Category Archives: Kurdish Globe

Kurdistan’s hour of reckoning

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Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Kurdistan Region has risen in prominence and prosperity on a continuous basis. The region was transformed in a short period of time but no project is ever smooth-sailing in the volatile Middle East and Kurdistan faces new obstacles and perils that threaten to derail its development.

Since January 2014, numerous new challenges have come to the fore. An economic crisis has been in motion since former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stopped budget payments to Kurdistan. Even under new premier Haider al-Abadi these budget payments have been rarely on time let alone to the full allocation, in spite of an oil export agreement that was struck in December 2014 but rapidly disintegrated.

Even as Kurdistan has started oil exports independently, plummeting oil prices have only added to the economic woe – not least due to the 1.8 million refugees residing in Kurdistan and in turn threatening the demographic make-up of the region and the brutal war with the Islamic State (IS) since June 2014 that stretches across a 1000km border.

Add Turkey resuming bombardment of the PKK in Kurdistan territory and the situation in Turkey ominously pointing to a return to the dark days of the 1990’s, and you would think that Kurdistan has more of it share of headaches and struggles.

However, the icing on the cake of the pressures facing Kurdistan is a bitter political feud over the fate of Massoud Barzani whose presidential term expired on 20th August with the main political parties no closer to a resolution over the fate of the presidency.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has sought a second extension of Barzani’s presidency after the current one expired citing the precarious predicament facing the region.

On the other hand, the Change Movement (Gorran) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and other political parties are not only opposed to any extension but are simultaneously promoting a change to the presidential system, meaning that the president would be selected by and accountable to the parliament in the future as opposed to selection by a popular vote, thereby seeking to dilute presidential powers.

Discussions have painstakingly dragged on and no consensus remains in sight for now. Gorran have insisted that the parliament speaker fills the void as interim President until elections can be held but the KDP are adamant that no such vacuum exists and that until consensus can be reached between all parties, Barzani remains as president with full powers.

The disappointing situation casts an unavoidable shadow over Kurdistan and side-steps from the core issue of fighting IS and resolving the economic hardships. It begs the question why the political parties could not reach consensus in the two years since Barzani’s term was first extended and why difficult negotiations at the eleventh hour are required.

No one can deny that Barzani cannot remain President indefinitely. However, other than various crises facing the region that demands stability and unity, it is not clear who the real candidates are for the role as president and when any voting can be held.

The US and European allies have favored continuity over any uncertainty that may undermine the crucial role played by the Kurds in the fight against IS.

In any case, not matter what is eventually agreed, the region must address the issues today and not postpone them yet again – it need a clear political roadmap and avoid last minute crisis.

If the presidential system is to be changed, then it must be via the appropriate parliamentary and democratic channels.

Democracy is indeed a process of evolution and Kurdistan has the opportunity to show its political maturity and enshrine its status as a major strategic force of the new Middle Eastern landscape. It’s time to demonstrate readiness to become fully independent and serve as a beacon of hope to the rest of the Middle East.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Independent oil exports – a new leaf for Kurdistan Region and International Oil Companies?

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Sitting on more than 45 billion barrels of oil reserves, Kurdistan has enormous potential but with the region also awash with great problems, it has faced a difficult predicament.

A deadly war with the Islamic State along an extended frontline and the reality of housing 1.8 million refugees is only made worse with the long running budget issues between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

Baghdad effectively halted budget payments under former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in January 2014 and a subsequent agreement last December under current premier Haider al-Abadi has seen the Kurds receive a fraction of their agreed entitlement.

This vicious cycle has meant that local salaries were often not paid, let alone the millions owed to International Oil Companies (IOC) under respective Production Sharing Contracts.

The last remaining umbilical cord that Baghdad has over the Kurdistan Region is control of oil exports but after months of feuding and growing impact on the economy of Kurdistan, the KRG had no choice but to resume independent oil exports in recent weeks and receive proceeds from the sales directly.

