Bravery, selflessness and sacrifice of the Peshmerga – words are easy, real deeds are not

Bravery, selflessness and sacrifice are easy words on the tongue but on the battlefield in the midst of bullets, mortar fire, machine guns and all sorts of explosive devices, these virtues and actions cannot be portrayed by mere words. We live in a day and age where some people will not sacrifice $50 for their poor neighbor let alone his life for his country, where someone will not intervene in a gross injustice in the streets in front of their very eyes for fear of reprisal.

This week we received the tragic news of another Peshmerga martyr in our family fighting the Islamic State (IS). The dedicated, passionate, loyal and long-serving Peshmerga, Ibrahim Sabir Ismaeel, was killed by a mine-trap left by the ever vicious and inhumane IS forces.

Leaving behind his wife, sons and daughters, not to mention his elderly and grieving parents, the hundreds of Peshmerga such as Ibrahim face the enemy not with mere words but real actions and in the face of the ultimate sacrifice.

I grew up in the devastating war of the 80’s against the Kurds. I may not have fought or held a gun but the tragic circumstances of those years will forever live in my memory. Witnessing the destruction of your village, been left homeless, believing that your father was dead for many years and seeing the bodies of scores of relatives executed by Saddam or killed in battle are not memories that simply vanish.

My father was confined to been disabled from a young age after been severely wounded as a Peshmerga. His mobility, health and sense of enjoyment in life were never the same. But it’s a sacrifice that he and thousands of other Peshmerga have made.

He often tells me the tales of battle of the Peshmerga forces. The tales are harrowing enough to listen to let alone for someone actually in the heat of battle under fierce gun-fire, knowing that with every battle they may pay the ultimate price and never see their families again.

2014 will be year that will serve in the memory of all Kurds much like the massacre of Halabja in 1988 or the Kurdish uprising in 1991. It’s a war that no Kurd asked for and most Kurds never imagined will return to their much scarred and blood-soaked lands.

Kurdistan was an island of peace and stability, far from the destruction and sectarian violence in Iraq or later in Syria. IS may have broken more mothers hearts but not the valor and determination of the Kurds. There are armies much stronger and tougher than IS that failed to break down the will and spirit of the Kurds and IS will be defeated.

As we enter 2015, we hope and pray for a peaceful dawn in Kurdistan and that dark forces such as IS will be swiftly broken and forever purged from these lands.

Our great gratitude, appreciation and debt will forever linger for the brave Peshmerga that sacrifice so much to protect these lands.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

2014 in review – a year that will long echo in the history of Kurdistan

Leave a reply

2014 proved a remarkable year for Kurdistan that will long serve in the memory and echo for many generations to come.

Kurdistan started the year on a historic footing with oil flowing, stored and read to sell via its new oil pipelines to Turkey. It completed a symbolic quest for self-sufficiency and opened a new chapter in its strategic standing with first oil exports a few months later in May. It finished the year on the attack against the Islamic State (IS) after breaking the siege of Mount Sinjar, just a few months after IS threatened to knock on the doors of Erbil.

These two events demonstrate the turbulence and emotional journey of Kurdistan in the last 12 months.

Independent oil exports were a significant stride for Kurdistan. It threatened to cut the last remaining umbilical cord with Baghdad. The first half of 2014 was tainted with much of the same relations with Baghdad – disagreements, distrust and marginalization policies of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Relations with Baghdad turned so sour that Maliki effectively launched an economic siege on Kurdistan, withholding budget payments.

Iraq may have held national elections on April 30th 2014 but any sense of unity or reconciliation amongst Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds was as distant as ever. Maliki’s State of Law coalition may have won but for the Kurds a third term for Maliki was a firm red line.

The Kurds themselves took several months after parliamentary elections to form their own government owed to changing political realities on the ground.

The real game changer undoubtedly came in June. IS, already prominent in parts of Anbar province, launched a whirlwind attack on Mosul, Tikrit and surrounding areas leaving Iraqi security forces in disarray. As IS took over town after town, not to mention oil installations and vast amounts of heavy weapons, it made mockery of US President Barack Obama’s assessment of groups such IS as minor players just six months prior.

Iraq was shaken with IS threatening to break down the door to Baghdad. The Kurds quickly assumed the security vacuum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories as IS forces closed in. It may have been far from an ideal scenario, but the lands that Kurds failed to get in 11 years of diplomacy and political jockeying, were swiftly in Kurdish control in merely hours.

Add to Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani’s public declaration to hold a referendum and independence never felt so close.

If Maliki’s days were already numbered, then the IS onslaught laid to rest any faint chance of retaining premiership. Such was the frayed relations with Kurds, that even under immense pressure and with Shiite militias effectively the last barrier between IS and Baghdad, Maliki resorted to launching a fierce tirade at the Kurds accusing them of hosting IS and other insurgents.

The Kurdish borders were no longer with Iraq but with the Islamic State. As IS seemed determined to head south, Kurdish forces became complacent and events thereafter will live in the memory much like other atrocities against the Kurds.

The Kurds, caught off-guard, were overrun in Sinjar and several other towns. Religious minorities were already the subject of widespread atrocities after the initial IS invasion in June, but what was to follow shocked Kurdistan and world. Thousands of Yezidis were slain with thousands of women taken captive, not to mention the thousands more that died in harsh conditions on top of Mount Sinjar under searing heat and threat of IS.

IS didn’t stop at Sinjar as it quickly took Zumar, Makhmur and threatened the very doorsteps of Erbil.it was at this moment that IS was no longer a regional problem that could be ignored. It became an international crisis and an international dilemma, even if the Kurds bore the brunt of the battle.

With threat of humanitarian catastrophe increasing by the day, the US and its allies finally intervened in August, a campaign that was later extended to Syria in September, helping Kurdish forces push back heavily armed IS forces.

The first casualty of US intervention was the end of Maliki. An already reluctant US was not going to intervene without their own preconditions for fractured Iraqis.

The struggle and determination of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces received wide coverage across the globe. US and European powers soon felt compelled to supply key arms to the Kurds.

Now the Kurds were at the forefront of the battle against IS that continues valiantly and with much sacrifice to this day. Syrian Kurdish forces were already engaged in deadly battles for many months before, but the latest battle for Kobane was a much different prospect. Surrounded on 3 sides, it was coalition airstrikes that gave much needed relief to Kurdish forces even as Turkish tanks on the border stood and watched on.

So iconic and defining was Kobane for Kurds across the border that it even threatened the end of the peace process in Turkey with the PKK.

The deployment of 150 Peshmerga to help Syrian YPG forces was symbolic in that it eroded borders of Kurdistan as Kurds in Syria, Turkey and Iraq came together.

With such widespread media coverage of Kobane, the bringing together of Kurds across the region and not mention regional and international players involved, Kobane transformed the regional dynamic.

Kurdish forces in Rojava received much acclaim as a bastion against IS in Syria as ties with the US slowly blossomed, much to the annoyance of Turkey whose relations with the US were already strained over Syria.

What 2015 brings for the Kurds is unclear. But top of the list of wishes is the end of IS, protection of their communities and renewed peace. Either way, 2014 will long echo in the history of Kurdistan.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

OPEC, IS, oil games and plunging prices

Leave a reply

When the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created in 1960, it brought together a powerful club of oil producing countries that wielded considerable influence on the oil market. Such was the power of the cartel that it has been used to promote political goals as well as economic leverage over the years.

But the latest crisis in oil markets, which has seen oil prices plunge by around 45% since June to between $55-$60 a barrel, has demonstrated the increasingly difficult predicament that OPEC faces. In a surprise move last month, OPEC members decided not to intervene by reducing output and theoretically providing an adequate floor for oil prices, thus accelerating the plunge further.

No doubt there were also political connotations with such a decision. Some members, particularly Saudi Arabia, the biggest oil producer by far in the cartel, refused to cut supply as it would threaten their market share.

The simple fact is the global thirst for oil is no longer so firmly in the hands of OPEC. Vast jumps in technology to extract shale oil and gas has seen the US, a historic consumer of Saudi oil, become a net exporter and flood further supply.

Then there is of course the huge oil supply of non-OPEC producing countries such as Russia and Norway. The math is simple. There is a glut of oil supplies and not enough global demand. Fears over the strength of the global economic recovery are true, but even then it doesn’t warrant a 50% drop in oil prices in merely a few months, leading to prices at levels not seen since the 2009 global economic crisis.

The majority of the OPEC countries rely heavily on oil revenues as main source of income to support their economy and balance their books. Some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, can survive in the short-term due to vast foreign exchange reserves but even then the games cannot last.

Each country has a base price they need to maintain revenues and almost all cannot survive at circa $50 a barrel in the long-run.

What it does in the short-term, is inhibit or even bankrupt some shale producers whose operational costs will much higher owed to more expensive hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling extraction methods from shale rock. Less shale oil will of course mean less supply of oil.

The declining prices hurt Iran and Russia more than most. This places additional pressure on the respective governments. First sanctions and now drastically lower oil prices has severely crippled the Russian economy. It remains to be seen how much the economic bite may force a stubborn and determined Russia to change course over Syria and Ukraine. Iran is hardly in a much better economic position with its own sanctions never mind its expensive foreign policy in propping Bashar al-Assad and other Shiite forces in the region, and low oil prices over the long-term may influence its negotiating stance over its nuclear program.

And one can hardly forget the newest member “state” of the oil export club – the Islamic State (IS). The richest terrorist organization in history is bolstered by a reported daily income from oil fields they control of anything between 1-3 million USD per day.

IS would not be running a fairly productive oil market if it didn’t have willing buyers across the Middle East. IS oil was sold at anywhere between $30-60 per barrel, at over 50% discount from market prices, before the oil crunch, making it a tempting option for many.

But if IS has to sell oil at $15-$30 per barrel that obviously greatly diminishes its financial clout and its appeal on the black market.

The problem with any cartel is that it must benefit all members, regardless of any political pressure-cards. Long-term splits amongst members will further dilute OPEC influence. OPEC may be forced to strike a deal with other non-OPEC producers over supply to bring long-term stability.

In the short-term prices will remain low, but if shale producers and certain other countries cannot meet export targets due to cost, this may use up remaining spare capacity and the second half of 2015 will see a spike in oil prices.

But then what? The games resume with some casualties out of the picture but fundamentally the problem remains the same (lack of control of supply versus demand)

Many oil producing countries are no way near their capability. Take Iraq, which has potential for the most growth in exports amongst the OPEC members. Add to its symbolic deal with the Kurdistan Region over oil-exports and revenue sharing that ended a bitter long-running feud, then the scene is set for a new dominant role for Iraq. It needs billions of investment to support its oil export growth targets and of course oil itself will need to be the main source of that funding.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Once the Islamic State is defeated, what is the long-term strategy to prevent IS mark 2?

Leave a reply

Almost 6 months since the Islamic State (IS) seized large swathes of territory Iraq in a rapid advance, the war on IS remains as fierce as ever in Iraq and Syria.

The obvious goal is to defeat IS but sheer military might aside, what is the long-term strategy to keeping IS defeated? Initially, IS sprung-up in Syria with limited influence before their support base and military capability snow-balled into an avalanche.

One way or another, with increasing air-strikes, military supplies to the Peshmerga and other anti-IS forces and a growing international coalition, IS will be defeated. But without long-term cross-border measures and strategy, could IS spring up again in the future, just when their defeat is celebrated?

The lack of a long-term vision or consideration of the bigger picture could not be clearer than in Syria. Syria was very much the fertile Jihadist garden which allowed the IS seeds to flourish. This was only exacerbated by a lack of a clear and consistent Western foreign policy and in particular reluctance of the U.S. to get involved.

As Bashar al-Assad scathed through the population, crossing various red-lines along the way, it paved the way for hardline sentiment to dominate and IS took full advantage. At one point, IS was even tolerated or directly and indirectly supported by some powers as they became a tool to the toppling of Assad. But IS eyes were not fixated on regime change in Damascus and in fact Assad and IS had mutual interests.

Now the battle in Syria rages on and nowhere depicts the current ferocity and pro-longed nature of the battle against IS better than in Kobane. Hundreds of air strikes and dozens of Kurdish sacrifices later, IS was dealt a blow but remained a determined foe.

Even if IS is defeated in Syria, what then for root-cause of IS, the Assad regime? There is much talk of a political transition in Syria but this has been much of the same tone since the Geneva Communique of 2012. Assad did not leave his throne when the regime was at its weakest let alone when he has regained ascendancy and moderate rebel forces are diminishing fast.

In Iraq, long-time disenfranchised Sunnis welcomed and some tribes openly supported the IS onslaught in Iraq. IS may have hijacked the Sunni revolution but nevertheless the seeds of animosity and conflict were sown long-before between bitter Sunnis and a Shiite-led Baghdad government where the fuels of sectarianism were increased by the marginalization policies of Nouri al-Maliki.

Like the deadly battle with al-Qaeda in the several years before IS, where the grounds are fertile fundamentalism will always grow.

Sunnis are growing increasingly fed up of IS and some tribes have openly fought against them, but doubts remain as to whether a true national and representative government will ever merge in Iraq. The recent government of Haider al-Abadi has patched some cracks but does not account for the many other Sunni groups and tribes that remain unconvinced and hostile.

One factor that illustrates the Iraqi difficulty in striking a semblance of unity is a lack of cross-national armed forces. The sectarian-leaning armed forces were long viewed with distrust by Sunnis and Kurds and quickly collapsed under the IS onslaught. In fact it was the Shiite militias and in particular the autonomous Peshmerga that stepped up to the plate.

One key product of the IS battle is the growing erosion of Middle Eastern borders but also state relations and foreign policies becoming much more intertwined. Gone are the days that states can keep regional conflicts at arm’s length and pursue unilateral policies.

Passive attitudes in the end do greater harm on one’s soil. Since 2011, many regional states and Western powers tried to stay out of the Syrian civil war.

However, peace in any country can only be achieved with cross collaboration across the borders. Whilst it’s not quite the equivalent of the European Union, it’s the grass-roots of such unions in the Middle East. Governments must work together, unify policies and seek common security objectives through pacts if they are to succeed.

One needs to look no further than Turkey. Just a few years ago, it was watching anxiously at the rapid development of a Kurdistan Region on its borders and had set its own red-lines.

Just this week Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu pledged increased military support and training for the Peshmerga with the prospect of providing heavy weapons to the Kurdistan Region.

Of course, it doesn’t meant that Turkish nationalist anxieties have evaporated, one only needs to look at the Turkish hesitancy over support of Kobane over links of the Kurdish forces and the main party to the PKK.

But Turkey cannot turn a blind eye to the conflicts on its door step or to the growing Syrian Kurdish autonomy. Turkey’s security and political stability will not endure by strong relations with one side of the border and animosity and distrust on another.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

As Biden flies in to Turkey to repair dwindling sentiment, Ankara show-cases its strong ties with the Kurdistan Region

Leave a reply

As much as Turkey has tried to steer clear of the Syrian civil war and the battle against the Islamic State (IS), it has found itself at the centre of the conflict in one way or another. Turkey has found itself embroiled in the conflict with the flood of millions of refugees, an extensive IS oil smuggling network and flow of foreign fighters and arms across the border.

At the same, Turkish relations with the United States have deteriorated rapidly. Relations may have cooled with increasing harsh rhetoric setting the tone but Turkey remains centre stage to the battle against IS as well as the eventual quest to topple Bashar al-Assad.

This week US Vice President Joe Biden flew into Turkey with the aim of reaching a compromise and patching ties. Public smiles and upbeat tones aside, privately the talks between Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu will be anything but straight forward.

After all, this is the same Biden who caused heated controversy with suggestions that Turkey helped Islamic fighters seeking to depose Assad, which fast turned into a did-he or did-he not apologise farce.

Biden and Davutolgu struck a conciliatory tone at their press conference and played down differences stressing their relations as long-time allies.

The question remains as to whether Biden can achieve real compromise. Turkey has insisted that it’s already an active part of the coalition against IS but US knows it can simply do a lot more.

Turkey has reservations about supporting Syrian Kurdish forces in Kobane, labelling them as terrorists, while conversely they have become one of the only reliable US partners in the fight against IS.

Talks with Erdogan are likely to be much tenser. Erdogan has shown that Turkish interests come first regardless of any international backlash and he has become somewhat unpredictable in nature, pursuing an independent foreign-policy.

Whilst Erdogan may work with the US it will certainly not bow to any pressure nor is he afraid of any fallout if his demands are not met.

Turkey demands are clear. The US must have a comprehensive strategy that also deals with the removal of Assad. Ironically, the IS emanated from Assad-fuelled Syrian conflict, but the US is far from willing to replace him in the tougher fashion demanded by Ankara.

US has insisted its hands are already full with focus on the removal of IS in Iraq and Syria but for Turkey this is just more foot-dragging from the US believing that the road to defeating IS runs through Damascus.

Unless there is real compromise on the part of the US, Erdogan has already warned that the Turkish position will not change. “From the no-fly zone to the safety zone and training and equipping – all these steps have to be taken now,” Erdogan said in mid-week. Before reiterating a common stance “The coalition forces have not taken those steps we asked them for. … Turkey’s position will be the same as it is now.”

Without meeting the main Turkish demands, compromise may be small and ineffective. For example, after US officials visited Turkey in recent weeks, there is already an agreement to train and equip approx. 2000 moderate Syrian fighters. Previously, Turkey allowed 150 Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga to cross into Kobane.

None of these are real game-changers when Turkey’s immense military might is at a viewing distance from the Syrian conflict.

US will continue to reach out to Turkey, in reality it has little option but to keep Ankara on-side as they remain key actors even with a growing feeling of animosity and reluctance.

No image summed up the downward spiral in relations better than that of three American sailors from the USS Ross been hooded and roughed up by an anti-American mob in Turkey.

In knowledge of the deteriorating relations with the US and the international out-cry at the perceived lack of Turkish action over Kobane and the battle against IS, Turkey has tried hard in recent days to emphasize solid relations with the Kurdistan Region and also a Baghdad who under the rule of Nouri al-Maliki saw increasingly frosty ties with Ankara.

In recent months, there has certainly been a patching-up of ties between Ankara and Baghdad with prospects this week after talks with Davutoglu and Iraqi officials of Turkey training Iraqi forces. Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi is also scheduled to visit Turkey next month to seek further normalisation in ties.

In a recent visit to Erbil, Davutoglu, under-scoring the close strategic and economic relations with the Kurdish Region, stressed “Turkey will provide support through any necessary means for the Kurdistan Region’s security”.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe
Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

How the battle for Kobane and Peshmerga deployment eroded borders between Kurds

Leave a reply

Barely a few weeks ago, Kobane was surrounded on three sides by heavily armed Islamic State (IS) forces and in danger of imminent collapse. Now, Kobane has propelled itself as the symbol of the international battle against IS but more importantly it has placed the Syrian Kurds under great international spotlight.

Few would have imagined that this small dusty town would have brought together in one way or another, Kurds in Iraq, Syria and Turkey, Free Syrian Army (FSA), Turkey, the US, European Union, Saudi Arabia and various coalition partners.

Events on the ground as well as the political dynamic have transformed to the extent John Allen, the retired US general in charge of overseeing the US campaign against IS, stated that the town is no longer in danger of fallen into IS hands.

This week in a highly symbolic move, 150 Iraqi Peshmerga forces crossed the Turkish border to help in the defense of the town. 150 troops is an important but nevertheless symbolic figure, however the heavy weaponry that accompanies them add to their considerable clout.

Of greater significance is the boost in morale and optimism that Kobane and the local Kurdish population have received with this reinforcement. The journey of these Peshmerga, to rapturous welcome of Turkish Kurds, was also symbolic as it crossed three parts of Kurdistan.

With Kurds in Iraq, Turkey and Syria cheering equally resolutely, the deployment of the Peshmerga forces greatly enhanced Kurdish unity. The deployment also opens a new channel that will not remain closed, if the situation dictates the path is clear for further Peshmerga reinforcements to arrive.

Just weeks ago, Kobane was confounded to a local problem. It is now cross-border Kurdish problem as well as a firm strategic goal of the coalition forces.

Kobane has not been without its ironies. Turkey has faced a backlash over its stance on Kobane. Although it has welcomed Iraqi Kurdish and FSA forces, at the same time it has loathed any support of the People Defense Unit (YPG) forces for their sympathies to the PKK.

In parallel with Peshmerga reinforcements, FSA forces recently entered to support Kobane, a key demand from Turkey to try and give the Kobane battle a more Syrian and anti-Assad feel, than a united Kurdish campaign based on nationalism. Although it won’t transform the historically cautious relations between FSA battalions and Kurdish forces overnight, this latest cooperation may pave the way for a joining of forces to oust Assad once the IS headache is resolved (as Ankara has long demanded)

This week, Turkish Prime Minister, Ahem Davutoglu hit back at growing critics, stating his refusal to be part of a ‘game’ for a few weeks to satisfy American or European opinion.

The battle for Kobane has marked the brave resistance of Syrian Kurdish forces but it has also placed into clear context the strength of IS. On Wednesday alone, there were 10 US led air strikes against IS positions in Kobane with dozens more since the allied campaign intensified in recent weeks.

Yet, even with other front lines in Iraq and other parts of Syria, and an avalanche of air strikes, IS has become weakened but largely prevailed. Literally hundreds of IS armored vehicles and positions have been destroyed – this only shows how much of a force and a problem that IS had become.

It developed tremendous strength over the past 2 years, especially since its conquests in Iraq, but the West ignored this stark reality and reacted too late. Indeed for the YPG, bloody battles with IS over the past year or so, often with little support and recognition, is not new.

Now a vicious war rages against IS in Syria and Iraq. What makes all this a remarkable irony, is that this is only a war within a war. A greater Syrian civil war still rages with over 200,000 killed and with Bashar al-Assad firmly in power, regardless of how the battle against IS now dominates the headlines.

It was the Syrian civil war, security vacuums and lack of a clear Western policy that created IS. Now, with much more investment, intense fighting and a great deal of sacrifice, IS will be defeated but what then for Syria and the other fronts of war?

Defeating IS is one thing, letting them re-spawn is another matter entirely that the West cannot overlook.

US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel finally admitted a well-known reality, that the campaign against IS is benefitting Assad even if their long-term target remains his removal from power.

Syrian and IS need a comprehensive solution. Above all, both regional and global powers now need to look at the new realities of the war in Syria. The situation can never return to any pre-civil war era. With every sacrifice and valiant resistance, the Syrian Kurds consolidate their hard fought and deserved autonomy. Kobane could well serve as the iconic bridge that brought all of great Kurdistan together both now and the future.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe
Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

How the struggle for Kobane transformed the regional dynamic

Leave a reply

“I don’t understand why Kobane is so strategic for the US, there are no civilians left there”, bemoanedthe disillusionedTurkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, after the US conducted multiple aidrops of military and medical supplies to the Syrian Kurdish YPG forces.

Whilst Turkey has downplayed the significance of the small town, Kobane has become a symbol of the international fight against the Islamic State (IS), placing the credibility of the coalition on the line.

At the same time the fight for Kobane is not just contained to a local struggle against IS militants but the battle reverberates politically and strategically across the region.

Kobane has already had a profound effect on the regional dynamic. Turkey has resisted international pressure to intervene in Kobane or allow Kurdish volunteers from Turkey to enter, labelling the Democratic Union Party (PYD) as a “terrorist organisation” that it sees as no different to the PKK or indeed the IS.

Turkey has repeated this rhetoric whilst conversely US military assistance and communication channels to the Syrian Kurds have rapidly increased.

US measures have contradictedthe Turkish line, with the US clearly seeing the Syrian Kurds as key allies in the battle against IS and hardly as a terrorist force.

At the same time, Turkey has tried to strike agreement with the Kurds to allow Free Syrian Army (FSA) to enter Kobane, even as it opposed the hundreds of Kurdish volunteers from joining the fight. Aligning the FSA in a more official capacity in Kobane, would dilute the sense of Kurdish nationalist struggle for Kobane and Rojava and also soften the rising stock of the PKK.

Turkey has worked hard to pressure the PYD to join the FSA to turn the battle as a Syrian national struggle with the wider goal of ousting Bashar al-Assad. Ironically, a Kurdish dominated win in Kobane, will only strengthen Kurdish nationalism, the standing of the PKK and Kurdish autonomy, not to mention the pivotal role of the Syrian Kurds in the battle against IS across Syria. This is the same fate that Ankara has tried to avoid.

As the US has grown closer to the Syrian Kurds, Ankara, in danger of been isolated underintense international spotlight, allowed Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces a passage through Turkey to support Kobane.

This week the Kurdistanregional parliament approved the deployment of up to 200 fighters. These fighters will provide key support to strained YPG forces but is also a symbolic move by the Kurdistan leadership to bolster cross-border Kurdish unity. For Turkey, having FSA and Peshmerga forces on the ground, alleviates it from an embarrassing situation of providing de-facto assistance to the Syrian Kurdish forces, even as they are labelled as a terrorist organisation and ultimately as anenemy.

A key move on the back of the decision to deploy Peshmergafighters this week was the unity agreement negotiated in days of talks in Dohuk between the PYD and rival Syrian Kurdish factions. The split between pro-PKK and pro-KRG Kurdish parties in Syria had severely handicapped the Kurdish struggle and their newfound autonomy.

Kurdistan president Massoud Barzani hailed the agreement, “This agreement brings us together and itself is a significant answer to enemies who did not intend the Kurds to be united.” While PYD leader, Salih Muslim, stated that “All Kurdish people are under attack, so they should be united.”

Previous unity agreements have quickly broken down and if it sticks this time around, it will serve as a major boost for the Syrian Kurdish cantons and perhaps in the way Ankara approaches the region.

Such is the intense international focus on Kobane and the symbol of the fight against IS that even the Syrian government has been quick to stake their part in the struggle, alleging military and logistical support to Kurds in Kobane.

Whoever thought that a small dusty town, unknown to much of the wider world, would bring together the Syrian Kurds, Iraqi Kurds, Turkey, IS, FSA, Assad, the US, Saudi Arabia and numerous other international and regional players?

First Published On: Kurdish Globe
Other Publication Sources: OpenDemoracy, eKurd.net

How Kobane placed a dark cloud on the peace process in Turkey

Leave a reply

Out-gunned, out-numbered and lacking firepower, it was the tenacity and willpower of the Syrian Kurdish forces that prevented an overrun of the Kurdish town of Kobane on the Turkish border and a likely massacre under the hands of the Islamic State (IS).

As the town of Kobane faced a dire threat under the hands of IS, the situation was made more difficult to stomach for the Kurds on both sides of the border, with the presence of Turkish troops and their heavy armory on the border.

The reluctance of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan to intervene in Kobane, even as he previously vowed to prevent the fall of Kobane, puzzled and drew widespread anger amongst the highly suspicious Kurds in Turkey.

Moreover, widespread protests cross Turkey highlight that it isn’t just Kobane that is at risk of falling, it also the tentative peace process that only recent brought a halt to almost 3 decades of conflict.

Ultimately for Turkey, coming to the aid of the YPG forces and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) which is affiliated with the PKK, would be akin to bailing out and fighting alongside the PKK.

Turkey continues to see Kobane as a PKK versus IS battle and not a Jihadist battle against ordinary Kurds. It simply does not differentiate between PKK or IS who they deem on equal footing.

That stance not only demonstrates the fragile nature of the peace process and Kurdish-Turkish relations, but that the climate for real peace amidst strong mistrust and animosity is lacking.

Turkey has set a number of preconditions before joining the fight against IS, which in many ways is understandable, including the need for a long-term plan in Syria if and when IS can be defeated and a no-fly zone, but this cannot be at the expense of ignoring a perilous humanitarian plight on your door step and to station a huge force on the border, with the bloodshed in clear sight, and then do nothing only adds to the fire.

Either way, as the Kurds have shown, they are more than capable of defeating IS if their fighters are allowed access and weapons at the border.

Turkey could have significantly enhanced its hand with the Kurds in Turkey if it had seen the battle against the Kurds in Syria as a fight against the partners of their nation.

On the contrary, it has long seen the autonomous Syrian Kurdish enclaves as a threat and has often accused the PYD of colluding with the Bashar al-Assad regime, as the Kurds refused to join the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Whatever the political stance, religious affiliation or nationality when it comes to averting a humanitarian catastrophe differences must be put aside.

The US and Western powers supported the Kurds in Iraq at their time of need including providing crucial arms, and support for the Syrian Kurds, as an effective force in the war on IS, should be no different.

Above all, it would be a real tragedy if the peace process ended in Turkey after the painstaking journey to reach to this elusive juncture.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe
Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

With the “wolf at the door”, what does it mean for Kurdish independence?

Leave a reply

Fast approaching 100 years since the Middle Eastern landscape was carved leaving the Kurds as the largest nation without a state, the Kurdish dreams for an independent homeland never wavered.

However, with ubiquitous disputes over oil revenues, disputed territories and share of the national budget already leaving Erbil-Baghdad relations at a new low, the onslaught of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq transformed the dynamics with the Kurds sharing a 1000km border with a new reality.

The Kurds have picked up the mantle in the fight against IS but for them IS was a product of marginalisation policies of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that fuelled another Sunni revolt and years of Western dithering in Syria that helped create the IS phenomenon.

With thousands of Yezidis, Christians and other minorities brutally killed and thousands more taking shelter in Kurdistan, and the Peshmerga taking the brunt of the battle against determined IS forces, the United States and other Western powers finally agreed to arm the Kurdish forces and provide support with air strikes and humanitarian relief.

However, with the US and European powers tip-toeing the diplomatic line, their support has been on the basis of preserving Iraq’s unity and installing a new inclusive government. Do the Kurds forfeit any plans to exercise self-determination and place their faith in Baghdad once more? More importantly will the growing Western motion to arm and bolster the Kurds, lead to an eventual support for an independent state?

Whilst a highly sensitive issue, for many MPs and analysts, the question of self-determination is ultimately one that only the Kurdish people can decide. Rory Stewart, Conservative Member of Parliament for Penrith and The Border, told Rudaw “this is a highly sensitive issue. In the end this must be a question for the Kurdish and Iraqi people. And conducted as sensitively as possible, in a situation of extreme instability. The key question remains the long-term stability and welfare of the people of Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq.”

Stewart, who recently spent time last week on the ground with Kurdish fighters and refugees, highlighted the apparent gulf between  what is needed to support the Kurdish army and to defend Kurdish refugee camps and what is currently been provided. He urged “There is a lot we can still do to provide further military equipment and training, as well as ensure essential supplies are reaching refugee camps to support those fleeing from IS.”

UK Labour MP, Mike Gapes, while pushing for support of Kurds “materially, militarily and politically”, stated “It would be better for the terms and timing and degree of separation to be negotiated and agreed but ultimately the Kurds have the right to self-determination.  The UK and US should respect the will of the people expressed in a democratic referendum.”

Angus McKee, UK Consul General to the Kurdistan Region, explained that the matter of any referendum is up to the Kurdish and Iraqi people to decide, not the UK.

Former leader of the Liberal Democrats, Paddy Ashdown, strongly hit out at the UK hesitation to arm and support the Kurds and urged on a more integrated strategy for containing a wider war that would involve Britain and the US acting as the “handmaidens to Kurdish independence”. Ashdown warned that the borders of the Middle East will be inevitably redrawn and “Sykes-Picot will be out the window and we will see a shape of the Middle East which is much more arbitrated by religious belief than by old imperial preferences.”

Ashdown added, “Support the Kurds by all means we can. They can provide rescue and refuge for the Yezidis. They are secular. They act as a northern bulwark against the advance of Isis.”

The Right Reverend David S. Walker, the Bishop of Manchester, commended the Kurdish role in the fight against IS and in humanitarian operations. Whilst noting the present national boundaries are largely the product not of individual peoples but of former imperial powers in former centuries, he told Rudaw, “I would feel that it is within my remit to say that I would hope and expect that the key issues around self-determination include, alongside economic and political viability, the extent to which there is confidence that a people would govern themselves in ways that protect and respect the rights of minorities – exactly the thing that IS is adamantly opposed to.”

 

Other analysts have warned of the dangers of any separation, Peter Harling of the International Crisis Group, stated “the Kurds are now in a situation where self-determination becomes less a function of their own course of action than Iraq’s general breakdown. This may reduce the price to pay for secession, ultimately. But that price remains steep given the remarkable benefits the Kurds currently derive from their relations with Baghdad, Ankara and Teheran. Actual partition likely would negatively affect all three.”

But for Steven Cook, an analyst at the US think tank the Council on Foreign Relations, recent shifts in the Middle Eastern political landscape mean that Iraq’s Kurds will gain independence “sooner rather than later”.

Even as some major powers have slowly warmed to the idea if not inevitability of Kurdish independence, they have treaded carefully around the diplomatic line. As talk of Kurdish independence accelerated, Philip Hammond, UK Defence Secretary, towed the same line as the US, affirming that the government’s position was to keep Iraq as a unified state.

Germany was quick to support the Kurds in the recent crisis but Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier warned “An independent Kurdish state would further destabilize the region and trigger new tensions, maybe with the neighboring Iraqi state as well.”

US President Barack Obama somewhat reluctantly agreed to military intervention in Iraq but no doubt placed such support on preserving Iraq’s unity, seeing the ouster of Maliki and creating a unified and inclusive government. “The wolf is at the door…in order for them to be credible with the Iraqi people, they’re going to have to put behind them some of the old practices and actually create a credible, united government,” Obama said.

The Kurds are often warned that due to geopolitics considerations, their time has now come. Now Kurds wonder if in the volatile and explosive Middle Eastern plains, whether such a “good” time ever exists.

Even Turkey, who for years staunchly opposed any notion of Kurdish nationalism let alone independence, has slowly removed resistance to Kurdish aspirations.  A Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman recently declared there was no “unease” about the weapons’ deliveries to Kurds or that it may boost their bid for independence.

In either case, under Western pressure, the Kurds may well have to shelve their plans for any independence referendum for now but either way the Kurdish position will never return to the pre-IS days.

The Kurdish demand for joining new Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government will have grown stronger to include right to sell oil, purchase arms, measures to prevent any centralisation of power as was the case under Maliki and referendums on disputed territories that Kurds now control.

Kurdistan Head of the Department of Foreign Relations, Falah Mustafa Bakir, previously warned “there is a new reality and that requires a new policy and a new approach.”

The greater question for the Kurds remains not on their end of the bargain in keeping Iraq stable and united, but whether Baghdad will truly forfeit ministries such as interior and defense that the Sunnis crave. There is little the Kurds can do but to shut the door on Baghdad if the current Sunni insurgency cannot be quelled lest another deadly insurgency should rise in the future.

Iran has pledged support for al-Abadi and backed the unity of Iraq and the stabilizing of security, but it remains to be seen whether they will exert pressure on Baghdad to cede power to Sunnis.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe
Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

As Iraqi crisis haunts the Kurds, double standards in the principle of self-determination come to the fore

Leave a reply

“What is good for the goose is good for gander” – English Proverb

It is fast approaching 100 years since US President Woodrow Wilson issued his 14 points at the end of the First World War with the concept of self-determination the overriding principle that he imposed on the League of Nations and the Middle East.

Wilson stated in January 1918 that “The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development”.

Wilson later warned that “Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril….”

For imperial interests at the time, Kurdistan was the only major nation not to be granted statehood. The Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, which proposed a Kurdish state, was later annulled by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

A secret deal between UK Foreign Minister Sir Mark Sykes and France Foreign Minister Francois Georges-Picot that divided the Middle East has somehow become unbreakable even if it lacked real socio-political or ethnic basis or mirrored realities on the ground.

Remarkably, close to a century later, the Kurds remain the largest ethnic group in the world without a state.

Self-determination is one of the key international charters and by which repression, imperialism and subjugation is eradicated and free will of nations is attained.

Arabs have fiercely campaigned and struggled for the establishment of Palestine and the 22nd Arab state in the Middle East that they see as a historic wrong, yet many oppose the establishment of a single Kurdish state.

The principle of self-determination

At the end of World War II, the ratification of the United Nations Charter in 1945 placed the right of self-determination into the framework of international law and diplomacy.

The United Nations Charter states that nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and fair equality of opportunity have the right to freely choose their sovereignty and international political status with no external compulsion or interference.

Chapter 1, article 1, part 2 clearly states that purpose of the UN Charter is “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”

Self-determination is also protected under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a right of “all peoples.”

The Iraqi struggle

With Iraq engulfed in yet more sectarian flames, the renewed Kurdish bid for independence is met with resistance, caution and obstacles. Ironically, while the ubiquitous talk has been of the Kurds breaking away from Iraq, thanks to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the marginalisation and centralist policies of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, it is Iraq that is breaking away from the Kurds.

Yet the Kurds are been asked to put the brakes on any move towards self-determination and save Iraq and Maliki.

The Unite States helped mask some of the post Saddam Hussein realities by acting as the crutches to support an Iraq that was broken and could not stand on its own two feet.

Here is the problem, what good is a comprehensive constitution, democratic frameworks, concessions and promises if the end product is failed implementation, by-passed legislature, half-hearted unity and empty gestures?

Today Kurdistan has a fundamental and unmolested right to two clear options. Either a truly democratic, federal and balanced Iraq or outright independence. Since the first option has all but eroded, outright independence remains the only real option.

What do you need to be independent?

While other countries, some with populations numbering in the thousands and others gripped with immense poverty and a lack of infrastructure dot the global horizon, the Kurds are warned to tread carefully or that their time has not come.

Some claim that Kurdistan does not have the infrastructure or conditions for statehood but just how much infrastructure does Palestine or Kosovo have compared to the Kurds?

Kurdistan is washed with immense amounts of oil, with a booming economy, a vibrant population and all the trappings of any state. It is a key strategic hub of the Middle East and with the influence and standing to play a key part in the evolution of the Middle East.

Have the Kurds spilled countless blood, tears and tragedy to now return to centralist rule in Iraq or to have terms dictated upon them by other groups?

At the first seismic shifting of the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were sidelined and had to painfully endure decades of suffering for their chance to rewrite the wrongs of history. They can ill-afford to be passengers as the evolutionary trains darts past this time around.

Is Kosovo really a “Special Case”?

The ruling by the International Court of Justice in 2010, the first case of secession raised before the World Court, declared that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was in fact legal and did not contravene international law.

Key global powers in support of Kosovar rights have continuously pointed to the notion that Kosovo was a special case, that since Serbia’s brutal campaign had forfeited right to govern Kosovo by “breaching its responsibility to protect” its civilians under international law, the Kosovar’s were free to choose not to reside with their Serbian counterparts.

This paved the way to implement a roadmap orchestrated by United Nations envoy Martti Ahtisaari, which proposed a scheduled transition to independence.

By this virtue, after brutal campaigns of genocide, repression and even chemical bombings, Iraq has long “forfeited” any sovereign right over Kurdistan.

U.S. President George W. Bush deemed that “history will prove this to be a correct move to bring peace to the Balkans.” Whilst a UK government statement deemed the Kosovar move as the “most viable way forward”.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called the situation “a special case” for reasons such as “…Yugoslavia’s breakup, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of U.N. administration.”

However, whilst Albanians already have a country of their own (Albania), the Kurds have nothing. The struggle to establish a ‘Kosovar’ identity in the aftermath of statehood is well documented. At the time of independence, Kosovar’s had yet to build a distinctive national image with a lack of an official flag, security force and national anthem. After all, it was the greater Albanian flag that was ubiquitous on every corner of Pristina.

Bids for independence

South Sudan followed in the heels of Kosovo by declaring statehood in 2011 after a referendum (ironically, despite statements by Barrack Obama to the contrary, a referendum was never held in Kosovo).

Crimea broke away from Ukraine and was annexed by Russia within weeks in a hastily arranged referendum.

Not to mention Scotland’s independence referendum scheduled for September as they vote to break away from the United Kingdom or Catalonia’s bid to break away from Spain.

All the while, international community worry about what precedence is been set for the likes of Cyprus, Somaliland, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria.

Can the case of 40 million ethnic Kurds without a homeland be compared to relatively small breakaway regions whose ethnicities is already linked to independent states?

New Kurdish push for independence

Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani recently declared his intention to hold a referendum on independence from Iraq. Barzani stated that “everything that’s happened recently shows that it’s the right of Kurdistan to achieve independence.”

Barzani added “From now on, we won’t hide that that’s our goal. Iraq is effectively partitioned now. Are we supposed to stay in this tragic situation the country’s living? It’s not me who will decide on independence. It’s the people. We’ll hold a referendum and it’s a matter of months.”

Kurdistan Head of the Department of Foreign Relations, Falah Mustafa Bakir, warned “there is a new reality and that requires a new policy and a new approach.”

Meanwhile, for Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s High Representative to the UK, it “would take a lot for Kurdistan to remain part of Iraq.”

The statement from Barzani had the United States and some Western powers scrambling. White House spokesman Josh Earnest stated “The fact is that we continue to believe that Iraq is stronger if it is united.”

US Secretary of State, John Kerry had reportedly told Barzani “‘whatever your aspirations are for your future, your interests now in the near-term are for a stable, sovereign and unified Iraq.”

Even as some major powers warm to the idea of Kurdish independence, they have treaded carefully around the diplomatic line. As talk of Kurdish independence accelerated, Philip Hammond, UK Defence Secretary, towed the same line as the US, affirming that the government’s position was to keep Iraq as a unified state.

Yet Iraq has failed to be united and will never achieve such a feat especially with the new reality of the Islamic State.

Some politicians have been more vocal in supporting Kurdish independence, in an exclusive interview with Rudaw, UK Labour MP, Mike Gapes, stated “It would be better for the terms and timing and degree of separation to be negotiated and agreed but ultimately the Kurds have the right to self-determination.  The UK and US should respect the will of the people expressed in a democratic referendum.”

Other analysts have warned of the dangers of any separation, Peter Harling of the International Crisis Group, told Rudaw “the Kurds are now in a situation where self-determination becomes less a function of their own course of action than Iraq’s general breakdown. This may reduce the price to pay for secession, ultimately. But that price remains steep given the remarkable benefits the Kurds currently derive from their relations with Baghdad, Ankara and Teheran. Actual partition likely would negatively affect all three.”

Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi warned a referendum on the independence of Iraq’s Kurdish region would lead to a “catastrophic” break-up of the country, yet the same Arab leaders have vehemently supported Palestine inspite of decades of bloodshed.

Obsessed with the unity of Iraq, it seems that the US and regional powers have missed the pieces of Iraq already lying broken on the floor.

First Published On: OpenDemocracy

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc