Category Archives: Kurdish Globe

DNO dispute places an avoidable cloud on the Kurdistan Region

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At a time when the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is actively seeking foreign investment and the strengthening of its relationships with major international partners, the DNO fiasco serves as a major blow to the region.

The KRG has worked tirelessly to attract direct interest and investment predominantly in its oil sector, much to the dismay of the Iraqi central government. Already the stance of Baghdad towards what it labels as “illegal” contracts signed by the KRG, has deterred major oil companies mindful of meddling in political disputes. Now the publicity around this case unnecessarily raises concerns on investments in the region.

The fallout is a lot more politically relevant than any amount of commercials, at the centre of this dispute, would ever matter. Baghdad wasted no time in using this case to bolster its case against the KRG.

The dispute arose when the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) made public details of a DNO sale of shares in October 2008, in an ongoing dispute in the oil-companies delay in providing information. More specifically it highlighted the involvement of the KRG in acting as intermediaries in the transaction in question.

Such publicity and coverage around the KRG “role” was met naturally by stiff defence by Kurdish officials, who have remained insistent that their part in the deal was to only facilitate the sale on behalf of Genel Energy, the beneficiaries of the shares, and to help DNO at a time where exports in the region were been hampered by ongoing wrangles with Baghdad.

The KRG suspended DNO operations until it could sufficiently repair the “unjustifiable and incalculable” damage that it had done to its reputation.

Although, in later meeting betweens the KRG and OSE the government was cleared of any wrongdoing, the revelation and ensuing controversy was embarrassing. In the short-term, under such spotlight there could be no immediate repair to the KRG’s image.

DNO was one of the first foreign companies to start work in the region and mooted as the first foreign company to pump crude in Iraq since the 1970’s. The productive gains of DNO in its successful drilling in the Tawke oil fields simultaneously served as a remarkable political milestone for the Iraqi Kurds.

DNO started exports in June, much to the jubilation of the region. It is evident that success of DNO was important to the KRG not primarily due to the revenue streams that it unearthed to the region, but more due its symbolic importance to the region. Clearly, this stance by KRG was vindicated by increased heightened interest and economic coverage in the region upon commencement of exports.

As such, KRG’s willingness and desire to aid its foreign partner is understandable, however, in the circus that can be the media spotlight, the move by the KRG was risky and avoidable. Whether the questions posed have any substance is one side of the equation, however, the mere fact that such questions are asked of a government has undesirable and long-term ramifications, even if it has been clearly proved by the KRG to the satisfaction of OSE that they have done no wrongdoing, or more importantly that they were never the object of the investigation in any shape or form.

The KRG should never have taken the risk of becoming directly or indirectly embroiled in such a far-reaching saga. Alternative and less murky facilitation of the finances would have avoided such allegations at government officials. DNO itself should have sought alternative means of short-term funding.

To many observers without insight into the exact nature of the deals, it is naturally unusual that a government would act as a mediator of such cash-raising initiatives. Without publication of the full extent of the dealings, with selective information as was published by OSE, people will draw their own predictable conclusions on the part of the Kurdish government.

Furthermore, why did the OSE reveal such information if it knew that the KRG was not implicated wrongly in the deal, knowing full well that it was not a Kurdish organisation that would be affected but essentially the region itself?

More importantly, it is the job of DNO to ensure full compliance with Norwegian laws and regulations, why did it take so long to release the relevant information requested to the OSE? It should have acted much sooner, in the knowledge of what potential releases by the OSE would entail to both itself and its Kurdish partners.

OSE released this information under a freedom of information law, propelled by requests from newspapers. It begs the question, whether those who pressurised the OSE to release the information had political and commercials gains in the knowledge of the likely storm that this would bring.

Although, “risky” in the eyes of some investors, the lucrative returns on the momentous untapped Kurdistan market is plain to see. Many smaller oil companies have struck gold in the region and DNO is no different. The fact that its shares plummeted by over 50% upon the announcement by the KRG that it would suspend its operation for six weeks and would reserve the right to revoke DNO’s contract, tells its own story.

While payment terms have not been agreed for its recent exports, for companies such as DNO its simply a case of bridging short-term financial exploration burdens, once the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) kick in, its financial clout increases dramatically.

This is clearly the reason behind its decision to sell a portion of its shares to create necessary capital that would allow it to assume its unprecedented windfall when exports commence.

While the lack of a national hydrocarbon law, owed to intense disputes between the Iraqi mosaic on sharing the immensely rich Iraqi cake, has proved a major obstacle, Baghdad’s agreement to authorise limited exports from the Kurdistan Region started a surge of interest in the region.

Kurdistan has the capacity and the capability to become one of the major oil and gas producers in the world, and the race to take “early” advantage has paid healthy dividends to a number of international companies. Some companies scrambled to increase their financial and strategic clout to assume a stronger hand in the region. For example, Heritage Oil Ltd is in the process of merging with Turkey’s Genel Energy International Ltd. While more recently, china’s second-largest oil company, China Petrochemical Corp., agreed the purchase of Addax Petroleum Corp.

In the aftermath of the DNO dispute, there has been perception of increased risk to licenses in the Kurdistan Region. This has placed the KRG in a highly-difficult position. While the threat to oust DNO altogether certainly got hold of Norwegian ears, any action to carry out this threat would see the KRG lose just as much as DNO, as it would seriously undermine general operations in the area and may in fact increase spotlight on the debacle further.

Regardless of the fact that they may not be at direct fault in an internal Norwegian issue, the KRG must work hard to remedy its image as much as it has demanded DNO do to their satisfaction. There is a much bigger picture, than the operations of a single company in this case.

Already, StatoilHydro ASA, Norway’s biggest oil and gas producer, involved in the preliminary bidding of some contracts in Iraq, expressed that it was monitoring the DNO situation.

Fortunately, the furore over this dispute has died down significantly after various meetings and mediations with the share value of DNO on the rise after dramatic falls. However, the KRG can ill-afford the smallest of controversies, lest give their adversaries in the region the ammunition to undermine their development and quest for prosperity and strategic standing.

In spite of this case, the immense interest in investing in the region, underpinned by some of the most favourable foreigner friendly legislation around, will be unaffected once the dust settles.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

The evident limits to the application of democracy in Iraq

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There is no region in the world more difficult to apply “off the shelf” Western notions than in the Middle East. The Middle East, the undoubted cradle of civilisation, has had its lands soiled with much blood. Nowhere are rivalries as bitter or animosities as historically entrenched and deep rooted.

With the rich heritage and millennia old civilisations comes a disparate patchwork of ethnicities and religions who often have claimed the cramped lands as their own at some historical juncture.

A prime example of age-old tensions, where the historical battle for land, supremacy and influence, compounded by an ethnic mosaic that has been stitched together in an artificial manner, is Iraq.

Judging the context

If democracy was going to be difficult to apply anywhere in the Middle East, Iraq would be high on the list. Six years since its liberation from tyranny, the “new” democratic Iraq, a perceived success on paper, struggles to plant real seeds of comfort and assurance of a future where its many communities and sects can truly flourish in one place.

However, as the US administration has realised – after thousands of lost lives and billions of dollars of expenditure, not forgetting a shattering of its foreign policy image in the process – democracy and western ideals are not something you can simply “hand-over”. Democracy is not like a modern piece of machinery you can hand to Iraqi farmers and workers, so that they can leave their previous ways for a new efficient and technologically advanced solution.

One must judge the context in which you intend to deploy a notion or initiative and carry out detailed feasibility studies. As the Bush administration discovered, Iraq as a harmonious unitary state, even in the face of the eradication of evil, is just a pipe dream. Temporary euphoria or gains can not bridge long-term socio-ethnic grievances.

Moreover, if all sides do not have the appetite to implement democratic notions and truly embrace each group within the greater Iraqi banner as “brothers” then no amount of US or foreign intervention or new diplomatic initiatives will ever truly matter.

Shoe-throwing shame

A great example of some existing out-dated mentalities in the Middle East and particularly in Iraq is the infamous shoe-thrower and newfound “celebrity”, Muntazer al-Zaidi, whose antics as he launched his shoes and insults at US President George W. Bush last year, resulted in imprisonment: he was released early last week.

Although, the actions of al-Zaidi, who became an instant hero across the Middle East, may have summed up the sentiments of many Iraqis, such action by a professional Iraqi journalist in front of international cameras does the image of Iraq, and the perception of it been bogged down by old fashioned ideas, no good.

The US undoubtedly embarked on a number of costly blunders, especially in the first few years post-liberation. At times the US has done its image no favours, especially with Abu Ghraib prison scandals and the general perception of its military operations. However, the idea that Bush is the fulcrum of all evil in Iraq is naïve, short-sighted and thinly papers over the historical cracks that are commonplace in Iraq.

Is it because of the US that, in the six years since liberation, Sunni and Shiite sectarian hit squads have been at logger-heads? It is understandable that anti-US anger may see the US soldiers as direct targets for a large number of insurrections, but why should this mask the deadly civil war that took place for more than a year between them?

Iraq’s lack of political and economic progress is not the direct fault of the Americans and its leaders have been just as culpable in prolonging the Iraqi agony. Why can’t al-Zaidi have saved one of his shoes for his failing leaders? More importantly, one wonders why no one dared to take such actions against Saddam Hussein. It is due to the advent of such new freedoms in Iraq that one can even dare to take such action – perhaps America can take some solace from this fact.

Admittedly, many Iraqis disagreed with, and condemned the actions of, al-Zaidi. This further highlighted the sectarian influence behind such moves. Saddam may be long gone but his legacy lives on in Iraq. Ultimately, this is the fundamental bottleneck of the new Iraq: democracy will never be embraced while some groups still have one eye on the past.

Deep-rooted animosity in Iraq that runs for centuries is not the doing of the US. It is evident that Iraq is still plagued by a lack of common trust with different groups reluctant to succumb or compromise to other parties. Unity and sharing the rich Iraqi cake in a fair and equitable manner when there are such an array of opinions and factions is a difficult, if not impossible, undertaking. Giving the current Iraqi political track record, at best a loose form of democracy can be implemented in Iraq.

Upcoming national elections

The path of democracy in Iraq is predictable due to its sectarian and ethnic grounding. Essentially, the national elections will become a national census rather than a real democratic contest. Kurds are highly likely to vote for Kurdish alliances, Shiites for Shiite groups and Sunnis for Sunni groups. The aim of each is to muster enough votes and parliamentary voice not be sidelined and to have a firm stake in proceedings.

Ironically, even when the votes are finally counted, the different groups will still not be happy. Iraqis are unwilling to take the voice and votes of the people as final.

The best gauge to determine national matters is the people itself. Ultimately, it is the people and not a handful of politicians that should dictate key matters.

This notion could not be more relevant than for article 140. Millions voted in favour of the Iraqi constitution which, among many other stipulations, outlined article 140 as a roadmap for dealing with disputed territories.

But now not only has article 140 become stalled, but other democratic steps have been changed in the disputed regions for the same fear – it may give an insight into the likely outcome of any referendum. Provincial elections were postponed in Kirkuk and now the national census scheduled for autumn has also been postponed. The national census will almost certainly have functioned as a defacto referendum, aiding the claims of rival groups.

The pretext that elections or democratic notions will fuel tensions is too obvious an excuse. In reality, it is the non implementation of democracy that may spark conflict. Moreover, when would be a good time to resolve a highly-contentious, emotive and deep-rooted dispute over land and masses amount of oil?

The answer is that even in 50 years, it will not be a “good” time to hold elections. However, democracy is democracy. It is not something that you can pick and choose as you see fit and democratic elections must be held regardless of any side fearing the outcome of its legal results.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Online Opinion, eKurd, PUK Media, Various Misc.

Building new bridges in Turkey based on old realities

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The time has come to usher a new era of peace and brotherhood. This no longer has to be a distant pipedream but an emerging reality that can propel Turkey to new cohesion and unity.

After 25 years of bloodshed and missed opportunities, Turkey must realise that cutting the branches of your problem is fruitless without addressing its root.

After much blood has been spilled, thousands have been killed, billions of wasted expenditure and decades of ethno-social animosity, Turkey got no closer to resolving its most prevalent issue since the formation of the republic. By the same token, as far as the PKK are concerned, violence and insurrection is no longer the solution to addressing its goals in the modern era. The opportunity for long-term peace has not been greater than at any time in history.

In the context of past policies, whilst recent reform and democratisation measures may have falling short of expectations, they still serve as remarkable progress for a country where the word “Kurd” has been a deep-rooted taboo. Now the times for ubiquitous promises are over and the Turkish government must implement concrete steps to back its rhetoric.

Greater consensus

Last month, the AKP government spearheaded by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an, announced a new democratisation motion in the shape of a package of landmark reforms designed to address the Kurdish issue through greater rights and recognition. In the governments own words the initiative was a “courageous” step aimed at ending the violence and building new bridges in Turkey. 

Whilst the contents of the plans have been concealed, measures by the government have been met with resistance from opposition parties and also from the “guardians of the republic”, the nationalist army.

It says a lot about the high sensitivity that prevails on the Kurdish topic that the government is anxious to ascertain broad public approval for the plans across the Turkish mosaic and has frequently defended its plans. Divided opinion remains common on the Kurdish issue and the nationalist circles remain highly-emotive about any plans that are deemed to break the mystical foundations of the republic.

Clearly, the problem for Turkey has never been a few thousand rebels in the mountains but the issue of 15 million Kurds, a great portion of its society. Kurdish rights and freedoms have been quelled for decades for simple fear that the Kurds endanger the sovereignty and unity of the republic. Such fears have resurfaced with warnings from Turkish army chiefs and opposition parties that any plans must not endanger unity or age-old Kemalist principles.

As a non-Turkic entity and the perceived potential harm they can cause to the foundations of Turkish society, successive governments have gone to great lengths to repress and assimilate Kurds and to eradicate elements of culture and “Kurdishness” from the Turkish landscape. However, this has failed to mask the fact that Kurds are a distinct ethnic entity and have every right to enjoy an equitable existence in lands they have inhibited for thousands of years.

A Turkey for both Kurds and Turks

Even the staunch nationalist army has realised over time that they can not defeat the PKK through sheer force alone without dealing with the heart of the issue and enticing the Kurds into brotherly ties. Whilst it may be easier to focus on ridding the mountains of the rebels, the real focus should be to ascertain why the rebels remain grounded with support in their battle.

The majority of the Kurds do not decree separatism and prefer to remain in a prosperous and modern European state with aspirations to join the EU. The advantages of the Kurds becoming a key productive component of Turkey are endless. If the Kurds were effectively enticed with more rights, employment and investment in the region, support for armed struggle in the midst of such greater benefits and gains that come from been part of a major European state would rapidly evaporate.

The Turkish “fear” culture of the Kurds should diminish and Kurds should finally be embraced as an essential and rightful cog of Turkish society. Antagonism must end and bloodshed must cease. The face of a mourning mother on either side of the divide is a tragedy, the life of a Kurd and Turk are just as sacred as another.

For wounds to heal between Kurds and Turks, one must look to the future and not the past. The past may have been grim and harsh but a solid future could be built based on harmony, peace and prosperity and above all else equality.

Diversity in Turkey should not be masked and repelled but embraced. Ethnic and cultural diversity of a country say much about its fundamentals, heritage and history. While nationalists will embrace every inch of Turkish land then by the same token it is unacceptable that large swathes of the Turkish southeast remain impoverished and lacking key infrastructure. Why shouldn’t all parts of Turkey treated by the same regard in reality as it is enshrined in the constitution?

With a more open society and breaking down the Kurdish fear factor, perhaps it may not be too long before Turks from the west of Turkey can visit the southeast in greater numbers through tourism and taste another flavour of Turkey. Any why not? The southeast of Turkey has as much of a fascinating history and culture as anywhere else. It is a part of Turkey after all and therefore should not be treated as a distance neglected land inhibited by a people who “despise” Turkey.

The path to reform

Whilst reform over past several years has been welcome, it has essentially been in dribs and drabs rather than wholesale measures aimed at resolving the problem. True reform as the government have seemingly proposed must be all encompassing and not implemented in half-measures.