This finally puts matters into Kurdish hands and rather than pleading for budget payments from Baghdad each month, they control their own destiny.

Plummeting oil prices have hardly helped but this can be offset with increased daily production.

As budget payments have threatened to put a stranglehold over the region, the balance sheets of established IOCs in the region such as Genel Energy and Gulf Keystone Petroleum have fared badly.

These so called smaller companies took the risk to explore for oil and were rewarded with significant discoveries, potentially making them majors in their own right. However, as share prices for both companies clearly show, potential in the ground is no consolation for lack of payments.

In this light, the KRG statement this week that promises IOCs a share of the oil revenues from September was a welcome boost that received much publicity. The announcement is a major milestone for such companies even if the finer details remain unclear such as exactly what these payments will amount to and how arrears amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars will be paid back.

The KRG has eyes on rapidly expanding production from the circa 500kbpd to 1 million bpd but such a plan relies heavily on IOCs and their ability to implement an infrastructure capable of supporting new outputs.

This is easier said than done if the focus of the IOCs is on getting by each month, let alone placing further investment in infrastructure.

Nevertheless, the recent announcement sets the platform for growth and stability. It will take time but with Kurdistan in control of its own destiny, such targets and commitments are very much achievable.

Independent oil exports allow Kurdistan and IOCs to turn a new page and this can only be good for the numerous foreign companies waiting on the sidelines to invest.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

With eyes on a new election, Erdogan takes a dangerous gamble by attacking PKK

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After decades of a bloody war between the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and Ankara, lessons are not been learnt with the peace process effectively dead in the ground and all the signs pointing to a swift return to the dark days of the past.

Decades of assimilation policies failed and now after the death of thousands on both sides of the divide, billions of dollars wasted and wounds that become more difficult to repair by the day, the lessons are been ignored. A military solution simply cannot serve either side.

But with Syrian mess becoming messier with Turkey joining fray against the Islamic State (IS) but simultaneously attacking PKK bases in Iraq, the ramifications of the renewed Ankara-PKK bloodshed goes well beyond the Turkish borders.

Many point to Turkey joining the IS fight as a sideshow to the main priority of hitting the PKK and undermining the Syrian Kurds whose territory and autonomy has grown with a series of victories over IS.

If Turkey fully commits to the fight against IS in Syria then it is no doubt a game changer, especially with the US-led coalition gaining vital access to Incirlik air base.

But the agreement poses many questions. Which force will man the proposed buffer zone? There are increasingly calls for a Syrian Turkmen force to take the lead in filling the vacuum, in which case it reinforces Kurdish anxiety that the buffer scheme is merely designed to curtail their expansion west of Kobane.

Furthermore, there are open contradictions on the role of People’s Protection Units (YPG) in the coalition campaign. Some Turkish officials have made it clear that coalition jets from Turkish bases will not be assisting YPG forces, whilst White House officials have stated to the contrary.

US is in a difficult position over the YPG who have been vital in stopping IS across the north with US air support.

It becomes difficult to differentiate the YPG and PKK forces when the PKK fighters have played a big role in Syria. Such PKK fighters may well shift their focus back to Turkey as tit-for-tat retaliation gathers speed.

It becomes clear that the “package” agreed between Turkey and US would comprise of Turkish action against the PKK as much as Washington has denied.

There have been skirmishes before between the PKK and government forces that saw the peace process intact. The decision now to open a new front has wide political connotations.

The People’s Democratic Party (HDP) led by Selahattin Demirtaş was the main benefactor of the June 2015 national elections securing a historic 13% of the vote.

Erdogan has eyes firmly on a new election as early as November as coalition talks point to increasing failure. This gives the Justice and Development Party (AKP) party a second lifeline to readjust and take power again.

The renewed conflict opens up the nationalist debate, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is seeking to muster nationalist voters he lost with a new hardline view on the PKK. By ending the peace process, Erdogan achieves what the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) promised, potentially luring MHP voters.

HDP stands to become the biggest losers in any new election. It successfully wooed liberal, non-Kurdish votes but is increasingly taking political center of the PKK fallout. Erdogan has tried to tie a political noose around Demirtaş and fierce rhetoric emanating from the HDP camp as they defend the Kurdish position implicates them further with the PKK.

Even an investigation was recently launched against Demirtaş for allegedly provoking protesters last October over Kobane.

If HDP drop below the 10% threshold then the AKP gains dramatically in parliament. But if HDP politicians have legal cases launched against them, if any imprisonment is imposed or if the HDP is suddenly sidelined, then the bloodshed will simply intensify.

Either way, the AKP is taking a very dangerous gamble.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

As UK tourists instructed to evacuate Tunisia, is UK succumbing to terrorist wishes or does it need to rethink its strategy?

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The devastating attack on the Tunisian beach resort of Sousse by an Islamic State (IS) linked Tunisian militant in June was the worse terror attack on Britons in a decade. In a brutal daylight rampage, Seifeddine Rezgui shot dead 38 with 30 of these Britons.

The attack sent shockwaves across the UK, with harrowing tales of tourists shot dead guarding their loves or in their desperate attempts to escape. As the coffins returned to British shores in recent weeks, the chilling nature of the attack could not be closer.

This placed the British government in an awkward position to react, with extension of air strikes to Syria been discussed by MPs. In recent days, the UK Foreign Office went a step further and advised that all UK tourists should leave Tunisia immediately.

UK Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond’s statement might be contradictory in that another attack was “highly likely” even though they have no firm intelligence on any impeding plot, but the UK government could not afford the backlash if more Britons were caught in the crossfire.

The Sousse attack has put the Tunisian government in a tough predicament. It has increased security across the beaches but now faces the threat that its vital tourism industry, which constitutes approx. 15% of GDP, could be ruined. Hammond defended their advice and stated “more work is needed to effectively protect tourists from the terrorist threat”.

The actions of a few tarnish the lives of millions and the image of a country but that was the intended objective of such attacks. The Tunisian people deserve huge respect for their actions that prevented an even larger massacre with many putting their lives in front of their “guests”.

It was not Syrians or Iraqis dying under the hands of IS but the attacks were much closer to home forcing the EU to rethink its stance on wars in Syria and Iraq.

The attack in Sousse follows the attack in March on Bardo Museum in Tunis which 20 tourists were killed. Tunisia was the trigger for the Arab Spring in 2011 and arguably the only success story of the Arab uprising. It has only recently recovered from the turmoil of such an uprising but with a civil war and Islamic State rampant across the border in Libya, Tunisia is in a precarious position.

It has tried portray itself as a democratic and secular country but at the same time Tunisians comprise the largest source of IS militants.

Ironically, Tunisia only ended years of security state rule in 2011 but are now in the ascendancy towards a new one. The government has been forced into tough action that risks alienating the population. For example, 80 mosques were closed in recent weeks with conservative Muslims feeling unfairly targeted.

Such is the threat emanating from Libya that it has even commissioned a new wall across its eastern border with Libya.

As a result of the UK decision to withdraw tourists, Irish and Danish governments quickly followed suite. Although, other European Government have not gone as far, tourism is already feeling the straining with some hotels almost empty and the ever popular tourist destination, the ruins of ancient Carthage, was reportedly devoid of a single tourist on Friday.

Ultimately, Nabil Ammar, Tunisian ambassador to the UK, is correct in labelling the actions of Westminster as “…what the terrorists want….By damaging the tourism, by having foreigners leaving the country, they damage the whole sector and put so many people out of work and on the streets.”

Evacuating all tourists may seem reactive short-term stance but this is not a solution. What if there was an attack in Morocco, Egypt etc, does the UK just keep adding these countries to its black list or does the Sousse attack serve as a wakeup call to the UK and European governments that their passive policies in Syria have failed and that they must alter their strategy on dealing with the threat of IS?

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Turkish red lines on Rojava will not hold sway

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The gains by the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in recent weeks against the Islamic State (IS) including the capture of the strategically important border town of Tel Abyad was hailed by the US-led coalition but was viewed with alarm and suspicion in Ankara.

In fact such gains have led to persistent rumors of imminent Turkish invasion to create a buffer zone in northern Syria.

The YPG have proved one of the US-led coalitions most effective partners against IS and the seemingly growing US-YPG cooperation has only worsened the blow for a Turkey that has repeatedly stated that it doesn’t differentiate between the IS and PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish forces.

Turkey has responded to the increasing Syrian Kurdish autonomy with a series of red lines. However, in spite of such repeated warnings, the Syrian Kurds have pressed ahead relatively unhindered. They announced autonomous administration in three cantons in 2013 and this autonomy has been expanding in recent months with a series of key gains by the YPG.

Jarablus, a key IS controlled town, which lies just west of Kurdish controlled Kobane and the Euphrates River that divides Kurdish\IS zones, has quickly emerged as another red line for Turkey. The fear is that with any success against the remaining IS foothold on the Turkish border, the Kurds could then bridge the Kobane and Afrin cantons forming a contiguous Kurdish zone across most of Northern Syria.

Clearly for Turkey, IS is second priority to YPG but Turkish anxiety over any notion of Kurdish nationalism is not new. The unraveling of the Middle East has added new sociopolitical and strategic dimensions and the legacy view of the Turkey regarding the Kurds is only a recipe for more instability and confrontation.

The Kurds have viewed with suspicion that Turkey finally moves to control a volatile and instable border just when Kurds assume control of the border zones.

Any prospective invasion will not serve Turkey’s goals, the peace process with its own Kurdish population or the overall situation in Syria.

In many ways the fate of Syrian and Turkish Kurds are intertwined. Strong sentiment of Kurds in Turkey towards Rojava was clear to see with mass protests over Turkish refusal to intervene in Koban under a IS siege.

A Turkish invasion on the door-steps of YPG will add a new unwanted angle to the already complicated Syrian war and will almost certainly kill the already fragile peace process in Turkey. Furthermore, any Turkish attack on IS may sow the seeds for retaliations across Turkey.

In the end, Turkey is unlikely to invade let alone agree a political consensus with no government formed and the strong rhetoric from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is mere saber-rattling and a pressure card against the US. Ankara-Washington relations have been on a downward spiral with US refusal to focus on the removal of Bashar al-Assad and their growing cooperation with the YPG and US belief that Ankara has not done enough to shore up its border.

The Middle East is often a game of red lines but such lines can quickly change. Turkey is seemingly open to somewhat of a rapprochement with the Democratic Union Party (PYD) who dominates power, if they denounce their autonomy and take down Kurdish flags.

Often one’s red line is met with that of another. The Syrian Kurds, after decades of been in the shadows of Arab rule and mass repression, will never abandon their gains or their quest for autonomy rule, especially after their costly sacrifices in such gains.

It is easy to forget that Turkey had set many a red line over the Kurdistan Region and was threatening to invade in the same way as Rojava. Many of these red lines passed with Kurds not only experiencing unprecedented economic ties with Turkey and control of Kirkuk but even outright independence is been discussed with little push back from Turkey.

Autonomous rule is one red line that the Syrian Kurds will not negotiate. Turkey is in a unique position in that it can positively influence Rojava and balance the political landscape. It is true that the PYD is the dominant party, but there are dozens of other parties not affiliated to the PKK or with strong ties to the Kurdistan Region.

Too often in the past, the terrorist card has resulted in narrow nationalist viewpoint and as a result a whole population has suffered. The Kurds have a right to self-defense under IS massacres and a right to decide how they will govern their own affairs.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Kobane massacre shows that double-standards to Syrian Kurdish forces must end

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As the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) forces were celebrating rapid gains against the Islamic State (IS) in the strategically important border town of Tel Abyad and then Ayn Issa, just 50 km from the self-declared IS capital of Raqqa, IS committed one of their worst massacres to date in Kobane.

Disguised as YPG and Free Syrian Army forces, IS units managed to infiltrate the town initiating a number of deadly suicide attacks and then brutally killing at least 146 civilians in a vicious house-to-house hunt. IS fighters managed to occupy a number of buildings and approximately 50 civilians are still held as hostages.

IS intention was never to occupy the town but send out a stark reminder after its recent losses of the damage that it could inflict at a moment’s notice. For the war-ravaged town of Kobane, any sense of normality may never return.

Kobane is a symbol of the Kurdish resistance against IS and one of the few success stories of the US-led coalition that provided pivotal air support and was finally liberated in January after 4 months of intense fighting.

YPG have proved one of the most capable fighting forces against IS but yet find themselves in the tough position where the US has hesitated to directly arm and support and who Turkey merely label as terrorists.

And it is this “terrorist” tag that is becoming an outdated and unfair noose on the Syrian Kurdish population. Turkey has insisted many times that for them both PKK affiliated YPG and IS are the same.

How can the actions of the YPG, which has been instrumental in driving back IS, ever be compared with the mass slaughter of innocent civilians?

More importantly, demarcating a group as terrorists is one thing but a population is another. The Syrian Kurds deserve the support of Turkey and the West. They deserve the right to defend their own lands from massacres such as that in Kobane.

Turkey, other regional powers and US have supported so-called moderate groups within the FSA for years, with US providing arms and training even when the notion of moderates in rebel ranks was as grey or non-existent as ever.

Jaish al-Fatah or the Army of Conquest, the new powerful alliance supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which has made rapid gains in Idlib province in recent months, is augmented by a loose alliance with al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. It is all the more ironic that with the immense brutality of the Syrian war, that definition of moderates and Jihadists has become a relative term.

Yet the Syrian Kurdish gains in recent weeks were quickly met with allegations of ethnic cleansing and land-grabbing to create a new Kurdish state. Syrian Kurdish priority is defense of their lands and people than the lofty dreams of a new state that is been propagated to paint the Syrian Kurdish forces as separatists who are only keen on pursuing their own interests.

There can be no great boost to the Kurdish peace process in Turkey than more Turkish support of the Syrian Kurds. The Kurds form a large part of the Turkish state and support of their brethren across the border can only enhance trust and unity in Turkey.

Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani strongly denounced the attacks on Kobane and urged the US-led coalition to provide greater support to YPG fighters against IS. Barzani stated willingness of the Kurdistan Region to support and aid the Kurds in Kobane and Rojava.

No regional power can stay idle to a human massacre on their door step and international powers must do more to allow the people to defend themselves.

As the recent chilling terrorist attacks in Tunisia on holiday makers, a bomb blast at a Shite –affiliated mosque in Kuwait and an explosion in a chemical factor in France have shown, the battle is far from one confided to Syria and Iraq.

The massacres such that in Kobane are not in a remote far away land, it could easily be on your doorstep.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

HDP’s historic triumph at the polls renews focus on peace process in Turkey

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History was achieved at the polls in Turkey as the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) became the first pro-Kurdish party to enter parliament as it emphatically surpassed the traditionally elusive election threshold with 13% of the vote.

At the same time, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) were the biggest losers even as they amassed the most votes.

The electoral outcome means that Turkey returns to the days of coalition governments and instability that blighted the country prior to the onset of the AKP in 2002. The elections results were also seen as a major dent in Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan quest to amend the constitution and for a stronger presidential system.

The manifestation of 80 seats in parliament in many ways builds a new bridge between East and West of Turkey. For too long, the Kurdish problem was reduced to a terror problem. In fact, various Kurdish parties suffered under the PKK label and were quickly shut.

However, 13% of the national vote is a strong political mandate and not a voice of terror. The people clearly strive for peace and a strong voice in parliament is the vehicle for the Kurdish card to firmly enter Turkish politics.

Importantly, the HDP were able to successfully muster non-Kurdish votes which is important in its ambition to become a progressive party of Turkey.

The peace process became a key battleground between the AKP and HDP as fierce rhetoric resonated on the issue.

The peace process has somewhat stalled ahead of the elections with the PKK not willing to giving up arms outright without certain conditions been met and the AKP not willing to alienate its nationalist voter base by succumbing to PKK demands.

HDP has worked as a key interlocutor with a measure of influence with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, but they have stressed that the power to instigate the giving up of arms is with Ocalan and not them.

HDP leader Selahattin Demirtaş hit back at criticism of interim Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu on the issue of laying down of arms, as heated rhetoric continued in the aftermath of the elections, stating that only Ocalan is capable of this and “Ocalan will make the call, and he is ready in İmralı to do it.”

A HDP delegation is seemingly ready to visit Imrali where there is optimism that Ocalan could set a date for the party’s congress to convene discussions on laying down of arms. Ocalan has undoubted influence but from an isolated prison other wider PKK circles have to be appeased, and it’s not clear how far or how willing a potentially weaker new government in Turkey would be to meeting key demands.

Elusive peace has many obstacles and many foes. Deadly bombings at a HDP rally days before the elections, increasing skirmishes between the PKK and Turkish forces and most recently a number of fatalities as the leader of a charity linked to the Kurdish Islamist political party Huda Par, with traditional animosity with the PKK, was killed.

It is clear so soon after the elections that these provocations are intended to stir unrest in the south east of Turkey and derail peace. This could be from nationalists who want to undermine the success of the HDP at the polls or sideline any peace with the PKK or show that HDP has unsufficient weight to placate the Kurdish region, from Huda Par seeking to stir old tension with the PKK or even elements from the PKK who believe their armed struggle is not over.

Demirtaş lashed out at the lack of government response, “People are taking steps to push the country into a civil war, and the prime minister and president are nowhere to be seen.”

From essential non-existence to a strong role in parliament, the Kurds have a come a long way in Turkey, the implementation of the peace process is now of critical importance for a better Turkey for both Turks and Kurds.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

HDP on cusp of history in Turkey’s elections but price of failure remains high

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For many years, the Kurds suffered a choice of the Kurdistan Workers Party’s (PKK) armed struggle and the repressive policies of successive governments. For the dozens of Kurdish political parties, allegations of been a voice of the PKK and Turkey’s harsh security laws, saw them quickly shut down.

Now ahead of historic general elections on 7th June, the Kurds latest political incarnation, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) led by Selahattin Demirtaş, not only strives to pass the elusive 10 percent election threshold that has so often blighted Kurdish parties but extend its support base to become a Turkish party that is representative of a wide range of groups and not just Kurds.

HDP’s quest to enter parliament as a party and not via the traditional independent candidate route, is seen by many as a gamble but it also demonstrates the growing confidence of the party.

Even as Kurds represent a large section of the population, the 10% threshold has been hard to breach. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have worked effectively to split the Kurdish vote in previous elections, especially from Islamist and conservative circles.

Then there are those Kurds who were greatly discouraged by voting for any Kurdish party who would ultimately fail to break the threshold and thus lose their votes and voice.

Couple with Kurdish fallout over Ankara’s stance on the struggle of the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane under a fierce Islamic State (IS) onslaught, the stalling of the Kurdish peace process, HDP’s broader manifesto and the prospect that HDP will enter parliament, the Kurdish voter base has become rich pickings.

Amidst the backdrop of the campaign to become a truly Turkish party, another key HDP battle ground has been the West of Turkey. The focus has been on displaying an image of a libertarian leftist party and capitalizing on disaffected and disenfranchised voters growing uneasy with the AKP or nationalist alternatives, especially appealing to Gezi protestors.

Demirtaş 9.7% of the vote in the presidential elections is deemed as a measure that HDP influence is growing.

As a party of the voice of marginalized, HDP has an appeal and a larger electorate including that of numerous other minorities. It is an alternative to the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) or the Right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), but the key test is whether it can must enough of these non-Kurdish votes, even if it successfully navigates the 10% threshold.

If it remains a Kurdish voice and a party of the Kurdish region, then it will struggle to escape the PKK stigma.

Such is the significance that the 10% of HDP vote may bring that the election campaign has pitted them in constant confrontation with the AKP.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has made no secret of his desire to rewrite the constitution after the elections, has traded frequent harsh rhetoric with Demirtaş. At the same time, Demirtaş has been equally clear that once in parliament he will be an obstacle to AKP goals and policies.

Then there are the bombings of HDP offices in May and in recent days a deadly double bombing at a HDP rally in Diyarbakir that killed or wounded dozens.

The bombings are a reminder of the nationalist camps in Turkey that aim stir violence and keep the south-eastern question as an armed struggle calculus, and then there are Kurds who are skeptical at the prospects of true peace and Kurdish rights through parliament.

If the HDP does breakthrough the threshold, it would empower their position as interlocutors in the peace-process. It will also give them a true platform to extend their gains.

On the flip side, if HDP fails to achieve this target, there are significant repercussions. Millions of votes would have lost their voice in parliament leading to further unrest, the Kurdish peace process may become sidelined or diluted and HDP would see their seats giving to the next largest party, most likely the AKP.

The AKP have vowed that the peace process will pursue regardless of the HDP in parliament. But whether it’s a change in constitution or peace with the PKK, without opposition in parliament, the AKP will have an unhindered path.

In either case, AKP is likely to muster a strong portion of the vote again and this will increase fractures with opposing political and ideological camps.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

U.S. House of Representative approves direct arming of Kurds as arms and oil payments from Baghdad trickle in

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At the heart of the fight against the Islamic State (IS), the Kurds have long complained at the lack of adequate weapons as the raging Peshmerga battles with IS forces reaches a year. At the center of Kurdish irritation is their share of the $1.6bn Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) but more importantly that key weapons are not funneling through at a sufficient speed or volume from Baghdad.

In recent days, the US House of Representatives passed a controversial defense bill that facilitated direct arming of the Peshmerga and Sunni militia forces as part of the $612 billion defense policy bill for next year.

The House Armed Services Committee of the US Congress caused controversy when it proposed clauses into the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), referencing the Peshmerga and Sunni militias as “countries” in order make the direct provisioning of arms easier.

The bill was objected by the Obama administration who threatened to veto and drew strong rebuke from Iraqi politicians who considered this as a step to Iraq’s division. Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, a historic thorn of US forces in Iraq, even threatened retaliation.

US Vice President Joe Biden, who ironically for years was a strong advocate of splitting Iraq into 3 distinct federal regions, stressed just last week that “all US military assistance in the fight against [ISIL] comes at the request of the Government of Iraq and must be coordinated through the Government of Iraq”.

The bill that was ultimately passed was rewritten to remove references to “country” and toned down any inference to the division of Iraq but nevertheless has proved just as contentious. The Peshmerga and Sunni tribal forces could directly receive $179 million of the US$715 million allocated to the Iraqi government.

At the same time, the Senate Armed Services Committee passed its own 2016 defense bill where strong support is expected for direct arming of the Peshmerga.

The Kurdistan leadership has attempted not to be drawn into the bill or the friction that it has caused for the Obama administration, with Kurdistan President, Massoud Barzani, declaring his satisfaction on White House assurances that “the necessary weapons” will be provided.

Although the bill is symbolic for the Kurds, in reality it is only a 25% share with the Sunnis. For Kurdish forces that are crucial to any victory against IS, a significant share should be provided by Baghdad that should not need US politicians or White House pressure to ensure Kurds receive a share of such arms.

At the same time, Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the long established Kurdistan Region enshrined in Iraqi legislature and recognized internationally should not be compared with burgeoning and disparate Sunni forces. With no formally recognized Sunni force and some directly aligned with IS or deeply against Shia dominated Baghdad, who is the ultimate Sunni beneficiary of such arms?

The Kurdish apprehension at the lack of arms filtering from Baghdad is the tip of a much larger iceberg. The Kurds and Baghdad have been at loggerheads over oil payments even as a deal was struck in December. The lack of budget payments from Baghdad, including only a part payment for April, has hardly aided relations.

With Mosul firmly in IS hands, it remains to be seen of the sacrifices that the Kurds would be willing to make when Baghdad doesn’t fund the Peshmerga forces as per the constitution, doesn’t provide arms or even budget payments.

All this has a familiar tone. The US has tried to promote the principle of a unified Iraq at every turn since 2003 whilst ignoring reality, with the Kurds having to tip-toe between their important US allies and a Baghdad that they must work with but who appears not keen on any step that strengthen Kurdish hands or breaks the remaining umbilical cords that it has over the Kurds.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

As Barzani heads for talks with Obama, has the battle against the Islamic State served to unify Iraq or merely underscored its division?

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The Islamic State (IS) has rapidly occupied the Middle Eastern equation over the last year and the Kurds find themselves at the centre of the battle.

While the Kurds assumed control of disputed territories as the Iraqi army wilted away amidst the IS avalanche, they have endured great atrocities under the hands of IS and with the Peshmerga suffering hundreds of casualties.

The battle against IS is far from just a military conundrum. At the heart of the matter is a political crisis underlined by a fractured landscape and deepening sectarian lines. The Sunni dilemma has not been addressed and IS merely took full advantage.

This begs the question of the repercussions of remaining as part of the Iraqi state for the Kurds. The statehood ambition of the Kurds is hardly a secret or a new phenomenon. If you ask any Kurd when statehood aspirations arose and the answer is most likely long before the artificial map of the Middle East was even drawn.

Kurdistan President Masoud Barzani is scheduled to commence an official visit to the US where will meet both President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden. Barzani’s visit comes soon after the visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

The fight against IS is likely to dominate the agenda, but according to statements by Fuad Hussein, the chief of staff to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) presidency, the issue of independence will also be discussed.

The notion of Kurdish statehood at a sensitive time in the struggle against IS is hardly music to Obama’s ears. On the contrary, the Washington administration has tried hard in recent months to reinforce the principle of a “unified federal, pluralistic and democratic Iraq”. Key to this has been coordinating coalition’s efforts and weapons supplies via the central government.

Barzani is likely to repeat the calls for more arms but the US tip-toeing around Baghdad has been a big hindrance.

A great example was the recent international anti-IS conference in London, where despite their crucial role in the fight against IS, the Kurds were not even represented in the conference as the presence of al-Abadi was deemed sufficient to represent all Iraqis.

A key condition of the US intervention in Iraq last year was the ouster of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the onset of a more liberal and inclusive government. In fact national reconciliation and unity has been a common theme of the US list since 2003.

A US spokeswoman confirmed that Barzani’s visit will include talks on Wednesday with Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken to discuss “the combined campaign to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.”

A key litmus test will be the liberation of Mosul. But this is not without its own perils. Ultimately, it must be Sunni sentiment and the local population that play the key role in driving out IS in conjunction with the Iraqi army.

And this is where Iraqi fault lines are best summed up. It is the Shia militias that are arguably the strongest force at the disposal of Baghdad and their presence in Mosul is hardly going to bode well for the locals.

The Kurds, who have shouldered tremendous sacrifices in largely liberating Kurdish areas, will have little appetite to lead the charge in Arab dominated areas such as Mosul but will ultimately still play a key support role.

Once IS is driven out, who is then responsible for the security and policy of the area? Without Sunni control over security, any Shia or Kurdish control of Mosul will simply stoke further unrest.

This ultimately leads to the question of arming Sunnis and creating an official Sunni force. Whilst it may be effective in the short-term, it will merely deepen the fractures in the Iraqi state.

Regardless of whether Obama entertains the notion of formal Kurdish independence or US insistence that the battle against IS has somewhat served to unify Iraqi ranks, IS has merely served to underscore the division of Iraq.

First Published: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc