Category Archives: Kurdistan Region

Kurdish oil exports, one remaining Baghdad noose that Kurds must break

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The latest action by the Iraqi parliament to pass the national 2013 budget despite a boycott by Kurdish MPs is just the tip of the ice-berg in Iraq.

Tensions have been brewing to dangerous levels between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad for some time and the lack of real intent to mend bridges and cool tensions is testament to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s reluctance to enact a government of partnership and to pursue national reconciliation.

Fast approaching a decade since the liberation of Iraq and the fragmented Iraqi horizon, continuously poisoned by common distrust, lack of unity and lack of true compromise, continues to blight Iraqi society in 2013 much in the same way as it did in 2003.

Maliki’s growing authoritarian policies and the latest decision to pass the budget without Kurdish involvement and approval may have severely irked the Kurds, but it’s wrong to focus merely on the Erbil-Baghdad divide as the source of Iraqi troubles.

The majority of MPs from al-Iraqiya had also boycotted the budget vote and the coalition and power sharing agreement in Baghdad has all but evaporated. Tensions with long-time disaffected Sunnis, greatly encouraged by the Syrian Sunni ascendancy to power, is steadily gathering pace and Sunni demonstrations since the back-end of 2012 still run rife in Sunni strongholds with protestor deaths at the hands of predominantly Shiite forces adding fuel to the fire. Even Shiites within the State of Law, including influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, have expressed concern.

Finance minister Rafa al-Essawi and agriculture minister Izzeddin al-Dolah are two high-profile Sunni resignations in recent weeks over the current protests.

Kurdish ire

The strong Kurdish reaction to the passing of budget in Baghdad was understandable.

With only 168 out of 325 MPs present due to the boycott, the bill may have been passed due to a “technicality” with a thin majority obtained but not involving the Kurds who are such vital components of the coalition and in the union with Iraq is a dangerous development.

Oil sharing and foreign oil contracts are not new bones of contention between the Kurds and Baghdad. Oil exports in Kurdistan have been very much stop-start for a number of years. The source of discontent in the 2013 budget was the amount set aside to pay oil companies in Kurdistan, with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) insisting it is owed $3.5 billion for costs accumulated by foreign oil companies over the past 3 years whilst Baghdad has allotted only $644.33 million in the latest budget.

This issue was one of the main reasons the 2013 budget was not ratified although the Iraqi cabinet approved the budget in October.

The frequent theme from Baghdad over the past several years is that oil contracts signed by KRG are illegal, in spite of the stipulations afforded in the national constitution. Therefore it is hardly surprising that Baghdad continues a hard-handed approach in dealing with the oil sharing issue. Ironically, passing a national hydrocarbon law gathering dust since 2007 that would end all disputes is not even seen as an immediate priority.

The State of Law had argued that Kurds were not entitled to compensation as they had not contributed their fair share to national exports.

As Kurds have insisted for years, any revenue from oil exports in Kurdistan will go to a central pot where Kurds will take their allotted share. Narrow-minded political goals in Baghdad, has failed to realise that a strong oil industry in Kurdistan is a bonus for all Iraqis. Baghdad may have costs of foreign oil companies to cover but what about the billions of surplus revenue that follows? Anyone would think Baghdad is taking a financial loss in dealing with Kurdish oil.

Budget imbalance

Baghdad has continuously refused to pay Peshmerga costs which are stipulated in the constitution. Yet it has been paying salaries of Sahwa Council Sunni militia for a number of years to appease Sunnis and has even increased their salaries in this year’s budget to try and dampen Sunni demonstrations.

Furthermore, whilst Kurdistan develops at a rapid pace but fails to receive fair share of revenues it needs, the province of Nineveh failed to spend around $6 billion of its $10 billion share in the 2012 budget. There is a similar pattern in other provinces.

Next steps for the Kurds

Undoubtedly, the budget issue will make prospects of reconciliation worse between Erbil and Baghdad. The continued halt of oil exports by Kurdistan may seem logical, but it’s counter-productive as Kurdistan needs to press-ahead with its oil industry and economic growth.

The KRG oil ministry confirmed it will not send any agreed quantities of oil unless Baghdad pays the relevant costs to foreign companies.

Control of oil exports is one remaining noose that Baghdad has around the Kurds. If the Kurds have an independent oil infrastructure and an oil pipeline purely on Kurdish soil, it greatly diminishes Baghdad’s bargaining power.

Kurdistan has greatly flourished in recent years whilst the south continues to lag behind, do the Kurds continue with ties in Baghdad or take unilateral measures in deciding national interests?

It begs the question of whether Baghdad sees the Kurds as true partners and looks to Kurdish achievements as an achievement for all of Iraq or does it want to see Kurdistan undermined, regress and stagnate? The Kurds would say recent disputes over Dijla Operations Command, halting of oil exports and now the national budget answers that question.

Baghdad has been intent on scaring oil companies from working in Kurdistan for a while. Giving the option to oil companies of either “us or them” is anything but the tone of partnership.

Kurdistan needs to break that noose, develop an independent oil pipeline and accumulate revenues directly and pay foreign companies from their own budget.

This stance was also suggested by Iraqi Kurdish MP Muhsin al-Saadoun as a measure against the federal government for side-lining the Kurds.

Naturally, Maliki led coalition hit back by threatening to deduct Kurdistan Region’s share of the federal budget.

Either way, something has to give and inaction by the Kurdish leadership is a non-starter. Kurdistan must ensure the destiny of Kurdish affairs is determined by Kurdish hands.

What real benefit have the Kurds ever received from Iraq’s immense oil wealth since Iraq’s creation? Now Kurdish oil must be the source of Kurdistan’s prosperity and to give back to its long-time suffering people and should not be viewed as somewhat of a curse.

Other issues

The Shiite-government announcement of the formation of a new military force under the name of the “al-Jazeera and Badiya Force” situated in the disputed city of Sinjar, which borders Syria is yet another confrontational step by Maliki. A pro-Assad Baghdad is vying for control of its Syrian borders, possibly due to pressure from Iran, with signs this week that the violence is spilling across the border. Kurds have a far different view of Assad and are unlikely to relinquish border control in their own territories to propel Baghdad’s goals in Syria.

Baghdad decision not to pay foreign companies could well be a punishment for Kurdistan’s growing partnership with Turkey and its anti-Assad stance.

Since Maliki assumed a second term in office, Iraq has been in decline. With Sunni’s growing boldness in standing-up to Shiite dominance, who will be around to broker the next government or mediate between Sunnis and Shiites? It certainly won’t be the Kurds.

A previous statement by Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani summed up current sentiments, “Iraq’s citizens are simply tired of Baghdad’s … language of threat and intimidation, which in the cynical pursuit of narrow political agendas only serves to create division and strife.”

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Interview with Nadhim Zahawi – Kurdish UK MP

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In May 2010, Nadhim Zahawi became the first Kurd to be elected as Minister of Parliament (MP) in the UK. Zahawi secured the historic constituency of Stratford-on-Avon in the iconic and oldest parliament in the world. Zahawi talked to the Globe’s Bashdar Ismaeel on a number of important topics, including making history, his roles as MP and co-chairman of the All Party Group for Kurdistan and his hard-work and determination in getting the Kurdish genocide recognised in UK parliament.

As the symbolic first Kurdish MP elected to UK parliament, what is the significance to you and also the Kurdish nation as a whole in receiving such an honour?

It is a real privilege to be a Member of Parliament (MP), in what is the mother of all parliaments coming up to its 750th birthday, and of course to represent a constituency like Stratford-On-Avon, with its immense history and previous office holders that have included John Profumo, Angus Maude, to the enlarged constituency which was Antony Eden’s of course. It is an incredible place and to have elected Nadhim Zahawi as their representative is a great privilege and a great honour.

I think it is important that all ethnic groups, especially for Kurds, who decide to make their home anywhere in Europe, whether in the UK, Sweden, Germany or elsewhere, to engage in the political process, the civic process, to be become councillors, governors of schools and MPs, to get involved in their local charities and  local communities. Because at the end of the day, if you are able to contribute to the society that you live in, then you can also hopefully help those back home.

Never forgot your heritage and your ancestry and that combination are incredibly powerful, and many other ethnic groups have done incredibly well around the world and have been able to help their people in their countries of origin.

Of course, your first priority will naturally be serving the people of Stratford-on-Avon, who have chosen you as their MP, but as a Kurd, how are you working to raise the Kurdish cause and improve UK ties with Kurdistan?

I think you’re absolutely right. My first, second and third priority is to serve the people of Stratford-on-Avon. They put me here to be their champion, to be able to represent them at every level in Westminster. But you are also right in that I think it is important as I mentioned earlier that everyone remembers their history, heritage and background, and I believe it is a duty upon all Kurds, who have become US citizens, Swedish, German or British, to do their bit for the Kurdish cause. I think I have contributed in the past two and a half years, the first thing I did when I came here is to join the All Party Group for Kurdistan and I am now co-chairman of that group. We then decided to spend a lot of time, resource and effort into looking at the genocide that occurred in Iraq and on the Kurdish people.  We have a genocide committee, which I asked one of my colleagues here, an excellent campaigner MP, Robert Halfon, to chair and which is making real progress now.

We had a petition that has now received almost 30,000 signatures, we would like to see it get to 100,000 and I would ask every Kurd, whether in Kurdistan or the UK, to ask their friends and family to sign the petition. It is very important that the British parliament recognises the genocide of Kurdistan, coming up to 25th anniversary of Anfal and of course Halabja. So this is an important year and it is important that we play our part to ensure that the world knows and never forgets.

 

UK-Kurdistan ties were solidified in 1991, and have generally remained strong up to today, could the UK do more in Kurdistan? Is the UK government doing enough to support Kurdistan economically, politically and to promote business?

Whenever we talk about relations between Kurdistan and the UK, we have to recognise the contribution that John Major made in protecting the Kurdish people in 1991 with the no-fly zones. The current Prime Minister in the chamber and the Foreign Secretary in the chamber, William Hague, referred to that protection of the Kurds because the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, at a meeting of foreign ministers during the Libya crisis, when Britain stepped in to do the same thing, to protect the Libyan people, was present and reminded the room that he would not be in that room if it hadn’t been for John Major protecting the Kurdish people. So one must always remember that.

I think business wise we can always do more. I would like to see direct flights from the UK to Erbil, Sulaimaniya and hopefully Duhok and other cities in Iraq as they develop their aviation infrastructure. I would like to see more UK businesses been involved in the oil and gas industry, which is becoming an incredibly important industry in Kurdistan. In fact, Kurdistan is now referred to as the exploration capital of the world, thanks to the hard work of Dr. Ashti Hawrami, who has been an extraordinary Minister of Natural Resources, and a real visionary for the country. But as he would say, if he were here, we need to see more service companies coming in because it is not just the upstream that you need, the Exxon’s, Chevron’s and Total’s and the Talisman’s of this world. But you also need the service sector, because the service sector at the end of the day are the ones that do the hard work to ensure that the oil and gas is extracted and delivered internationally and to the domestic market.

In other areas, we are very strong in the UK in accountancy, in the legal system and in various other industries. 2012 saw the UK become a net exporter of cars. Certainly in my constituency of Stratford-on-Avon, I have got Jaguar, Land Rover and Aston Martin, head-quartered on the borders of my constituency. So the automotive industry needs to be reflected in a bigger way, although I know that Jaguar and Land Rover are doing great business in Kurdistan and can only do more.

All these sectors need to be enhanced and the UKTI is working very hard with the KRG representative office in UK, who do a great job I have to say. The representative office in London is best of breed, in organising conferences and match making between business and needs in Kurdistan. There was a fantastic water and agri conference here with the minister coming over, with 18 projects that were very clearly outlined with clear targets, with British businesses to look at and hopefully bid for.

In terms of electricity, Kurdistan benefits from almost 24-hours of electricity provision, but the consumption has increased exponentially with more industry coming in and the rise in consumer consumption. We can do more with our British companies. In the gas industry, British Gas and others should get involved in our incredible gas finds in Kurdistan.

So in all these areas, I try and work very hard, both in my role as the co-chairman of the All Party Group but also I sit on the Business Innovation Skill Select Committee, that is a business department that I scrutinise and I always make sure that they are playing their role in delivering that relationship between the UK and Kurdistan.

The great persecution and terror of the Baathist regime is one of the reasons why you and many other Kurds fled to sanctuary of the UK, in the ethno-sectarian turbulence of Iraq and the monopolisation of power in Baghdad is the UK ready to protect Kurdistan and Kurdish people against any new tyranny?

In the post Saddam Hussein Iraq, the political groups in Iraq came together and drafted a constitution, which the Iraqi people ratified through a referendum. It is very important that the whole of Iraq and all its political components respect that constitution and that constitutional arrangement. That arrangement recognises very clearly the rights of the Kurdish people, the autonomous right of the Kurds, their parliament and the ability to design the way they want to be governed is all there. There are issues, of course, around Kirkuk, the hydrocarbons law and a number of other issues which do need addressing.

I think it is important that Iraq continues on the journey of democratisation. And democracy by the way, isn’t just about a cross in the ballot box on a piece of paper, democracy is about establishing and strengthening institutions that protect the rights of all citizens of a country, especially minorities. Civilised societies are judged by how they deal with their minorities and how they protect those minorities, as opposed the mere wishes of the majority. I think it is very important that all Iraqi politicians remember that and it is very important that those institutions are enhanced and supported. What I mean by that is rule of law and an independent judiciary that in no way is influenced by politicians and politics. Like in the UK, nobody in their right mind would dream that a judge in any way would make a decision based on who is in government and wanting to please that party in government.

This needs to be the same in Iraq for people to trust the judiciary; they have to feel that the judiciary is truly independent. An independent and robust media that is also responsible needs to be established, and protected from the state and other areas of government. The sooner that Iraq and its political groups continue that journey, the better it is for the whole of Iraq.

 

Kosovo, South Sudan are just recent examples of new states assuming their right to self-determination and been support by the likes of the UK and the international community while Kurdistan has been cruelly denied, as we say in English is “what’s good for the gander, good for the geese”?

I think the right to self-determination is a basic human right. You look at what we are doing here in our own union, where the Scottish people and the ruling power of Scotland, the Scottish Nationalist Party, have campaigned on a platform of independence as far as they are concerned and wanted a referendum. Of course, my government here, led by David Cameron, recognised that and have granted a referendum. Actually, I think that you will find the majority of the Scottish people will choose to remain within the union because they see the strength of the union and the union as something incredibly valuable. But they have that right and to deny that right to any human been would be wrong.

In saying that, I also think that as far as the UK is concerned, in its focus on developing Kurdistan, in making sure that people have good jobs to go to, children have great schools to go to, when people are ill they have fantastic health service that looks after them, the elderly and frail are well looked after, there is economic dynamism, the economy is growing. If you look at nations around the world, none was more battered and bruised than the German people or the Japanese people after the Second World War, and the way they picked themselves up was through economic development and growth. The way they become world beaters is through the understanding that if you are economically powerful, then you have a seat at the table, you matter in the world.

I wouldn’t be arrogant enough to advise the political leadership in Kurdistan, other than to say you are doing the right thing in focusing on economic development and making sure that is in place because that is the building block for you to then able to begin to consider issues like self-determination and what the Kurdish people ultimately dream of.

Approaching 3 years since been elected Stratford-on-Avon, how do you look back on your time and achievements to date?

Stratford-on-Avon is a wonderful constituency. It has 79 villages and hamlets, wonderful market towns, and of course the great town of Stratford-upon-Avon where that extraordinary poet and author, William Shakespeare was born and where his resting place lies.

I have had almost 3 years here, your quite right. I have focused on my select committee work, the Business Innovation Skill Select Committee, because my background as a businessman before entering this place was running a public company here in the UK. Understanding the innovation space helped me to be elected to that select committee. By the way, for the first time in the history of our parliament, the select committee was elected as opposed to appointed, which gave a stronger mandate because if they were appointed then seniority may have played a bigger role, therefore, many of the new intake would not have got onto the select committee. Select committees are very important in our parliamentary system. So that for me has been a major achievement.

I organised and led a rebellion against my own government, which one must not do too often if one wants to progress in government, but I felt that the House of Lords reform bill was not one that I could support. Abolishing the House of Lords and replacing it with an elected Senate, I don’t think would have produced a better and healthier democracy. You only have to ask the Americans what they think of their Senate and Congress and the deadlock that they get in their system isn’t particularly healthy for decision making and democracy. I rebelled on that with the support of my association and my constituents; there were many letters and email supporting my position on that.

Other than that single rebellion, I work to promote and support my government. We are doing some very important work here in reforming the government. Remember in 2010, the UK was borrowing something like a £160 billion pounds a year, that’s the deficit. That’s the difference between what we were getting in terms of tax intake into the exchequer, because of course, the government doesn’t have its own money, and it’s yours and my money that we spend in government. Now, we have reduced that deficit down to £120 billion so or by a quarter. Nevertheless, if you do the arithmetic, we are still borrowing £426 million pounds a day.   So every time you got to bed and wake up, we notch up another £426 million in debt. That’s what we inherited, an economic mess from the previous government.

We are trying to sort that out, we are trying to shrink the size of government debt, focus spending on those who need it most, and look at the reforms in welfare, focusing on people who need it most but also making sure that work always pays. You will see the pilot coming in April with Universal Credit that we rolled out nationwide. The reforms in education have been extraordinary, if you look at what we have done with education under Michael Gove, to free up schools so that the headmaster and the governing bodies can make real decisions and the parents know exactly who is in charge, so if there is a failure in the system, they know who to go to and there is an individual that is responsible. It’s the head teacher and the governing board, not some faceless bureaucrat in local government or in Whitehall, allowing them to use those budgets where they need to use them and where they can, if they want to, pay extra bonuses for great teachers to come into the school who have done particularly well.

We started in 2010 with around 200 academies and now we have over 2200, and of course balancing the books, reforming education and welfare are the 3 major policies. I think that in 2015 we will be judged on those. If we have delivered on those 3 things, then our prospects of winning an election outright will be incredibly high.

As an MP, what are the key items on your agenda in the UK political sphere? Finally, what are your personal political aspirations?

Personally, I want to be known as the secretary of state for Stratford-On-Avon, this is my ambition. I said that to my association, when they selected me as their candidate to be their MP. I have a wonderful constituency; I think the best in the England. The heart of England as it’s referred to. I want to be able to serve my constituents and make sure that their voices are heard in Westminster. So that’s my goal.

In terms of my focus, we are half-way through the parliament, so the next half of parliament is all about delivery and all about implementation. So my work in the select committee is making sure for example, the Biz departments, which looks after university tuition fees as well as business so that the UKTI and other bits of business promotion is doing well. In terms of reforms in tuition fees, the evidence at the moment points towards a real success story in terms of the reforms we have put through to ensure that our universities continue to be well beaters.

If you look at our reputation around the world, we are second only to America in terms of our university education. Kurdistan has been one of our major clients, in fact Kurdistan has sent over 1250 students to the UK on scholarships.

Many senior politicians in Kurdistan including Ministry of Foreign Relations, Kak Falah, who was a scholar here, did their education in the UK. Kak Barham was educated here, and Kak Dilawar who was the Minister of Education before was at Nottingham University. Wherever you go in the world, not just in Kurdistan, but as far as Malaysia to Brazil, senior politicians, and senior business people will say I went to a university in your country in England. So it’s a very important export for that country. My focus is the department that I scrutinise; that I hold to account in delivering on those things.

I think if every politician, all the select committee, is focused on those things, so the Treasury Select Committee, the Health Select Committee, education and welfare departments all focused on delivery, we will be in a good position come 2015 to point to the delivery on the ground for people that put us here to serve them.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

Sunni protests in Iraq reopen sectarian wounds and historic fault lines

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The elusive quest of enticing the disenfranchised Sunni population after the fall of Saddam Hussein plagued the Iraqi transition to democracy. The brutal civil war that peaked between 2006-2007 centred on the failure to reconcile with Sunnis and bring them into the political fold after Shiite supremacy replaced decades of Sunni rule almost overnight. The sectarian bloodshed may have declined dramatically from its peak, but realities were merely masked and the political picture never really changed.

The lack of Sunni power in government and their bitter political decline coincided with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s drive to monopolise power, break an already fragile political framework and initiate drums of war against the Kurds.

The Arab Spring has transformed the Middle Eastern political climate, and emboldened by the rise of Sunnis in Syria, Iraqi Sunnis see this as a chance to ignite their own spring and wrest control from Iranian backed Shiite domination of power.

Sentiments around lack of Sunni power in Baghdad have been worsened by Maliki’s failure to deliver basic services, improve living conditions and address high unemployment. Iraq has immense natural resources and a relatively high national budget, yet much of southern Iraq has languished behind.

Mass demonstrations continued in Sunni dominated parts of Iraqi, including in al-Anbar, a hub of the Sunni population and indeed the vicious civil war that beset Iraq. Other provinces that witnessed protests were Salahaddin, Nineveh and Anbar with the cities of Fallujah, Tikrit, Ramadi and Mosul taking center stage.  While the recent wave of protests may be new, Sunni disgruntlement is anything but that.

Sunni passions and anger were evident merely months after the withdrawal of US forces, with the arrest warranty of Sunni Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, attempts to stifle Sunni Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq and more recently the raid and arrest of body guards of Rafie al-Issawi, Iraq’s Finance Minister.

Sunnis clearly perceive anti-terror laws as orchestrated to diminish their power and see the Shiite dominated security forces as sectarian biased.

As the intensity of Sunni demonstrations and its inevitable manipulation by extremists and Baathists increase, so does it role in shattering any chance of reconciliation in the government’s present form. Depending on the response of the Iraq security forces and any hard-handed attempts by Maliki to quell the protests, it may well put Iraq back to square one.

Maliki’s coalition has shown willingness to dissolve parliament and embark upon new elections to coincide with provincial elections in April. However, this is not the real solution nor will it sufficiently appease Sunnis or Kurds for that matter. Iraq has now held a number of milestone elections yet the same problems have continued to hound the Iraqi political landscape.

New elections will not dilute Shiite political domination as the major components of Iraq, nor will it address the age-old question of how to share power in a way that will appease Kurds, Sunni and Shiites. The record time taken to form the present government says it all.

Sunnis, who largely boycotted the first elections, were never happy with the outcome of the second as it meant playing second fiddle to Maliki once more. Far from enacting the Erbil Agreement and power sharing principles, Maliki assigned to himself a number of powerful “caretaker” positions and distrust with al-Iraqiya only depended.

One result is certain, unless Iraqi politics take a drastic turn for the better and Shiite and Sunni moderates as well as U.S. and foreign allies mediate effectively, the ensuing bloodshed will be even worse than before.

Such is the nature of Iraqi politics that even a caretaker government which should be led by the Presidential Council is riddled with difficulties, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani is receiving medical treatment following a stroke and Vice President Hashemi is in exile and convicted of murder.

The recent surge of Sunni discomfort clearly shows that it was never just the Kurds who were at great unease over Maliki’s growing centralist tendencies and even Shiites have become increasingly weary of Maliki. The only surprise is that it took so long for all sides to wake up to the realities that have gripped Iraqi for many a year.

Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani should be lauded for standing up to Maliki while ironically some saw such grave national developments as “personal”. Maliki has come to the brink of war with the Kurds and has been willing to antagonise Sunnis at the same time. At the current rate, not only is war and more bloodshed inevitable but also the breakup of Iraq.

Just where Iraq goes from here is far from certain, power sharing on paper alone will not satisfy Sunni demands, and the Kurds, who have been patient while much of the implementation of the constitution has been neglected, can ill-afford to get sucked into another sectarian mayhem in Iraq or wait indefinitely for Baghdad to enact agreements such as oil sharing and resolution to disputed territories.

With new elections almost a certainty, the intense jockeying for power has already begun. Influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, heaped blame on Maliki and supported Sunnis in their demonstrations and also reached out to Christian minorities.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

The Kurdish hand in creating the Maliki monster

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Kurds rubber stamped two Maliki terms of power while Maliki has frequently reneged on agreements and sidelined Kurdish demands. After 6 years in power and frequent accusation of centralist tendencies, is the current situation a surprise?

A sharp escalation in the already tenuous relations between the Erbil and Baghdad after a deadly skirmish in Tuz Khurmato between Kurdish and Iraqi forces was followed by frantic efforts to calm a crisis that had seen an unprecedented military build-up from both sides in the disputed areas.

However, an eventful week after negotiations between Kurdish and Iraqi military leaders and political figures, mediated by Speaker in the Iraqi Parliament, Osama al-Nujaifi and a high ranking American General, ended with talks collapsing and no agreement, despite promise of a breakthrough after an initial 14 point agreement was earlier agreed.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki scuppered the prospect of any deal, unwilling to meet the key Kurdish condition to abolish the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command, the very heart of the conflict.

According to Secretary General of the Ministry of Peshmerga, Jabar Yawar, the federal government reneged on the agreement reached earlier in the week after originally approving 12 out of 14 of Kurdistan’s demands but later only agreeing to three.

The Dijla command was created by Maliki for no other reason than to stoke Kurdish sentiments, win over Sunni support and create an Arab nationalist bandwagon that would allow Baghdad to mask a deep political crisis, corruption allegations and the increasing isolation of Maliki, even amongst traditional Shiite allies.

The Dijla command was a way of demonstrating a show of strength to the Kurds and to highlight the extent of Maliki’s powers. If unopposed the Dijla forces would severely dilute and harm Kurdish interests in the disputed territories. In spite of the current sabre-rattling, it is unlikely that Maliki will call the Kurdish bluff. However, Maliki will not back down until he is pushed to the edge or has achieved his political goals.

A show of force to increase sway over the resolution of disputed territories is also a big nail in the Iraqi constitutional coffin and article 140. Either way, Maliki’s actions show that he is not serious in resolving problems with the Kurds and that he is unwilling to relinquish his growing unilateralist hand. When constitutional violations and consolidation of top positions of power goes unhindered, then this spells the death of democracy in Iraq.

For all of Maliki’s faults, the Kurdish parties must also take blame for the current predicament awaiting Kurdish nationalist interests. They knew as far back as 2008 with deployment of Iraqi forces to Khanaqin and in a number of similar instances that Maliki would resort to force to exert his influence and to achieve his goals. This is the same Maliki that Kurdish politicians had saved at key crisis points in the first government.

Kurds frequently accused Maliki of centralist and dictatorial tendencies in his first term of power, long before Kurds essentially rubber stamped his second stint in power and before ironically he accumulated further power by consolidating control over a number of powerful positions under the pretext of a “caretaker”.

Maliki was a key factor in the continuous foot dragging of Baghdad over the implementation of article 140 and the failure to hold a census decreed by law. Maliki’s government frequently objected to Kurdish oil deals while ensuring that efforts to resolve a national hydro-carbon law were left stagnant. Maliki and his government have violated the Iraqi constitution a number of times when it has served their interests, and refused to pay for the budget of Peshmerga forces while on an annual basis striving passionately to reduce Kurdistan’s share of the budget.

Kurdish support for the latest coalition was on the back of guarantees for the implementation of 19 key points that formed the basis of the Erbil Agreement, conditions that Maliki has paid continuous lip service to.

Kurds can hardly be surprised at the predicament they find themselves in. Key Kurdish conditions as part of their support for the first coalition in 2006 were also largely sidelined.

Yet remarkably, fast forwarding to 2012 and 6 years of Maliki rule, Kurds still managed to miss their opportunity to unseat Maliki through lack of unity and lack of clear political accord when it came to promoting Kurdish interests in Baghdad.

A strong motion spear-headed by Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani was essentially thwarted by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, leader of the PUK which ironically has a strategic power sharing agreement with the KDP, while Kurdish opposition forces such as the Gorran movement also failed to support the initiative.

Maliki triumphed even at a moment of great weakness and this political victory by managing to conserve power only served to embolden his quest to solidify his sphere of influence.

The Kurdish leaders must use the current crisis as a wake-up call to preserve their unity and to ensure no matter how varied or passionate disagreements within Kurdistan may reach, disunity in Baghdad is a red-line.

The current stand-off between Iraqi and Kurdish forces saw perhaps for the first time unity amongst all Kurdish divisions and this greatly strengthened the Kurdish hand and galvanised their bargaining power in the crisis.

It has stirred the PUK and KDP leadership and particularly Talabani to readjust their positions, which had seen disagreement over the 2007 power sharing agreement, Kurdistan draft constitution and regional relations with Baghdad.

If talk that Barzani had “lost” Talabani had any grounding, Talabani’s revised position is a welcome step for the Kurdistan President.

Maliki has continuously shown his expertise to muster his way out of tight political corners and it is no coincidence that Maliki’s bold actions in the disputed territories coincides with a key political year fast around the corner. 2013 promises a number of key milestones that will act as a gauge for the alliances within Iraq that have shifted drastically and will no doubt dramatically alter the political landscape.

The first key milestone is the nationwide provincial elections in April, followed by regional parliamentary elections and not forgetting the national elections in 2014. There are also crucial provincial elections across Kurdistan Region in 2013 which will reveal the ever-changing balance of power in Kurdistan.

Maliki is in a race against time to conduct the provincial elections and beat any no-confidence vote. When a smart politician loses friends, he works hard to make new ones.

Maliki needs to rethink his alliances that have shifted considerably since 2010. He single-handedly alienated the Sunni’s this year through the issuance of a death warrant on Iraqi Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi and exchanged fierce rhetoric with al-Nujaifi, ironically mediator in the current crisis between the Kurds and Maliki and a number of other prominent Sunni figures.

His own State of Law alliance is shaky at best and Maliki may well need to reach out to Sunnis to cling to power. His onetime Sadrist ally, Moqtada al-Sadr, is drifting further and further from Maliki and his recent statement spoke volumes,   “the Iraqi spring will come against corruption, sectarianism, and those engaged in corruption and terrorism.”

Maliki in a way scarified the trust and support of Talabani by opting to reach out to Sunnis, and Talabani’s angered stance was on clear display when he recently called on the governing Shiite bloc to either apply pressure on Maliki to change his stance or replace him outright. Talabani accused Maliki of effectively announcing a state of emergency through the establishment of Dijla command, which is not within Maliki’s powers.

But such is the unfortunate situation of Iraqi politics, that even if they oust Maliki, it will take them several more months to agree on a new leader and build a new alliance.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

As Kurd-Arab relations hit rock bottom, tensions reach dangerous heights

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With a language of confrontation, the writing for conflict is always on the wall.

With tension over the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command already at boiling point, the writing for open confrontation was always on the wall. Violent skirmishes between Peshmerga forces and Dijla forces in Tuz Kkurmatu, resulting in two casualties and many wounded, could be the tip of the ice-berg in what may embroil into serious conflict between Kurds and Arabs if sentiments do not dramatically change.

Any escalation in conflict has the potential to drastically alter the face of Iraq and indeed the entire region. Kurdish and Arab forces have come close to blows in the past, but the establishment of the Dijla forces was an open intent to ruffle Kurdish feathers and use military might to achieve goals.

The Dijla forces which Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki setup in September after promising he would not go ahead with the move, illustrate alarming boldness and arrogance by Maliki as he seeks to solidify his growing grip on power.

The escalation in the disputed territories and the rapidly deteriorating relations between Erbil and Baghdad comes as no surprise. Maliki has been consistently interested in preserving his sphere of power, has successfully consolidated a number of powerful roles under his helm and has affectively manipulated political actors and played on sectarian emotions when backed against a corner. If in moments of weakness he can prevail, then Maliki’s capabilities and confidence at times of strength have little bounds.

Weeks after a cross-party Kurdish delegation returned from Baghdad in what many deemed as a “final attempt” at resolving the crisis between Kurdistan and Baghdad, relations have plummeted to new lows.

The Kurdish delegation promised a united stand should negotiations prove unsuccessful and it is time for Kurdish political forces to show solidary and a clear plan of action as Kurdish interests are threatened more than ever.

Only in April of this year, a vote of no-confidence on Maliki failed in spite of cross-party support in Baghdad, with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani playing a big part in thwarting the measures to remove al-Maliki. How a betrayed Talabani, who received promises from Maliki about new national dialogue and a halt to Dijla forces, must now regret that.

The reason for the Dijla Operations Command was supposedly to address “poor” security coordination in the areas that had witness violent attacks. But as always with Maliki, timing of the moves and initiatives is the clue to real intent.

There have been terrorist attacks in the northern disputed belt for years, with residents long complaining about a lack of government protection. For the large part, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces had been relied on to affectively protect disputed areas as Iraqi national forces were bogged down in a fierce sectarian civil war further south for a number of years.

None of the Dijla commanders had been appointed by the council of representatives and most of the leaders have allegiance to Maliki. In fact the majority of the military commanders across the Iraqi army are carefully hand-picked by Maliki, making them increasingly a sectarian and not a national force.

Coordination was already a common feature under years of American mediation with the setup of join patrols and commands between Peshmerga and the Iraqi army. Kirkuk province’s Kurdish governor Najimaldin Omar Karim refused to cooperate with the new command and tensions have been brewing slowly towards open confrontation. Lt. Jamal Tahir, the chief of police in Kirkuk, refused to take orders from the command and warned about any Dijla meddling in Kirkuk.

It is no confidence that new measures by Baghdad have come as relations between Baghdad and Erbil have dramatically declined, with internal disputes and a difference in regional strategy widening all the time as Kurds have moved closer to Turkey, reaffirmed their anti-Assad stance and have grown ever more independent with new energy deals.

The new manoeuvres in the disputed territories are political and have little to do with provision of security. Maliki’s increasing sabre-rattling is designed to dilute Kurdish power, undermine Kurdish security forces and strengthen Baghdad’s hand in the jostle for control of disputed territories.

Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani had stated in recent remarks, “the formation of the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command in Kirkuk and Diyala is an unconstitutional step by the Iraqi government,” whilst warning that “the intentions, aims, formation and actions of this command centre are against the Kurdish people, the political process, co- existence and the process of normalising the situation in the disputed areas.”

The years of delays in the implementation of Article 140 and constitutional articles was already clear gauge of Baghdad’s appetite to conform to democratic principles that go against their interests. This latest move is nothing but further measures to hinder a clear resolution of disputed territories and to derail Kurdistan’s growing economic and political strength.

Barzani said in a recent statement “I want to reassure the people of Iraq, and especially the people of Kurdistan, that after consultation with the Iraqi President and other concerned parties, we will make our position clear and take appropriate steps against this unconstitutional action and any actions designed to impose unconstitutional arrangements in the disputed areas”. The PUK leadership had also warned that the Kurds would resort to other means if Maliki did not rectify and backtrack from his “mistakes”.

Warnings by the Kurdish leadership are not new and the desire to adopt patience must surely be running thin. It is also signifies the importance of Kurdish solidarity and a united stand to protect Kurdish interests. Lack of Kurdish unity in disputed territories and particularly Baghdad over the past several months has already harmed Kurdish goals.

The move led by Barzani to oust Maliki under his growing abuse of power was wrongly seen as “personal” in some circles with Maliki’s track record over the past number of years telling its own story.

When backed into a corner or on the negotiation table Maliki and the State of Law Coalition make all the right overtures and gestures. But almost a decade under the new Iraq, Kurds have to finally realise that promises are not worth the paper they are written on in Baghdad.

The Kurdish security forces had warned that they will respond harshly and this was met with Maliki’s own stern warnings for the Peshermrga forces not to provoke Iraqi forces. Maliki had ominously insisted in the past that “there are no restrictions on the movements of the Iraqi army, which according to the constitution is a federal army and has right to be present in Basra or Zakho. And no one has the right to prevent that.”

As Maliki came under renewed pressure over the Dijla Operations Command, he boldly added the Salahaddin province under its command.

The growing rhetoric from Maliki, the likes of Yassin Majeed and other Shiite leaders and new assertiveness that their powerbase stretches to all corners of Iraq is an open threat of war.

In a sign of growing hostility towards the principle of the Kurds as the sole guardians of Kurdistan, Abdul Salam al-Maliki, an MP from the State of Law bloc, urged the Iraqi Prime Minister to open a “North Operations Command” to “protect” Kurdistan Region, under the pretext that the Peshmerga are unable to secure the province.

It is ironic that the Peshmerga who receive no funding or support from Baghdad or a share of weapons purchases are been advised of their lack of strength. Peshmerga had the capability to repel the might of Saddam and are capable of securing Kurdistan both now and the future.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

A long-term oil law, the making or breaking of Iraq

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“This deal cannot solve all the problems currently but it is considered a good step,” Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani

One of the greatest items of contention in Iraq has been a formula to share its immense oil wealth amongst its distrusted and fragmented ethno-social mosaic. Since oil was discovered in Iraq almost a century ago, it has been akin to more of a curse than a blessing for the ordinary people.

It’s difficult not to imagine what Iraq would have been like today if its oil wealth was not in the hands of tyrants and those who have abused Iraq’s treasure.

Kurdistan oil is home to estimated 45 billion barrels of oil and trillions cubic feet of gas, yet ironically the Kurds have seen the oil in the past used to purchase arsenal in their repression them and destroy their villages and livelihoods. It is a little wonder that the Kurds were keen to muster a level of autonomy on their energy reserves as part of the Iraqi constitution negotiated in 2005.

Although, the Iraqi constitution has clear stipulations around oil exploration, revenue sharing, export and control of federal regions, oil has been a contentious thorn in relations between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad.

Oil minnows have flocked to the region as the early pace-setters and for the like of Gulf Keystone Petroleum, Addax, Heritage Oil, Western Zagros, Genel Energy and many more, the early bird really does catch the worm. Such is the spectacular promise and potential of energy in Kurdistan that akin to a rags-to-riches story, juniors have become majors in their own right almost overnight.

Oil giants coming off the fence

Any oil company anywhere in the world would have been misguided not to see the unravelling of the newest and perhaps last global oil frontier before their very eyes. However, while some smaller companies jumped in with both feet at the rewards and the lucrative terms of the Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) on offer, oil majors, while licking their lips at what was on offer, sat on the fence to preserve their interests and contracts further south and to appease Baghdad.

In spite of Baghdad’s fierce rhetoric against the KRG deeming their contracts signed with foreign companies as “illegal” and sending stern warning to oil companies, oil majors could simply no longer remain idle.

A spate of oil majors such as Chevron, Total and Gazprom have recently joined the fray with ExxonMobil’s oil deal a little short of a year ago serving as the ice breaker. Whilst from 2003 onwards there was a rush of juniors, now there appears to be a rush of majors keen not to lose out on the limited spots remaining at the Kurdish oil counter. Royal Dutch Shell is the latest major rumoured to be in discussions with the KRG which will serve as another symbolic feather in the cap for Kurdistan.

The possibility of Shell signing an agreement with Kurdistan, after twice coming close in the past before pulling back, comes as Baghdad continued to threaten ExxonMobil this week. As part of the timelines of the PSA with the KRG, ExxonMobil is starting logistical preparations to dig its first exploration well.

In reality none of the oil majors need to be reminded about the threats on offer, they are all fully aware. Furthermore, they have first class law teams and their confidence in the legal dealing with Kurdistan is a major endorsement to KRG policies. The fact that Baghdad effectively asked these companies to take sides makes the feat all the greater.

ExxonMobil has a major interest in the southern lucrative West Qurna-1 oilfield and Shell has its supergiant Majnoon field in addition to a multibillion gas venture.

But just what can Baghdad do to actually implement their threats? What would be left for Baghdad if it blacklisted all these oil majors? Simply put, Baghdad will do some sabre-rattling but ultimately it can’t afford to shoot itself in the foot and lose out.

Resolution over oil payments

The Kurdistan oil export taps have been frequently used in recent years for political gains, threats and concessions. While the production rate has been modest, it has the potential to significantly ramp up output.

Last week an agreement was ratified between the KRG and Baghdad ensuring that oil exports could continue and a dispute over oil payments could end with the Kurdistan receiving 147,000 barrels of oil products per day.

Lack of payment to foreign oil companies in Kurdistan and the stop-start nature of oil exports and thus oil revenues for these companies has been the only major blemish in an otherwise spectacular rise of the Kurdistan energy sector.

Kurdistan will keep export at around 140,000 bpd per day this month before ramping up to 200,000 bpd for the remainder of the year. In turn, Baghdad would pay around $857 million owed to foreign companies working in Kurdistan.

“It was agreed to form a permanent committee to follow up on the terms agreed, and give the committee authority to resolve any obstacles blocking implementation,” a KRG statement confirmed.

This committee is perhaps the most important step of all. If any side has any reason to doubt any elements of the oil revenues or the activities of any party, including foreign oil companies, then it must address them legally, politically and with clear audits, accounts and evidence to eliminate any doubt, accusations or grey areas.

While this agreement serves as a major relief or in the words of KRG Oil Minister Ashti Hawrami “a big breakthrough” and a promising step towards a new oil law, it is hardly comprehensive and may serve as another false dawn.

The bones of contentions stretch much deeper than just payments to oil companies. The question of federal autonomy and more importantly territorial disputes are etched much deeper. The issues of oil, article 140 and disputes territories and KRG foreign policies are very much intertwined.

Baghdad’s last remaining grip on Kurdistan is in the oil sector. It was naturally alarmed with the signing of landmark oil exportation deals between the KRG and Turkey in recent months. With the proviso of an independent oil pipeline under implementation, Kurds have much more control over the energy sector.

The national hydrocarbon law has stalled since 2007 and without formal ratification of an oil sharing law the Iraqi energy sector will remain rocky at best.

Iraq’s oil infrastructure is in urgent need of revitalisation and Iraq is in urgent need of additional revenue for it’s much needed and delayed reconstruction.

Oil for all of Iraq

Ironically, whilst Baghdad has accused the Kurds of manipulating its oil reserves, the oil in Kurdistan belongs to all of Iraq. The KRG has made it clear from the outset that they will abide by the 17% ratio agreed with Baghdad.

It is outdated mentalities that prevent Baghdad from realising that should Kurdistan gain then so does the whole of Iraq. Arab nationalists are quick to remind Kurds that Kurdistan is actually on Iraqi soil but then by the same token, treat Kurds like they are trespassers on their own soil, even if the Kurdish rise to prominence is essentially a major gain for all of Iraq

Kurdish oil exports and payments of foreign companies was actually on the of key prerequisites of the Kurdish political parties supporting Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and joining the coalition and thus there was already agreements in principle, but in Iraq agreements are not always worth the paper they are written on.

The successful passing of a national oil law in Iraq could be the making or breaking of Iraq such is the immense oil resources Iraq has at stake. If it was not for oil, Baghdad would have given disputed Kurdish territories back to the Kurds many months ago, would have implemented article 140 and would not have implemented its Arabisation policy in the first place.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Turkey and Kurdistan’s new focus on “what unites us rather than what divides us”

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As the political gulf between Baghdad and Kurdistan continues to grow at a rapid rate, and Ankara revaluates its position in Iraq and the Middle East, the alliance between Turkey and Kurdistan assumes a new dawn.

The Middle East crisis has meant that sectarian, political, economic and strategic tides have dramatically shifted.

As Turkey’s “zero problems” policy with their neighbours has slowly unravelled, this has continuously made Ankara and Kurdistan natural allies, a far cry from the more tenuous relations of just a few years ago.

In recent weeks both the Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani and Kurdistan Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani have participated in productive and high-profile visits to Turkey, a symbol of the growing respect and solidarity that is pushing the two parties together.

Too often relations in the past have been based on the ideals of “what divides us, rather than what unites us”. Turkey may have a historical fear of Kurdish nationalism but it has slowly come to terms with the huge benefits that stability and constructive relations with the Kurds bring.

While politics plays a big part, especially, as the political earthquake across the Middle East has left governments scurrying to revaluate their positions, ultimately money talks and no rational government can ignore the massive trade and energy opportunities that come with a growing economic power-house such as Kurdistan.

Iraq is already Turkeys biggest trade partner, with Kurdistan accounting for the majority of that trade.

Kurdistan is the next energy hub of the Middle East and with its immense oil and gas reserves, Turkey stands to benefit tremendously with a close alliance with the Kurds.

This led to an inevitable energy pact with Turkey and Kurdistan that was always going to stir tensions in Baghdad.

Oil pipeline enhances autonomy

Kurdistan and Turkey used the international energy conference hosted in Erbil to outline details of a new pipeline that will drastically alter the political and economic map of Iraq and the greater region.

Kurdistan Minister of Natural Resources, Ashti Hawrami, confirmed the proposal of a new pipeline to be built within the next 12 months with a capacity of 1 million barrel per day that will carry Kurdish oil and gas via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey.

The first phase of the pipeline scheduled for completion by October 2012 will carry crude from the Taq Taq oilfield. The second phase is due for completion by August 2013.

Kurdistan then plans to build a separate pipeline by 2014 that would connect to refineries in Ceyhan.

The new pipeline will greatly diminish Kurdistan’s dependence on Baghdad both for exportation of oil and import of refined oil products and also ensure that Kurdistan has an oil exportation infrastructure solely within their territory.

Baghdad unsurprisingly denounced the deal with a repeat of its usual rhetoric that all deals must be ratified by the federal government. Nechirvan Barzani reiterated the long-time Kurdish position that their oil deals fall within the remits of the constitution, while stating at the energy conference, “unlike some of the officials of the federal government in Baghdad, we believe that our policies in the field of energy and natural resources should be based on cooperation and coordination, and not on hostility, confrontation and retaliation.”

The fact that Turkey had a high-profile representation including Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz, demonstrated Ankara’s willingness to deal with Kurds directly at the expense of angering Baghdad.

The one last rope that Baghdad has over Kurdistan is over oil. By taking export infrastructure, size and format of exports and receipt of the respective revenues, Kurdistan seeks to break that rope. Currently, oil exports in Kurdistan are halted over dispute of payments to foreign parties.

However, dispute over oil exports is just tip of the iceberg as relations between Baghdad and Erbil have drastically declined, with Massaud Barzani in repeated remarks making it very clear that Kurds will no longer tolerate the policies of Nouri al-Maliki and will take matters into their own hands if the situation doesn’t change.

The fact that Barzani openly repeated this warning in Ankara to Turkish leaders shows an increasingly confident Kurdistan but also shows that Turkey is slowly coming to terms with realities on the ground.

Zero problems policy backfires

At the current time Turkey is far from its doctrine of zero problems with its neighbours. Its increasingly dragged into the uprising in Syria as its opposition to Bashar al-Assad has accelerated, especially as Damascus renews its ties and support of the PKK. Its relations with Iran has cooled as Tehran has sided with Assad, refused to backdown over its nuclear ambitions while becoming uncomfortable with the idea of Turkey hosting a NATO anti-missile shield just next door. Its relations with Baghdad have deteriorated with harsh exchange of words in recent weeks between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Maliki that were exasperated with Ankara affectively affording protection to exiled Sunni Vice-President, Tariq al-Hashemi and accusing Maliki of monopolising power and stoking sectarian tensions.

The end result is that Turkey needs the secular Kurds as a strategic political ally and as a key buffer to Shiite dominance, to put pressure on Iraqi Kurds to leverage influence over the Kurds in Syria to back the Arab dominated Syrian opposition, and as a way of maintaining equilibrium in a fast changing region.

In addition, as one of the fastest growing economies in the world, Turkish energy demands are increasing all the time. It has an overriding reliance on Russia and particularly Iran which provides a third of its gas supplies, for its energy needs.

Turkey is already a key part of the 1 million bpd Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea. Oil and gas supplies from Kurdistan will quench its own energy first but also allow it to diversify its current dependence on limited sources, whilst at the same time confirming its role as a strategic energy hub of Europe that will bring with its levies and taxes billions of dollars of revenue to Turkey.

Oil in Kurdistan belongs to Kurds

On paper Iraq is one of richest countries in the world with its immense oil reserves. However, for decades upon end the people have endured suffering as opposed to prosperity for their divine gift.

In the example of Kurdistan, oil revenues were used not to promote unity and brotherhood but to purchase apparatus to systemically oppress the Kurds and destroy their villages and livelihood.

One can only imagine what Kurdistan or the rest of Iraq for that matter would look like if vast oil revenues were used in a rightful and productive manner.

Now the pages of history have turned and a new dawn has arrived. Kurdistan can look to Baghdad for their rewards from the oil reserves and rely on Arab sentiments, or take matters into their own hands and use oil in Kurdistan for their own benefit.

This doesn’t mean that Kurds will not abide by the constitution or their allocated share of revenues; it just means that it doesn’t wait indefinitely for fairness and equitable distribution of wealth that Hawrami has alluded to.

Indeed the implementation of revenue sharing and Iraqis getting a fair slice of the cake whilst adhering to a constitution approved by the majority of the population can bring unity. But this is Iraq after all and one shouldn’t hold it breath with distant dreams.

Note of caution to Kurds

Whilst relations with Turkey are increasingly strong with the crisis in the Middle East and Turkey’s frosty relations with their neighbours pushing them closer to the Kurds, in the Middle East nothing is irreversible.

Turkey is still weary of Kurdish independence, anxious over the possibility of another Kurdistan developing on its doorstep in Syria and above all has a major Kurdish problem that it has failed to effectively address for many decades.

Furthermore, any ties or deal should be as much on Kurdish terms as Turkish terms. The need for unity in Kurdistan is as great as ever as is the need to become self-sufficient and protect their future and not rely on existing socio-political sentiment that can later undercut the Kurds as witnessed in the past.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Enjoy your natural right to statehood or prolong agony with an unrepentant Baghdad?

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The current crisis in Iraq is anything but new. The past nine years have been shrouded in sectarianism, civil war, political bickering, shaky unity governments, animosity, distrust and agreements that were not worth the paper they were written on.

The Unite States helped mask some of the realities by acting as the crutches to support an Iraq that was broken and could not stand on its own two feet.

On the other hand, the Kurds chose to re-join the new Iraq after years of isolation on the premise of a partnership based on a voluntary union.

The Kurdish leadership on many occasions were the key intermediaries in a bitter cycle of violence between the newly-empowered Shiites and disenfranchised Sunnis. Key negotiations, initiatives and interventions from the Kurds often resulted in pivotal breakthroughs, notwithstanding the important role that Kurdish security forces paid in restoring stability in the south.

The Kurds, owed to their kingmaker role were the beneficiaries of a number of concessions and countless promises from Baghdad.

Here is the problem, what good is a comprehensive constitution, democratic frameworks, concessions and promises if the end product is failed implementation, by-passed legislature, half-hearted unity and empty gestures?

The Kurds find themselves in a position of deep mistrust with a Baghdad that continues policies that are detriment to the development of Kurdistan, of reconciliation and brotherhood.

The centralist tenancies of al-Maliki are not new, this was a frequent criticism of his first term in charge.

Despite reservations and widespread mistrust of his party, somewhat regrettably al-Maliki was given a lifeline and a brittle coalition with al-Iraqiya and the Kurds broke a world record for the formation of a government.

Ironically, as al-Maliki has come under more pressure from Sunnis and Kurds, he has conversely grown in power. He has successfully monopolised power, combined several powerful posts under the disguise of temporary cover and all but broken the coalition beyond repair.

Barzani’s ultimatum

The Kurds after playing the patient game and seeing a lack of change in Baghdad are now at a critical juncture were they dare not stay idle.

Do the Kurds continue to exhaust energy in the new Iraq, when clearly the basis for new Iraq is non-existent? After nine years of effort and perseverance, the Kurds cannot continue to ignore the writing on the wall. Iraq is not united, it’s not democratic, constitutional article are no binding and parties such as Maliki clearly do not believe in a true partnership with the Kurds.

Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani has made a number of bold remarks around the plight of Iraq, the critical political crisis and has warned that the Kurds will not tolerate a return to centralisation or dictatorship.

He repeated his stance in an interview with AP, where he warned that if a positive breakthrough was not achieved by local elections in September then he will turn to the Kurdish people for a decision and thus a referendum on independence.

Barzani has been critical of al-Maliki and Baghdad in the past, but simultaneous events has pushed the Kurdish leadership well beyond the limits of passive observation or tolerance.

Barzani’s visit to Turkey in recent weeks followed a keynote visit to Washington where met with U.S. President Barack Obama and Joe Biden. No doubt at the top of the agenda was Barzani’s growing worry over the consolidation of power in Baghdad and his message to his counterparts in Turkey and US was that the Kurds had reached breaking-point and were serious about threats to secede if the foundations that were a proviso for re-joining the new Iraq were continually disregarded.

Some critics viewed Barzani’s remarks as a mere ploy to extract concession from al-Maliki rather than any real threat to secede. Such views are narrow-minded and lack conjecture.

The Kurds have already received countless concessions and have already had many promises around power-sharing, resolution of disputed territories and hydrocarbon laws. More concessions alone are in fact just the tonic that the Kurds should avoid.

Empty promises are worthless as are positive agreements that are no adopted. What the Kurds must demand of al-Maliki and Baghdad in the key weeks and months ahead is real action, practical steps and tangible outcomes.

The visit of influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to Erbil and growing disillusionment of some Shiite factions on top of an already marginalised and bitter Sunni population shows that the current crisis is more deep-rooted than ever before.

Re-writing the wrongs of history

Kurdistan has a fundamental and unmolested right to two clear options. Either a truly democratic, federal and balanced Iraq or outright independence.

As the largest ethnic group in the world without a state, subject to a cruel and selfish partition of their lands and decades of repression, if any nation had a right to determine its destiny it would be the Kurds.

While other countries, some with populations numbering in the thousands and others gripped with immense poverty and a lack of infrastructure dot the global horizon, the Kurds are warned to tread carefully or that their time has not come.

After the end of the First World War, the concept of self-determination was the overriding principle of US president Woodrow Wilson that he imposed on the League of Nations and the Middle East.

For imperial interests at the time, Kurdistan was the only major nation not to be granted statehood.

Self-determination is one of the key international charters and by which repression, imperialism and subjugation is eradicated and free will is attained.

Some claim that Kurdistan does not have the infrastructure or conditions for statehood but just how much infrastructure does Palestine or Kosovo have compared to the Kurds?

Kurdistan is washed with immense amounts of oil, with a booming economy, a vibrant population and all the trappings of any state. It is a key strategic hub of the Middle East and with the influence and standing to play a key part in the evolution of the Middle East.

However, double standards of foreign are something that the Kurds can no longer accept. Kosovo was granted independence as special case where foreign powers had ruled that Serbia had forfeited the right of sovereignty due to their treatment of the Kosovars.

If anyone has forfeited the right to have any say on Kurdistan is Arabs and Iraq. After decades of brutal Arabisation, destruction and systematic repression, the Kurds deserve to be applauded for single-handedly standing up to one of the most powerful dictators of recent times.

Have the Kurds spilled countless blood, tears and tragedy to now return to centralist rule in Iraq or to have terms dictated upon them by other groups?

No Turk, Persian or Arab can intimidate the Kurds any longer. In reality, even Turkey has accepted that Kurdish statehood is not only a natural and inevitable reality but that Turkey itself may benefit from such a development.

The Middle East is in turmoil as governments jostle for power and influence. Turkey’s rapid decline of relations with Syria, Iran and ever increasingly Iraq, puts the Kurds in a strong position to be at forefront of shaping the Middle East socially, politically and economically.

At the first seismic shifting of the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were sidelined and had to painfully endure decades of suffering for their chance to rewrite the wrongs of history. They can ill-afford to be passengers as the evolutionary trains darts past this time around.

Way ahead in Iraq

Barzani has warned Maliki before, but it was the first time that a real timetable was set for action.

If Maliki is sincere about power-sharing and partnership with the Kurds, then he doesn’t need weeks to show his intentions.

However, even if Maliki does change his tune, it will be temporary at best. Arab nationalists such as Maliki will never want what best for Kurdistan, only what is best for himself and their party.

There is no threat of Iraq’s disintegration when it has already happened. A crisis between Kurdistan and Baghdad is just tip of the iceberg. Deadly bombings serve as a daily reminder that bloody sectarianism is not a thing of the past, with Sunni digging their heels and ready to battle for their slice of the cake, it begs the question of just what part of the new Iraq would any Kurd want?

Regional powers have continually served their interests at the expense of Kurdistan, it is time for Kurdistan to be selfish and solely focus on motions that exclusively serve their national interests.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Kurds – showing a tongue with which to talk, but teeth with which to bite

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The Syrian Kurds are in many ways the forgotten kindred of the Kurdish landscape that have suddenly found themselves at a centre of increasing regional and international focus. Indeed, while Kurdistan was forcibly partitioned in the selfish interest of the imperial powers at the time, the Kurdish national identity became increasingly more localised with the respective struggles following suit.

It has become a common future to be labelled as an Iraqi Kurd, Turkish Kurd, Syrian Kurd or Iranian Kurd, which in itself is rubbing salt into the wounds of the Kurds. They were segregated against their will and such labelling based on their new found minority status, may seem as a logical way to distinguish the new Kurdish segments, but it simply aided the assimilation drive of the respective occupying forces.

At a crucial and sensitive juncture of the Kurdistan national renaissance, the Kurds have a unique opportunity to rewrite the wrongs of history. While the borders cannot be redrawn overnight, the mere conception of the Kurds as a disparate force whose influence is limited to their respective state can be changed.

Whether based in Syria, Turkey, Iraq or Iran, a Kurd will always be a Kurd and successive Kurdish policies should reflect a coming together of interests and an alliance of different components for the benefit of greater Kurdish nationalism. The old Kurdish saying that Kurds have no friends but the mountains may have spoken true in yesteryears, but in the new dawn the Kurds have each other.

Millions of Kurds under Baghdad rule

Although the Kurdistan Region finds itself in an enviable position of becoming a prosperous, strategic, political and economic hub, it is at the end of the day only the boundaries of the Kurdistan that has been loosely defined by the Iraqi constitution.

Remarkably, over 40% of the Kurdistan ethnic border lies outside of the Region that form part of the so-called disputed territories.  Yet constitutional articles that govern how the status of these territories is to be resolved has been strategically stalled by Baghdad in order to restrain the rapid advancement of the Kurds.

Four years after the deadline for the implementation of article 140, these Kurds still find themselves no closer to an official return to the Kurdistan Region and to compound matters are at the mercy of insurgents intent on derailing Kurdish grip on these areas.

While most Kurds in the Kurdistan Region enjoy relative stability and welfare, the Kurds outside of the region do not enjoy such privileges. Deterioration in the security of Iraq or any political vacuums in Baghdad such as that experienced today ensures they get caught up in the whirlwind of violence and fear.

The Kurdish and Iraqi security forces have come close to outright fighting on a number of occasions in the disputed areas and Baghdad has frequently opposed the presence of Peshmerga forces in the disputed territories, but at some point the Kurds have to say enough is enough.

The recent spate of bombings across Kirkuk, Nineveh, Salahaddin and especially Diyala provinces continues to highlight the dangers that Kurds endure in the face of hard-line groups and Arab nationalists.

Kurdish complaints at the lack of protection from Baghdad are not new and have regularly called on the KRG to intercede on their behalf.

Baghdad cannot have it both ways – stalling the resolution of disputed territories yet not affording the Kurds the protection they are entitled to under their roof.

It is time for the KRG to intervene more directly in such hotspots and safeguard the wellbeing of the Kurdish citizens. Sitting idle or waiting for the goodwill of Baghdad to take pace will only end in disappointment.

More importantly, the Kurds have to grab the bull by the horns as far as the issue of disputed territories are concerned and set Baghdad key deadlines and milestones, whereby if they fail to deliver then the Kurds will take matters into their own hands.

Kurds too often have been fearful of not upsetting their neighbours with respective Kurdish headaches or straining ties with Baghdad. However, Kurds have done as much as anyone to preserve stability and unity in Iraq and indeed ensure dialogue takes precedence over violence in Turkey. The Kurds should not be any less weary than other nation to enjoy their legal rights and make their own demands and also enact counter measures as they see fit to defend their nationality and region.

This is not to say that productive relations with neighbours is not of paramount importance as this is key for the economic growth of Kurdistan and overall political stability, however it means that the Kurds have to be taken as an important strategic power in their own right and as equal partners at the regional table. To show that the Kurds have a tongue by which they engage dialogue but also teeth by which they can bite.

Plight of Syrian Kurds

Under the increasing limelight are the Syrian Kurds who in many ways are stuck between an Assad regime that has subjected them to systemic repression and Arab opposition groups they distrust.

While neighbouring Sunni countries have flocked to stand up for their brethren that are subject to increasing brutality amidst a fierce government reprisal, the Kurds in Syria have suffered for decades with much of the world turning a blind eye.

When Arabs defend their brethren, the Kurdistan Region should be ready to defend their own. Syrian Kurds look to the Kurds in Iraq as big brothers and it is the duty of Kurdistan region to embrace them with open arms.

As such the awarding of refugee status to 30 Syrian Kurdish soldiers who had defected is a welcome step. The Kurdistan Region should become the natural hub where Syrian Kurds can use to oppose the Assad regime and ensure a new democratic and federalist dawn in Syria ensues.

Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 to protect its Turkish inhabitants and has played a frequent hand in ensuring Turkmen interests are preserved in Iraq, with many other regional examples that follow suit. The Kurds cannot stay idle at a unique historical opportunity to unite all of Kurdistan in politics, strategy and spirit.

Federalism as a step to unity

The minimum demand of the Kurds in Syria should be federalism. While the Kurds have an undeniable right to self-determination that has been harshly and selfishly deprived, the greatest formula for the overall unity of Kurdistan at the present time is the establishment of federal region across all countries where they find themselves a significant minority.

A future federal state of Kurdistan in Syria will undoubtedly have a strong alliance with Kurdistan Region which will benefit the entire region in promoting long-term stability.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Kurdistan first, all else second

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While it was never officially announced until recently, it was always widely acknowledged that KDP Vice President Nechirvan Barzani would take over from incumbent Barham Salih and head the next cabinet as Prime Minister. Not only does Barzani’s highly anticipated return mark the end of a 2-year political chapter but it also comes at the beginning of a highly crucial year for Kurdistan.

In many ways, Salih had a tough two years in office. Almost as soon as he was appointed, he was severely disadvantaged with the dilution of PUK power and the emergence of Gorran as a major rival in traditional PUK strongholds This meant that while the power-sharing agreement between the KDP and PUK in theory remained evenly split, it was anything but that in reality and it effectively ensured there was little chance of the PUK securing the full four-year term at the helm.

After the last elections, KDP took centre stage in the Kurdish political arena and was clearly the most influential component of government. With the imminent return of Barzani, hope and expectations have already been greatly shifted. This is based on Barzani’s positive track record in his last term in office but also at a crucial juncture for Kurdistan, the expectation of the Kurdish people are at an all-time high. His appointment also serves to bolster the strength of government. After all he will be head of cabinet and representing the strongest political party in Kurdistan.

Barzani’s challenges are two pronged. On the one hand, appeasing Kurdish expectations at home and secondly, ensuring Kurdistan makes the strongest possible benefit in the greater region and with Baghdad.

Challenges within Kurdistan

2011 was a turbulent year for the Kurdistan Region but one that despite a number of drawbacks could propel Kurdistan to greater heights. As witnessed with the demonstrations last year and general public sentiments, the Kurdish people are growing frustrated and impatient whilst some historic Kurdish handicaps become resolved.

Corruption is still a persistent thorn in the side of Kurdish politics, as is government hegemony over the economy and employment with lack of a thriving private sector, bureaucracy and public services that are in need of investment and improvement.

The Gorran Movement was in many ways a by-product of Kurdish emotion and the advent of real opposition in Kurdish government only added to the credibility and standing of Kurdish democracy. Although there are signs that Gorran is too evolving to become a more affective component of the political arena, at times it has shown political immaturity at achieving its goals.

Kurdish people generally acknowledge that Kurdistan has made remarkable progress in a short period of time, but this is no excuse for politicians to rest on their laurels and take their vote for granted.

The only reason any politician or political party is in power is because they have been given a mandate by the people. As long as the idea of serving the national interests comes first, Kurdistan can only continue to grow and evolve.

However, it’s widely accepted by all sides that Kurdistan is in need of reform on a number of levels and without this Kurdistan will only be dragged into the future as opposed to racing at full speed.

On the topic of serving the people, comes accountability and transparency. The politicians must live and breathe around the very people they have been appointed to serve. They must hear the people on the ground and actively heed public sentiment. How can politicians serve Kurdistan if there are simply out of touch with the people and the situation on the ground and enjoying a life that must ordinary Kurds can only dream of?

Diversify the political powerbase is one significant prelude to ensuring that future voting outcomes cannot be taking for granted. This means that unless political parties raise the bar and deliver even higher, the people may place their votes elsewhere (as long as they deem that there worthwhile and credible alternatives to place their vote). In this regard, it would be beneficial for Kurdistan to ensure that the PUK and KDP no long server on a single list. Having more parties with political clout will allow for greater compromise amongst parties and facilitate a broader more inclusive government.

The shape of the next cabinet

Barzani may not have officially assumed his post but has already got to work and marked his intention to other political players by assuring that “our door is always open.” One of his key goals was to build general consensus and understanding with all political parties. Barzani declared, “We will be happy to have a broad-based government for the next cabinet… it is the duty of all of us to try and work to serve this country and its people”

So far the fruit of Barzani’s endeavours have been productive but there is no certainty that the new cabinet will necessarily be all inclusive. Most opposition parties have stated their willingness to work with Barzani and that could only be good news for Kurdistan but under specific conditions, which will signify the new cabinet’s appetite for change and appeasing opposition groups.

Gorran’s final take on joining the new cabinet will likely depend on their sense of reassurance around the reform packages that they have previously agreed with the government.

However, an all-inclusive cabinet is not the be all and end all for Kurdish politics. You don’t have to be on the same cabinet to be on the same page.

Gorran can serve as an affective opposition and play its key role of ensuring the evolution and reform of Kurdistan without formally been a part of the cabinet.

What matters is a national consensus amongst all parties and an eagerness to set aside their differences for the sake of Kurdistan. All political parties have the responsibility to answer to the people that have voted them in power and deep personal or ideological rifts must be set aside.

Without a common basis amongst the ruling parties and opposition, it is almost certain that months and years will tick away without any real progress. It is one thing to agree on reform and make positive intentions and it’s another to deliver the reform package in a timely, measurable and transparent manner.

The regional view

Reform and political evolvement will ultimately benefit the people, improve standards of living and fulfil the growing expectations of the people. However, it will also put Kurdistan on a much stronger footing in the greater region and internationally.

Kurdistan is at a highly sensitive point and one that one will determine how Kurdistan will be shaped in years to come.

It is still part of a largely fragmented Iraq that is underpinned by deep animosity. It is still part of the same Iraq that still has many unresolved disputes with Kurdistan and on the brink of a new civil war.

The Kurds have played the patient waiting game on issues such as disputed territories and national hydrocarbon law, while Baghdad has shown little enthusiasm to implement constitutional articles that ultimately serve to enhance the status of Kurdistan.

In the greater region, Kurdistan is becoming ever engulfed in power tussles between neighbours in a fast changing strategic picture. Kurds in Syria, Turkey and to a lesser extent Iran are at the forefront of changing dynamics in the Middle East.

Kurds in these parts of Kurdistan are also at sensitive crossroads and ubiquitously look to the Kurdistan Region as a big brother.

This means firstly, that Kurdish political parties must work as closely and as united as ever no matter their differences in solidifying and protecting Kurdish interests and secondly, that Kurdish leaders must make delicate and difficult decisions to ensure they safeguard Kurdish interests outside of the Kurdistan Region.

As with the example of Baghdad, the Kurds should not feel compelled to constantly resolve bitter feuds in Baghdad and become dragged into the middle of frequent sectarian and political clashes, whilst much of their demands have been sidelined.

The Kurdish quest should be about strengthening Kurdistan and not Baghdad. The basis for Kurdish support in Iraq and beyond should not be unconditional, but come at an advantage to Kurdistan.

Ankara and Baghdad need Kurdistan more than ever, and after historically getting the raw end of the deal from both these sides, it’s about time the Kurds drove a hard bargain.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.