With new angles to the peace process in Turkey, where now for the PKK’s armed struggle?

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The Kurdish New Year of Newroz is a traditional fuel for Kurdish nationalist fever in Turkey, often resulting in mass protests and deadly clashes with state forces. In recent years, however, it has come to represent a new democratic opening to ending the three decade old war between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish government.

The peace process that started in 2012, culminating in imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s announcement of a cease-fire in March 2013, was a significant milestone. After years of a polarization, thousands of lives and a much stagnated local economy owed to fighting and security restrictions, there came a growing realization that neither side could ultimately triumph with the status quo.

The much anticipated Newroz address of 2015 by Ocalan, feel short of widespread expectations that he would announce the laying down of arms but was nevertheless significant as he acknowledged that the armed struggle was no longer sustainable and urged the PKK to launch a congress with view to ending the conflict.

Whilst the plight of Kurds today is a far cry from the past and a number of steps have been taken by Ankara, peace talks have proved far from plain sailing.

The bridge between what the Kurds demand and what the government is willing to concede has always been a slippery slope.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was pivotal in the launching of the peace process and the increase of Kurdish rights from his tenure as Prime Minister, summed up the frailty of sentiment when he recently insisted that Turkey does not have a Kurdish problem. What Kurdish problem?” Erdogan insisted, “There isn’t one anymore.”

Another point of contention for Erdogan concerned Ocalan’s demand of a monitoring committee to oversee the peace process. Ocalan and the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) have insisted on an open and transparent government commitment that is underpinned by a recognized framework.

In recent weeks, cracks have emerged between Erdogan and his AKP led government. The government has agreed to a monitoring committee whilst Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc rebuked Erdogan for his “emotional” and “personal” views.

The peace talks are against the backdrop of looming national elections in Turkey. Erdogan’s seemingly hardening stance on the peace talks could be explained by his endeavor to appease the nationalist votes. Then there is the widespread belief that Erdogan is working to secure a presidential system with extended powers.

Erdogan was also critical of the manner of recent negotiations and agreement between the government and HDP. The AKP and Erdogan still have a substantial support base amongst Kurds, and Erdogan has attempted to discredit the HDP as it tries to reach the elusive 10% threshold to enter parliament.

So far Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has a more positive view of the peace talks and the government initiative, “Let’s forever bury in the ground the hatred, the cultural of hate, violence, guns,” he declared at a recent rally.

Agreeing to peace talks is one thing, agreeing on an end goal and its implementation is proving much trickier.

Erdogan maintains that disarmament is a prerequisite to peace and not an outcome of it. But PKK has shown that they want to see action first.

The frailty of the peace talks were underscored by small clashes between the PKK and government forces in the regions close to Iraq.

Although Ocalan holds huge sway of the PKK, this is not a forgone conclusion, his actions and decisions must appease many sceptics in the PKK camp. An example is a potential backlash if Ocalan had announced disarmament without concrete steps from the Turkish government.

Cemil Bayik, a co-founder of the PKK, emphasized such feelings “for the armed struggle to end, there are certain steps the Turkish state and government must take.”

With the PKK enjoying an influential role in the Syrian Kurdish battle against the Islamic State and with increasing autonomy and recognition of the Syrian Kurds, the goalposts have greatly shifted with increasing regional PKK interests.

Clashes between Kurdish protestors and Ankara over Kobane in October have highlighted the continued sensitivity of the Kurdish question and how peace talks have at the same time assumed new angles.

Even if arms are dropped in Turkey, they are merely picked up elsewhere against the PKK’s new enemy.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Iran nuclear deal – a historic milestone or the fuel for increased tensions in the region?

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In the context of decades of animosity and distrust between the United States and Iran, the recent preliminary framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme that aims to curb nuclear activities in return for a gradual softening of sanctions that have crippled the Iranian economy, is certainly historic.

However, in today’s volatile and tumultuous Middle East, where Iran has an influential hand that stretches from the Houthi Shia onslaught in Yemen, the direct Iranian involvement as Iraq pushes back Islamist State (IS) rebels, to the devastating civil war in Syria and not forgetting the influence of Iranian backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, for a number of countries in the region, the connotations from this deal could not have come at a worse time.

As US President Barrack Obama hailed the agreement, his next task is to sway unconvinced members of Congress, in particular Republicans who have threatened to veto the agreement or even impose fresh sanctions. Then he must the repeat the trick with weary allies.

The agreement with the P5+1 countries (US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany), was also praised by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, with jubilant scenes of victory across Iran.

As both sides seemingly lauded the agreement, is it truly a mutual win for both parties?

Under the agreement, Iran is obliged to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium that could ultimately be used to make nuclear weapons as well as drastically slash the number of centrifuges at its disposal.

Iran has long denied claims that it seeks a nuclear weapon, emphasizing its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

However, Western unease with Tehran was merely accelerated with unveiling of Iran’s nuclear programme. Hardline rhetoric from Tehran especially from the tenure of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hardly settled nerves.

For sceptics in the region particularly Saudi Arabia, who is spearheading an Arab military coalition to curtail the advance of Houthi rebels in Yemen, sanctions relief coupled with the fact that Iranian nuclear programme remains in place in one form or another, will just add fuel to the regional fire.

There is a rapidly developing Shia-Sunni conflict line in the Middle East that is leading to proxy wars from Lebanon to Yemen. There is an increasing if indirect showdown between Saudi Arabia and Iran across this line.

The Saudis were already alarmed at the perceived cooperation between Iran and the US over the fight back against IS in Iraq. The Saudis have already warned the US over what they deemed as the Iranian takeover of Iraq

Now, with signs of increased diplomatic channels with Tehran, and the potential for an even stronger Iran both economically and militaristically as a result of the nuclear agreement, regional anxiety, arms race and battle for influence will only increase.

More frenzied alarm was in Israel where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was deeply skeptical at the agreement that he believed threatened the survival of his state. Reassurances by Obama and further security pledges will have had little impact on Israeli reservations.

In the deeply interconnected fault lines, the nuclear agreement cannot be judged alone. It has wider ramifications on the resolution of Palestinian statehood, influence of Hezbollah and even potential peace in Syria and stability in Iraq and Yemen.

On the surface, increased Western diplomatic channels with Iran could lead to cooperation on the resolution or at least calming of these matters.

However, decades of animosity in the region and the West are not about to disappear with the mere stroke of a pen.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

The battle for Tikrit – Iraq going down “that” sectarian road again?

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Why does the following sentence hold so much significance? Iraqi forces, backed by thousands of Shiite militiamen and Sunni tribesmen and supervised by the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ elite Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, launched an attacked to retake the Islamic State (IS) held town of Tikrit, without the assistance of Coalition forces.

This sentences pretty much sums up Iraq’s past, present and most likely its future failings. Just who are the ‘official’ government forces and why after a decade of rebuilding, extensive training and supplied with vast amounts of weaponry, do they need to be significantly augmented by Iranian backed Shiite militia or indeed led by an al-Quds Force commander?

Any sense of a united force is lacking in Iraq and having wasted the chance for several years to build a cross-sectarian and multi-ethnic armed force, the scene is dominated by one of a number of different forces depending on where you are in Iraq.

Whilst hundreds of Sunni tribesman have played a role in the Tikrit offensive, currently it is more of symbolic than of real strategic value. There are plenty of Sunni tribes that are anti-IS and support Baghdad’s efforts but by large the Sunni position from the pre IS days has not been drastically addressed.

Sunnis continue to view the Baghdad political chambers and its Shia dominated security apparatus with distrust and resentment. It is easy to forget that IS strolled into town amidst widespread Sunni protests and continued clashes in the traditionally problematic Anbar province.

As the combined Iraq force slowly makes progress around Tikrit, there is a growing danger of a wider sectarian divide. Crucially, the liberators must be separated from the eventual protectors. If the Sunnis do not lead the protection and control of their heartland then this is a recipe for disaster.

Iranian backed militias on the Sunni doorstep simply echoes the sentiments that led to the Sunni welcome from some sections as the IS blitzed in to town.

In fact, the Iraqi Sunni tribal and various Baathist forces became so blended with the IS ‘label’ that it is often misleading when attacks merely become tagged as against IS. There is a danger that sectarian atrocities could be committed under the banner of banishing the evil of IS.

The Sahwa or Sunni Awakening Councils that drove al-Qaeda out of the Sunni hotspots is an example that Sunnis can be enticed into the fold – but the success of the Sahwa initiative was greatly diluted as the Sunni tribal forces were not sufficiently embedded within the national security apparatus and the opportunity to lure the Sunnis into a greater political role was lost by Baghdad.

Even as the Coalition plays no part in a key offensive against IS in Iraq, the US has somewhat tried to brush off the Iranian influence in the battle for Tikrit but this fact is not lost on weary regional powers. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal pointed to the offensive in Tikrit as the prime example of the anxiety of Gulf States of Iran “taking over” Iraqi forces.

With the U.S. in deep negotiations with Tehran over the curbing of its nuclear program and concern amongst regional powers that US is softening its stance on Iran, hardly soothes this regional anxiety.

In the words of US General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the hodge-podge of Iraqi Humvees and various vehicles who darted towards Tikrit like “rush hour on the Washington Beltway”, will ultimately overcome IS forces in Tikrit due to their “overwhelming numbers.”

The US is naturally worried that their enormous investment in eradicating IS will be hijacked by Iran as it increasingly displays its influence and plays a leading role by training militia and providing general arms and increasingly sophisticated weaponry.

Of course, Iraqi forces in spite of any backing from Iran would not be anywhere near Tikrit if it was not for the significant coalition airstrikes.

The greater concern for Iraq is whether the common threat of IS, where battles rage from Kurdistan to the north, Anbar to the West or to the gates of Baghdad further south, will be bring the county closer together or even wider apart?

Unfortunately, augmented by the growing political rifts with Kurdistan, all the signs currently point to the latter. As U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter pointed out “We’ve been down the road of sectarianism in Iraq and it’s important that the government of Iraq not go down that road again.”

When you have a significant Shiite militia backed by Iran that is perhaps more powerful than the official state forces leading the road to Tikrit, it’s hard not to see that in spite of Carter’s warnings, Iraq is going down that road again and fast.

Tikrit is the all-important dress rehearsal for Mosul. If Iraqi forces get bogged into a protracted battle with IS or worse the situation turns into sectarian anarchy, then the battle for Mosul will no longer be Iraq versus IS but Shiite versus Sunni.

First Published: Daily Sabah

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

As oil deal with Baghdad threatens to unravel, Kurdistan must decide – is oil to be their curse or treasure?

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The backdrop to a raging battle with the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq is a raging political battle for control of the vast oil wealth of the country.

The billions of barrels of oil reserves under the Iraqi feet should be a real treasure and a divine gift but it has proven much more of a historical curse.

First misuse of revenues under Saddam Hussein to fund expensive wars and campaigns of repression against the Kurds and now since 2003, with the exception of the Kurdistan Region, Iraq is in a worse state in terms of economy, infrastructure and public services in spite of record revenues in recent years.

Control of oil exploration and revenues has been a real thorn in the relations between Kurdistan Region and Iraq. Several years later, no national hydrocarbon law exists and disputes continue to linger.

Many agreements have been reached between Erbil and Baghdad, often through gritted teeth and bitterness than real compromise or a common vision. As soon as the oil taps have turned on, it hasn’t been long before they were switched off again.

In addition to the rise of IS in large swathes of Iraq, another milestone in 2014 was the first independent Kurdish oil exports and revenues.

It may have sent relations with Baghdad spiraling downwards but certainly for their self-sufficiency and increased autonomy the direction was firmly upwards. Baghdad has sporadically paid Kurdistan’s share of the budget since January 2014 and Kurdistan was forced to take unilateral action but at the same time found itself in legal grey zones.

Finally, a deal was struck in late 2014 between Erbil and Baghdad that brought much optimism. Signs of unity and a willingness to find a true solution to the age old dispute came as IS remained deeply entrenched in Iraq.

The Kurds committed to export 550,000 in 2015 and in return Baghdad would resume over $1billion of monthly budget payments.

However, it didn’t take long for the agreement to become a source of more contention.

The Kurdish government has long complained that they have kept their end of the export bargain but Baghdad, suffering a massive budget deficit due to the crash in oil prices and owing over $21 billion to oil companies alone, was not moved.

Then comes the sheer irony. Kurdistan Region is washed with oil and yet still relies on budget payments from Baghdad. Oil revenues are the last noose or umbilical cord that Baghdad has over the Kurds.

Do the Kurds play the patient game that has borne little fruit or do they cut the umbilical cord and go alone, by receiving revenues directly or going after the buyers of Kurdish oil via SOMO, after all Baghdad has frequently threatened to sue buyers of Kurdish oil.

Kurdistan would receive more revenues than Baghdad would ever give if they exported directly from fields under their control. Then there is the plethora of oil companies in Kurdistan who are suffering due to the oil noose around the region. The capacity and infrastructure is there but the oil companies of course need their own revenues.

Kurdistan has criticized Baghdad for treating them like an oil company then a key part of Iraq. Although both Erbil and Baghdad recently reinforced their commitment to the deal, the government of Kurdistan has a very clear plan B. sells their own oil and receives revenues directly and bypass Baghdad altogether.

It may strike the ire of Washington who has placed firm political conditions on their campaign against IS, but if the disagreement continue unabated, then the immense oil under Kurdish feet continues to feel like a curse when salaries are unpaid, services are disrupted and the economy is hit.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

As Iranian commander and Shiite militias spearhead attack on Tikrit, more questions than answers emerge from Iraq

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As lines of Iraqi Humvees and trucks jammed the roads to Tikrit with thousands of Iraqi forces looking well-motivated and itching for battle, on the surface this would point to all the positive signs – Iraq was finally ready to banish the Islamic State (IS) from their doorstep.

However, as Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, pointed out, eventual recapture of Tikrit is not the burning question. The key issue is the security and political apparatus that is left behind to support Tikrit and other Sunni towns that are retaken.

Whilst Sunni tribal forces play a role in the battle for Tikrit, it is the unmissable presence of thousands of Shiite militia supervised by commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ elite Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani that speaks volumes.

Kurdistan leaders have repeated warned that without the support of local Sunni tribesman in Tikrit and particularly Mosul, any military offensive will ultimately not have the desired long-term goals.

Masrour Barzani, Chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council, reiterated warnings this week that “Without the Iraqi army and, more specifically, Sunni elements within these forces, it will not produce the results that we all hope for.” Barzani also lamented the lack of supplies of heavy weaponry to the Peshmerga forces even as Kurds play leading role against IS.

The Tikrit offensive was underscored by a lack of Coalition involvement. It also comes amidst signs of cracks with the coalition over strategy. Where the U.S. openly lauded a looming spring offensive to retake Mosul, Iraqi Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi quickly reminded that Baghdad would determine the timing for any Mosul offensive.

It was Iran pulling the strings in Tikrit and whilst U.S. officials have played this down for now, this has hardly soothed regional anxiety.

“As the Iraqi army stands up more and more, militias and external actors are going to be less and less imperative and needed,” US Secretary of State John Kerry tried to reassure its coalition partners. But for Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, Tikrit was example of the Iranian “take over” that they are worried about.

Iraq has been engulfed in sectarian storms since 2003. On paper it built a considerable state force with years of training and US military aid, yet without support from Shiite militias, attacks such as that on Tikrit are simply not possible.

Sunni Sahwa or Awakening Councils that were crucial to previously driving out al-Qaeda have shown that Sunni tribal leaders can be enticed. But many of their demands, such as embedding Sahwa forces into the official security apparatus and greater control of their affairs were not met and increasing sectarian policies of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki fanned more Sunni discontent which eventually led to the welcoming of IS in various Sunni circles.

If greater local Sunni support can be attained in Tikrit and Mosul, IS can be much more readily defeated.

Of greater importance is the shape of Tikrit and Mosul that is left behind, if Sunnis can take control of their own security and see humanitarian assistance and reconstruction from Baghdad then stability can be achieved.

If Shiite militias or any semblance of Iranian marks are left behind on these cities or if Baghdad wastes yet another opportunity to entice the Sunnis with greater political and security representation, then a sense of déjà vu cannot be avoided.

One of the conditions for the eventual support against IS was that the new Iraqi premier, Haider al-Abadi, could achieve the elusive U.S. hope of a plural and stable Iraq with cross sectarian and ethnic representation.

In Iraq, there remains as always more questions than answers.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

With Kurdish forces in ascendancy against IS in Syria and Iraq – coalition must focus on empowering vital allies of today, not training of Syrian and Iraqi forces that may come too late

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As the barbarous threat of the Islamic State (IS) has become the top global concern, Kurdish forces have taken center stage in the fight in Iraq and Syria.

Peshmerga forces have been instrumental in breaking any notion of invincibility of IS. Meanwhile, the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Forces (YPG), have proven that on both sides of the border, the US-led coalitions biggest bet against IS are the Kurds.

Since the siege of Kobane was broken after months of fierce battles with the help of Peshmerga forces and hundreds of coalition airstrikes, YPG forces have been on the offensive, retaking hundreds of villages in the area and dealing a blow to IS.

Advances also included sections of the vital highway that connects IS forces from Aleppo to Raqqa, as YPG and Peshmerga forces closed on another vital border crossing with Turkey – Gire Sipe (Tel Abyad).

YPG forces also took control of the strategic town of Tel Hamees in the Hassakah province in recent days, clearing dozens of villages along the way. The battle against IS, cannot be confined to local battles in Iraq or Syria – the battle is one and the same.

With the Peshmerga continuing to choke IS supply lines around Mosul, Shingal and key areas on the border with Syria, YPG led advances break a vital IS bridge linking forces across the border.

However, as symbolic as Kurdish gains appear to be in Syria, they are by no means irreversible. IS may have lost strategic ground and their pride will be hurt, but they far from a spent force.

Whilst coalition air strikes have been pivotal in Kurdish advances on both sides of the border, it brings into full view the lack of short-term urgency in the US strategy.

The US plans to start training the first batch of moderate Syrian fighters as part of its wider initiative to defeat IS. Unfortunately, the 5000 or so fighters will only be ready by end of year and in total there may be 15000 fighters after 3 years.

This is where the vast cracks in policy appear. The battle against IS is now, not end of the year or in 3 years’ time.

Crucially, the YPG were supported by Syrian rebel fighters. It proves that as fractured as the opposition forces are in Syria, alliances can be affective. YPG forces need support now if they are to firstly hold onto their gains and secondly if they are to continue their vital push into IS strongholds.

Syrian Kurds have proved an affective fighting force but they remain somewhat in the shadows of Turkish suspicion and anxiety over empowering them any further.

Turkey has to choose between a strong Kurdish force that will be vital to defeating IS and bringing stability to the Turkish border, which has been the real gateway for IS, or seeing that IS regains the upper hand whilst moderate Syrian forces get trained.

The people greatly afflicted by IS cannot wait whilst Syrian rebels or Iraqi forces are trained. Only this week the militants abducted over 200 Christian Assyrians in the same area that YPG forces later liberated.

If US continues to focus on Syrian and Iraqi forces, the gains against IS will be diluted. As much as YPG forces need arms, Peshmerga forces are in need of heavy weaponry and equipment. Yet the US has focused on training Iraqi battalions to retake Mosul.

Ironically, the same Peshmerga forces are then expected to make further sacrifices in joining the battle for Mosul, when local Arabs have not been enticed to fight.

With coordinated action across the borders, IS can be split further and their effectiveness greatly hampered. Does the US provide necessary arms and support to the Kurds now in their ascendency, or do they drag out the war waiting to train Syrian forces?

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

As Iraq prepares for Mosul battle, sentiments in post-Islamic State Iraq unlikely to change

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Fasting approach a year since the Islamic State (IS) darted across the Syrian desert to rapidly occupy Mosul, this week an official from the U.S. Central Command laid out plans for a spring offensive on the city involving Kurdish and Iraqi forces.

The five Iraqi brigades expected to spearhead the attack are subject of frantic efforts by coalition forces to complete training on schedule. The smaller brigades will serve as reserve forces with three Peshmerga brigades playing the crucial role of pinning down IS fighters in the north and west of the city.

Whilst a spring offensive is highly symbolic for Iraq and the Coalition, it is less a question of training but more whether Iraqi forces will sufficiently motivated to drive out thousands of well-armed IS fighters or if sectarian affiliations will once again prove a handicap.

Moreover, the long-term questions still cast a dark cloud over Iraq – the size and buy-in of any Sunni force, their role in the battle for Mosul and whether they will be sufficiently enticed into an IS-free region after years of animosity and mistrust of the Baghdad government and Shiite dominated forces.

Even if IS driven from Mosul, who assumes control of the city? If Baghdad does not deal with the Sunni card effectively, something that it has failed to properly address since 2003, then any post IS Iraq may not be a far cry from the one before it.

Sunnis continue to view Iraqi forces with mistrust, not to mention the sectarian militias who have for many years been a source of blood-letting.

As for Baghdad-Erbil tensions, although the Kurds have played the pivotal role of containing and driving back IS, the divide with Baghdad has if anything only increased.

The oil exportation deal struck in late 2014 between Baghdad and Erbil, which delivered a glimmer of hope that age-old tension over oil exports and revenues would finally be settled, has once again stalled. You would think that with the menace the IS poses, Baghdad would focus on the task at hand, and not the ubiquitous policy aimed curbing Kurdish drive towards full autonomy.

The Kurds quickly took control of Kirkuk in the aftermath of the IS onslaught as Iraqi forces wilted away. Giving up control of Kirkuk has become a Kurdish red-line, but there are clear signs that Sunnis and Shiites will not accept such a view.

Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani warned that Kurdish control of Kirkuk was not a topic of discussion. “…they must know that either we will all die, or Kirkuk will never fall to the enemy ever again,” Barzani vowed.

Barzani warned that only the Kurds can decide if they needed support in Kirkuk, “unless we make such a decision no other force is allowed in Kirkuk,” Barzani stressed.

However, the growing presence of Shiite militias on the borders of Kirkuk, principally aimed at IS, but certainly as a show of force against the Kurds, demonstrates that in spite of all the Kurdish sacrifices against IS, Baghdad’s stance towards the Kurds remains unchanged.

As Barzani insisted that Shiite militiamen would be “prohibited under any circumstances” from entering the Kirkuk, Hadi al-Amiri, a top Shiite militia commander, vowed that his forces “are able to go wherever if needed”.

The question remains, are such forces really needed to protect Kirkuk or attack Tikrit and Mosul?

If IS can be defeated, then it is likely that Baghdad would insist on a return of Iraqi troops to Kirkuk. It was the lack of competence of the 12th division in Kirkuk that caused the vacuum in the first place.

Barzani urged Arabs who oppose IS to “play your roles” and to come forward “with action, not words alone”.

But are Arabs really ready to reconcile, unite and bridge the sectarian divide? Unfortunately, this is very doubtful.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

“Eye for an eye” retaliation only benefits the Islamic State

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For thousands of years, largely fuelled by religious and ethnic hatred, the Middle East has been a fertile plain for bloodshed based on retaliation and vengeance. Indeed revenge is quickly on the lips of many when any crime is perpetrated.

The principle of an “eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth” or “lex talionis” (law of retaliation) has roots across Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

As the Islamic State (IS) perpetrates heinous crimes against humanity in both Iraq and Syria, passion runs high with understandable anger and distaste at some of the worst crimes possible.

Indeed, the word on everyone’s lip in Jordan in recent days was that of vengeance. Jordan went from a state of reservation to their involvement in the coalition effort to a deep drive to punish and retaliate against the IS for the brutal execution of captured Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh.

In the days of mass technology and an exponentially smaller word, IS has used social media effectively as a weapon to strike shock and fear into the hearts of many. After IS released the video of Moaz al-Kasasbeh being burned alive in a cage, the video quickly circulated around the world. Its effect were so dramatic on Jordanians that it would have left like a whole section of Amman went on fire than just the murder of a pilot.

King Abdullah II vowed a “severe” and within hours convicted terrorists Sajida al-Rishawi and Ziad al-Karbouli, already on death row, were executed in response.

Since then, the Jordanian air force has launched a fierce air campaign against IS. But whether the execution of the terrorists in retaliation serves much of a gain against IS is doubtful.

The IS level of brutality should not be matched as this is exactly what they desire – a plethora of violence, vengeance and retaliation that pitches the Middle East back into the dark ages.

IS applies the Islamic law of Qasas in its broadest terms. In their extreme interpretation of most codes of religious practice, all their crimes against Yezidism, Christians, Kurds and Shiites or captured hostages are not only acceptable but have a legal justification.

The Kurds have suffered as much as any in recent months. With every grieving mother, lays the framework for an emboldened desire to defeat the organization but images such that of IS bodies been dragged through the streets of Kirkuk sends off the completely wrong sense of retaliation.

The doctrine of hatred and brutality is what IS hope to perpetrate. Tit for tit cases only plays into their hands any blurs the lines of the good and bad guys. Of course, the case of Kirkuk was limited to a few and Kurdish forces have been dignified and honorable in their battle but just like an act of IS gets magnified through social media, this is not difference to responses against IS.

The irony in committing such atrocities against IS, is that IS will not be shocked by such a level of response. It’s an expectation not exception to see such responses.

This week Kurdistan Region President Masoud Barzani vowed that Peshmerga were ready to “go into the final war” against IS with the right of military aid. Crucially, he vowed Kurdistan would seek “justice but not revenge.”

The opposite mentality has crippled Iraq since 2003 as sectarian hit squads have succeeded in their aim of creating a climate of fear and anarchy by promoting mass revenge attacks. One attack is met by a bigger attack in response and so on until the whirlwind of violence and hatred reaches a point of no return.

Ironically, the majority of the time it is innocent civilians that get caught up under the veil of “equal retribution.”

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

At the forefront of the war on Islamic State, yet Arab suspicions of Kurds highlight failed state

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Months of fierce fighting and several hundred coalition air-strikes later, the Islamic State (IS) finds itself largely on the defensive, but as a spate of attacks across Iraq clearly showed in recent days, IS is an adaptive and determined organization that is far from a finished force.

As recent Peshmerga advances around Mosul threatened to choke vital IS supply routes, IS militants launched a series of attacks on Kurdish positions to the south of Kirkuk. The aim of the move was to sow new fear amongst the people and show it can still strike at the heart of Kurdistan but also to divert Kurdish forces from the real IS prize – Mosul.

US-led coalition airstrikes have no doubt been in instrumental in keeping IS militants on the back foot, but the protracted and deadly battles have shown the limitations of airpower without an effective ground force.

Kurdistan Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani highlighted this very point, “The question is: is the policy one of containment, or to dislodge and destroy them?” adding, “In order to totally eradicate them, further action must be taken.”

Barzani rejected any notion of the Kurds spearheading an attack to wrest control of Mosul, to avoid any ethnic battle between Kurds and Arabs.

Such fears speak volumes about the fractured nature of the Iraqi landscape. Whilst Kurdish advances have proved pivotal against IS in recent months including protecting areas where the Iraqi army originally fled, some noises in Baghdad and in segments of the Sunni population have viewed Kurdish advances against IS and their defense of disputed territories with suspicion.

The Peshmerga have lost over 700 men since the start of the conflict with thousands more wounded. They have afforded protection to Arab areas not to mention hosting thousands of refugees. Furthermore, Kurds filled a security vacuum and didn’t oust Iraqi forces from Kirkuk and the like. What would have happened to such cities if IS had a free ticket to roam in or indeed if Kurdish forces were not protecting the city in recent days when IS launched attacks on Kirkuk?

As Barzani explained, “there is no loyalty to a country called Iraq. It really is important to find a formula for how to live together within the boundaries of what is called Iraq. Unless a formula is found, there will be more bloodshed and the country will remain a destabilizing factor in the region.”

And here is the problem, whilst Peshmerga have advanced against IS in the north, it is Shiite militias and not really an Iraqi army that have thwarted IS from the doors of Baghdad in Anbar and Diyala provinces.

A number of Sunni tribes are fighting IS but by large the disenfranchised Sunnis have not been enticed to fight IS forces. On the contrary, prior to the IS advance, Sunni dominated areas of Iraq where gripped with protests and violent skirmishes with security forces and some influential tribes welcomed IS with open arms.

Barzani played down any imminent joined attack on Mosul setting the fall of this year as a more realistic target. For any chance of IS to be eradicated, Iraq needs some semblance of an effective national force including the all-important Sunni components in Mosul.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

As Peshmerga continue advance on Mosul, Kurds repaid with no seat at international anti-Islamic State conference

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When the Islamic State (IS) launched rapid attacks on Mosul, Tikrit and large swathes of Iraq, the well-equipped and sizeable Iraqi army wilted away. Ironically, IS took large quantities of US-supplied heavy weaponry and laid siege on more Iraqi cities and then Kurdistan.

The United States led coalition has spent billions and several hundred air-strikes destroying a large proportion of their own weaponry.

As the Iraqi army evaporated, the Kurds took center stage in the battle against IS. The sacrifices of the Peshmerga have directly resulted in the IS staying largely on the back-foot and on the defensive.

It was highly symbolic that in the same week that Kurdish force took control of several towns and villages in an offensive west of Mosul bringing Mosul center firmly within range, that Kurdistan leadership was not even represented at the international anti-IS conference in London.

Kurdistan forces have gained international-wide coverage and respect as the champions of the war against IS and Western powers, seeing the strategic importance of the Peshmerga in the fight against IS, have supplied heavy weaponry and ammunition to the Kurds.

The Kurds hoped that their ever increasing strategic standing would have enshrined their quest for independence. After all, they were the real defenders of the so-called disputed territories in Iraq, it was their forces that led the push-back against IS and it was their bastion of peace and tolerance that IS wanted to break.

The Kurdish role took on greater significance for the West but yet again it appears that the Kurdish effort is diluted by the Western obsession of a united Iraq. It was as though, Iraqi Prime Ministers Haider al-Abadi presence was all that was necessary.

Baghdad has proven anything but a true representative of the Kurds. When IS attacked Kurdistan and the disputed territories that Baghdad so stubbornly refused to hold referendums over, the Iraqi army was nowhere in sight. In fact, for over a decade Baghdad has refused to fund the Peshmerga forces even though they have protected Iraqi cities amidst al-Qaeda and inter-sectarian conflict, never mind the fight against IS today.

Kurdistan President, Massoud Barzani, who expressed his disappointment at the organizers of the conference, stated “it is unfortunate that the people of Kurdistan do the sacrifice and the credit goes to others.” Barzani highlighted that the Peshmerga “are the most effective force countering global terrorism today” and that “the people of Kurdistan bear the brunt of this situation and no country or party can represent or truly convey their voice in international gatherings.”

Meanwhile, Abadi pleaded for more weapons. The problem is not providing heavy weaponry to the Iraqi army, they have already received plenty. The underlying problem is that sectarian animosity, lack of belief in a national cause and no common loyalty, means that such provisions were quickly wasted.

It is time for the Kurds to receive military assistance and the due credit they deserve. The continuous illusion of US and European powers of a unified Iraq was one of the main reasons for the IS onslaught in the first place. If Iraq as a nation was fractured before the events of 2014, it is now firmly beyond repair.

Stable, secular and pro-Western forces are values and allies that the US should be running to protect and endorse, they have hardly got them in abundance in a rapidly deteriorating Middle East.

With a major assault to retake Mosul mooted for the spring, already hesitant Kurds must be thinking twice of further sacrifices in fighting Baghdad’s war.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.