Signed, tested, flowing and ready for world markets – Kurds will sell oil via new pipeline with or without Baghdad

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The new pipeline linking crude oil from Kurdistan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan is signed, tested, flowing and ready to be presented to world markets. The only hitch appears to be elusive thumbs-up from Baghdad to officially dispatch and sell the oil.

However, having come so far from numerous contracts signed between Erbil and Ankara, millions invested in the planning and construction and testing of the pipeline, the oil gathering pace at thousands of barrels is not designed to sit in Turkish silo’s indefinitely waiting for Baghdad. It’s there to be sold and let there be no doubt, it will ultimately be sold with or without the consent of Baghdad.

Over the past few years, thousands of barrels were sold to Turkey, Iran and local markets via trucks and the oil pipeline doesn’t change the end outcome, only the method of transportation.

Turkey has been careful not to alienate Iraq, who has persistently voiced their discontent at increasingly closer ties Ankara has with the Kurds and with the Kurds growing independence, and has tried to reassure the Iraqi authorities in recent months.

Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, stated last week that they would wait for approval from Baghdad prior to shipping the crude and expressed hope that a deal can be reached this month.

But is Turkey really about to rip-up the contracts, abandon the pipelines and its high stakes and interests because Baghdad deems growing independence of the Kurds against their interests? In reality, Turkey is already neck-deep in Kurdistan and is not about to backtrack. It benefits tremendously from easy accessible Kurdish oil and gas, from billions of dollars of trade and having the Kurds as strategic partners at a time of great regional turmoil.

Turkey or any other major power cannot overlook a region that has at least 45 billion barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of gas. According to some estimates, Kurdistan Region would rank 10th amongst countries with most oil reserves. Ironically, this doesn’t take into account the Kirkuk province that the Kurds have long sought.

The flows to the pipeline are set to start at 300,000 bpd and rise to 400,000 bpd. The ambitious Kurdish government is targeting 1 million bpd by 2015 and 2 million by 2019.

Every year, the Kurds seemingly fight a battle to secure share of the Iraqi federal budget, and strikingly for Kurdistan, it could soon receive more via the pipeline than the share of the revenues it struggles to receive from Baghdad. Ultimately Baghdad seeks to gain significantly from Kurdish oil as revenue would be received centrally and then split according to previous revenue sharing agreements – a fact that stubborn Iraqi pride overlooks.

All this means is that the Kurds will soon cut the umbilical cord that keeps it reliant on Baghdad. It put the boot firmly on the feet of the Kurds. However, any side-stepping of Baghdad in oil revenues would increase hostilities and serves to ensure that Baghdad digs their heels in over article 140 and Kirkuk and other festering disputes.

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Disunity weakens the Syrian Kurdish hand in Geneva

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When it comes to pivotal international conferences, particularly in Switzerland, the Kurds hardly have a colourful record. It was the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 that cruelly deprived the Kurds of an independent homeland that was promised as part of the earlier Treaty of Sevres in 1920. Today the Kurds are slowly regaining control of their destiny, but still suffer from the fate enforced upon them by world powers whilst they were deprived of a voice.

With this in mind, the upcoming Geneva II conference that foreign powers hope will lead to a peaceful political solution to the bloody Syrian civil war is an important platform for the Syrian Kurds.

Yet in spite of intense negotiations in Erbil to mend the Kurdish divide and unite the Kurdish stand in Geneva, unity appears as elusive as ever and it’s becoming increasingly evident that the Kurds will send two separate delegations to the talks, and worryingly one with the Syrian regime delegation.

After decades of repression and confounded to the shadows of the Syrian state, the Syrian Kurds have been great benefactors of the intra-Arab turmoil and afforded a unique chapter in their history.

Yet a lack of unity has been a severe handicap that has threatened to undermine the new Kurdish dawn and historical juncture.

Regional jockeying over Rojava between the PKK, Turkey, Kurdistan Region and neighbouring powers has added to the tension.

The talks in Erbil between the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which is more closely aligned with Massaud Barzani and is expected to attend Geneva talks with the opposition, and the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan (PCWK), which is spear-headed by the dominant Democratic Union Party (PYD) that refused to join the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), failed to produce a conclusive agreement despite earlier promise.

The Erbil Agreement of 2012 which united the Kurdish ranks with the establishment of the Kurdish Supreme Committee has all but eroded.

The PYD, who recently declared autonomy, is more closely aligned with the PKK and has been accused of monopolising power and has been the subject of strong criticism from the Kurdistan government,.

The Kurdish differences overshadow the fragile nature of the Kurdish gains in Syria. Thousands of Kurds continue to suffer in Syria and thousands more have sought refuge in the Kurdistan Region while fierce battles continue against Islamist forces.

The ideal position for the Kurds is to attend as a separate united delegation – this sends the strong message that the Kurds are a factor within their own right and not merely as a component of opposition struggle. In other words, fighting for your rights in a broader coalition dilutes the Kurdish cause by the leaving the Kurdish position to one of minority rights. The Kurds were often treated as second-class by Arabs in Syria and deserve a position as a distinct Syrian component. This will ensure Kurds are a separate topic where a separate solution is required with the ultimate goal of enshrining autonomy.

Of course, offering the Kurds such a position at the negotiating tables is likely to be blocked by Turkey, the US and some regional powers.

The need for a united and strong Kurdish position in Geneva is not that Geneva II is likely to herald the lofty goals expected. In contrary, a stubborn regime and a highly disjointed Syrian opposition are unlikely to strike an elusive political transition with such wide starting positions, but such a Kurdish position would be symbolic and send a strong message to the world that Syrian Kurdish rights and autonomy is not the end goal but a starting position.

The recent Erbil talks must continue with hope of bridging gaps, ensuring a share of power and decision making in Rojava, easing the suffering of the population through the opening of the border crossings and above all putting Kurdish national interests above any party or individual interests.

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Nelson Mandela’s virtues of peace, struggle and forgiveness in the Kurdish question

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“Courageous people do not fear forgiving, for the sake of peace” – Nelson Mandela

Nelson Mandela, who died at the age of 95, will forever remain an icon of justice, peace, patience and perseverance. His life was a journey against the odds underlined by determination, belief and passion for the cause. In a remarkable transformation, Mandela went from imprisoned activist of 27 years,  18 years of those years in the harsh confinement of Robben Island, to freedom in 1990 and just 4 years later as South Africa’s first black president in the country’s first multi-racial fully representative democratic elections.

Mandela’s primary struggle was against the apartheid system of the all-white National Party of South Africa that oppressed the black population and whose policies “separated” the black and white societies ensuring contrasting lives and conditions.

The case and struggle of Mandela is certainly true for the Kurds. Whether discrimination is on racial, religion or ethnic ground, the end product and crimes are no different.

As the old saying goes “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. Mandela may have been despised by the white regime as a “communist” or “terrorist” but for thousands more he was a true revolutionary and a symbol of sacrifice, bravery and determination. Mandela was a true advocate of peace but he was not afraid to use other means when peaceful pleas went unanswered and when oppression against the blacks continued.

Much in the same way as the blacks in South Africa, the Kurds have suffered oppression at the hands of their rulers, often with a second-class label in their lands of forefathers. The Kurds did not desire violence to achieve their means but would the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey really be where they are today without the great struggle of their leaders and people?

There was uproar in many a Turkish circle when the Turkish government turned to imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan as a key interlocutor of the peace process.

But as Mandela put so wisely – “if you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner.”

When Mandela became president, in spite of his harsh ordeal, he advocated reconciliation, forgiveness and employed a lack of bitterness or hatred.

In Turkey, the Kurds and Turks can truly turn a new page by embracing the same ideals of forgiveness and reconciliation and swaying away from hatred or animosity. As Mandela put so well himself, “courageous people do not fear forgiving, for the sake of peace.”

A look at Turkeys past needs a balanced approach. Killings of Turks or Kurds are as tragic as each other. Is a mourning Turkish mother any different to a mourning Kurdish mother?

There can never be reconciliation in Turkey without reflecting on the past. Mandela did not oppress those who did wrong against him or side-line them from his government – after all, that would make him no better than the perpetrator of crimes against him but he created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate past human rights abuses and to ensure the past is not merely swept under the rugs of history but is purposely taking forward to build a better future.

In December 1993, in a symbolic moment both Mandela and Frederik Willem de Klerk, the leader of the National Party at the time, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. It highlighted that when it comes to peace, there should be no hero or villain or bitter taste.

Whether it is Nelson Mandela, Massaud Barzani or Abdullah Ocalan, they have all struggled for their people.

Mandela himself was acutely aware of the Kurdish struggle. In 1992, he refused the Atatürk Peace Award citing human rights violations, before later accepting the award in 1999.

In April 2009, Essa Moosa, the lawyer of Mandela on an official visit to Turkey, denounced the criminalisation of the Kurdish struggle for freedom, likening Ocalan’s struggle for the Kurds to that of Mandela.

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Attitude to Turkish atrocities of the past the real gauge of sentiment in the future

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The Kurdish position in Turkey is a far-cry from decades of denial, persecution and second class status but has Turkey comes to terms with its past policies?

The carnival atmosphere last week in Diyarbakir with Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani side-by-side with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and famous Kurdish artists was an unprecedented event.

The theme was one of brotherhood, peace and a prosperous future of co-existence. The mere idea that a Turkish MP would utter the word “Kurdistan” was unthinkable just years ago, let alone by a Prime Minister.

The increasing conciliatory ties and a dose of reality from the Turkish state are welcome and take the Kurdish standing in Turkey to new levels. The reality of a population of over 20 million with a rich history, culture and separate ethnic identity was cynically ignored in Turkey to its detriment.

However, Turkey has a long way to go before national sentiments will truly sway. The Kurds have a bad label, a tainted image in Turkey and seen as the aggressors and overreachers. In 2013, with the Kurds as strategic actors on the Middle Eastern stage and with the Kurdistan Region long established, it speaks volumes when the word Kurdistan stills stirs such nationalist emotion.

The fact of the matter is that until Turkey comes to true terms with its past and its crimes against the Kurds, a new age and a new future based on unity and co-existence will never come to fruition. The account of the conflict is acutely one-sided with the media and state policy playing a strong hand in the psychology of the greater population against the Kurds.

The West of Turkey never had the full picture of the Kurdish issue and state atrocities. The scene of the battle always seemed like a distant, backward, lawless and secluded land, not a land that constitutes such a major part of Turkey.

Without forgiveness and understanding, brotherhood will never arrive. Turkey must at the same time look at its past with a deal of justice, repentance and regret.

Many dark chapters in Turkey’s history where concealed from the public eye. Only recently with some prosecutions and trials in the Kurdish region have of some these tales come to light. The Kurds have resorted to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the past, but it is the Turkish justice system that must take ownership and responsibility. Too often perpetrators of state injustices of the best have been sheltered and defended.

Recent trials have focused on the dark days of the 1990’s when the war with the PKK was at its peak. Thousands of villages were burned and destroyed, with millions of Kurds forced to migrate and with thousands killed or disappeared. Some of the horrid accounts were revealed by soldiers themselves.

Yet the acts of the 90’s scratch the surface. Only in 2011 did Erdogan take the bold and unprecedented steps of apologising for the killing of over 13,000 Kurds in Dersim in the 1930’s.

Violent means of achieving your rights should not be condoned and no war is without casualty but the whole Kurdish population was suddenly branded with the PKK or terrorist bush. If one village supported the PKK, it was as if the whole village supported such views.

Furthermore, the state repression of the Kurds goes back decades before the onset of the PKK.

If the Turkish government has genuine intentions to build a new future of brotherhood then the unbalanced view of the Kurdish struggle must be addressed.

The greater Turkish population must understand the crimes that were committed by state forces and the suffering that was inflicted on the Kurdish population.

Whether in Iraq, Syria or Turkey, the attitude to the repressive government policies of the past is an indicator of real sentiment in the future. Has the atmosphere really changed or is just been masked with mere rhetoric and policies that strengthens short-term goals of individuals?

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Syrian Kurdish administration – a historic step shrouded in controversy

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The Syrian Kurds have suffered more than any other group under decades of Baathist dictatorship. The Syrian civil war opened an unchartered and once unthinkable opportunity for the Syrian Kurds, but the growing Kurdish assertiveness and power has not been without controversy.

The Syrian Kurdish region is dominated both politically and militarily by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and their announcement of an interim administration for the growing Kurdish areas under their control resulted in a backlash from many sides.

No doubt self-governance would placate the remarkable turnaround in Kurdish fortunes which on paper is a benefit for all of greater Kurdistan, so why such controversy?

Timing and the actors is of course key at such a delicate juncture in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and beyond. The Syrian revolution is at a sensitive stage but it is factors across the borders that are more pronounced. The Syrian conflict has ramifications across the Middle Eastern divide and this is no different for the Kurds.

Syrian Kurdistan may number no more than 10% of the Syrian population or 2 million people, but disunity with dozens or so parties is plain to see. There is a split of sentiment for the PKK of whom the Syrian Kurdistan population has enjoyed historic ties and groups more closely affiliated with Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

The current correlations between the PYD, PKK, Kurdistan Region, Ankara and even Baghdad add to the sensitive mix. Whilst the Kurdistan Region is enjoying increasing prominence in the region and greater strategic, political and economic ties with Ankara, the PKK is a headache for Ankara that in spite of the peace process will not go away.

Ankara’s anxiety and rejection of the unilateral declaration of autonomy by the PYD is no surprise. Ankara naturally prefers a KRG influence that they can trust in Syrian Kurdistan than the region becoming a de facto extension of PKK sphere of influence, that they would find difficult to combat.

Ultimately Ankara cannot ignore developments in Syrian Kurdistan and must at the same time not antagonise the PKK. The rocky peace process needs a jumpstart. Ankara may have taken a number of bold steps, but it won’t take much for emotions to re-spill into armed conflict.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has to manoeuvre wisely with the Kurds with fast approaching national elections in Turkey, knowing that the Kurdish vote holds a decisive swing.

President Barzani’s historic visit to Diyarbakir at such a critical juncture was no coincidence. Erdogan needs to sway Kurdish sentiment and the Kurdish vote in 2014 will speak volumes in how the peace process and the PKK conflict will unravel. Greater Kurdish vote for AKP sends a strong message to the PKK.

At the same time, it promotes Barzani as a credible leader of greater Kurdistan, and sends a warning to the PKK leadership.

President Barzani wrote a strongly worded statement upon the declaration of autonomy by the PYD. It is not that Barzani would not want to see a Kurdish region in Syria, in fact this would greatly placate Kurdish power within the Middle East and open a de-facto bridge between Kurds on both sides. It is the fact that it is the PYD who would ultimately hold control and sway over the region, further eroding the Erbil Agreement of 2012.

Barzani lamented the “marginalisation” of other Kurdish parties and the PYDs perceived collusion with the Syrian regime and stated “We only support the steps that have the consensus of all Kurdish parties in Rojava…we refuse to deal with unilateral actions.” Barzani urged all Kurdish parties to return to the principles of the Erbil Agreement as the “best option to strengthen the Kurdish position in Syria”

The relations between the PYD and Syrian opposition forces have been one of mistrust and the Syrian National Council has accused the Syrian Kurds of collaborating with Bashar al Assad many times.

In response to Kurdish plans for a transitional administration, the Syrian National Council labelled the PYD as a “group hostile to the Syrian revolution”, even as the Coalition announced its own plans for an interim government in rebel-held territory.

With growing divide and differing camps, the Syrian Kurds are naturally at risk of wasting this historical juncture.

It must be noted that the PYD enjoys strong support amongst the Kurds and their stock has risen as they have affectively pushed back Islamist forces in Kurdish areas. They cannot be ignored as a major actor. However, the PYD and ultimately Syrian Kurdish region will struggle against a backdrop of animosity from the KRG, Turkey and the Syrian opposition.

The sooner the PYD and KRG can mend their bridges along with other Kurdish parties in Syria the better. At the same time, the PYD needs Ankara. The last thing the Syrian Kurds need is an isolated region. Finally, Syrian Kurds must maneuverer carefully with a future Syrian in mind. They need all the support to ensure self-rule is wrapped in legislation and not controversy. Self-rule is a must and a minimum for the Syrian Kurds.

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Will yet another electoral term in 2014 lead to any real change on Kirkuk and article 140?

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The Kirkuk has been at the historic forefront of the Kurdish nationalist struggle. It has been an area of contention for decades and formed a red-line for Kurdish negotiations with Baathist regime long before the liberation of Iraq in 2003.

Resolution of Kirkuk and disputed territories was a firm Kurdish condition since 2003, enshrined even in the Transitive Administrative Law (TAL), before the onset of the official constitution in 2005.

It has then served as the basis for negotiations with coalition partners in Baghdad in 2003, 2006, 2010 and more than likely in 2014.

Approaching six years since the passing of the deadline for Article 140, is Kirkuk any closer today to formal resolution and a return to Kurdistan than it was in 2003 (or indeed under the Saddam regime)?

The lack of progress in article 140, including the all-important national census is hardly an accident. The intentional foot-dragging is clear to see. Ahead of negotiations to form a coalition government in 2014, Kirkuk will once again be a key Kurdish stipulation. But will the new parliamentary term in 2014 witness anything different with regards to this issue?

The reality is that Baghdad will not give up Kirkuk or any additional territory that easily.

It is no coincidence that as soon as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) announced oil pipelines to Turkey much to the ire of Baghdad, Iraqi Oil Minister Abdelkarim al-Luaybi was roaming the Kirkuk province with BP CEO Bob Dudley as part of a recent deal between Baghdad and the oil giant to revive Kirkuk’s declining oil fields.

KRG reiterated their objection to the deal which it deemed against the principles of the unconstitutional and illegal.

Yet, in what has become a tit-for-tat, Baghdad also deemed Kurdish deal with foreign oil firms as illegal and had raised warnings over the new oil pipelines which increased the notches in the Kurdish autonomous drive.

Kirkuk sits atop of billions of barrels of oil reserves which have only added to the intensity of the fight over the province.

Baghdad’s move with BP, which had bypassed the KRG, is designed to show authority over disputed territories. This is similar to the onset of the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command by Iraqi Prime Ministry Nouri al-Maliki in 2012 designed to mark Baghdad’s sphere of influence, leading to dangerous escalations between Erbil and Baghdad.

The resolution of disputed territories is one of many unresolved and hotly-contested articles. Many other items such as the status of Peshmerga forces and a national hydrocarbon law linger much in the same shape as 2007.

Baghdad has sought to address the power balance in Kirkuk with electoral law whilst provincial elections have not been held since 2005.

But Kirkuk does not need short-term fixes or a council representation done on a special basis. The solution is already there – article 140. After that proper elections can be held like any other city.

The more that Kirkuk is treated as a special case – the more excuses that argue against article 140.

Mosul is also a mixed city, but where are special laws and equitable distribution of seats? The elections do the talking, as should be the case anywhere else in Iraq or as in any democratic country.

The same round-robin scenario promises to play out in the aftermath of the elections in 2014. Kurds play a hard-bargain, make clear conditions for their support and the Shiite powers agree. Yet soon after, a game of cat and mouse plays out for yet another 4 years.

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Kurdistan oil pipeline cuts the remaining umbilical cord of Baghdad

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A consistent bone of contention between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad has been oil resources. The heated debates around exploration rights, revenue sharing and interpretation of constitutional clauses have seen the issue go round in circles for several years.

The jostle for control of oil has only grown as oil majors have flocked to Kurdistan, ignoring threats from Baghdad, and as Kurdistan has added continual billions to its oil reserve figures. Companies continue to make discoveries in the Region with Total and Marathon only recently announcing a fresh discovery.

The reasons for Baghdad’s unease with growing Kurdish economic independence are hardly a secret. Control of oil revenues and oil infrastructure is like an umbilical cord that Baghdad has over the Kurds. With the exception of control of oil revenues and resolution of disputed territories, Kurdistan would be all but independent.

In this light, Baghdad foot-dragging over the resolution of national hydrocarbon oil laws and Article 140 is clear to see.

The national budget and share of oil revenues is currently a tap which Baghdad can use to influence and pressure the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Oil production to date in Kurdistan has been stop-start at best owing to disputes.

Such is the ambition of Kurdistan that little before completion of the first historic oil pipeline to pump crude from Kurdish oil fields, a second pipeline was already actively planned for completion in 18-24 months that would drastically improve production capacity and bring the Kurds closer to their ultimate target of 3 million bpd.

With oil exports and revenues set to rise in greater Iraq, in theory so should 17% of the budget allocated to Kurdistan. If oil is equitably shared on an 83-17 split then both Erbil and Baghdad benefit. In other words, most of the Kurdish oil revenues would actually go to Baghdad.

But distribution of the national budget has been anything but clear-cut with the Kurds arguing that they receive closer to 11%, not to mention the billions of dollars in unpaid bills to foreign companies in the Region that the Kurds demand.

Independent control of oil exports puts the gloves firmly in the hands of the Kurds. While they can now achieve the 400,000 bpd or so demanded by Baghdad for share of the budget, Kurds will not be at the mercy of Baghdad – if it boiled down to it, Kurdistan could keep specific portion of its oil revenue (and any debt that it deems to have been unpaid) and only then pay Baghdad.

Baghdad has used the recent thawing of its difficult ties with Ankara to warn against any export of Kurdish crude through the new pipeline without its consent.

Ironically, as the Baghdad-Ankara ties nose-dived, the Erbil-Ankara relations were hitting new heights, underpinned by billions of dollars of trade and Kurdish strategic relevance in the changing Middle Eastern picture.

Recently, Kurdistan Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani visited Ankara and met with Turkish officials, where the topics were likely to be expanding economic ties, oil exports and the Syrian conflict.

For now, Ankara will aim to keep Baghdad sweet by promising no to import Kurdish oil without their consent. But in reality, Turkey is already arm deep in Kurdish oil and its booming economy. It has already supported the constitutional rights of the Kurds with regards to oil exploration and the 17-83 revenue split.

Ankara may not want to alienate Baghdad, as it has recently looked to kick-start relations with Baghdad and Tehran that it strongly needs for any favourable resolution to the Syrian conflict and to avoid any regional isolation at a critical juncture.

As for the Kurds, its new oil export infrastructure literally adds the fuel for independence. However, the real game-changer would be additional pipelines independent of the Iraqi Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline and exclusively on Kurdistan soil and once exports reach 1 million bpd, let alone the 3 million bpd that Kurds hope for.

It’s no secret that the billions of dollars that Kurds could then acquire would far outweigh any of the 17% (or less) that Baghdad would offer. This is not to mention any potential gas exports to Europe, which would further placate Kurdistan on the world energy map (and perhaps on the map as a new found independent state)

 

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Lessons of Yugoslavia in the unraveling of the Middle East

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The expanding Middle Eastern conflict in recent years and the merging of sectarian and ethnic front-lines may seem like a recent phenomenon, but in reality it is anything but that. The unraveling of the sociopolitical map of the Middle East is a by-product of the gradual end to dictatorships, which were an almost necessary ingredient to hold together the Sykes-Picot inspired Middle Eastern status quo.

Nowhere is this example more prominent than in Syria. The Sunni conflicts in Iraq and Syria are merging as one battle, with communal ties across the borders. The Syrian Kurdish battle and the fight for democratic rights naturally link to the Turkish and Iraqi Kurds across the border, especially the Kurdistan Region. The Shiite powers in Lebanon and Syria are grouping to defend their future and powerbase.

Syria has quickly become a series of war within wars in addition to a proxy battle between regional Sunni and Shiite powers.

With 100,000 dead and millions more people displaced, just when will the Syrian fortunes take a turn for the better? Unfortunately, in most wars, it is when enough devastation of lives, infrastructure, economy and society takes place when ethnic, sectarian or national loyalties are finally exhausted by a stark reality. A reality is that sooner or later, there is no option but to sit at the peace table and negotiate.

There is revived talk of Geneva II been held next month, but such negotiations are only successful when there is the realisation that things can never be the same again. The building of bridges must be based on a new reality. In Syria, it means that the days of a strong man, authoritarian rule and ultimately Bashar al-Assad is over.

Syria will only work with a decentralisation of power much like in Iraq. With artificial created borders comes a pooling of people that is unnatural and unsustainable. The pride of Syrian nationality becomes secondary to significance of ethnic or sectarian identity.

It is not just in Syria where such soft-partitions are inevitable, most countries whose dictatorial rule was ended by the Arab Spring risk this eventuality especially Libya. Most of these countries never tasted true democracy and thus regional splits and boundaries within each state could be masked. Iraq is a prime example, through the electoral polls, Shiites may now be the majority but Sunnis and Kurds would never accept rule of the Shiites by virtue of their electoral clout.

The unraveling of the Middle East needs no greater example than the fall of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia managed to mask numerous ethnic and religious fault lines through the use of force and an iron hand.

The eventual break-up of Yugoslavia was brutal and bloody but ultimately the only solution was outright separation in most cases and soft-partition in some others.

The conflict in Bosnia that started in 1992 and ended with the Dayton Agreement in 1995, effectively split Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Bosniak and Croat federation and a second Serb entity, Republika Srpska.

With the untangling of borders comes a rush to form new identities and to consolidate power. As with Yugoslavia and particularly Bosnia, the result of that is ethnic cleansing and mass population movements.

It took countless lives, atrocities and suffering to finally realise that a negotiated settlement was the only way out of the Bosnian conflict and ultimately this will be the same for Syria. A soft portion of course casts doubts on real unity or the principle of a single state.

This example can be described no better than the recent Bosnian football team triumph that saw them reach the World Cup in 2014 for the first time. Football normally brings the country together but in spite of a truly historic achievement, the reaction of the Serbian entity, whose natural allegiance is to neighboring Serbia, was muted at best. The Croatian elements in Bosnia were hardly more inspiring.

This is the result of borders not reflecting split of ethnicities or sectarian components.

The ethnic group that has suffered the most from the artificial boundaries of the Middle East is the Kurds. With de-facto erosions in the Middle Eastern borders, they have a unique opportunity to build bridges between all parts of Kurdistan.

The Kurds must capitalize when the shape of the Middle East is in a fluid state by leveraging a strong had in the current crises they are exposed to and have significantly influence in. This starts with the protection of the Syrian Kurds and their newfound historic autonomy.

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Kurdish reforms in Turkey should not be weighed with grim days of the past

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Just decades ago against a backdrop of assimilation policies, repression and Kurdish phobia, many of the democratic rights and freedoms that the Kurds enjoy today would have been unthinkable.

Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power in 2002, it is fair to say that the party has taken a number of bold steps to resolve the countries long-standing Kurdish problem.

The reforms packages of the past decade instigated by Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, may prove historical when placed into context but it is difficult to compare an era of improved rights to times when the existence of the Kurds was denied altogether or when even Kurdish names were banned.

Fast forward to 2013 with the PKK war reaching close to 3 decades and when the peace process and the new political climate in both Turkey and the wider Middle East has made the stage ripe to finally resolve the Kurdish conflict.

This year has been the least deadly in almost 30 years of conflict as imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan assumed a position of peacemaker. The PKK forces began to withdraw and a ceasefire was put in force. This time there was renewed hope and optimism that Ankara could finally Ankara take on its aged old Kurdish problem head-on with a dose of reality and away from an outdated nationalist ethos.

However, as the months have rolled on without concrete measures, Kurdish anxiety has steadily increased leading to disgruntled and disenchanted voices within both the PKK and the Peace and Democratic Party (BDP) and war of words between the Kurdish groups and the government.

By the time Erdogan announced his much anticipated democracy package on 30th September 2013 a new climate had already taken fold with the PKK halting their withdrawal from Turkey as retaliation for the labored nature of the peace process and the political and social scars that the highly-publicized Gezi Park protests inflicted on Erdogan’s government.

Of course, in relation to the past, the latest reforms announced are historic and a significant milestone. But this is the 21st century. Thousands across the Middle East are fighting for their rights and ever-expectant populations are not ready to settle for second-best.

The Turkish Kurds see their brethren in Iraq go from strength to strength with de-facto independence, new economic power and strategic and political clout. To the south, they see their Syrian Kurdish counterparts sowing the seeds of unprecedented power and autonomy.

Simply put, after a long wait, Erdogan’s package disappointed and is unlikely to appease long-term Kurdish aspirations or build meaningful bridges with the PKK that will see a genuine end to armed conflict.

Erdogan’s changes include allowing education in Kurdish in private schools, towns and villages now able to use their Kurdish form, abolishing the long-standing pledge of allegiance by school children, lifting of the ban on Kurdish letters not present in the Turkish alphabet and a promise to review the 10% threshold designed to hinder Kurdish footing in parliament.

Many key demands have not been met, especially in the field of judiciary. There can never be justice, social harmony or peace while anti-terror laws remain in their current form or judicial reforms are not enforced.

As long as such laws remain in place, an element of Kurdish phobia will always prevail.

Whilst the reform packages may disappoint, the timings and the implication of the announcements echoes beyond the short-term.

Erdogan came out of the summer protests bruised but not defeated. However, a backlash over the summer has placed Erdogan into a difficult predicament with elections just months away. He has to balance the secular, nationalist and minority voices in a way that almost gets him past the crucial milestone of upcoming local elections in March, presidential elections in August and parliamentary polls in 2015.

More radical reforms to appease Kurds would almost certainly have been met with a nationalist backlash. At the same time, a lack of reform would have threatened an abrupt end to the peace process and an almost instant return of violence.

The same dilemma applies to appeasing secular voices whilst at the same time not betraying the Islamist principles of his party and his millions of Islamist supporters.

Clearly there was a lack of real consultation with the various groups including the Kurds and the reforms will not please all sides but it’s a gamble and balance that Erdogan is prepared to take.

The PKK and BDP were quick to criticize the reform package but it’s not clear whether it will derail the peace process altogether or merely delay and hinder the initiative.

The latest reforms can only be labeled as a new dawn if they serve as the precursor and basis for future reforms rather than a solution in itself.

An ever expectant and resurgent Kurdish population will not settle for token democratic gestures that they should never have been deprived of in the first place.

Furthermore, minority rights have to be put in perspective. You cannot apply equal weight or the same brush to Alevi, Assyrian or Christian demands and the much deeper and fundamental Kurdish question.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

The new politician dawn of Kurdistan and its ramifications

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The Kurdistan legislative elections of 2013 promised to mark a historical milestone in the Kurdish political and democratic evolvement and the outcome was no different.

Kurdistan has moved from the predictable electoral nature that underscored the duopoly of KDP-PUK control of the Kurdish political sphere where political control could be almost split in the middle, to a new political horizon with more healthy competition and need for different permutations and alliances.

This duopoly was broken in 2009 with the emergence of the Movement for Change (Gorran) adding an opposition element to the Kurdistan government previously unseen.

The success of Gorran was at the expense of the PUK in their traditional backyard of Sulaimaniya and indeed this was a reoccurring theme in 2013.

The KDP as most expected proved the overall winners of the polls, with preliminary results indicating over 37.5% of the vote. But crucially, such was the more balanced nature of the electoral outcome that the KDP must work with other parties, including Gorran to form a new cabinet.

Much focus has been placed on the demise of the PUK, but the fall from joint rulers of Kurdistan to a third-placed position cannot be underestimated.

With the end of the Strategic Agreement, the PUK failings could not be veiled by prospect of a coalition list with the KDP as was the case in recent years. Running independently meant the strength of each party was easier to gauge.

However, talk of the PUK as a new weak or insignificant actor is premature. When one political door closes, with the right leadership, strategy and resolve many new doors can open.

But any PUK revival must be underpinned by forward-thinking and a new reality and away from its past status. In this light, although the KDP clearly prefers to keep intact its partnership with the PUK and form a new cabinet with the Kurdistan Islamic Union, this is may do more harm in the long-term to the PUK.

The Strategic Agreement may have made sense when both the KDP and PUK were on roughly equal footing and the region was effectively split into two administrations and the government was split into two terms. but the rules have changed and PUK would have to work under new diluted terms and mainly under the KDP umbrella of policies and dominance.

The PUK and KDP have many historical differences including political ideology, control of security forces, foreign alliances and government policies, and with a weaker PUK hand this cannot be masked as before.

The PUK can serve as an effective force in opposition movement. As Gorran has shown, the opposition tag can be a key magnet for a vital voice in Kurdistan. Much can change in the next 4 years and a move to opposition would also allow the PUK to regroup over the next years, lick their wounds and move on.

The PUK leaders to their credit have been quick to acknowledge their disappointment at the polls and the new reality that beckons. The loyal PUK voter base would prefer a new fight and the realisation of a new dawn than a continuing an outdated and now uneven strategic alliance with the KDP.

As for Gorran, their status as the second largest party in Kurdistan is a remarkable feat. However, much in the same way as the PUK, they are about to embark on a new chapter and a new identity. How they fare with their new status and political clout will determine whether they can continue to grow as a political force or whether their support base rescinds in 4 years’ time.

Gorran are in a tricky position. With such a large proportion of votes, its support base does not expect them to continue to work on the peripherals of power as an opposition force. At the same time, joining the government places Gorran into unchartered territory. They have to work with the KDP and been against the ruling parties is somewhat easier than working side-by-side with them.

An option that cannot be overlooked with the number of seats combined is Gorran and the PUK joining forces to form a new cabinet at the expense of the KDP.

However, these would mean the PUK mending bridges amidst a fierce rivalry with Gorran and PUK alienating the KDP, even though the KDP has reaffirmed their support and commitment to the PUK.

The ideal scenario, at least on paper, is a broad based political coalition amongst the major parties. However, this would deprive Kurdistan of a decisive opposition and will make the government brittle and susceptible to differences, bickering and prolonged decision making.

With the new political reality, rivalries and passions may intensify, especially in Sulaimaniya. A factor that should not be discounted is that the PUK may have lost political power but still have allegiance and influence of most of the security forces in Sulaimaniya province.

More political competition and jockeying for power must not be at the detriment, unity or stability of Kurdistan or ultimately the serving of the people who voted them into power.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc