Tag Archives: Geneva III

Can a ceasefire be achieved in Syria amidst Assad’s victory march?

The battle lines have been frequently redrawn in the deadly Syrian civil war. However, Russian military intervention shattered the military picture. From the outskirts of Latakia, Syrian rebels are scampering to defend an increasingly encircled Aleppo from outright fall into regime hands.

As regime forces lay siege on remaining crucial rebel supply lines to the Turkish border, it becomes clear that with Geneva III coinciding with the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s strongest hands in years, peace talks were always going to fail.

For the rebels, it is increasingly a becoming now or never moment. They rebels are surrounded by regime forces with the Islamic State (IS) in close proximity and to the north, especially around Azaz and the Turkish border, rebels are under pressure from Syrian Kurdish forces, who increasingly feel their strategic goals are more likely to be realized through Moscow than Washington.

Under the cover of relentless Russian airstrikes, rebels groups are increasingly weak on the ground and since leverage at any peace talk will always be heavily swayed by the picture on the ground, Syrian opposition parties will find it difficult to twist Assad or Moscow’s arms with their lofty demands.

Even as major powers agreed on a “cessation of hostilities” in Munich which is due to take effect next week, sheer skepticism and animosity quickly diluted any optimism.

For one, the agreement is not an actual ceasefire, since neither of the warring parties signed the agreement. Secondly, Russia has vowed to continue airstrikes against what they deem as “terrorists”. Thirdly, a buoyant Assad remains ambitious that with Russian support and a potential sealing of the borders he could recapture all of Syria.

Assad recently statement that “… if we negotiate, it does not mean we stop fighting terrorism” does not speak of a man, who after clinging to power at his weakest point is about to relinquish power when he holds the aces.

Russia enjoys a powerful position in the Syrian calculus, and whilst the U.S. is bogged down in the struggle against IS, it can ill-afford the same bold intervention as the Russians or to turn the focus to the removal of Assad, which longed slipped as a priority.

The ball is firmly in the court of Assad and Russia. Assad has always been willing to negotiate but on his terms. If Assad succeeds in sealing the borders and overrunning Aleppo, any peace talks will to him feel like a victory treaty.

However, the war in Syria has proved be fluid and Assad’s renewed position of strength could easily change if Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other regional powers decide that after 5 years of immense investment in the opposition cause, they can ill-afford to throw-in the towel.

Assad and his allies are juggling a rapid defeat of rebel forces with the possibility of a Turkish or Saudi ground invasion.

Tensions between Russia and Turkey are already high owed to the Turkish downing of a Russian jet last November. It won’t take much for all-out war if Turkish or Russian forces engage each other once more.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry openly acknowledged that if the peace plan fails then more foreign troops would become a reality in the conflict. As Kerry pointed out, without pressure on Russia or Iranians to hold Assad to any ceasefire or peace talks, then Syrian regime has little reason to back down on their victory march.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Heated discussions, disagreements and distrust, and the tenuous Syrian peace talks have not even begun

The starts of the Geneva III peace talks were delayed twice last week owing to objections from the main Syria opposition represented by the Higher Negotiating Committee (HNC). The HNC finally bowed to pressure from the United States and the United Nations and agreed to attend the talks after “receiving assurances”, even then they insisted they are going “not to negotiate” with the government just yet, but lay the grounds for their demands to the UN.

What makes the situation more complicated is the disparate nature of the opposition, some 15 opposition grounds are represented in the Saud Arabian backed HNC alone, this discounts various other groups deemed too close to the regime or too hardline to play any role in the future of Syria.

The exclusion of no party is more ironic than that of the Democratic Union Party (PYD). They have been pooled with other terrorists not acceptable to join talks such as al-Qaeda afflicted al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State (IS).

Russia has long insisted on the inclusion of the PYD and other opposition parties. Whilst the Syrian Democratic Council that includes the PYD is invited, the omission of the PYD leaders is a grave mistake.

The PYD and its armed wing, People’s Protection Units (YPG), have been supported by US air power as well as Russian forces. A political settlement is unimaginable without the Kurds who control large parties of Syria with autonomous administration and a strong militia force that is spearheading the battle against IS.

Whilst the UN has not set loft goals at the start of the talks and expects the prospect of any agreement to be protracted, it remains to be seen whether it is the opposition and Bashar al-Assad’s regime that will decide the outcome or if it will be US and Russia.

Both the US and Russia have a clear role to play both now and in striking any agreement. There is no doubt that many aspects of the future Syrian framework have already been discussed and agreed between both camps such as the composition of the transitional government and state forces.

The US rhetoric over Assad may be the same but Washington has taken an increasing backseat role allowing Russia to become the dominant actor.

As US tip-toed around military action in Syria, Russia showed little hesitation as they salvaged Assad from the brink with military intervention.

If the notion that negotiation is determined by the state of the battleground, then Assad has the upper hand as he quickly recovers ground. Both Russia and Iran have shown that they will not allow Assad to fall.

The US has long abandoned the view that Assad must go before any peace talks. Ironically, it is now the US that is insisting that it is “important for these talks to continue without preconditions”.

In fact, with streams of millions of refugees streaming across Europe and IS problem becoming a more dominant issue by the day, Washington and its allies are reluctant for any wholesale changes of regime apparatus that will only fuel more chaos and bloodshed.

Without major concessions from the regime and the opposition and the inclusion of the Syrian Kurds, Geneva III will end much in the same way as Geneva II.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Kurds omitted from Geneva III as US and Russian jockey to build bases in Syrian Kurdish territory

As the Syrian war enters its 6^th year, months of preparation to cultivate another round of negotiations between Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian opposition could still unravel.

Just days before the talks were due to commence, there is fervent debate on who should attend the talks as well as various other pre-conditions still been set.

The High Negotiations Committee (HNC) that was created in December after a Syrian opposition conference in Riyadh is deemed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey as the only representatives of the opposition.

The age-old problem in Syria’s brutal war is deciding who the opposition is, with literally dozens of groups and just who are the moderates.

Russia has been jockeying for involvement of other Syrian opposition parties that are aligned to their strategy and that the HNC deems as too close to the regime.

But of all the groups, the omission of the Syrian Kurds led by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) is the most controversial. The PYD and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), have proved to be the most effective fighting force on the ground and have made steady gains against the Islamic State (IS).

The Syrian Kurds have been heavily backed under the cover of United States warplanes and are the only group that both the U.S. and Russia can agree on.

Turkey has been ever suspicious of the rising stock of the Syrian Kurds and the ramifications of their increased autonomy.

In recent days, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan repeated warnings that they will not tolerate any expansion of Kurdish territory west of the Euphrates and deem PYD as no different to IS or the PKK.

And this is where the contradictions intensify. The remaining IS corridor to the Turkish border can be easily sealed with coalition support and YPG forces. But for an anxious Turkey facing a renewed Kurdish war at home, IS still remains a more manageable entity than Syrian Kurds assuming most of its southern border.

In parallel to the Syrian Kurds facing the reality of no invitation to Geneva III, there have been widespread rumors in recent days that U.S. has been working to expand a disused former airbase in Rmelian, Hassaka, in the heart of Kurdish territory and in close proximity to Turkey and Iraq.

Whilst the US Central Command (CENTCOM) has stated it ‘has not taken control of any airfield in Syria’, other statements were not as definitive as a spokesman for the US Department of Defence said its small team in Syria needed “occasional logistical support”.

Either way, for a concerted move on Raqqa and even Mosul, opposition forces need greater logistical support from the U.S. led coalition than the usual airdrops.

If Ankara was feeling unease with the U.S. reports, then similar reports of Russian troops and a team of engineers in Qamishli looking to expand the airport and build a Russian base there would hardly have helped.

Whilst the US has tip-toed around both its key allies in Turkey and the Syrian Kurds, Russia does not have this problem and after relations nosedived with the downing of a Russian jet in November by Turkey, the Syrian Kurds remain a vital card for Moscow.

Any notion of a Russian military base in Kurdish territory would send a strong warning to Turkey.

It remains to be seen if PYD will attend the peace talks. Both the HNC and Turkey have insisted that if PYD does join, then it would be on the side of the regime. Turkey has even threatened to boycott the talks if PYD becomes part of the “official” opposition.

The differing stances of the Syrian Arab opposition, U.S., Russia and Turkey towards the Kurds will create another time-bomb if the Syrian Kurds are side-lined. Even if elusive peace is achieved, what then for the Syrian Kurds? Do you disregard their strategic importance against IS? Or do you even take moves to take away their autonomy or not include them in a future political framework?

With so many opposition groups and as many ideals and goals, and the crucial Kurdish position, Syrian troubles will continue long after Assad is gone.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc