Category Archives: Kurdistan Region

Will yet another electoral term in 2014 lead to any real change on Kirkuk and article 140?

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The Kirkuk has been at the historic forefront of the Kurdish nationalist struggle. It has been an area of contention for decades and formed a red-line for Kurdish negotiations with Baathist regime long before the liberation of Iraq in 2003.

Resolution of Kirkuk and disputed territories was a firm Kurdish condition since 2003, enshrined even in the Transitive Administrative Law (TAL), before the onset of the official constitution in 2005.

It has then served as the basis for negotiations with coalition partners in Baghdad in 2003, 2006, 2010 and more than likely in 2014.

Approaching six years since the passing of the deadline for Article 140, is Kirkuk any closer today to formal resolution and a return to Kurdistan than it was in 2003 (or indeed under the Saddam regime)?

The lack of progress in article 140, including the all-important national census is hardly an accident. The intentional foot-dragging is clear to see. Ahead of negotiations to form a coalition government in 2014, Kirkuk will once again be a key Kurdish stipulation. But will the new parliamentary term in 2014 witness anything different with regards to this issue?

The reality is that Baghdad will not give up Kirkuk or any additional territory that easily.

It is no coincidence that as soon as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) announced oil pipelines to Turkey much to the ire of Baghdad, Iraqi Oil Minister Abdelkarim al-Luaybi was roaming the Kirkuk province with BP CEO Bob Dudley as part of a recent deal between Baghdad and the oil giant to revive Kirkuk’s declining oil fields.

KRG reiterated their objection to the deal which it deemed against the principles of the unconstitutional and illegal.

Yet, in what has become a tit-for-tat, Baghdad also deemed Kurdish deal with foreign oil firms as illegal and had raised warnings over the new oil pipelines which increased the notches in the Kurdish autonomous drive.

Kirkuk sits atop of billions of barrels of oil reserves which have only added to the intensity of the fight over the province.

Baghdad’s move with BP, which had bypassed the KRG, is designed to show authority over disputed territories. This is similar to the onset of the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command by Iraqi Prime Ministry Nouri al-Maliki in 2012 designed to mark Baghdad’s sphere of influence, leading to dangerous escalations between Erbil and Baghdad.

The resolution of disputed territories is one of many unresolved and hotly-contested articles. Many other items such as the status of Peshmerga forces and a national hydrocarbon law linger much in the same shape as 2007.

Baghdad has sought to address the power balance in Kirkuk with electoral law whilst provincial elections have not been held since 2005.

But Kirkuk does not need short-term fixes or a council representation done on a special basis. The solution is already there – article 140. After that proper elections can be held like any other city.

The more that Kirkuk is treated as a special case – the more excuses that argue against article 140.

Mosul is also a mixed city, but where are special laws and equitable distribution of seats? The elections do the talking, as should be the case anywhere else in Iraq or as in any democratic country.

The same round-robin scenario promises to play out in the aftermath of the elections in 2014. Kurds play a hard-bargain, make clear conditions for their support and the Shiite powers agree. Yet soon after, a game of cat and mouse plays out for yet another 4 years.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Kurdistan oil pipeline cuts the remaining umbilical cord of Baghdad

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A consistent bone of contention between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad has been oil resources. The heated debates around exploration rights, revenue sharing and interpretation of constitutional clauses have seen the issue go round in circles for several years.

The jostle for control of oil has only grown as oil majors have flocked to Kurdistan, ignoring threats from Baghdad, and as Kurdistan has added continual billions to its oil reserve figures. Companies continue to make discoveries in the Region with Total and Marathon only recently announcing a fresh discovery.

The reasons for Baghdad’s unease with growing Kurdish economic independence are hardly a secret. Control of oil revenues and oil infrastructure is like an umbilical cord that Baghdad has over the Kurds. With the exception of control of oil revenues and resolution of disputed territories, Kurdistan would be all but independent.

In this light, Baghdad foot-dragging over the resolution of national hydrocarbon oil laws and Article 140 is clear to see.

The national budget and share of oil revenues is currently a tap which Baghdad can use to influence and pressure the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Oil production to date in Kurdistan has been stop-start at best owing to disputes.

Such is the ambition of Kurdistan that little before completion of the first historic oil pipeline to pump crude from Kurdish oil fields, a second pipeline was already actively planned for completion in 18-24 months that would drastically improve production capacity and bring the Kurds closer to their ultimate target of 3 million bpd.

With oil exports and revenues set to rise in greater Iraq, in theory so should 17% of the budget allocated to Kurdistan. If oil is equitably shared on an 83-17 split then both Erbil and Baghdad benefit. In other words, most of the Kurdish oil revenues would actually go to Baghdad.

But distribution of the national budget has been anything but clear-cut with the Kurds arguing that they receive closer to 11%, not to mention the billions of dollars in unpaid bills to foreign companies in the Region that the Kurds demand.

Independent control of oil exports puts the gloves firmly in the hands of the Kurds. While they can now achieve the 400,000 bpd or so demanded by Baghdad for share of the budget, Kurds will not be at the mercy of Baghdad – if it boiled down to it, Kurdistan could keep specific portion of its oil revenue (and any debt that it deems to have been unpaid) and only then pay Baghdad.

Baghdad has used the recent thawing of its difficult ties with Ankara to warn against any export of Kurdish crude through the new pipeline without its consent.

Ironically, as the Baghdad-Ankara ties nose-dived, the Erbil-Ankara relations were hitting new heights, underpinned by billions of dollars of trade and Kurdish strategic relevance in the changing Middle Eastern picture.

Recently, Kurdistan Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani visited Ankara and met with Turkish officials, where the topics were likely to be expanding economic ties, oil exports and the Syrian conflict.

For now, Ankara will aim to keep Baghdad sweet by promising no to import Kurdish oil without their consent. But in reality, Turkey is already arm deep in Kurdish oil and its booming economy. It has already supported the constitutional rights of the Kurds with regards to oil exploration and the 17-83 revenue split.

Ankara may not want to alienate Baghdad, as it has recently looked to kick-start relations with Baghdad and Tehran that it strongly needs for any favourable resolution to the Syrian conflict and to avoid any regional isolation at a critical juncture.

As for the Kurds, its new oil export infrastructure literally adds the fuel for independence. However, the real game-changer would be additional pipelines independent of the Iraqi Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline and exclusively on Kurdistan soil and once exports reach 1 million bpd, let alone the 3 million bpd that Kurds hope for.

It’s no secret that the billions of dollars that Kurds could then acquire would far outweigh any of the 17% (or less) that Baghdad would offer. This is not to mention any potential gas exports to Europe, which would further placate Kurdistan on the world energy map (and perhaps on the map as a new found independent state)

 

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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The new politician dawn of Kurdistan and its ramifications

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The Kurdistan legislative elections of 2013 promised to mark a historical milestone in the Kurdish political and democratic evolvement and the outcome was no different.

Kurdistan has moved from the predictable electoral nature that underscored the duopoly of KDP-PUK control of the Kurdish political sphere where political control could be almost split in the middle, to a new political horizon with more healthy competition and need for different permutations and alliances.

This duopoly was broken in 2009 with the emergence of the Movement for Change (Gorran) adding an opposition element to the Kurdistan government previously unseen.

The success of Gorran was at the expense of the PUK in their traditional backyard of Sulaimaniya and indeed this was a reoccurring theme in 2013.

The KDP as most expected proved the overall winners of the polls, with preliminary results indicating over 37.5% of the vote. But crucially, such was the more balanced nature of the electoral outcome that the KDP must work with other parties, including Gorran to form a new cabinet.

Much focus has been placed on the demise of the PUK, but the fall from joint rulers of Kurdistan to a third-placed position cannot be underestimated.

With the end of the Strategic Agreement, the PUK failings could not be veiled by prospect of a coalition list with the KDP as was the case in recent years. Running independently meant the strength of each party was easier to gauge.

However, talk of the PUK as a new weak or insignificant actor is premature. When one political door closes, with the right leadership, strategy and resolve many new doors can open.

But any PUK revival must be underpinned by forward-thinking and a new reality and away from its past status. In this light, although the KDP clearly prefers to keep intact its partnership with the PUK and form a new cabinet with the Kurdistan Islamic Union, this is may do more harm in the long-term to the PUK.

The Strategic Agreement may have made sense when both the KDP and PUK were on roughly equal footing and the region was effectively split into two administrations and the government was split into two terms. but the rules have changed and PUK would have to work under new diluted terms and mainly under the KDP umbrella of policies and dominance.

The PUK and KDP have many historical differences including political ideology, control of security forces, foreign alliances and government policies, and with a weaker PUK hand this cannot be masked as before.

The PUK can serve as an effective force in opposition movement. As Gorran has shown, the opposition tag can be a key magnet for a vital voice in Kurdistan. Much can change in the next 4 years and a move to opposition would also allow the PUK to regroup over the next years, lick their wounds and move on.

The PUK leaders to their credit have been quick to acknowledge their disappointment at the polls and the new reality that beckons. The loyal PUK voter base would prefer a new fight and the realisation of a new dawn than a continuing an outdated and now uneven strategic alliance with the KDP.

As for Gorran, their status as the second largest party in Kurdistan is a remarkable feat. However, much in the same way as the PUK, they are about to embark on a new chapter and a new identity. How they fare with their new status and political clout will determine whether they can continue to grow as a political force or whether their support base rescinds in 4 years’ time.

Gorran are in a tricky position. With such a large proportion of votes, its support base does not expect them to continue to work on the peripherals of power as an opposition force. At the same time, joining the government places Gorran into unchartered territory. They have to work with the KDP and been against the ruling parties is somewhat easier than working side-by-side with them.

An option that cannot be overlooked with the number of seats combined is Gorran and the PUK joining forces to form a new cabinet at the expense of the KDP.

However, these would mean the PUK mending bridges amidst a fierce rivalry with Gorran and PUK alienating the KDP, even though the KDP has reaffirmed their support and commitment to the PUK.

The ideal scenario, at least on paper, is a broad based political coalition amongst the major parties. However, this would deprive Kurdistan of a decisive opposition and will make the government brittle and susceptible to differences, bickering and prolonged decision making.

With the new political reality, rivalries and passions may intensify, especially in Sulaimaniya. A factor that should not be discounted is that the PUK may have lost political power but still have allegiance and influence of most of the security forces in Sulaimaniya province.

More political competition and jockeying for power must not be at the detriment, unity or stability of Kurdistan or ultimately the serving of the people who voted them into power.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Upcoming Kurdistan elections set to spark shift in political horizon

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Kurdistan is no stranger to holding parliamentary elections since it was free from the clutches of Baghdad, but the legislative elections set for 21st September 2013 provide a different flavour for a number of reasons.

The electoral climate is tense, the passions are as elated as above, the stakes are high for the political parties involved but above all else it is the uncertainty at the polls that is most intriguing, placing Kurdistan at a critical juncture.

The tense battle for the 100 seats on offer (11 are reserved for minorities) is set to change the political landscape of Kurdistan.

This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, in an unprecedented step, the ruling parties will run on separate lists swaying from their traditional power–sharing agreements. This is a positive step for the democratic evolvement of Kurdistan and means that the KDP and PUK have to fight their own respective corners, the strength of both sides will be clear to gauge and ultimately no side will need to “carry” the other.

The second key area is whether the Change Movement (Goran) can better the 25 seats it managed to achieve in 2009, particularly at the expense of the PUK in their traditional Sulaimaniya stronghold. Jockeying for votes in Sulaimaniya province has been as fierce as 2009 and the outcome will transform the destiny of either party. Finally, elections will be held under a semi-open electoral system.

Kurdistan finds itself with a new and expectant generation who are harder to appease and demand more from the government. The government has been under pressure to tackle corruption, provide reforms, improve public services, ensure transparency and afford more opportunities for the youth. The election battle will hinge on undecided voters – have the ruling parties made good on their promises in the last 4 years and made enough progress on well-documented areas of improvement and if the voters believe otherwise, are they convinced that Goran can take Kurdish politics to the new level?

The advent of a strong opposition party was a boost for democracy in the Kurdistan Region.  The parliamentary sessions may have been much tenser, squabbling more common place and political agreements less straightforward, but Kurdistan needed the angle of political rivalry and less certain decision making. A firm opposition also ups the political ante and ensures ruling powers are not complacent.

However, despite the lofty electoral goals they have set, doubts remain whether Goran can step up from an opposition force to a new force ready for governance and legislative authority.

The current elections will also be unique for the uncertainty not just before the polls but also long after it. This makes coalitions, compromises and negotiations all the more delicate. It is unlikely that any party will assume enough votes to form a government alone.

The Islamic parties, who attained 10 seats in 2009 are likely to increase on this figure. Although, much of the talk of future governments has resided on the ruling parties and Goran, the seats of the Islamic parties will provide a key angle to the political makeshift of parliament.

 

The KDP may still attain the most votes with a core support base in Duhok and Erbil and with their dominant mark on the political, economic and strategic map of Kurdistan, but it will need to work with the PUK or Goran in forming a new government.

Due to wider spread of seats, even a coalition between the PUK, Goran and other opposition forces to form a new cabinet cannot be discounted.

Without the figurehead of their historic leader, Jalal Talabani, and the safety net of the KDP, the PUK is most exposed and the elections may well prove a turning point for the party.

When the number of seats is more balanced and distributed more tightly, this makes future coalitions more fragile and may lead to political instability. The idea of a government that includes all parties makes sense on paper but will be difficult to maintain in reality. The relationship between Goran and the ruling parties since 2009 has hardly been a rosy affair.

No matter the election outcome, politicians and political parties must not lose perspective of their ultimate duty of serving Kurds and Kurdistan.

Political competiveness, disagreements and tension is fine to a certainty extent, but it must not jeopardise unity or weaken the Kurdish hand in an already volatile region. Kurds have much left to achieve at home and abroad, narrow-minded party interests must not compromise the Kurdish hand at a critical historical juncture for Kurds and the Middle East.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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The Kurdish angle a paramount part of any Middle Eastern debate

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The much heralded “Arab Spring” has swiftly morphed into an Arab nightmare. The successive lauded popular uprisings across the Middle East were to an extent only the end of the beginning and not a quick-fire solution to the complex network of Middle Eastern disputes.

The aftermath of the Arab Spring has been far bloodier, protracted and troublesome than many expected. The new Middle Eastern horizon has brought with it new crises and new rules. One in which the US and the West are struggling to take a view on.

The uprising in Syria has unearthed a deadly civil war that has directly or indirectly sucked in most players of the Middle East. The short-lived euphoria over the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt has been replaced by social turmoil and a deep-rooted battle over political Islam that threatens to send Egypt into full blown conflict. The removal of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya was seen as reality straightforward by the West but his removal has witnessed more instability and violence. In Tunisia, an oppositional leader has been assassinated in renewed friction.

All the while in Iraq, sectarian violence threatens to return to levels not seen since the peak of 20007.

The rapid plunging of the Middle East into conflict has drawn many analysts to the roots of conflict, the role of Western powers in sowing the seeds of today’s strife in the aftermath of the First World War and historical vendettas.

But while typically the arguments point to the artificial boundaries of Middle East and sectarian fault-lines, the greatest travesty of the Middle East is often ignored – the failure to give the Kurds, the fourth largest nation in the Middle East, a nation of their own.

Too often the recent Middle Eastern fault lines are ascribed to Sunni-Shiite sectarian conflict and secular versus political Islam; somewhat replacing the old focus on the Arab-Israeli struggle.

Conflicts in Syria and Iraq are narrowed to sectarianism. The polarisation of Turkey is generalised as between Islamists and those who uphold the mystical secular foundations of the republic.

Yet it is the selfish and ruthless carving of the Kurdish lands that will always serve as a critical destabilisation factor in the Middle East. The ethnic angle of the Middle Eastern conflict is not just between Jews and Arabs. It’s a travesty that in the 21st century that the Kurds have the unfortunate distinction of been the largest nation without a state.

It’s remarkable that the Kurds have to struggle for even “minority” rights in the lands of the forefathers, yet so much of the world’s focus is on Arab strife and Islamist positioning in governance. The Arabs view the lack of a 22nd state in Palestine as a great injustice whilst the Kurds are often viewed suspiciously or as overreaching when seeking rights. This sums up why equitable dealing of arguments or disputes is non-starter in the Middle East.

Syria is viewed as a confrontation between the Alawite minority and Sunni majority, whilst the Kurds who were roped into the state boundaries are often overlooked.

The redrawing of the Middle Eastern map is not just a necessity but a natural unravelling that would always happen at some point. Iraq is the starting point for such unravelling, with Kurds finally able demonstrate strategic and political clout in terms of new geography.

Yes, the new Middle East is hardly the advert for harmony and communal peace, but all that has been done is to let the cat out of the bag. All the problems and ingredients for conflict where always there, but they were caged and held tightly by dictatorial regimes supported by the West.

The Middle East is at an acute cross road, unfortunately with players intent on resolving differences the region knows all too well – conflict.

Ironically, as the West has found out bitterly in Iraq and Egypt, democracy and religion is not always the perfect tonic. What happens when the people select a party or system of government that the West never wants or fears?

It will take decades for the dust from the new Middle East to settle, but contained for so long it won’t be easy for such a crisis zone filled with high emotion, history and natural resources to take its new shape.

But let there be no doubt – the Kurdish question is central to any prospects of real peace and stability in the new Middle East.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Political crisis must not compromise ultimate mission of serving Kurds and greater Kurdistan

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Gripped by quarrels, division and uncertainty, the past few months has hardly been a golden period for Kurdish politics.

However, the prospect of parliamentary and presidential elections against the backdrop of a bitter dispute between ruling parties and the opposition over the draft Kurdish constitution which if passed would have allowed Massaud Barzani to serve another 2 terms as President, threatened to severely deepen the political and social divide.

Kurdistan is currently surrounded by regional and sectarian turmoil in Syria, Iraq and Turkey and the last thing it needs is greater disunity or a crisis of its own that would consume much of its energy internally at a critical juncture in its history.

The upcoming elections would certainly serve as a critical gauge for KDP, PUK and Gorran. Any pre-election public outcry, anger or propaganda could easily sway voters. For the KDP and especially with the greater Kurdistan project in full swing, at the current time any president other than Barzani would be unacceptable.

For the PUK, who has seen its votes dwindle since 2009 when Gorran took ascendancy and with the illness to Jalal Talabani increasing visibility of intra-party divide, the next elections are a vital gauge. At a sensitive time, it needs the help of its old-ally in the KDP and thus a strategic deal with the KDP in the current political climate was win-win.

For Gorran, the next elections could either make or break the movement. Whilst it secured a respectable number of votes in 2009, it is not certain whether it can sustain or increase the current voter base. Much of it hinges on the public perception of the ruling parties particularly the PUK and whether those who switched allegiance from PUK to Gorran in 2009 believe that Gorran has delivered sufficiently.

Gorran’s best bet is a public uproar or a political crisis that works against the ruling parties. Certainly there has already been plenty of emotion, animosity and divide to stir tensions in Kurdistan and polarise society.

It was no surprise amidst acute tensions between the opposition and the ruling parties in the past several months that the decision by the Kurdistan parliament to extend the current parliamentary session for two months and specifically to extend the term of Massoud Barzani’s presidency by two years would generate a new storm.

Even the parliamentary session was engulfed with bitter tension and fist-cuffs between rival politicians.

The decision by parliament that was ratified by Barzani creates yet more ingredients for political hostility. Any subsequent protests or public discontent will only raise the stakes.

With no imminent deal in-sight over the constitution, the ruling parties viewed this as best way to maneuverer out of an even greater crisis.

By extending Barzani’s term by two years, KDP get their wish of retaining Barzani at a critical time and PUK are provided some breathing space to politically re-arm ahead of a critical battle with Gorran at the upcoming polls. Of course, in return for their support in extending Barzani’s term as president, the PUK will expect help in kind in retaining the Iraqi presidency.

It also soothes those in the PUK circles who were in favour of amending the constitution.

With the PUK and KDP running on separate lists and with much political jockeying and hurdles around the corner, the next elections remains the game changer for the Kurdish political landscape.

Whilst the parliamentary move will hardly appease all parties, it was deemed the best out of a series of difficult options. It affords some breathing space to strike a consensus on the constitution which if put to a referendum on the eve of elections as originally planned would have almost certainly handicapped Kurdistan politically.

With talk of Gorran, KDP, PUK and other parties, it is very easy to miss the bigger picture. All political parties and politicians are voted solely to serve the Kurds who voted for them and greater Kurdistan. It is important that party agendas do not sway away from the greater needs of Kurdistan.

Kurdistan has grown in strategic and economic power but is still shrouded by disputes with Baghdad, vital energy projects unfinished and a regional flame that is intensifying by the day.

In this light and in the absence of true rivals with broad national support, Barzani remains the key figure and leader for the Kurds.

However, at the same time, democracy entails that no person is indispensable and more importantly beyond the two years any extension must strictly be in the form of legislature voted in by the people.

Either way, as much as politicians can compromise, consult or wrangle, it is the people on the ground that should ultimately decide who governs and how they would like to be governed.

 

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Kurdistan to Maliki – your last (last) chance?

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As Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki landed in Erbil to chair a rare but symbolic meeting of the Iraqi cabinet in the Kurdish capital and discuss a number of issues with the Kurdish leadership, expectations appeared high.

However, Maliki has shown political shrewdness when backed against a corner in the past, making concessions, striking agreements, renewing promises and proposing committees when the heat has been on, only to prove that rhetoric prevailed over real action and practical steps.

A delegation to Baghdad led by Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani in May culminated in a decision to form seven committees all geared towards addressing specific issues between Kurdistan and Baghdad which also ended the boycott of Kurdish MPs in Baghdad.

The committees, to be directly by Maliki and Barzani, include ones to oversee reviews of the federal budget, draft oil and gas law, article 140 and overseeing of parliamentary work and Baghdad and Erbil relations.

Kurdistan Massaud Barzani emphasized that the latest round of negotiations are a final chance and that Kurdistan will be forced to seek a “new form of relations” with the central government in Baghdad if negotiations fail to resolve key disputes.

The issues between the KRG and Baghdad have become so deep-rooted, cyclic and predictable that it is hard to see why this time around will be any different.

The Kurdistan leadership has played a role in reaching the current predicament and the lack of progress on historic issues such as disputed terrotories. KRG has rubber-stamped two terms of power for Maliki in return for strategic partnerships.

Yet several years since the first Iraqi elections and over 10 years since the liberation of Iraq, the strategic agreements have not been fully implemented and if anything disputes have become more protracted, entrenched and distant from resolution. Kurdistan should have given a “last chance” to Maliki and Baghdad many years ago.

Maliki was accused of centralist tendencies, inciting sectarian tensions and foot-dragging on constitutional implementation in his first term of power, never mind the second term (or even in a third term if he gets his way).

The relations between Erbil and Baghdad have been shrouded by formation of committees, agreements and political road-maps. But how many more meetings and committees do the Kurd want to participate in?

Kirkuk and disputed territories is a prime example. It is understandable if there are technical delays to implementing complex constitutional articles. But should there be a delay of several months or 6 years? And since there were delays, any sincere government would adopt a plan to meet its legal obligations in the quickest possible time.

This is the same for hydrocarbon law which has gathered dust since 2007, status of Peshermrga forces, national budget etc. In the case of Kirkuk, even a national census, delayed on so many occasions, would have at least marked one achievement. Even that has been sidelined as Baghdad knows it would serve as a de-facto referendum on disputed territories.

Now is the time for practical steps and firm timelines for implementation of issues by the Kurdistan leadership. Until Baghdad resolves disputed territories, KRG and Peshmerga forces have the right to jointly govern and control these regions.

The bitter Sunni protests and the latest cycle of sectarian violence has redrawn sharp lines between Shiites and Sunni and coupled with sectarian polarisation in the wider region, may prove to be even greater than peaks reached in 2007.

Maliki can ill-afford to carry on antagonising ever corner of Iraq (including his own Shiite alliance) and for Iraqi Kurds the time is ripe to seek real concessions. If Baghdad refused to succumb to Kurdish demands when it is at its knees, it will never implement agreements at its peak.

The recent provincial elections only served to highlight the deepening polarisation of the county and weak political picture. Forming a new government and choosing a Prime Minister after elections in 2014 will prove as daunting as ever.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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New Turkish oil venture signals growing clout of Kurdistan

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As the Middle Eastern socio-political landscape has unraveled in recent years, it has transformed the one-time frosty relations between the Iraqi Kurds and Turkey into one of the most important alliances in the region.

The Arab Spring and the rapidly changing power makeup of the Middle East may have played a key part, but money and the power of economy have echoed louder. Trade between the Kurdistan Region and Turkey is reaching unprecedented heights, none more so than in the field of energy.

The booming economy of Kurdistan is underpinned by its status as the last great oil frontier.  Kurdistan has billion of barrels of oil reserves and remarkably with the majority of the oil not even discovered.

With the oil rush in Kurdistan, Turkey, with an ever-growing thirst for oil to fuel its heated economy, does not want to remain idle while global players capitalise on immense opportunities on its door step.

The growing energy ties between Ankara and Erbil, has not only resulted in strategic and historic contracts between the two governments setting the stage for a rapid rise in trade, but it has slowly led to intertwined destinies of the Turks and Kurds. This drive has led to great unease in Washington, who ironically, only few years ago were frantically trying to reconcile both parties.

The win-win partnership on an economic scale is in tune with the need to redraw strategic alliances and political balance of power in the Middle East. Turkey needs the stable, secular and Western-leaning Kurdistan, in the midst of a Syrian civil war that threatens Turkey at every turn, Shiite domination in Baghdad rekindling animosity and insurgency amongst Sunnis and not forgetting Iran with its nuclear ambitions and its hands deep in regional struggles.

While Syria took center stage in the diplomatic flurries of recent days, leading to the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Washington, the announcement by Erdogan as he left on the plane for Washington of a partnership between the state run Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) and US giants Exxon-Mobil to jointly explore for oil in Kurdistan, has significant long-term ramifications.

Not only does Kurdistan and Turkey have the basis for direct exports with the implementation of new oil pipelines, but this places Turkey directly at the grass-roots of the Kurdish oil drive.

According to Erdogan “there’s nothing more normal, more natural than Turkey… to take a step that is based on mutual benefit.” In recent months Ankara has strongly defended their agreements with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and has also in turn backed the Kurdish rights under the current Iraqi constitution.

The Kurdish oil boom is long the source of Baghdad ire, which views control of oil exports and unresolved nature disputed of territories, as the last placenta by which they can reign in and influence Kurdistan. With contracts with some of the biggest oil companies in the world and strategic agreements with Turkey, Baghdad’s unease has gone into overdrive.

In reality, the oil majors and Turkey know fully well the risks. The ire of Baghdad is considered secondary to their lucrative opportunities and the strategic and political benefits that such moves harness.

These parties are essentially choosing Kurdistan over Baghdad and such measures only makes the KRG more confident in its economic growth, its regional standing and in its stand-off with Baghdad.

Baghdad may have been playing hardball over payments to foreign oil companies, constitutional interpretations and national budget as well as over disputed territories, but with its hands full in the fresh Sunni uprising, maintaining a shaky national coalition and national elections around the corner, it needs the Kurds and Nouri al-Maliki’s government may have to rethink its policies on Kurdistan.

Kurdistan’s message is simple, it will drive on with its national programme and lofty goals, with or without Baghdad.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Interview with KRG Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir – Head of the Department of Foreign Relations

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The Kurdistan Region, at a crucial juncture in its history, is enjoying increasing strategic and economic prominence, growing global interest and recognition as key constituents of the new Middle East. At the same time, Kurdistan is facing a number of pressing issues such as a crisis of relations with Baghdad and a Syrian civil war on its border.

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel of the Kurdish Globe spoke with KRG Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir, Head of the Department of Foreign Relations, on a number of key issues.

Kak Falah, thank you very much for your time with the Kurdish Globe. Let’s start with KRG relationships with Baghdad which are at a critical stage. What is your view on the current crisis and what is your demand from Baghdad?

Not only is the current crisis between Baghdad and Erbil at a critical stage, indeed the political process as a whole is in a deep and dangerous crisis. President Masoud Barzani has recalled all the Kurdish MP’s and ministers from Baghdad to come to Erbil for consultations and discuss the possible options that can be taken. This decision is not solely due to the budget being passed without an agreement with the Kurdish MP’s in Baghdad. This decision is only the latest in a string of moves made by the State of the Law bloc and Prime Minister Maliki against the people of the Kurdistan Region. It is no secret that he has opened fronts with not only us but with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and some of the Iraqi Shi’ite political parties and the main issue which we are all united against is his insistence of making decisions unilaterally with no respect for the constitution, power sharing principles or agreements that he has signed. This will endanger the democratic process and the implementation of federalism in Iraq.

Our demands from Baghdad have been honest and consistent and while we have to be part of the process we are not aware and they are not transparent. Regarding the budget, every year we are humble and transparent in our demands and yet we are painted as if we have excessive demands. What type of unity is Mr. Maliki trying to promote when he does not wish to allocate funds to the Peshmerga, who are part of the Iraqi defense system, protect the borders as well as the internal security of the Kurdistan Region which by extension means protecting Iraq.

In addition, the oil and gas issues are still an issue and it is unfortunate that in 2013, Mr. Maliki still wants the Kurdistan Region to be at the economic mercy of Baghdad. According to Article 117 (3) of Iraq’s constitution, “Regions and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share of the national revenues sufficient to discharge its responsibilities and duties, but having regard to its resources, needs and the percentage of its population.” This is why we have gone ahead with our decision to work towards economic independence so that the people of Kurdistan are no longer at the mercy of one party rule which is sadly the case in Baghdad.

Mr. Maliki controls in addition to the army the security apparatus, the judiciary and even the independent institutions such as the Central Bank and IHEC have been attacked in his attempts to bring those closer to his control.

With Dijla Operations Command established by Maliki and signification mobilisation of forces on both sides, if the situation deteriorates any further, is there a real danger of all-out war between the Kurds and Arabs?

The danger of an all-out war between Erbil and Baghdad is quite remote and rest assured that if any violence were to break out, it would be due to Prime Minister Maliki’s policies and his forces making the first move. Our Peshmerga are stationed for defensive purposes because our history has shown that some of Iraq’s individuals will not hesitate to turn weapons against us in attempts to deflect from their own shortcomings. Mr. Maliki attempts to use Dijla forces and the Iraqi Army not only to threaten our security and stability, but to turn public opinion in Iraq against us and to attempt to deflect from his failure to combat corruption, provide basic services and bring stability to the rest of Iraq after seven years being in charge. Fortunately, the regional situation along with developments on the ground mean that an internal war in 2013 is highly unlikely and Mr. Maliki is slowly realizing that negotiations, not violence are the only way to solve any political disputes between us and Baghdad.

It is now been almost 10 years, a decade, since the fall of Saddam. The Kurds have been patient, but there seems to be no real movement on article 140, a national census, a national hydrocarbon law, oil export payments etc. When will Kirkuk be returned to the Kurds? How patient are the Kurds willing to be on Kirkuk and these other key articles?

Indeed it has been ten years and sadly we have been misled by many on the issue of Article 140. We believed strongly that dialogue, adherence to the constitution and its implementation would eventually take place, but instead we see voices today speaking of Kurdistan’s demands being excessive, when on the contrary we have been extremely patient and could easily have taken full control of these areas ourselves without the need for consensus. We do not want a short term solution rather we need to solve this once and for all, and we believe that the international community as well as the United Nations need to play a more active role in the support of Article 140 and in part they have to be blamed for this issue not being solved so far.  For example, the people of the Kurdistan Region have continuously asked for a census to take place across all of Iraq, yet the other political parties keep making excuses. At the same time we are seeing a shift in Sunni Arabs who are starting to also ask for a census in order to be able to ascertain the real numbers of Iraq’s population and from there be able to address their needs.

Our patience is running thin and the recent meetings chaired by President Barzani will result in decisions being made not only regarding the budget but about sidelining Kurds not only from the political process but also denying us our rights enshrined in Iraq’s constitution.

What is your view of the recent wave of Sunni protects in Iraq, is their a danger that the bloody sectarian civil war that peaked in 2007 will be repeated? Does this indicate to you that only way is to create a federal entity for Sunnis?

Iraq’s Arab Sunnis have also been marginalized heavily by Mr. Maliki and his State of the Law coalition and that is why we are constantly in discussions with them and other partners in the Shi’ite community, because the new Iraq belongs to all Iraqis and not to one political party or one sect. There is a real danger of another civil war erupting particularly given Mr. Maliki and his State of the Law members’ comments towards these protesters as well as ignoring many of their legitimate demands. Being a constitutional right, I believe that the Sunni Arabs would be better off with their own federal region and being in control of running their own cities and towns but the decision is up to them and from what I understand some of them do want their own federal region while others think it may be more detrimental for them given their reliance from oil and gas outside their provinces.

The KRG relations with Turkey have been on a rapid rise, with trade, political and energy ties at the forefront. Would you say that as the gap between Kurdistan and Baghdad is growing, that the gap between the Kurds and Turkey is ever closing?

The KRG has an open door policy. The Kurdistan Region would like to establish cultural, economic, political, and educational ties with the international community that mutually benefits both sides, and done within the constitutional framework. 

KRG’s policy towards Baghdad and international community is very clear. The KRG has no policy of enhancing its ties with Ankara or any other member of international community at the expense of Baghdad. There are specific reasons behind the fact that our relations with Ankara are growing while we regularly face setbacks in our ties with Baghdad.

Growing relations between Erbil and Ankara are the result of wise and visionary leadership from both sides. The leaders in Kurdistan and Turkey have wisely chosen for establishing mutually beneficial ties that could equally serve the interests of both sides. These relations will benefit all of Iraq.

On the other side, ties between Erbil and Baghdad are not going on the right direction. Unilateral actions by the Federal Government and lack of commitment to the Erbil agreement raise serious questions about the intention of the Federal Government. We are always for strong relations with the federal government, a government that abides by the constitution and believes in partnership and power sharing and in a federal, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq.

The Kurds were often viewed as potentially the “best friends” of U.S.A in the Middle East, however, it appears that Kurds if anything are somewhat frustrated and annoyed with the US. What is your view of current state of relations between America and Kurdistan? Could Washington do more to resolve disputes with Baghdad, and pressure Baghdad to implement constitutional articles? Does America have a balanced approach to dealing with Iraq?

We appreciate the sacrifices made by the Americans in overthrowing the former Iraqi regime and also to the reconstruction efforts following the removal of that regime.

We are for having good relations with the U.S. Our ties with the U.S are not only limited to political interaction between the two sides. American companies and private sector are contributing to the economic developments in the Region, particularly in the field of energy. However, we are not satisfied with the level of American economic presence and we would like to see more involvement form the American investors and businessmen. 

Iraq is supposed to be a sovereign country and it has to take its matters on its hands. The prime factor behind lack of progress on solving disputes among Iraqi political parties is lack of political will not lack of U.S interference. Without political will, there will be no genuine solutions to the political crisis facing Iraq.

In the midst of the deadly war to topple Bashar Assad, Syrian Kurds have a unique opportunity to determine and govern their own affairs. How is the KRG supporting their ethnic brethren in Syria? Is the situation in Kurdish areas of Syria viewed as an external affair or a Kurdistani affair by the Kurdistan Region leadership?

We are very concerned about what is happening in Syria and it is important for us for two main reasons. Firstly, we share border with Syria and what happens in Syria affects the Kurdistan Region as well. Secondly, there is a sizable Kurdish population in Syria.

We have always encouraged the Kurdish people in Iran, Turkey, and Syria to find peaceful and democratic solutions to their differences with their respective governments. Our position on the Syrian crisis is very clear. We encourage the Kurds in Syria to preserve their unity and realize their rights in the future state of Syria. We call for an end to bloodshed and violence in Syria and we are for democratic changes through peaceful means. 

What is the government’s stance in terms of reforms demanded by the opposition parties, including the draft constitution?

The government and Parliament are empowered by the vote of the people of Kurdistan Region. We do not claim perfection and we are mindful of our shortcomings. The KRG is committed to make meaningful reforms and to improve governance. We have a democratic system and we are making concerted efforts to enhance governance, decrease bureaucracy, and increase efficiency.

Our leadership believes that there has to be a national consensus on the constitution of the Kurdistan Region. The KRG Prime Minister, Nechirvan Barzani has consistently reiterated that the government has no red lines towards the reforms demanded by the people of the Kurdistan Region.

Finally, fast forward 10 years, what kind of a Kurdistan do you see?

It is hard to predict the future but I can proudly say that the Kurdistan Regional Government is making serious efforts and taking meaningful steps to provide a prosperous life for the people of the Region. Domestically, we are trying to provide the highest possible standard of life for our people through building the infrastructure, enhancing our economy and developing our institutions, ensuring the rule of law, promoting civil rights, and investing in our young generation through various programs such as Human Capacity Development Program. 

Today there exist international agreements that shape economic relations between countries of the world, and there exists a time frame to implement all these economic agreements whether it is related to industry, trade or services. We should not wait, rather we should act fast in order to attract foreign direct investment.  

Externally, our objective is to establish cultural, economic, educational, and political ties with international community. We welcome and value the diplomatic and economic presence of foreign countries in Kurdistan Region.  Establishing ties with international community gives us the opportunity to increase understanding not only about our past but also about our vision for future and how international community can contribute to political, cultural and economic developments of our region.  We are willing to learn from the experience of international community and ready to utilize their knowledge and expertise in further developing our region.

Our first and last goal is to ensure the rights of our citizens, men, women, youth and children. The individual is the foundation of progress and it is that individual who can guarantee the success of our institutions and consequently of the Kurdistan Region.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

The Kurdish exodus of 1991 – the plight that transformed Kurdish destiny

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Triumph at time of great adversity – how national despair gave birth to the Kurdistan Region

This week marks the 22nd anniversary of the great Kurdish exodus of 1991 that was triggered by a cold-hearted retaliation by Saddam Hussein, resulting in a humanitarian plight that Kurds will never forget.

After popular uprisings in both Kurdish and Shiite areas in the aftermath of the First Gulf War, encouraged and then quickly abandoned by an idle U.S., Saddam used the full-force of his arsenal to rapidly quell the uprisings, ruthlessly killing thousands and driving two million Kurds to the Turkish and Iranian borders.

Thousands of Kurds died of starvation, disease and harsh conditions, if not the military might of Baathist forces.

The timing of the latest act of mass repression against the Kurds could not be more ironic. It was merely weeks after the US led coalition swiftly came to the aid of their oil rich friends in Kuwait, days after President George Bush encouraged Iraqis to take matters into their own hands and to compound the misery of the Kurds, it was just three years after the great genocide of Halabja in 1988.

The already ill-fated Kurdish plight undoubtedly hit a fresh low in 1991 and reinforced the feeling amongst Kurds that they have no friends but the mountains. Indeed it was those mountains that were the source of refuge in 1991 when in spite of the growing international media coverage on the Kurdish disaster, the world’s powers laboured far too long to respond.

It’s hard to forget that for their short-sighted strategic interests, the West played a blind-eye to the atrocities committed against the Kurds and in spite of his unforgivable crimes against humanity, kept Saddam in power.

In spite of the immense evidence at the time, the United Nations Sub-Committee on Human Rights inexplicably voted in August 1988 not to condemn Iraq for human rights violations.

All the while, Saddam was further strengthened with the West providing new war planes, more advanced scud capabilities and not forgetting the ingredients for the very chemical weapons that were used against the Kurds.

The thousands of Kurdish refugees were an unwelcome site on the borders for Turks battling their own restive Kurdish population and Kurds endured further pain that they should never have faced upon arriving to what they saw as safety. How ironic that Kurds evicted from their own homes, were treated like foreigners and unwanted guests in the other parts of greater Kurdistan, the lands of their forefathers.

At times greatest of triumphs come at times of great adversity and so it proved for the valiant Kurds. The bravery in the face of the Kurdish uprising of 1991 and the tough conditions for the millions that fled soon after with crucial international spotlight that followed is now a milestone in the Kurdish renaissance and the ushering of a new era in their history.

Of course, great credit must still be placed to the coalition forces and in particular the then UK Prime Minister, John Major, who despite common objection to his stance broke ranks and played a great hand in realising his vision of a Kurdish Safe Haven and the effectively the birth of the Kurdistan Region.

However, as much as Kurds will always be grateful for the ousting of Saddam, at any time for that matter, it cannot be overlooked that for far too long Kurds were left to fend for themselves and in cases such as the Algiers Accord of 1975 fed to the lions.

The Iraqi liberation of 2003 came years too late for the Kurds. It was the strategic interests of the West and the Arab world that led to the mass support for Saddam, particularly in the bloody Iran-Iraq war. Saddam was viewed as a secular bulwark against Islamist revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini and the resurgence of a powerful Iran.

The moral of the story is that as grateful as the Kurds are to the Americans, the U.S. had more pretext to liberate Iraqi in 1991 than 2003 and they only toppled Saddam after the monster that the West created could no longer be contained.

Fast forward 22 years since the great exodus, and Kurdish fortunes could not be more different. The sacrifices of those who fled and of the Peshmerga who bravely battled Saddam were not in vain and indeed it was exactly those actions that make the Kurdistan of today possible.

2003 may have heralded the start of the golden age for Kurdistan but it was 1991 that was the true spark and the “Spring” that transformed the destiny of Kurdistan. It is Kurdish sacrifice, spirit, bravery and desire that pushed the Kurds over the line, more than coalition forces ever did.

Now 2013 marks a new passage in the history of the Kurds and the beginning of a fresh dawn. The Spring Equinox or Newroz always had a special place in people’s hearts and in the numerous milestones it has heralded in recent years. The talk in the Kurdistan Region of today is about economic boom, new construction, oil infrastructure and prosperity. Meanwhile, the talk in Turkey is about peace, breaking taboos and finally taking bold steps to resolving the age-old Kurdish problem. All the while, the Syrian Kurds, breaking from the shadows of their Kurdish brethren, are now key components of both the Syrian and Kurdish national and political landscape.

Times have changed and with the onset of the Arab Spring and the unravelling of the Middle East, the Kurds have risen in prominence. 

The Kurdish determination and never-say-die spirit is the very reason for their resurgence today and the fruits of the labours of Kurds in all respective parts of Kurdistan.

But lofty heights and new dawns must bring a firm acknowledgment and great appreciation of the past. The Kurds cannot and will not ever forget the tragedies and travesties of yesteryears.

The Kurdish best friends remain their own brethren and indeed their mystical mountains.

It is all the more ironic that having played such a great role in the repression of the Kurds, some Arabs in Baghdad remain unrepentant and indeed despise the Kurdish economic and strategic drive.

Even America, who stood idle for so long while the Kurds were persecuted, now look to growing Kurdish power and autonomy with weariness, only not to upset their Iraqi friends and the balance of their interests in the Middle East.

The growing energy ties between Ankara and Kurdistan, promoted just this week by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is viewed as the source of Iraq’s disintegration, while America and the West can clearly see it is the policies of Baghdad and specifically Nouri al-Maliki that has been the real wedge in Iraq.

The Kurds must take lessons from their past and ensure their destiny remains firmly in their own hands. The dependence on Baghdad for oil revenues and oil exports is one last umbilical cord that Kurds must cut.

The building of new pipelines and new energy deals with Turkey are protected by Iraq’s constitution.

Kurds must not follow policies to suit their American allies or the wishes of Baghdad but those that benefit the Kurdish nation.

After decades of repression, destruction of thousands of villages and chemical bombings, while much of the world’s powers remained idle, Kurdistan deserves that much.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.