Tag Archives: KRG Baghdad Relations

As Kurd-Arab relations hit rock bottom, tensions reach dangerous heights

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With a language of confrontation, the writing for conflict is always on the wall.

With tension over the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command already at boiling point, the writing for open confrontation was always on the wall. Violent skirmishes between Peshmerga forces and Dijla forces in Tuz Kkurmatu, resulting in two casualties and many wounded, could be the tip of the ice-berg in what may embroil into serious conflict between Kurds and Arabs if sentiments do not dramatically change.

Any escalation in conflict has the potential to drastically alter the face of Iraq and indeed the entire region. Kurdish and Arab forces have come close to blows in the past, but the establishment of the Dijla forces was an open intent to ruffle Kurdish feathers and use military might to achieve goals.

The Dijla forces which Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki setup in September after promising he would not go ahead with the move, illustrate alarming boldness and arrogance by Maliki as he seeks to solidify his growing grip on power.

The escalation in the disputed territories and the rapidly deteriorating relations between Erbil and Baghdad comes as no surprise. Maliki has been consistently interested in preserving his sphere of power, has successfully consolidated a number of powerful roles under his helm and has affectively manipulated political actors and played on sectarian emotions when backed against a corner. If in moments of weakness he can prevail, then Maliki’s capabilities and confidence at times of strength have little bounds.

Weeks after a cross-party Kurdish delegation returned from Baghdad in what many deemed as a “final attempt” at resolving the crisis between Kurdistan and Baghdad, relations have plummeted to new lows.

The Kurdish delegation promised a united stand should negotiations prove unsuccessful and it is time for Kurdish political forces to show solidary and a clear plan of action as Kurdish interests are threatened more than ever.

Only in April of this year, a vote of no-confidence on Maliki failed in spite of cross-party support in Baghdad, with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani playing a big part in thwarting the measures to remove al-Maliki. How a betrayed Talabani, who received promises from Maliki about new national dialogue and a halt to Dijla forces, must now regret that.

The reason for the Dijla Operations Command was supposedly to address “poor” security coordination in the areas that had witness violent attacks. But as always with Maliki, timing of the moves and initiatives is the clue to real intent.

There have been terrorist attacks in the northern disputed belt for years, with residents long complaining about a lack of government protection. For the large part, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces had been relied on to affectively protect disputed areas as Iraqi national forces were bogged down in a fierce sectarian civil war further south for a number of years.

None of the Dijla commanders had been appointed by the council of representatives and most of the leaders have allegiance to Maliki. In fact the majority of the military commanders across the Iraqi army are carefully hand-picked by Maliki, making them increasingly a sectarian and not a national force.

Coordination was already a common feature under years of American mediation with the setup of join patrols and commands between Peshmerga and the Iraqi army. Kirkuk province’s Kurdish governor Najimaldin Omar Karim refused to cooperate with the new command and tensions have been brewing slowly towards open confrontation. Lt. Jamal Tahir, the chief of police in Kirkuk, refused to take orders from the command and warned about any Dijla meddling in Kirkuk.

It is no confidence that new measures by Baghdad have come as relations between Baghdad and Erbil have dramatically declined, with internal disputes and a difference in regional strategy widening all the time as Kurds have moved closer to Turkey, reaffirmed their anti-Assad stance and have grown ever more independent with new energy deals.

The new manoeuvres in the disputed territories are political and have little to do with provision of security. Maliki’s increasing sabre-rattling is designed to dilute Kurdish power, undermine Kurdish security forces and strengthen Baghdad’s hand in the jostle for control of disputed territories.

Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani had stated in recent remarks, “the formation of the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command in Kirkuk and Diyala is an unconstitutional step by the Iraqi government,” whilst warning that “the intentions, aims, formation and actions of this command centre are against the Kurdish people, the political process, co- existence and the process of normalising the situation in the disputed areas.”

The years of delays in the implementation of Article 140 and constitutional articles was already clear gauge of Baghdad’s appetite to conform to democratic principles that go against their interests. This latest move is nothing but further measures to hinder a clear resolution of disputed territories and to derail Kurdistan’s growing economic and political strength.

Barzani said in a recent statement “I want to reassure the people of Iraq, and especially the people of Kurdistan, that after consultation with the Iraqi President and other concerned parties, we will make our position clear and take appropriate steps against this unconstitutional action and any actions designed to impose unconstitutional arrangements in the disputed areas”. The PUK leadership had also warned that the Kurds would resort to other means if Maliki did not rectify and backtrack from his “mistakes”.

Warnings by the Kurdish leadership are not new and the desire to adopt patience must surely be running thin. It is also signifies the importance of Kurdish solidarity and a united stand to protect Kurdish interests. Lack of Kurdish unity in disputed territories and particularly Baghdad over the past several months has already harmed Kurdish goals.

The move led by Barzani to oust Maliki under his growing abuse of power was wrongly seen as “personal” in some circles with Maliki’s track record over the past number of years telling its own story.

When backed into a corner or on the negotiation table Maliki and the State of Law Coalition make all the right overtures and gestures. But almost a decade under the new Iraq, Kurds have to finally realise that promises are not worth the paper they are written on in Baghdad.

The Kurdish security forces had warned that they will respond harshly and this was met with Maliki’s own stern warnings for the Peshermrga forces not to provoke Iraqi forces. Maliki had ominously insisted in the past that “there are no restrictions on the movements of the Iraqi army, which according to the constitution is a federal army and has right to be present in Basra or Zakho. And no one has the right to prevent that.”

As Maliki came under renewed pressure over the Dijla Operations Command, he boldly added the Salahaddin province under its command.

The growing rhetoric from Maliki, the likes of Yassin Majeed and other Shiite leaders and new assertiveness that their powerbase stretches to all corners of Iraq is an open threat of war.

In a sign of growing hostility towards the principle of the Kurds as the sole guardians of Kurdistan, Abdul Salam al-Maliki, an MP from the State of Law bloc, urged the Iraqi Prime Minister to open a “North Operations Command” to “protect” Kurdistan Region, under the pretext that the Peshmerga are unable to secure the province.

It is ironic that the Peshmerga who receive no funding or support from Baghdad or a share of weapons purchases are been advised of their lack of strength. Peshmerga had the capability to repel the might of Saddam and are capable of securing Kurdistan both now and the future.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

Cleaning polluted political waters in Iraq when streams are rising

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The Kurds prepare to send yet another delegation to Baghdad but can the same formula produce a different answer?

The political forces in the Kurdistan Region are preparing to send a delegation ahead of Eid Ad’ha to Baghdad, hailed as a “final attempt” to solving the crisis.

The delegation, which was intended to represent a cross-spectrum of Kurdish political voices, is charged with reaffirming the Region’s adherence to the constitution and former deals concluded but also on the other hand to warn the government over its damaging monopolisation policies.

Kurdish political forces have agreed to take a united stand should attempts to find a solution prove futile.

While looking for factors to remain hopeful or positive, it is difficult to overlook the fact that such delegations, negotiations and attempts at reconciliation are hardly new.

Furthermore, they come at a time when a Kurdish olive branch has been severely burned by brazen and worrying statements from a leader of the State of Law Coalition, Yassin Majeed, who attacked Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani as a “a real danger to Iraq’s economy and national security” just as the Kurds were preparing their reach out.

While the statement from Majeed may not be reflective of the overall view of the State of Law Coalition, it severely derails any positive motions that are initiated and makes the bridge towards reconciliation and understanding all the more slippery.

Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, severely reprimanded Majeed for his statements, deeming them as a “call to war”. Talabani blasted Majeed’s “provocative” and “reckless” statements at a time when the Kurdish government was working to send a delegation to reignite dialogue with the National Iraqi Alliance (NIA) and other groups.

The Kurdistan Alliance (KA) also hit back at Majeed saying his stance was designed to cover the failures of the government, and as Barzani is against the onset of a totalatarian regime spurred towards sectarianism and the corruption that is rife in Baghdad.

The problem is Majeed’s stance is unlikely to be an isolated view and too often dialogue has proved fruitless and met with insincere ears. Nouri al-Maliki is the real danger in Iraq and his centralisation tendencies have too often been masked under narrow political or security pretexts.

All of the problems that grip Iraq today including issues between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad have been discussed before with agreed mechanisms for their resolution.

The problem in Iraq is not finding agreements amongst parties but the implementation of such agreements. The Iraqi constitution already lays the groundwork for the resolution of disputed territories, oil sharing, federal powers and the distribution of the federal budget. The Erbil Agreement and the 19 points that underpinned the agreement that formed a key precondition for the formation of the current coalition and broke the unprecedented political stalemate, already make the terms and basis for political partnership clear.

Why does an already settled and accepted Iraqi constitution or clear political basis for partnership need to be revised or restudied? How many more agreements need to be formed for a solution to the current differences or discrepancies to be adopted?

The issue is not striking agreement but the stomach and genuine intent to fulfilling the terms of such agreements. Until such a time, dozens more agreements will not be worth the paper they are written on.

This makes the Kurdish position all the more precarious. From the Transitive Administrative Law (TAL), the Iraqi constitution, to the Erbil agreement, they have watched as successive Baghdad governments and particularly Maliki have paid lip service to honouring such legally binding covenants.

The Kurdish leadership have emphasised that should the latest Kurdish delegation fail to yield solutions with the Baghdad government this time round, they will take a “united stand”. However, the manner of such a stance was not clear and ambiguities of reprisals in the face of broken Baghdad promises have hurt the Kurds on countless occasions before.

Any responses or actions by Kurds should they deem negotiations a failure should be met with definitive action. Conversely, if any agreements are struck, these should be measured by clear timetables and a join committee to monitor the implementation of the terms of agreement. What good is any political concord, such as the Erbil Agreement, if a little over a year to new national elections, the terms are not implemented?

Both internal developments as well as growing regional shifts and crises that are drastically changing the political and strategic outlook of the Middle East is pushing Iraq further apart with the stance of various factions becoming more engrained. Iraq does not have a coherent and commonly accepted domestic vision or strategy yet alone a national foreign policy and divisions are becoming more paramount.

While Iraq threatens Turkey as relations have nose-dived, the Kurds are growing ever closer to an economic and political alliance with Ankara. As the Kurds, favour an overthrow of Assad and have helped their ethnic brethren, Baghdad sought to the secure the Syrian border to avert any steps against the regime.

Baghdad remains ever weary of looking too far west by striking a new alliance with Russia and strengthening its ties with Shiite regimes in Damascus and Tehran. Sunnis remain wary of Shiite domination and naturally look towards their Sunni neighbours.

All in all, resolutions on Kirkuk, disputed territories and oil sharing become even more difficult to resolve.

Just this week, Exxon-Mobil was mooted to sell its interests in the West-Qurna field in Southern Iraq, seemingly removing itself from the political chaos between Baghdad and Erbil. Exxon was affectively asked to take sides and it is appearing to do so in favour of lucrative returns in Kurdistan.

More than ever, Kurdistan and Iraq are two distinct and distant entities and the policies of Baghdad and Maliki should assume a lion’s share of the blame.

Maliki continues to act as a Shiite leader rather than a leader of Iraq and recent arms purchases raises doubts on whose security Maliki is trying to boost.

Iraq national budget in 2013 is set to be a record, but where are the billions of dollars been spent as Iraqis continue suffer from a lack of services and infrastructure? While Iraqi oil and defence budgets dramatically grow, Kurdistan is asked to cater for all its expenses, including defence forces which should fall under the national budget, out of its own portion of the budget.

Baghdad has set aside billons to develop oil field further south, but criticises the Kurds for any moves to bolster its oil industry.

Kurdish leaders have emphasised their adherence to the constitution and have warned repeatedly that they will not accept violations or neglect of constitutional principles. This is the same message that the Kurdish delegation will convey once more and it is time to show whether these warnings are just empty rhetoric or the basis of real intent.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd.net, Various Misc.

 

New Iraqi arms deals stoke natural Kurdish anxiety

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With a dark memories of an Arab Iraqi military might firmly on their mind, Kurds fear an extended Baghdad military arm, especially with Maliki at the helm, sectarian divisions that run rife and growing disputes between Erbil and Baghdad.

On the back of a recent multi-billion deal with the U.S. to supply 36 F16 fighter jets including training of Iraq pilots, Iraq signed further multi-billion arms deals with Russia and Czech this week with the intent to bolster its weak air defences but to ultimately reinvigorate its role as a major regional power.

Iraq hopes to have an eventual fleet of 96 F16s, with the first shipment of the planes due next year, which it aims to start flying by 2014-2015. Under the current agreement between the U.S. and Iraq, the Arizona AAir National Guard’s 162nd Fighter Wing is well on the way to training the quota of 27 Iraqi pilots.

Under normal circumstances a state aspiring to boost aspects of its armed forces it deems weak or its defensive capabilities is hardly unnatural, so what’s the big deal with Iraq when it comes to the recent procurement of arms and the bolstering of its air force?

The answer is simple. Iraq is not a normal state and history has cruelly shown the consequence of such a supposed right to build armed forces.

More crucially, arms purchases are masterminded by Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who is renowned for centralist tendencies and monopolisation of power, while consolidating a number of powerful posts under the guise of “acting” cover.

Under the constitution, the national defence forces are for the whole of Iraq, and when the Iraqi army was resurrected in 2003, the aim was to make it inclusive of both Arab and Kurdish officers. However, such is the effect of sectarianism and animosity that has gripped the disparate Iraqi social mosaic, that forces are unlikely to serve the benefit all of Iraq.

The danger of the ever growing Iraqi army been used in the political sphere cannot be discounted. Whether the army has an allegiance to a sectarian pooling or political faction as opposed to the greater nation of Iraq will always be an underlying uncertainty.

Kurds and particularly Sunnis have complained in the past about the disproportionate Shiite leverage and sectarian influence on the makeup of the Iraqi security forces.

Baghdad arms deals

The symbolic arms deals with Russia and later Czech Republic amounted to billions of dollars.

As part of the deal with Moscow Iraq is to obtain 30 Mi-28 attack helicopters and 42 Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile systems for a reported fee of $4.2 billion dollars. Although with such a significant commercial arms deal, Russia sought to reposition itself as a major arms supplier in the Middle East and rekindle old ties with Iraq that had turned somewhat stagnant since 2003, it was more of political relevance than anything else.

Moscow hailed the Russia-Iraq relations, as ties “based on traditional friendship,” with Maliki quick to emphasise the importance of their partnership with the Russians.

Baghdad has had to play a rather tricky game of keeping both Tehran and Washington happy. Tehran has a powerful political hand in Baghdad, whilst it was the U.S. that Baghdad greatly relied on for so many years and of whom Baghdad built what seemed solid and long-term strategic ties.

However, as Baghdad has slowly spread its wings in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal, and while it has tried to keep the US on its side, it has also sought put its foot down.

The deal makes Russia the second largest arms supplier to Iraq after the US. In this move, Baghdad sought to diversify its dependence on U.S. arms and thus the associated long-term training and rearmament of US weaponry that would be necessary but to also demonstrate that it would work on its own terms and not as a regional puppet of America.

Hot on the heels of the Russian arms deal came a $1 billion agreement with the Czech government to deliver 28 L-159 fighter jets.

The deals come in the midst of a deadly Syrian war, where Russia has been a staunch ally of the Syrian regime while Baghdad has tried to maintain a perception of neutrality. However, Baghdad has anything but a neutral position towards Syria and mindful of not upsetting its Iranian partners, it has remained part of the pro-Assad camp in one form or another.

Russia and Iraq clearly share the same view on Syria on ensuring non-Western intervention and potential break-up of Syria that would greatly change the sectarian and political balance in the Middle East.

At the same time, Iraq has had to succumb to the pressure of their American partners. This could be seen when the Americans insisted of an Iraqi inspection of Iranian passenger jets flying over Iraqi air space, which they suspected of carrying arms shipments to Damascus.

Kurdish fear

Whenever there is any motion to strengthen the hand of Baghdad, there is almost a natural unease that runs down the spine of Kurdistan.

Just what is the reason for Baghdad’s hunger for renewed military might? While Iraq wants to be a revived force to be reckoned with in the Middle East and to take an influential and powerful position in the region, the first Kurdish fear is that an extended Baghdad military arm means a direct threat to their population, their autonomy and their new found prominence. In others words it is not defence that Baghdad seeks with its new military quest but offence.

Iraq argues that it needs a revitalised and new air force to deal with terrorism and to protect what they deem vulnerable airspace. Baghdad has already warned that it won’t be able to protect its airspace until 2020 and that it cannot fully protect its borders and territorial waters. However, counter-insurgency is hardly about acquiring a deadly new air force. Iraq had the huge might of the Americans on its side for several years and yet failed to defeat insurgents.

The image of Iraqi forces repressing the Kurds, destroying Kurdish villages and bombing civilians with chemical weapons is hardly a distant memory.

Furthermore, a rapid rise to regional fame under Saddam Hussein with the amassment of a powerful military force led to an arrogance that launched a deadly war with Iran, an invasion of Kuwait and successive destructive civil wars with Kurdistan.

Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani has already voiced great concern on the likes of F16s falling into the hands of Maliki, warning in April 2012 that “I feel Kurdistan’s future is in severe danger because of (Maliki)…F-16 (jets) should not reach the hands of this man (Maliki).”

Barzani claimed that in meetings with his military advisers, Maliki showed chilling readiness to strike the Kurds with his new weaponry when the time was right.

Kurdish guarantees

The Kurds have sought guarantees from Western powers who have sold billions dollars’ worth of arms to Iraq, but remain unconvinced about the real intentions of Baghdad.

Worryingly for the Kurds, recent deals with Russia and Czech do not have the same clauses they forced on U.S. arms deals that newly acquired arms will not be used on the internal population.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has urged Baghdad to keep them informed and in the process around any such deals.

Furthermore, since the Iraqi defence forces are for the whole of Iraq, it is thus not only logical but a constitutional right that a portion of these defence forces goes to Kurdistan. It is not clear how and to what extent Baghdad supplies arms to Kurdish security forces or military training to Kurds, leading to a danger of imbalance and Kurdistan been in a position whereby it is forced to take defensive measures in light of the growing power of Baghdad.

The Kurdistan Peshermrga forces are part of the national Iraqi forces and thus the responsibility should clearly fall on Baghdad for the financing, military enforcement of the Kurdish regiments as well as providing Kurds with air defence training and capability. However, Baghdad has continuously objected to not only the size of the Peshermrga forces and its level of arming but to the actual funding itself.

Such is the alienation and mistrust that runs between Kurdish and Iraqi forces that often it is like two armies of two sovereign nations rather than a national army with two strands. There is a growing threat of an arms race, and continuing ploy by Baghdad to reinforce military capabilities will only stoke hostilities.

Furthermore, with a new air force to protect its vulnerable airspace, it will be interesting to see what Baghdad does to protect any violations of Kurdistan airspace or borders by Turkish or Iranian forces.

The agreement with Maliki and Russia must be referred to parliament as stipulated by parliament, and it waits to be seen how inclusive the political process will be.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd.net, Various Misc.

A long-term oil law, the making or breaking of Iraq

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“This deal cannot solve all the problems currently but it is considered a good step,” Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani

One of the greatest items of contention in Iraq has been a formula to share its immense oil wealth amongst its distrusted and fragmented ethno-social mosaic. Since oil was discovered in Iraq almost a century ago, it has been akin to more of a curse than a blessing for the ordinary people.

It’s difficult not to imagine what Iraq would have been like today if its oil wealth was not in the hands of tyrants and those who have abused Iraq’s treasure.

Kurdistan oil is home to estimated 45 billion barrels of oil and trillions cubic feet of gas, yet ironically the Kurds have seen the oil in the past used to purchase arsenal in their repression them and destroy their villages and livelihoods. It is a little wonder that the Kurds were keen to muster a level of autonomy on their energy reserves as part of the Iraqi constitution negotiated in 2005.

Although, the Iraqi constitution has clear stipulations around oil exploration, revenue sharing, export and control of federal regions, oil has been a contentious thorn in relations between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad.

Oil minnows have flocked to the region as the early pace-setters and for the like of Gulf Keystone Petroleum, Addax, Heritage Oil, Western Zagros, Genel Energy and many more, the early bird really does catch the worm. Such is the spectacular promise and potential of energy in Kurdistan that akin to a rags-to-riches story, juniors have become majors in their own right almost overnight.

Oil giants coming off the fence

Any oil company anywhere in the world would have been misguided not to see the unravelling of the newest and perhaps last global oil frontier before their very eyes. However, while some smaller companies jumped in with both feet at the rewards and the lucrative terms of the Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) on offer, oil majors, while licking their lips at what was on offer, sat on the fence to preserve their interests and contracts further south and to appease Baghdad.

In spite of Baghdad’s fierce rhetoric against the KRG deeming their contracts signed with foreign companies as “illegal” and sending stern warning to oil companies, oil majors could simply no longer remain idle.

A spate of oil majors such as Chevron, Total and Gazprom have recently joined the fray with ExxonMobil’s oil deal a little short of a year ago serving as the ice breaker. Whilst from 2003 onwards there was a rush of juniors, now there appears to be a rush of majors keen not to lose out on the limited spots remaining at the Kurdish oil counter. Royal Dutch Shell is the latest major rumoured to be in discussions with the KRG which will serve as another symbolic feather in the cap for Kurdistan.

The possibility of Shell signing an agreement with Kurdistan, after twice coming close in the past before pulling back, comes as Baghdad continued to threaten ExxonMobil this week. As part of the timelines of the PSA with the KRG, ExxonMobil is starting logistical preparations to dig its first exploration well.

In reality none of the oil majors need to be reminded about the threats on offer, they are all fully aware. Furthermore, they have first class law teams and their confidence in the legal dealing with Kurdistan is a major endorsement to KRG policies. The fact that Baghdad effectively asked these companies to take sides makes the feat all the greater.

ExxonMobil has a major interest in the southern lucrative West Qurna-1 oilfield and Shell has its supergiant Majnoon field in addition to a multibillion gas venture.

But just what can Baghdad do to actually implement their threats? What would be left for Baghdad if it blacklisted all these oil majors? Simply put, Baghdad will do some sabre-rattling but ultimately it can’t afford to shoot itself in the foot and lose out.

Resolution over oil payments

The Kurdistan oil export taps have been frequently used in recent years for political gains, threats and concessions. While the production rate has been modest, it has the potential to significantly ramp up output.

Last week an agreement was ratified between the KRG and Baghdad ensuring that oil exports could continue and a dispute over oil payments could end with the Kurdistan receiving 147,000 barrels of oil products per day.

Lack of payment to foreign oil companies in Kurdistan and the stop-start nature of oil exports and thus oil revenues for these companies has been the only major blemish in an otherwise spectacular rise of the Kurdistan energy sector.

Kurdistan will keep export at around 140,000 bpd per day this month before ramping up to 200,000 bpd for the remainder of the year. In turn, Baghdad would pay around $857 million owed to foreign companies working in Kurdistan.

“It was agreed to form a permanent committee to follow up on the terms agreed, and give the committee authority to resolve any obstacles blocking implementation,” a KRG statement confirmed.

This committee is perhaps the most important step of all. If any side has any reason to doubt any elements of the oil revenues or the activities of any party, including foreign oil companies, then it must address them legally, politically and with clear audits, accounts and evidence to eliminate any doubt, accusations or grey areas.

While this agreement serves as a major relief or in the words of KRG Oil Minister Ashti Hawrami “a big breakthrough” and a promising step towards a new oil law, it is hardly comprehensive and may serve as another false dawn.

The bones of contentions stretch much deeper than just payments to oil companies. The question of federal autonomy and more importantly territorial disputes are etched much deeper. The issues of oil, article 140 and disputes territories and KRG foreign policies are very much intertwined.

Baghdad’s last remaining grip on Kurdistan is in the oil sector. It was naturally alarmed with the signing of landmark oil exportation deals between the KRG and Turkey in recent months. With the proviso of an independent oil pipeline under implementation, Kurds have much more control over the energy sector.

The national hydrocarbon law has stalled since 2007 and without formal ratification of an oil sharing law the Iraqi energy sector will remain rocky at best.

Iraq’s oil infrastructure is in urgent need of revitalisation and Iraq is in urgent need of additional revenue for it’s much needed and delayed reconstruction.

Oil for all of Iraq

Ironically, whilst Baghdad has accused the Kurds of manipulating its oil reserves, the oil in Kurdistan belongs to all of Iraq. The KRG has made it clear from the outset that they will abide by the 17% ratio agreed with Baghdad.

It is outdated mentalities that prevent Baghdad from realising that should Kurdistan gain then so does the whole of Iraq. Arab nationalists are quick to remind Kurds that Kurdistan is actually on Iraqi soil but then by the same token, treat Kurds like they are trespassers on their own soil, even if the Kurdish rise to prominence is essentially a major gain for all of Iraq

Kurdish oil exports and payments of foreign companies was actually on the of key prerequisites of the Kurdish political parties supporting Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and joining the coalition and thus there was already agreements in principle, but in Iraq agreements are not always worth the paper they are written on.

The successful passing of a national oil law in Iraq could be the making or breaking of Iraq such is the immense oil resources Iraq has at stake. If it was not for oil, Baghdad would have given disputed Kurdish territories back to the Kurds many months ago, would have implemented article 140 and would not have implemented its Arabisation policy in the first place.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Enjoy your natural right to statehood or prolong agony with an unrepentant Baghdad?

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The current crisis in Iraq is anything but new. The past nine years have been shrouded in sectarianism, civil war, political bickering, shaky unity governments, animosity, distrust and agreements that were not worth the paper they were written on.

The Unite States helped mask some of the realities by acting as the crutches to support an Iraq that was broken and could not stand on its own two feet.

On the other hand, the Kurds chose to re-join the new Iraq after years of isolation on the premise of a partnership based on a voluntary union.

The Kurdish leadership on many occasions were the key intermediaries in a bitter cycle of violence between the newly-empowered Shiites and disenfranchised Sunnis. Key negotiations, initiatives and interventions from the Kurds often resulted in pivotal breakthroughs, notwithstanding the important role that Kurdish security forces paid in restoring stability in the south.

The Kurds, owed to their kingmaker role were the beneficiaries of a number of concessions and countless promises from Baghdad.

Here is the problem, what good is a comprehensive constitution, democratic frameworks, concessions and promises if the end product is failed implementation, by-passed legislature, half-hearted unity and empty gestures?

The Kurds find themselves in a position of deep mistrust with a Baghdad that continues policies that are detriment to the development of Kurdistan, of reconciliation and brotherhood.

The centralist tenancies of al-Maliki are not new, this was a frequent criticism of his first term in charge.

Despite reservations and widespread mistrust of his party, somewhat regrettably al-Maliki was given a lifeline and a brittle coalition with al-Iraqiya and the Kurds broke a world record for the formation of a government.

Ironically, as al-Maliki has come under more pressure from Sunnis and Kurds, he has conversely grown in power. He has successfully monopolised power, combined several powerful posts under the disguise of temporary cover and all but broken the coalition beyond repair.

Barzani’s ultimatum

The Kurds after playing the patient game and seeing a lack of change in Baghdad are now at a critical juncture were they dare not stay idle.

Do the Kurds continue to exhaust energy in the new Iraq, when clearly the basis for new Iraq is non-existent? After nine years of effort and perseverance, the Kurds cannot continue to ignore the writing on the wall. Iraq is not united, it’s not democratic, constitutional article are no binding and parties such as Maliki clearly do not believe in a true partnership with the Kurds.

Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani has made a number of bold remarks around the plight of Iraq, the critical political crisis and has warned that the Kurds will not tolerate a return to centralisation or dictatorship.

He repeated his stance in an interview with AP, where he warned that if a positive breakthrough was not achieved by local elections in September then he will turn to the Kurdish people for a decision and thus a referendum on independence.

Barzani has been critical of al-Maliki and Baghdad in the past, but simultaneous events has pushed the Kurdish leadership well beyond the limits of passive observation or tolerance.

Barzani’s visit to Turkey in recent weeks followed a keynote visit to Washington where met with U.S. President Barack Obama and Joe Biden. No doubt at the top of the agenda was Barzani’s growing worry over the consolidation of power in Baghdad and his message to his counterparts in Turkey and US was that the Kurds had reached breaking-point and were serious about threats to secede if the foundations that were a proviso for re-joining the new Iraq were continually disregarded.

Some critics viewed Barzani’s remarks as a mere ploy to extract concession from al-Maliki rather than any real threat to secede. Such views are narrow-minded and lack conjecture.

The Kurds have already received countless concessions and have already had many promises around power-sharing, resolution of disputed territories and hydrocarbon laws. More concessions alone are in fact just the tonic that the Kurds should avoid.

Empty promises are worthless as are positive agreements that are no adopted. What the Kurds must demand of al-Maliki and Baghdad in the key weeks and months ahead is real action, practical steps and tangible outcomes.

The visit of influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to Erbil and growing disillusionment of some Shiite factions on top of an already marginalised and bitter Sunni population shows that the current crisis is more deep-rooted than ever before.

Re-writing the wrongs of history

Kurdistan has a fundamental and unmolested right to two clear options. Either a truly democratic, federal and balanced Iraq or outright independence.

As the largest ethnic group in the world without a state, subject to a cruel and selfish partition of their lands and decades of repression, if any nation had a right to determine its destiny it would be the Kurds.

While other countries, some with populations numbering in the thousands and others gripped with immense poverty and a lack of infrastructure dot the global horizon, the Kurds are warned to tread carefully or that their time has not come.

After the end of the First World War, the concept of self-determination was the overriding principle of US president Woodrow Wilson that he imposed on the League of Nations and the Middle East.

For imperial interests at the time, Kurdistan was the only major nation not to be granted statehood.

Self-determination is one of the key international charters and by which repression, imperialism and subjugation is eradicated and free will is attained.

Some claim that Kurdistan does not have the infrastructure or conditions for statehood but just how much infrastructure does Palestine or Kosovo have compared to the Kurds?

Kurdistan is washed with immense amounts of oil, with a booming economy, a vibrant population and all the trappings of any state. It is a key strategic hub of the Middle East and with the influence and standing to play a key part in the evolution of the Middle East.

However, double standards of foreign are something that the Kurds can no longer accept. Kosovo was granted independence as special case where foreign powers had ruled that Serbia had forfeited the right of sovereignty due to their treatment of the Kosovars.

If anyone has forfeited the right to have any say on Kurdistan is Arabs and Iraq. After decades of brutal Arabisation, destruction and systematic repression, the Kurds deserve to be applauded for single-handedly standing up to one of the most powerful dictators of recent times.

Have the Kurds spilled countless blood, tears and tragedy to now return to centralist rule in Iraq or to have terms dictated upon them by other groups?

No Turk, Persian or Arab can intimidate the Kurds any longer. In reality, even Turkey has accepted that Kurdish statehood is not only a natural and inevitable reality but that Turkey itself may benefit from such a development.

The Middle East is in turmoil as governments jostle for power and influence. Turkey’s rapid decline of relations with Syria, Iran and ever increasingly Iraq, puts the Kurds in a strong position to be at forefront of shaping the Middle East socially, politically and economically.

At the first seismic shifting of the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were sidelined and had to painfully endure decades of suffering for their chance to rewrite the wrongs of history. They can ill-afford to be passengers as the evolutionary trains darts past this time around.

Way ahead in Iraq

Barzani has warned Maliki before, but it was the first time that a real timetable was set for action.

If Maliki is sincere about power-sharing and partnership with the Kurds, then he doesn’t need weeks to show his intentions.

However, even if Maliki does change his tune, it will be temporary at best. Arab nationalists such as Maliki will never want what best for Kurdistan, only what is best for himself and their party.

There is no threat of Iraq’s disintegration when it has already happened. A crisis between Kurdistan and Baghdad is just tip of the iceberg. Deadly bombings serve as a daily reminder that bloody sectarianism is not a thing of the past, with Sunni digging their heels and ready to battle for their slice of the cake, it begs the question of just what part of the new Iraq would any Kurd want?

Regional powers have continually served their interests at the expense of Kurdistan, it is time for Kurdistan to be selfish and solely focus on motions that exclusively serve their national interests.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Continue to nurse a sick Iraq at the expense of Kurdish nationalism?

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Not so long ago, the Kurds would have been overjoyed to see the Kurdistan flag hoisted on a building in Iraq, let alone see it proudly flap in the wind as it overhangs the prestigious Ritz Carlton hotel in Washington, D.C., to commemorate the visit of the head of a state.

The point is simple. The Kurds have come a long way, establishing themselves as a strong strategic power in the Middle East, influential components of the new revolution sweeping the Middle East and major actors in the new Iraq.

The Kurds have to be taken seriously as a major force with their demands and sentiments cajoled by global powers. Therefore, it is no surprise of the importance that the U.S. places on the alliance and partnership with the Kurds that resulted in the recent visit to the White House by Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani.

Barzani met U.S. President Barrack Obama, U.S. Vice President John Biden as well as a number of senior political figures in Washington.

Obama urged Barzani to re-engage with Baghdad amid growing tensions, a serious political crisis in Iraq and a collapse in the current power-sharing agreement.

The U.S. has long leaned on the Kurds in implementing their vision of the new Iraq and for their influential part in keeping Iraq together. The new Iraq was inaugurated including the constitution, pluralistic and democratic principles under the auspices of the U.S. government.

The U.S. formally withdrew at the end of 2011, and yet the new Iraq they left behind is as troublesome as the old Iraq they inherited.

While every Iraqi misfortune cannot be directly attributed to the U.S., after all the underlying Iraqi issues are historic and owed to its artificial inception, the U.S. must take firm accountability in guiding the new Iraq and appeasing all sides or bearing the consequences of failed policies and as such the collapse of the Iraqi state.

Kurdish weariness of Baghdad

Interfactional relations have hardly been great right across Iraq over the past several years, owed to deep mistrust, sectarian splits and stark political differences. However, relations between Kurdistan and Baghdad have been tentative to say the least, and the divide has been deepening year after year.

While Kurdistan has developed at pace with an economic boom and a new lease of life, Baghdad has been dragging it down. It appears that Baghdad policies are enacted to contain the Kurds and slow down their rapid rise and ensure that they don’t escape from the clutches of Baghdad. Without the bolt and chain that is Baghdad, Kurdistan would have developed at an even faster pace.

After the recent meeting between Barzani and Obama, the U.S. once again reaffirmed its support for a democratic and federalist Iraq. “The United States is committed to our close and historic relationship with Kurdistan and the Kurdish people, in the context of our strategic partnership with a federal, democratic and unified Iraq,” read a statement.

But how long can the Kurds continue to believe in this vision of the new Iraq, which is clearly miles away from reality?

Political power has been consolidated in the hands of Nouri al-Maliki, there is a great sectarian and political imbalance in the security forces, the power-sharing agreement has all but failed, constitution articles continue to be overlooked, and many key laws needed to bridge the national divide such a Hydrocarbon Law continue to gather dust on the political shelf; the list goes on.

The U.S. continues to pressure the Kurds to spearhead Iraqi reconciliation and re-engage with Baghdad, while over the past several years the Kurds have clearly been the main mediating party in resolving numerous disputes in Baghdad as well as helping pull Iraq back from the brink of all-out civil war.

Barzani’s statement at his annual Newroz address and the reaffirmation of those views at a speech he gave in Washington (at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy) must be taken with utmost seriousness. At the same time the Kurdish leadership must make clear to their U.S., Iraqi and international allies that their threats are not in vain.

Barzani reiterated that Iraq is facing a serious crisis and that all the current signs point to a one-man rule, referring to Maliki’s running as prime minister whilst simultaneously holding positions of the commander in chief of the armed forces, the minister of defense, the minister of the interior and the chief of intelligence.

Kurdish plan B

As the divide between Baghdad and Erbil grows, it simultaneously hastens the inevitable declaration of independence by Kurdistan.

Barzani pledged to continue to work toward a solution within the terms of the Iraqi constitution, but once again warned that should efforts to find concord fail that he will go back to the Kurdish people for their decision, in reference to a referendum on independence.

How can the U.S. or any international power deny the legitimate right of the Kurdish nation to self-determination and statehood, especially when the Kurds have done more than their fair share of protecting and promoting a unified Iraq?

The Kurdistan Regional Government and the remit of the Kurdish leaders are to serve the Kurdish people and not Baghdad. Therefore, when Baghdad renegs on the key points of the Erbil agreement, continues policies at the detriment of Kurdish growth, does not implement constitutional articles or continues to lean toward a recentralisation of power and dictatorial tendencies, how can Erbil remain idle?

The heated rhetoric between Baghdad and Erbil over outstanding oil export payments and the subsequent halting of Kurdish oil exports, over Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi who the Kurds housed before he fled to Qatar, over KRG oil contracts with Exxon Mobil and other companies, and over disputed territories is all proof that Iraq is already fractured in all but name and that reconciliation efforts with Baghdad will prove to be a futile exercise.

US jockeying

The U.S. may have officially withdrawn forces from Iraq, but their interests and stakes in the new Iraq are as great as ever. U.S. diplomats are as productive as ever in Iraq with top U.S. officials continuing to frantically jockey between factions. After billions of dollars of expenditure, thousands of lost lives and several years of efforts to promote unity and democracy in Iraq, the U.S. can hardly afford just to walk away.

The U.S. have been aiming to promote national reconciliation in Iraq for over nine years, but the Iraqi actors have continued to blight such efforts and failed to meet most of the U.S. benchmarks. It is unsurprising in the current political climate that the Iraqi government indefinitely postponed a national reconciliation meeting that was scheduled for this week.

The Kurds are no longer pawns of foreign powers on the Iraqi or Middle Eastern chessboard. The U.S. may want a certain outcome from Iraq or have a certain vision, but what if this never comes? Do the Kurds sit idle and indefinitely nurse a sick Iraq?

This is the same U.S. that fed the Kurds to the wolves to serve their own strategic purposes in the past. The Kurds can over-rely on Washington at their own peril. While the Kurds today have more friends than the mountains that were once the symbolic saying, it is still surrounded by enemies and parties that will do all they can to check Kurdish national advancement.

Moving forward without fear

When the Kurds had little more than fierce pride and passion and basic weapons against chemical weapons and some of the most powerful armies in the world, they still didn’t succumb to fear or subjugation in spite of all the odds.

Why then should the Kurds of today, with immense oil wealth, security forces, strategic standing, a booming economy and great regional influence, be fearful of upsetting or annoying the U.S. or other such powers when their own interests are at risk?

The Kurds chose to be part of a unified Iraq under a federalist banner that was enshrined by the constitution. They could have taken Kirkuk and other disputed territories by force and gone their own way, but with U.S., Turkish and international pressure and their endeavor for democratic solutions, they opted for a different route.

At the same time, the U.S., Turkey and some other global powers continue to warn Kurds not to proclaim independence. Baghdad and such powers cannot have it both ways, deprive the Kurds of legally enshrined articles and principles in the new Iraq and at the same time expect the Kurds to succumb to what best suits other powers.

In reality, the Kurds can declare independence. And in spite of threats and warnings from the likes of Turkey, there is nothing they can do to delay or prevent this eventuality.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Another political fallout in Kurdistan at a time when need for unity greatest

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Just when an aurora of calm and stability was returning to Kurdistan following the several weeks of riots that were instigated earlier this year in Sulaimanyia, turmoil, tension and anger returned to the scene once again in Kurdistan.

The riots over the past week, which started when a large number of liquor stores, massage parlors and other venues deemed un-religious, were set on fire after Friday prayers, quickly spread across the Duhok region.

The much unfortunate attacks on such shops and massage parlors, seemingly a direct attack on the Kurdish Christian and Yezidi community, were followed by tit-for-tit reprisal attacks by other group of rioters where a number of buildings of Kurdistan Islamist Union (KIU) and some media offices were set on fire.

In a repeat of heightened tensions that ensued in February of this year in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) stronghold in the east of the Kurdistan Region with Gorran at the center of the political and social exchanges, this time it was the west of the Region and the stronghold of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the KIU at the heart of the controversies.

Either way, such events prove the sensitivity of the Kurdistan Region and how polarised Kurdistan continues to be along mainly political but also sectarian lines.

Tensions always escalate rapidly with a culture of a blame game and media war taking precedence. Accusatory fingers by either side or attacks on their credibility via the media simply add great fuel to the fire in a region renowned for passion and strong emotions when it comes to political affiliations and nationalism.

In truth, such events much like those in February can never be judged merely on the surface of affairs. In practice, there is a series of underhand reasoning”s, probabilities and intentions that have been used to spark a downward spiral of relations.

Was it the KIU that encouraged violence in the first place on dozens of shops and other outlets in Zakho, was it the KDP that was responsible for the burning of KIU buildings, was it the KDP that was responsible for any crackdown of rioters? Was it actually a member of KIU that intended to greatly harm the images of both KIU itself and the KDP for certain gain? Or was it actually someone from the KDP who intended to harm the image of both sides?

Could such attacks have been perpetrated by Islamist groups in the greater Iraq with influence on elements in the region?

It was widely alleged that emotions on Friday were heightened by fiery sermons in Zakho with the KRG in particular blaming a particular Imam with alleged ties to KIU.

As always the questions pondered rage unanswered with the obsession of finding a side to blame taking significance. Rather than singling out the minority elements of each party in such episodes, the blame is quickly shifted to the whole party and the whole government.

What is clear is that while the attacks on so-called western icons in Zakho may seem to have a religious grounding, in reality the fundamental undertones are political.

These liqueur stores or the like did not appear overnight in Zakho or in the Kurdistan Region. They have been there for years that have encompassed various events of political turmoil, so why now?

The region is renowned for its religious and ethnic tolerance and it”s embracing of pluralism and indeed the KIU and other Islamist-rooted parties would be hard-pressed not to agree that that is one element of the Kurdish landscape that has received a lot of positive light from Western powers, in a greater region hardly renowned for its tolerance or pluralism.

There is no smoke without fire and all signs to point a pre-mediated set of events. It”s hard to believe that events in Zakho and subsequent incidents were simply spontaneous in nature.

Such is the level of passion that political parties and protesters almost expect harsh reprisal actions following initial violent attacks. It is almost a case of goading of sentiments, with key elements taking full advantage of the emotive and political polarisation that appears at such turns.

Tensions between the KIU and KDP is not new, you only need to go back to 2005 when small group of supporters attacked their buildings, with the KDP later compensating families of victims and renovating KIU buildings. With the Duhok province a longtime stronghold of the KDP, with the KDP weeks away from assuming the premiership a further time and with the much anticipated provincial elections around the corner, these stirring of tensions, blame games and media war allows early points to be scored.

Although the relations between the ruling parties and opposition groups have calmed significantly, there has been a lack of real reconciliation, dialogue and concord. Aside from KIU statements this week against the KDP, all opposition parties still have somewhat of a bitter taste in their mouths.

In this light, it was hardly surprising when it was announced this week that opposition groups had refused to take part in proposed multi-party talks, with Gorran stating their solidarity with the KIU “for the oppression they were subjected to”.

Kurdistan Region President, Massaud Barzani, promised a full investigation of the incidents and vowed to hold any perpetrator to account regardless of political affiliation.

Indeed, this is not about the KIU, KDP or any other political party. This is about preserving the interests of Kurdistan and preserving the interests of the people who ultimately vote for these parties. Injustice has the same connotations no matter the background and any wrong doing, criminal attacks or violent reprisals must be fully accounted for no matter who the guilty party turns out to be.

The most unfortunate casualty of this setback is the media. The media becomes a default target where emotions are channeled. Journalists, media outlets and freedom of speech must be protected as a symbol of our society. However, by the same token this does give the media, especially those owned by the political parties, the right to enflame tensions, spread false accusations or mislead viewers.

KDP has issues statements expecting the KIU to end the media war it believe was instigated again the KDP. The media war in Kurdistan is perhaps the greatest poison of such riots. The Committee to Protect Journalists and Reports Without Borders quickly condemned all political factions for the targeting of the media.

Other opposition parties should be a part of reconciliation in such circumstances, after all they are still an accountable part of the political interests of Kurdistan. However, all too often such events and deepening of wounds is manipulated to serve political interests, not the interests of the Region.

These events also clearly demonstrate that real soothing of political and social tension never happened after the February violence. The KRG must continue their investigation of the events earlier this year, rapidly conduct investigation via a formal committee on the latest riots and proceed with the positive reform that was announced.

As Kurdistan attracts more and more foreign interest, more foreign consuls are opened and further portals to the outside world are created, it conversely draws attention more quickly.

Kurdistan needs unity more than ever, with key disputes in Baghdad as tense as ever, with Kurdistan surrounded by hostile partners and with the stability of the Region at stake. Within the region itself, finger pointing and media wars may tarnish individual parties, to the outside world all of Kurdistan becomes tarnished.

The Yezidi and Christian communities have been a heralded icon of Kurdish society for thousands of years. For hundreds of years they have lived with fellow Muslims and under Islamist empires. Are they really the source of problem in Kurdistan all of a sudden? The Yezidi and Christian community calls for protection must be heeded and the notion of tolerance in Kurdistan must be reinforced.

Christian and various other sects in the south of Iraq have flocked to the region for safety where they have been embraced as brothers. This is a proud achievement for Kurdistan that has not gone unnoticed even in the Vatican.

The onus is on both the KIU, KDP and KRG to put this issue aside, investigate fully and protects the interests and unity of Kurdistan at all costs.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

With the numbers game so prevalent in Iraq, the national census will rock the political horizon

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The upcoming national census due to be held on 24th October 2010 holds additional significance for an Iraq that almost seven months after the staging of national elections has still failed to form a new government. The importance of this elusive and milestone national census, the first across all of Iraq since 1987, can not be underestimated.

Iraq is a disparate nation where statistics have huge significance. While in most places this event would be a question of numbers and not politics, in an Iraq that encompasses an enthralling and tense mosaic as a result of its artificial formation by imperial powers, it’s almost impossible to discount the huge significance of this census in shaping and influencing the political arena.

The conducting of a census has proved controversial for a number of reasons, none more so than its undoubted direct affect on the status of disputed territories. Under article 140 of the constitution the implementation of the census is the milestone step before a referendum can be held in Kirkuk and other areas fiercely contested between Kurds and Arabs.

As Baghdad has dragged its heels on the implementation of article 140, clearly for fear of seceding power and territory to the Kurds and due to strong pressure from neighbouring countries, the census in turn has been delayed a number of times.

At a time when the formation of a new government has proved painstaking at best and security is deteriorating exponentially, voices from predominantly Arab circles calling for yet another postponement of this elusive census was predictable.

In reality, if the census was to be held without the three Kurdish provinces as was the case in 1997, Baghdad would not hesitate to hold the census even under the current tense climate. Simply put, the census directly pits Kurds against Arabs in the fierce political stakes, hence the long-term apprehension of holding this critical national poll.

While the principle of a census itself is not politically driven, in Iraq numbers means power and power is a prelude to wrestling as much influence and share of the national cake.

Those who believe that a census would be the source of the polarisation of Iraq are simply wide of the mark. This census does not lead to a polarisation of Iraq, for it merely confirms the extent of the existing polarisation of Iraq.

No matter how the matter is viewed, Iraq is a bitterly divided country that houses a number of ethnic and religious groupings who existence under the Iraqi banner has been fraught with historical mistrust and animosity.

Furthermore, although masked under a different light, this is hardly the first post-Saddam census in Iraq. With the fragmented nature of the social horizon, each of the national elections held thus far have been nothing short of a high-level census.

The formula is simple. Kurds vote for Kurdish parties, Arab Shiites for Shiite parties, Arab Sunnis for Sunni parties and so on. There are of course general exceptions to this rule in Arabic circles with more cross-sectarian political coalitions in the last elections but the post-ballot patterns remain essentially the same.

Analysis of the previous election results will broadly determine the nature of the outcome from the census. For example, the recent national elections in Kirkuk were a direct contest between Arabs and Kurds jockeying for power. The current distribution of seats in the Iraqi national assembly is affectivity a snapshot of the demographic breakdown of Iraq.

The census will have by far the greatest implication on the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. With the normalisation process incomplete to say the least, there is a great chance that Kurdish ranks will be swelled further. In this case, the census essentially becomes the de-facto referendum that most Arabs and Turkmens have long feared and proactively attempted to stall.

The results of the census merely confirm the results of a referendum in Kirkuk and disputed territories. In this respect, even if article 140 is stalled further and referendums are never held in Kirkuk, a census that clearly shows a Kurdish majority naturally provides the best political ammunition possible for the Kurds.

A census that shows a Kurdish majority in the disputed areas can almost be taken as the will of the people to become annexed with the KRG as opposed to remaining under Baghdad control.

One of the reasons why the census pits Kurds versus Arabs as opposed to promoting inter-Arab friction is the fact the census omits sectarian based questions. It will show how many Arabs there are but crucially it steps a major landline in not providing a breakdown of Sunnis or Shiites within Arabic sphere.

Ironically, the census does propose the Yezidi’s and Shabbak’s as separate groupings so there is a danger this may harm Kurdish representation.

In addition to the all important step of deducing a rundown of Iraq’s ethnic identity, the census will also ascertain many other keys answers from the nation such number of widows, disabled people and orphans and those who have been forced to move.

While most parties point to the census as something that will further stoke tensions at a delicate tenure in the new Iraq, it is often forgotten that the census can actually be a factor for reconciliation.

After all, as long as the census count is vigilantly analysed and prepared by Iraqis with representation from all major groups and with key UN input and monitoring, facts do not lie.

Kurds and Arabs have bickered at length over the distribution of the national budget with the KRG receiving a portion that they deem equal to their numbers in Iraq which Baghdad has ubiquitously contested. However, no politician should doubt this breakdown on the back of clear evidence from the census.

In a similar vain, if the census shows clearly how the vote is going to be swayed in any future referendum on disputed territories, this provides no excuse to delay the implementation of the constitution forever.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Balancing the ethno-social political triangle in Iraq

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Four months after the much anticipated national elections in Iraq that was hoped to foster the first all encompassing government in Baghdad, Iraqi politicians continue to jockey, debate and pursue tense negotiations with view to assembling the required majority to form government. Giving the Iraqi track record, a lengthy period of government forming is hardly surprising. However, the process was exasperated with contentious delays to the election itself, controversy over banned politicians on eve of political campaigning and then bitter disputes over the final election results.

In many ways, Iraq has made a lot of progress since the previous elections marred by Sunni boycotting, not least on the security and sectarian front. However, as the democratic process has become stalled in recent weeks, this has afforded a chance for insurgents to relay the road of instability and sectarianism. 

The critical government forming process has been giving added bite with the expected withdrawal of U.S. combat forces by the end of August. While the departing of foreign forces may have been a welcome sight for many Iraqis, the presence and influence of the U.S. all too often masked political and security cracks, and this has now become more evident than ever.

At critical times over the past several years Washington has used its substantial sway on Iraqi politics to ensure the Iraqi democratic bandwagon rolled on. Stability and success in Iraq shortly after the nightmare that ensued post-2003 became an American obsession. After all, in such an aftermath, anything short of peace, relative democracy and stability in Iraq would have catastrophic consequences, especially with neighbouring predators already circling with intent.

U.S. military presence will drop significantly from a peak of 170,000 just a few years ago. While the sheer U.S. military expenditure and involvement in Iraq may have been taken for granted in recent years, as the democratic journey continues to remain frail, the readiness, loyalty and impartiality of Iraqi security forces will be put to a firm test.

Government shaping has been further complicated with the lack of a clear winner at the polls. Although Ayad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya group won the most seats, it was marginally ahead of incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, and debate continues to rage on the party that has the legal jurisdiction to attempt to form government. Although Maliki did not win, he strengthened his claim to form government with an alliance with the religious based Shiite Iraqi National Alliance, meaning that his party was only seats away from attaining the majority needed to form a new government.

The Kurds, who continue to hold a key card in the formation of the new government, have taken their time over the selection of any alliance this time and aim to seek written guarantees on nationalistic issues before committing to bring another power in Baghdad. The natural and preferred alliance of the Kurds will be to work once more with their Shiite counterparts. However, persistent foot dragging on key Kurdish interests by Maliki put doubt in the minds of many a Kurd, especially as Maliki’s dominance and political standing solidified. However, the predominantly Sunni umbrella of Allawi is hardy the tonic that weary Kurds seek either. Al-Iraqiya was direct in competition to the Kurds in the tense oil-rich province of Kirkuk and has often voiced its intent against Kurdish attempts to annex disputed territories.

If Kurds do join the mainly Shiite coalition of Maliki, there is a danger that they may not receive their first choice government posts, as may have been the case a few years ago. However, more critically a Kurdish-Shiite alliance without the key Sunni parties and the ultimate victor of the polls, Allawi, will sow a new chapter of democracy in Iraq on shaky foundations.  After all, it was the sidelining of Sunni’s after their decades of near dominance that triggered Iraq to the brink of civil war. For years Baghdad and particularly the U.S. have sought to appease Sunni’s and bring nation reconciliation in Iraq.

While in theory US Vice President Joe Biden’s comments this week that Iraqi politics was “not a lot different” from other countries, may speak true on the surface. Unlike some other countries, democracy in Iraq produces brittle results. This is owed to the ethnic and sectarian disparity of Iraq. Regardless of election results, Kurds, Sunni or Shiites will still demand power in government. The ‘triangle’ can not always be massaged based on election results. Shiites will always form a majority in Iraq and Sunni’s will always refuse to succumb to all-out Shiite dominance, especially with the proviso of a strong Tehran hand in Baghdad. At the same time, Kurd will never submit to Arab dominance and influence, due to their autonomous existence, history and national interests.

This means that key posts must be divided carefully regardless of the election outcome. The sidelining of any major group will only spell trouble.  The elections themselves are generally formulaic, Kurds will always vote for Kurds, Shiites for Shiites and so on, even if the elections this time around swayed from a sectarian underpinning compared to before.

The triangle became more interesting in recent weeks with the thawing of relations between Allawi and Maliki, raising the prospect of what seemed an unlikely political marriage. A coalition of such proportions may seem a dramatic gain for democracy but this may also mean that key positions such as President and Prime Minister will go to Shiites. Furthermore, this has raised anxiety in Kurdistan that they lose political sway and key posts in Iraq to Arab coalitions.

The US has largely stayed out of the political manoeuvring this time around. However, Biden’s visit was a clear indicator that Washington is getting itchy feet. While their forces may withdraw, their high stakes in Iraq will not dwindle. Stability and prosperity in Iraq has become a keynote health gauge of the Middle East.

As for the political process itself, it is still better to endure more months of protracted progress and frustrations in hope of genuine gains, than short-term achievements under US pressure as witnessed too often, that may lead to shaky coalitions and more fundamental Iraqi issues been swept under the political rug.

It is these real issues such as oil sharing, broadly represented security forces, federalism and resolving of disputed territories that often become sidelined for the sake of progress on the surface. Any new government must make firm commitments to these aforementioned principles and critically to the implementation of the constitution that is after all meant to be the blueprint of the democratic existence in Iraq.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

As kingmakers, ensuring the right king is made is paramount to the Kurds

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Months of painstaking preparations for the national elections and weeks of the controversial counting of the votes are finally over. However, before the Iraqi political bandwagon ponders a breather, the real work starts now.

The final election results encapsulated an enthralling, tense and close contest. This was a crucial milestone for the new Iraq and even more so as all sides of the Iraqi ethno-sectarian mosaic turned out in good proportion, striving to make a difference from years of frustrating post-war turmoil, instability, sectarianism and lacklustre living standards. The elections provide hope of a declined sectarian divide in Iraqi politics and the possibility of the establishment of the first all encompassing coalition in Iraq housing the embittered groups.

In reality however, the process of government forming will prove protracted and could well linger for many months longer.

None will be more weary of the future political shape and eager to strike the right alliance than the Kurds. The Kurds will likely be kingmakers again, as the only other distinct ethnic group with power, their support to the remaining Arab political rivals in Iyad al-Allawi, Nouri al-Maliki and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim will hold crucial sway to surpassing the all-important 163 seat mark to form government.

As such, their role as “kingmakers” carries enormous responsibility on Kurdish aspirations and the Kurdish people. Been kingmaker is one thing, ensuring the right king is “made” is another.

In the aftermath of the last elections, Kurds were in a more powerful bargaining position than in today. After a Sunni boycott and a larger allocation of seats per population for the Kurdistan region, the Kurds decided to side with Maliki’s Shiite alliance in what initially seemed to good affect.

The Kurds were able to assume the posts of President, Foreign Minister and Vice Prime Minister. However, as the months and years rolled by, while the Kurds dug their heels in at times to the desired affect and many bills reflected Kurdish jockeying, the key disputes and national goals of the Kurds become increasingly distant and stagnant in resolution.

As Maliki’s influence and credibility slowly rose, especially in light of improving security conditions from the brink of civil war, the Kurds who supported Maliki at key times, become increasingly despondent with the more hard-line government stance and Baghdad’s laboured approach to the implementation of key articles of the constitution.

However, this should not come as a great surprise. While Maliki may hardly be first choice for a Kurdish partner based on the tenuous political marriage, Allawi is hardly the flavour of the month either. The same foot-dragging was employed by Allawi as Interim Prime Minister of Iraq prior to the 2005 legislative elections, which saw slow progress on Kurdish-sided disputes. The growing nationalist stance of Allawi’s al-Iraqiya group, particularly concerning Kirkuk and other disputed territories is hardly an ice breaker either. Although a secular Shiite, the tough nationalistic tone of Allawi and his non-sectarian basis saw his alliance as a new logical platform for the Sunni voice.

This places the Kurds into a difficult predicament, which in theory has been made more challenging by the structure of the elections this time around. Firstly, disunity within Kurdish ranks with Change Movement (Gorran) running on a separate list to the KDP and PUK, potentially cost the Kurds a number of seats. Gorran won over sixty-thousand votes in Kirkuk but ultimately did not meet the necessary threshold to gain seats.

The other crucial factor was the Kurdistan Region receiving a modest rise in the number of national assembly seats which were increased from 275 to 325, with the rest of the south picking up the majority of the allocation of extra seats. Furthermore, bigger Sunni turnouts in the north and north-western provinces also contributed to a dilution of Kurdish power in these mixed provinces, which they had assumed almost by default in the last elections.

Kurdish support should not come cheap, and if its means that the coalition building process drags on for another few months, then so be it. It is better for Kurds to get firm and written guarantees this time around even if they are perceived as stalling the political process and pressured by Baghdad and Washington to “back down”, rather than to wait another four years for the resolution of key issues impacting the Kurdistan Region to be further sidelined and become stale.

The Kurdish alliance won 43 seats with other Kurdish parties claiming another 14 seats in total. The voting was generally well-spread with no party coming through as clear winners. Ultimate victors were Allawi’s al-Iraqiya group with 91 seats but this was only two more than Maliki’s State of Law coalition. As a result, this means that the permutations for coalitions are more ajar and thus the negotiation and bartrering process will be as delicate as ever.

Certainly, marginalising any bloc will come with its own headache, while attaining a broad reconciliation will still prove to be a bitter pill to swallow for the new Iraq.

Adding to the heated mix is the tricky allocation of the key ministerial posts. While the Kurds enjoyed a fair share of key positions in the past government, distribution of key posts to appease Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni sentiments will not be so straightforward. The running for the next President, held by Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, is already gathering heat with some Arab sides proclaiming that the President as a representative of the Iraqi nation should be an Arab. However, more crucially, the Kurds need to focus on positions that will ultimately hold influence and sway within Iraq itself. For example, the posts of Ministry of Oil or the Interior Ministry will be a lot more beneficial to the Kurds than positions that are high on paper but may do little to directly favour Kurdish interests in reality.

Meanwhile, as credible as the newfound opposition is to the Kurdistan Region, this will almost certainly have negative connotations if Kurds enter Baghdad divided. With the rise of Arab nationalist parties, Kurds can ill afford disharmony on the national stage. Disputes over article 140, national budget, status and funding of Peshermarga forces and not to mention the oil sharing, are only going to get fiercer before any resolution becomes more likely.

Attempts by Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani to ensure a united front in Baghdad, and pledges by Gorran leaders to maintain unity on Kurdish national issues is an absolute minimum if Kurds expect any fruit from any prospective alliance they strike.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Hewler Post (Kurdish), Peyamner, Various Misc.