Tag Archives: PKK Peace Process

With new angles to the peace process in Turkey, where now for the PKK’s armed struggle?

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The Kurdish New Year of Newroz is a traditional fuel for Kurdish nationalist fever in Turkey, often resulting in mass protests and deadly clashes with state forces. In recent years, however, it has come to represent a new democratic opening to ending the three decade old war between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish government.

The peace process that started in 2012, culminating in imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s announcement of a cease-fire in March 2013, was a significant milestone. After years of a polarization, thousands of lives and a much stagnated local economy owed to fighting and security restrictions, there came a growing realization that neither side could ultimately triumph with the status quo.

The much anticipated Newroz address of 2015 by Ocalan, feel short of widespread expectations that he would announce the laying down of arms but was nevertheless significant as he acknowledged that the armed struggle was no longer sustainable and urged the PKK to launch a congress with view to ending the conflict.

Whilst the plight of Kurds today is a far cry from the past and a number of steps have been taken by Ankara, peace talks have proved far from plain sailing.

The bridge between what the Kurds demand and what the government is willing to concede has always been a slippery slope.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was pivotal in the launching of the peace process and the increase of Kurdish rights from his tenure as Prime Minister, summed up the frailty of sentiment when he recently insisted that Turkey does not have a Kurdish problem. What Kurdish problem?” Erdogan insisted, “There isn’t one anymore.”

Another point of contention for Erdogan concerned Ocalan’s demand of a monitoring committee to oversee the peace process. Ocalan and the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) have insisted on an open and transparent government commitment that is underpinned by a recognized framework.

In recent weeks, cracks have emerged between Erdogan and his AKP led government. The government has agreed to a monitoring committee whilst Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc rebuked Erdogan for his “emotional” and “personal” views.

The peace talks are against the backdrop of looming national elections in Turkey. Erdogan’s seemingly hardening stance on the peace talks could be explained by his endeavor to appease the nationalist votes. Then there is the widespread belief that Erdogan is working to secure a presidential system with extended powers.

Erdogan was also critical of the manner of recent negotiations and agreement between the government and HDP. The AKP and Erdogan still have a substantial support base amongst Kurds, and Erdogan has attempted to discredit the HDP as it tries to reach the elusive 10% threshold to enter parliament.

So far Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has a more positive view of the peace talks and the government initiative, “Let’s forever bury in the ground the hatred, the cultural of hate, violence, guns,” he declared at a recent rally.

Agreeing to peace talks is one thing, agreeing on an end goal and its implementation is proving much trickier.

Erdogan maintains that disarmament is a prerequisite to peace and not an outcome of it. But PKK has shown that they want to see action first.

The frailty of the peace talks were underscored by small clashes between the PKK and government forces in the regions close to Iraq.

Although Ocalan holds huge sway of the PKK, this is not a forgone conclusion, his actions and decisions must appease many sceptics in the PKK camp. An example is a potential backlash if Ocalan had announced disarmament without concrete steps from the Turkish government.

Cemil Bayik, a co-founder of the PKK, emphasized such feelings “for the armed struggle to end, there are certain steps the Turkish state and government must take.”

With the PKK enjoying an influential role in the Syrian Kurdish battle against the Islamic State and with increasing autonomy and recognition of the Syrian Kurds, the goalposts have greatly shifted with increasing regional PKK interests.

Clashes between Kurdish protestors and Ankara over Kobane in October have highlighted the continued sensitivity of the Kurdish question and how peace talks have at the same time assumed new angles.

Even if arms are dropped in Turkey, they are merely picked up elsewhere against the PKK’s new enemy.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Kurdish reforms in Turkey should not be weighed with grim days of the past

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Just decades ago against a backdrop of assimilation policies, repression and Kurdish phobia, many of the democratic rights and freedoms that the Kurds enjoy today would have been unthinkable.

Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power in 2002, it is fair to say that the party has taken a number of bold steps to resolve the countries long-standing Kurdish problem.

The reforms packages of the past decade instigated by Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, may prove historical when placed into context but it is difficult to compare an era of improved rights to times when the existence of the Kurds was denied altogether or when even Kurdish names were banned.

Fast forward to 2013 with the PKK war reaching close to 3 decades and when the peace process and the new political climate in both Turkey and the wider Middle East has made the stage ripe to finally resolve the Kurdish conflict.

This year has been the least deadly in almost 30 years of conflict as imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan assumed a position of peacemaker. The PKK forces began to withdraw and a ceasefire was put in force. This time there was renewed hope and optimism that Ankara could finally Ankara take on its aged old Kurdish problem head-on with a dose of reality and away from an outdated nationalist ethos.

However, as the months have rolled on without concrete measures, Kurdish anxiety has steadily increased leading to disgruntled and disenchanted voices within both the PKK and the Peace and Democratic Party (BDP) and war of words between the Kurdish groups and the government.

By the time Erdogan announced his much anticipated democracy package on 30th September 2013 a new climate had already taken fold with the PKK halting their withdrawal from Turkey as retaliation for the labored nature of the peace process and the political and social scars that the highly-publicized Gezi Park protests inflicted on Erdogan’s government.

Of course, in relation to the past, the latest reforms announced are historic and a significant milestone. But this is the 21st century. Thousands across the Middle East are fighting for their rights and ever-expectant populations are not ready to settle for second-best.

The Turkish Kurds see their brethren in Iraq go from strength to strength with de-facto independence, new economic power and strategic and political clout. To the south, they see their Syrian Kurdish counterparts sowing the seeds of unprecedented power and autonomy.

Simply put, after a long wait, Erdogan’s package disappointed and is unlikely to appease long-term Kurdish aspirations or build meaningful bridges with the PKK that will see a genuine end to armed conflict.

Erdogan’s changes include allowing education in Kurdish in private schools, towns and villages now able to use their Kurdish form, abolishing the long-standing pledge of allegiance by school children, lifting of the ban on Kurdish letters not present in the Turkish alphabet and a promise to review the 10% threshold designed to hinder Kurdish footing in parliament.

Many key demands have not been met, especially in the field of judiciary. There can never be justice, social harmony or peace while anti-terror laws remain in their current form or judicial reforms are not enforced.

As long as such laws remain in place, an element of Kurdish phobia will always prevail.

Whilst the reform packages may disappoint, the timings and the implication of the announcements echoes beyond the short-term.

Erdogan came out of the summer protests bruised but not defeated. However, a backlash over the summer has placed Erdogan into a difficult predicament with elections just months away. He has to balance the secular, nationalist and minority voices in a way that almost gets him past the crucial milestone of upcoming local elections in March, presidential elections in August and parliamentary polls in 2015.

More radical reforms to appease Kurds would almost certainly have been met with a nationalist backlash. At the same time, a lack of reform would have threatened an abrupt end to the peace process and an almost instant return of violence.

The same dilemma applies to appeasing secular voices whilst at the same time not betraying the Islamist principles of his party and his millions of Islamist supporters.

Clearly there was a lack of real consultation with the various groups including the Kurds and the reforms will not please all sides but it’s a gamble and balance that Erdogan is prepared to take.

The PKK and BDP were quick to criticize the reform package but it’s not clear whether it will derail the peace process altogether or merely delay and hinder the initiative.

The latest reforms can only be labeled as a new dawn if they serve as the precursor and basis for future reforms rather than a solution in itself.

An ever expectant and resurgent Kurdish population will not settle for token democratic gestures that they should never have been deprived of in the first place.

Furthermore, minority rights have to be put in perspective. You cannot apply equal weight or the same brush to Alevi, Assyrian or Christian demands and the much deeper and fundamental Kurdish question.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Turkey’s peace initiative – ensuring that once rebels drop weapons, they are not picked up again

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The turn of the year has created a unique environment and momentum in Turkey for solving the age-old Kurdish question, better than any time in the history of the Turkish republic, culminating in Abdullah Ocalan’s Newroz ceasefire declaration and an on-going peace process.

While the current progress and general rhetoric is certainly positive, many obstacles lie head and the initiative can be easily derailed.

It has taken bold steps from both sides to get this far and settling a three decade armed struggle cannot be achieved without courageous steps, determination and real compromise and desire. While many in Turkey continue to believe there is no Kurdish question and what remains to be resolved is a “terrorist” problem, true resolution and reconciliation will only come with the acknowledgement that the Kurdish question and the PKK problem are one and the same.

The details of peace talks and agreements, other than through leaked press reports, have been generally concealed. The government needs to be clear and transparent in the negotiations and with practical steps it is willing to take.

These steps must mean wholesale gestures to the Kurds through parliamentary measures and not via a piecemeal carrot and stick approach.

The current debate about the withdrawal of PKK rebels within Turkey highlights the current sensitivity that continues to plague Turkey. The AKP government has refused demands to enshrine the disarmament and withdrawal of PKK rebels into legislation. It remains conscious of nationalist reservations or giving the PKK nemesis credibility or acclaim through any “public” withdrawal.

In the grander scheme of things, dropping of guns will not be an issue and it is likely that in Ocalan’s latest letter to be announced that he will push the rebels to disarm before withdrawing. It is ensuring that these guns are not picked up gain that is the issue.

If Turkish government concessions fail to materialise or appease the greater portion of Kurdish society, the process can easily unravel. Furthermore, without long-term peace and democratic measures, reflected in a constitution that deliver true rights for the Kurds and a level of regional autonomy enveloped with economy growth and investment in the south east, another armed group may simply fly the flag.

With new democratic channels, a constitution that protects Kurdish identity and new jobs, much needed public services and an improved standard of living, a new natural political climate can take hold in the Kurdish regions of Turkey.

Indeed the onset of a new Turkey is a win-win for Turks and Kurds, but for the PKK it has to realise that an end of violence is also win-win for all parts of Kurdistan. The new Kurdistan Region of Syria was hampered by its association with the PKK and a harsh line of Turkey. Peace in Turkey will also result in constructive steps by Ankara with Qamishli.

The anti-Assad stance of the Turkish government led to a somewhat predictable reinvigoration of Damascus ties with the PKK serving to “punish” and destabilise Turkey. The influence of PKK peace negotiations on the PYD can arguably already be seen with escalating tensions between YPG Kurdish forces and regime forces.

 

Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who for many is staking his political career in the rapprochement with Ocalan, is seeking to make a number of gains in one move.

It cannot ignore the onset of Syrian Kurdish autonomy which raises the nationalist stake for all Kurds and in the fast changing Middle East and surrounded by all four parts of Kurdistan, it can risk animosity with the Kurds at its peril.

Last but not least, peace with the PKK removes one remaining thorn in the already strong and prosperous relations between the Kurdistan Region and Ankara. With expanding energy ties with Erbil and unprecedented trade volumes not to mention the importance of strategic and political alliances with the Kurdistan Regional Government, Ankara can ill-afford to let out-dated nationalist principles mark the growing reality of a new middle Eastern order and with it the rise of the Kurds. Ankara can either ignore the Kurdish nationalist reality to its detriment or harness it for the betterment of Turkey’s regional and strategic goals.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.