an ominous prelude to a growing social divide, increased bitterness and rising inter-communal tension.

The PKK continues to cast a hefty shadow on the Kurdish landscape yet the government refuses to negotiate with them, and continues to attack them culturally, politically and militaristically thereby punishing all Kurds.

Underpinned by a Kurdish boycott of parliament and a contentious declaration of democratic autonomy much to the fury of Ankara is a number of controversial trials of Kurdish politicians and a deepening Kurdish-Turkish divide created by a growing number of Turkish casualties in an escalating war with the PKK.

With signs of a dangerous increase in the polarisation of Turkey, sentiments are hardly helped with the recent high-profile charges against Kurdish politicians.

Only this week Turkey charged over 100 Kurdish politicians, 98 of which are former mayors, for signing a demand over two years ago that called for better conditions for imprisoned former PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.

Prosecutors had deemed that such demands constituted terrorist propaganda, whereas for the Kurds it merely reemphasised the prevalent out-dated mentality and approach of the Turkish judiciary. The politicians could face years in jail and the trials will almost certainly placate growing Kurdish resentment towards Ankara.

As witnessed by the huge Kurdish uproar and protests that came with a number of pre-election arrests and charges, the Kurds are increasingly determined to stand up to what they see as Turkish political aggression against the advancement of the Kurdish cause. The BDP have maintained a boycott of parliament in retaliation for the stripping of jailed deputy Hatip Dicle of his seat.

The proclamation of more trails comes hot on the heels of popular Kurdish deputy Aysel Tuğluk who was elected to parliament last month been given a two year sentence for similar charges.

Placing a dark cloud on reconciliation and soothing of sentiments is the high-profile “KCK trials” which includes 12 Kurdish mayors and dozens of other politicians. Ankara has accused them of been part of KCK, an umbrella organisation of the PKK.

The nature of these trials has cause greater enmity amongst the Kurdish community and even criticism from the European Union and international observers. The continuing harassment of Kurdish political parties and the application of ruthless outdated penalties in cases where there is subjective evidence at best, not only damages the chances of a breakthrough via Kurdish political channels but yet again places the Kurds into opposing camps of thought.

The Turkish government has vehemently refused to negotiate with the PKK on an official level, yet the continuing disillusionment in Kurdish circles and the suppression of any Kurdish political vehicle, means that the PKK remains as entrenched a part of the Kurdish problem and thereby its solution as ever.

Only this week Abdullah Ocalan in a detailed and emotive statement ended talks with the AKP, claiming “If they want me to resume a role then I have three conditions, health, security and an area where I can move freely”.

It is clear from the statement that the AKP has long been in discussions with the PKK. However, while refusing to legitimise the demands of the PKK against a backdrop of hawkish circles, it at the same time tries to muster peace.

Ocalan accused both the AKP and PKK of using him as a ‘subcontractor’ and for their own purposes. Ocalan claimed the AKP wants war and does not want to resolve the question.

While some claim that Ocalan’s apparent criticism of the current PKK command and those who rally around his name, is a sign of dissent within PKK circles, it is not clear how much sway Ocalan had in any case from his prison cell. Ocalan’s name continues to be used as a figurehead and to strengthen the PKK identity, in reality the PKK is the result of a greater Kurdish problem and not an Ocalan problem. Even if the PKK were banished, under the current hostile climate another off-shoot will quickly emerge.

Turkish nationalism and suffocation of the infant Kurdish political renaissance means more than ever the PKK remain the default representation of the Kurds and the only true interlocutors to the Kurdish problem.

It seems that after thousands of lost lives, billions dollars of lost expenditure and decades of failed policies towards the Kurds, Ankara still doesn’t come to term with the limits of any military solution. In recent weeks the Turkey has reaffirmed its commitment to attack the rebels with all its might. The life of either a Kurd or Turk is equally sacred and tears of a mother are equally regretful. After 40 years of confrontation and painful memories, it is time that all sides see that bloodshed must be ended.

Only recently Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan boldly proclaimed, “there is no Kurdish problem; only a PKK problem.” And that the issues of the Kurdish citizens in Turkey are not to do with the PKK.

On the contrary, the PKK has not been eradicated because Turkey has refused to see that the problem is not 5000 guerrillas but 15 million people. Without resolving the root of its age-old conundrum, Turkey’s continual cutting of branches will never bear any fruit.

The issue of the 5000 guerrillas and the 15 million people goes hand in hand. More than ever the PKK is intertwined with the struggle of the Kurds in Turkey.

Too often Turkey’s policies have meant that Kurds have been trapped with no real alternative. Not for the first time, the Kurdish political campaign has ground to a halt and the PKK remains the noose by which Ankara can control and intimidate the Kurds. Ankara too often not only tries to resolve the problem without the PKK but without the Kurds themselves.

Turkey’s policies continually place the Kurds into the hands of the PKK, yet ironically the Turks then use this as an opportunity to charge Kurds for been supporters of the PKK.

It is Ankara’s policies and continual labelling of any pro-Kurdish figure as PKK or terrorist related that has given the PKK more weight.

This general labelling of Kurds in Turkish circles as separatists or PKK collaborators has fuelled inter-communal friction. Not all Kurds support the PKK lest all Kurds been supporters of violence or having anti-Turkish sentiments.

This is demonstrated with the strong support for the AKP in previous elections, and even though they were over shadowed by BDP’s record success at the recent polls, the AKP still mustered 30 seats.

But clearly the Kurds feel that they have given the AKP enough time and support, but the AKP has not lived up to its pledges and bold pre-electoral promises.

The problem is that although the AKP has made a number of positive steps and breakthroughs in resolving the Kurdish problem in last decade or so, their hands are tied by the nationalist elite and general nationalist euphoria that plagues Turkish society.

Keeping the Kurds content with piecemeal gestures in the east yet appeasing nationalist circles in the west has proved almost impossible.

On the back of the recent spate of Turkish casualties in fighting with the PKK, inter-communal tension has become dangerously high.

Popular Kurdish singer Aynur Dogan was heckled off the stage by the audience at a concert for singing in Kurdish after the death of Turkish soldiers. This was preceded by protests and attacks by both sides in Istanbul.

This attack on Kurdish identity shows the progress that Turkey still needs to make. There appears this mentality that an attack on a Turk by a small group of Kurds is akin by an attack by all Kurds.

The younger generation of Kurds, with growing expectations and resentment towards Ankara, will be more difficult to appease. This standoff between expectant and frustrated Kurds and the government’s tentative dealing of its Kurdish problem will only lead to a wider gulf.

The only solution is a new Turkey that embraces the Kurds as true partners and as a key component of their society.