At the core of “courageous” reforms must be the advent of constitutional changes. No reform or initiative that addresses the heart of the republic can be ultimately successful without amendments to the blueprint of the country – its constitution. The principle that Turkey is for Turks only is an outdated ethos. This doesn’t mean that the greater foundations of the republic will necessarily unravel, it just means that Turkey can finally get away from a nationalist mentality that was planted at such contrasting times in history to the current era of globalisation, democracy and diversification that we find ourselves in today.

Kurds must be recognised as a distinct minority within Turkey with the Kurdish language noted as one of the official languages of Turkey. The Kurdish population should be allowed to exercise more language rights in the south east and a level of autonomy must be granted to municipalities in the Kurdish parts of the country. Kurdish names should be freely used in public and villages should be renamed to their original names.

The Kurdish “region” should now be treated as a distinct part of Turkey, not to promote separatism but to build a bridge based on this reality to create a new unison.

Although, the government has pledged a “democratic path”, it has ruled out direct negotiations with the PKK or greater amnesty. The PKK is a key actor in the region and if the Turkish government refuses a bilateral peace with view to dissolving the PKK as a military force, reforms may prove counterproductive.

Rallies in Turkey

Recent celebratory military parades were used as a show of force by the army that it still holds the aces in preserving the core foundations of the republic. The Turkish army chief recently stated that he “respects cultural diversity” but was opposed to the politicisation of the issue, a thinly-veiled caution that major changes to the blueprint of the Turkish republic would be blocked.

Rallies were also organised in Diyarbakir to promote peace initiatives and Kurdish rights. Arguably, announcement of reform packages were pushed through by the Turkish government in light of Abdullah Ocalan’s own declaration of a “road map” that he plans to release on resolving the Kurdish issue.

Whilst Turkey has ruled out negotiations with the PKK, in what would arguably be portrayed as a major “defeat” for Turkey by opposition parties, the government has held encouraging talks with the Democratic Society Party (DTP) after previously contentious relations, an important development since in practice the DTP has become the bastion of the Kurdish political movement.

A great platform has been afforded for peace and brotherhood in Turkey. If the measures are enforced in the same vigour as intent then a great future can be forged in Turkey for both its Kurdish and Turkish constituents.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

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While much of the attention since the liberation of Iraq has been occupied by the sectarian strife of the south, heightened tension between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad are increasingly the object of much focus.

Although international mediums have concentrated on the tense relationships in recent times, none of the issues are particularly new and too often have been merely brushed under the political rug for the sake of progress.

Time and again political agreements such as with the constitution and key laws have been fraught with protraction, acrimony and difficulty. On many occasions, Iraqi’s agreed to disagree under fierce pressure from the US, intent on showcasing a new democratic Iraq and political progress amongst the feuding elite, whilst in reality the problems were simply postponed.

Ironically, even when the Iraqis did find concord on political notions after what may be deemed as “classic compromise”, in the aftermath not all sides had the stomach to implement the measures it entailed. Article 140 is a prime example of a legal stipulation that has been overlooked and prolonged, for the simple reason that ultimately Baghdad does not want to implement the motions for fear of its underlying implications – Kurdish control of oil.

The Kurdistan Region since 1991 has been practically independent and as such reintegration with the rest of Iraq was never going to be easy. Kurdistan has been relatively stable and protected, while bloodshed and terror has ensued further south. It is evident that the Kurds have benefitted from the situation, economically and politically, becoming kingmakers in the new Iraq. Now voices in Iraq cry of overreaching and hostile actions. 

A look across the 300-mile or so “trigger line” that spans from Syria to Iran covering disputed territories paints its own story of why friction is a common theme as the Arab-Kurd divide becomes murky. However, it’s hardly a secret that ethnic and historical pride aside, one can not overlook the simple fact that this line weaves through an immense amount of oil.

As compromise on issues such disputed territories, particularly Kirkuk and article 140, national hydrocarbon law and federalism has become more difficult to muster, both sides have seemingly dug their heels in.

On the one hand, a rejuvenated Baghdad is somewhat on a mission to rescind Kurdish powers, thwart their demands and form a new strong centre. This is best highlighted by the refusal of Baghdad to recognise oil contracts signed by the KRG and in reluctance to deal with the issue of disputed territories.

The fear is simple, Kurdish expansion in terms of land, power and economy will push the country further towards de facto disintegration, even if in reality it may have occurred long-ago.

With the US engaging in its elusive exit strategy and beginning its much anticipated withdrawal, its eyes are firmly on political reconciliation. Washington has placed much focus on reconciling both governments in fear of leaving an Iraq on the verge of all out war. The Pentagon has expressed it anxiety with what it calls as the “most dangerous” development in Iraq, but in reality these problems did not arise overnight but with the very foundation of the state. 

Recently, influential senator John McCain and a number of aides visited Kurdistan on the back of a recent visit by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, with the easing of the current stand-off likely to be on the agenda.

The US must not overlook the very fact that the Kurds and Arabs have been at odds for decades over influence, autonomy and natural resources. Fear of Kurdish power and demands, is the very reason Saddam Hussein went to such great lengths to repress the Kurdish community.

In this historic land that houses different ethnicities and sects, only an all encompassing and “future proof” solution can work. This can be achieved by a loose federation, with borders decided via internationally recognised and legitimate referendums, which no sides can dispute. It is ultimately the people that should decide their fate, taking the argument around the importance of implementing article 140 a full circle.

Under US pressure, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki travelled to Kurdistan with hope of striking reconciliatory tones with Kurdistan President, Massoud Barzani, and the Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani. Although the meeting was symbolic, given that al-Maliki and Barzani had not spoken in over a year, smiles in public are unlikely to change moods in the background.

Both sides agreed to create committees to deal with disputes, however, such committees have proven ineffective in the past and in essence may change little if the appetite for such principles does not change from the top.

Iraqis need a roadmap and legal starting point to underline their negotiations and as such there is not better product than the blueprint of the country – its constitution. There should be room for compromise and negotiation, but primarily on the principles of this document. The sidelining of this document, the calls to deem key articles as void or attempts to make wholesale changes to the constitution is a prelude to the collapse of the “heart beat” of Iraq and thus its demise.

In all essence two national armies are employed in Iraq, with as much animosity for each other as ever. As the disputed borderline becomes cloudy, so do the lines of responsibility, engagement and control. As tensions have reached dangerous heights, this has pitted the Kurdish and Iraqi forces ominously on a collision course. A number of recent incidents have been averted, while clearly the message from the respective commanders was shoot on order.

Ill-feeling has not been helped by a string of bombings in the Nineveh province and disputed territories with al-Qaeda keen as ever to foster instability. This has led to a war of words between both sides as the KRG have warned about the increasing violence and has accused al-Hadba of fermenting the escalations. Sentiments are hardly aided by the fact that the Kurds boycotted the new Nineveh administration after been deprived of practically all key positions by al-Hadba.

Now, not only two armies roam this province but also now in essence two administrations. If Kurds are deprived of power as a minority in Mosul, then the Kurds may choose to do likewise in Kirkuk. The call for compromise on hypocritical foundations is recipe for future problems.

With key Iraqi parliamentary elections around the corner, this may provide room for a breakthrough as sides look to build alliances. However, all too often in Iraq it has been a case of one step forward and two steps back, simply because animosity has been masked by short-term tactical gains.

Kurds are ever-weary of a stronger revitalized Baghdad and anxious about the prospect of US withdrawal. Their stance has also served as a warning to their US counterparts that in spite of pressure and mounting friction, they are not going to be the ones that budge over what they deem as legitimate rights.

Focus on ethnic tensions further north, must not mask the sectarian bloodshed that still firmly grips Iraq, as recent bombings have ripped through the heart of Baghdad. The question of how the Iraqi cake can be affectively shared between the Iraqi mosaic is as pertinent as ever.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Interview with Dindar Zebari (KRG Special rep. to UN)

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In your opinion, is the United Nations in a position to resolve a complicated internal dispute such as Kirkuk?

Let me first take this angle on the subject, the UN involvement in finding a resolution on the so-called disputed areas is based on a UN Resolution 1770 and after after 2008, 1880. These two resolutions are crucial to the legitimacy of involvement on the part of the UN. The UN has a mission in Iraq today; this mission is a political one, as well as construction and humanitarian one, which are supported by the Iraqi authorities. The UN involvement on the disputed areas including of Kirkuk came upon the request from Iraqi officials, adding another angle of legitimacy. One angle is the UN resolution that states for the UN special representative and Secretary General to help Iraqi leaders.  It doesn’t say Iraqi central or Iraqi regional government but from Iraqi leaders to resolve internal borders disputes, internally. This as a format used for the draft resolution of 1770 and the later resolution of 1830.

The second legitimate argument for the freedom of UN involvement came upon the request of the Iraqi leaders themselves.  Iraqi leaders requested assistance for United National Secretary General special representative to Iraq, Steffan di Mistura, in later December 2007, when article 140 expired as per the timetable set in the Iraqi constitution.

When the UN came in on exactly the first day Article 140 expired, it was upon on the request of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and KRG Prime Minister Nerchirvan Barzani, to help to extend the resolution and solution of the subject. So timetable was extended, and the UN officially intervened on the request of the Iraqi leader. UN is providing consultancy, technical support, general report, logistics, support in data, criteria that have to be used for the solution. So the UN involvement is an advisory and consultancy capacity, to advice Iraqi leaders in the solution of these. But the executive side, in terms of implementing any solution is on the Iraqi side

In other words, any report is not prescriptive?

The UN reports, we have in our hands, doesn’t say these areas have to part of a certain authority but may state that according to criteria that have been used, let’s say geographical, historical and cultural backgrounds, previous elections result, the majority of the certain districts of these areas are supporting annexation or support to be part of that authority, but it does not say the UN decides.

One of first things that Steffan di Mistura said when he headed the mission, was that the UN stopped a “ticking time bomb” in Kirkuk, have they really stopped the time-bomb?

I believe the involvement of the UN has been a big help to the political process in Iraq, because one of the main current disputes is around the internal borders, including districts and sub-districts.  Article 140 is an Iraqi article, part of a constitution voted by the Iraqi people, therefore any delay in implementing the constitution will create further disagreement and differences, and I believe time is not in favor of further delays, UN has been pushed forward to help bring Iraqi authorities around the table for discussions and start negotiations on how to implement this article.

Do you think that Steffan di Mistura can enforce the implementation of Article 140 regarding Kirkuk?

According to Resolution 1830, the UN does not have the decisive or the executive power to enforce any part of the article or the constitution. But the UN support s the constitution and I believe this is an important fact for the Kurds, as this report is not in fact in favor of the Kurds, Arabs or Turkmen but in favor of every side.  If negotiations are geared towards all sides, they have to favor mechanism of negotiations that to lead to the success for everyone. Sustainable solutions are important, not just decisions made by the central or regional authorities.  This is the first time we have this piece of work conducted internationally with help of international communities, not just with the UN by the way, but with other foreign powers in Iraq such as the Americans and Britain.

Can the UN take a completely impartial view of the dispute over Kirkuk, in light of heavy political pressure from regional governments or internal pressure in Iraq? In other words will such pressures, predetermine how the report is shaped?

The UN report is in its final draft. We know it has been shaped towards and to satisfy the Iraqi leaders including Iraqi President, Iraqi Vice President, Iraqi Prime Minister, KRG Prime Minister and KRG President,

The report has been given to all 5 leaders, to read, analyze and come back on the technical details submitted. I am sure all 5 leaders will come back to Steffan Di Mistura and to the UNAMI mission by saying these are our observations and afterwards come up with another set of recommendations. So if there are deemed to be mistakes, then there is an opportunity to deal with this.

Looking at it from a Kurdish perspective, do you believe that before the report has already been issued, Steffan di Mistura may have a predefined mindset before he issues the report due to external political pressures, say from Turkey?

I don’t believe the report will redrafted or redesigned, the report has been finally produced after months of studies. What has been given to the authorities, these are the five leaders of Iraq, to take into consideration the elements that had been officially requested to the UN to determine. The five leaders will read the report as it stands, I suppose in the next couple of days, their final observations will be given to UNAMI, to take into consideration if there are facts and figures but not the objectives. I don’t believe the UN is taking observations from one sector of Iraqis or from neighboring countries, this is a complete package that they we come up with.

The most important thing I can gather from your replies, is the that whatever the shape of the, the report will be neutral and will be a very balanced report that serves every side

This is what we hope, of course.

What is the KRG stance towards the report at the moment?

KRG has been very clear on any options regarding disputed territories, that regardless of timetable or transitional period, there must be a solution and this solution must be quick. KRG is looking forward to counterparts, official counterparts, governmental counterparts to sit down and discus how to implement this report frankly and KRG looks forward to more compromises amongst all Iraqis, and the solution must be immediate and more urgent, because it affects the political process, it affects the trust between Iraqis in this period of transition.

The KRG also believes in working together with Iraqis and taking the support as an advisory side of it, as another recognition that there must be solution, there must be no alternative to 140. it doesn’t matter on 140 on what practical capacity, or it will be implemented on what geographical areas or the means and mechanisms of the implementation, the power sharing will not make any difference, what is important is to implement the solution.

Kurdish leaders have been adamant that article 140 is the defining principle behind resolving the conflict, is the issue here how we get to implement 140 or alternative 140

I believe for many months the discussion was how to implement article 140, because 140 is an Iraqi constitutional article and no one can say that this article must be neglected, because the constitution is  a package and you can not ignore a part of that package, otherwise the other sides groups or minorities will take other articles out of the constitution, so you have to look at it as a package

Do you feel confident that stalemate on Kirkuk can soon be broken?

I don’t look it like that frankly, I believe this report has been, my personal view as KRG chief coordinator to the UN relations and as an envoy of the KRG the UN, because I have been working hard for the past 2 or 3 years to convince all sides to come and help, don’t forget that inside article 140 there is a clear indication that if Iraqis can not find a solution for the internal borders of the districts and sub districts of Iraq, they might approach for international arbitration , and from that side of the constitution, I believe bringing the UN to the process and bringing advisers from the international committee is a huge asset that Iraq can use today, and it’s a huge asset for the Iraq political process, since there must be a solution

With regards to the UN role in general, the UN is a massive organization to support human rights, social development, and other factors, is the UN doing enough to help Kurdistan and ensure that the Region has the representation it needs?

There is no sentence or indication internationally that UN is an independent position at current.  UN is an international created by the states and composed of multi international entities.

But UN has a policy towards its own member states, and UN has a responsibility to preserve the security of its own member states, we have seen from resolution 688, there are problems in Iraq. Sometimes humanitarian problem, but I think this report made the problem of the Iraqi Kurds in Iraq a political problem, and the UN has another responsibility in Iraq, which means the UN has to support the political process in Iraq since the collapse of the regime in 2003 and I think the Iraqi Kurds, are part of the process, as the region is recognized by the UN as well as the federal nature of the country. This region is the first region to share power with central government, and I believe there has been mismanagement or misunderstanding, therefore UN has a role in successful reconciliation, and the current involvement is a part of the UN commitment to the political process.

It goes back to the early question, therefore, the UN must be impartial?

Certainly, the approach must have impartial and certainly must be neutral, otherwise the UN can not give solutions

Do you think the solution in the respect of Kirkuk, since it’s such a tentative issue, we have seen mutterings from many sides, many neighboring countries

It is a different scenario, if we compare UN involvement in the last 20 years ago in Iraq or its member states by today, if you compare, frankly because in Iraq of today you still have foreigners that control some of the political process in Iraq, when I say controlling its because they are part of the international pact to support Iraq, you still have multi national forces in Iraq, that still have a huge responsibility of the international community to make Iraq a success. And I think the time is very crucial for this sort of report to come out because in Iraq today, it’s not just Iraqis themselves that can make decisions

in many areas Iraqis failed to make a decision, and I think I stand against let say it’s a purely Iraqi matter, that has to be Iraqi wide supported or solved I say no, because Iraqis have not sorted out, Iraqis leaders have not implemented the constitution, and I think when we have a problem to implementation, and the state, stability and security of the county is in danger, therefore its an international responsibility. Therefore they must be involved, they must help to sort out and bring peace and prosperity to Iraq

With regards to the recent Amnesty International Report, the KRG have been quite proactive in their reply, to the issue of human rights and taking the report seriously. I just want to get a brief perceptive from your pint of view, on how the Kurds will approach the Amnesty International Report?

I am personally a member of the high committee of this government to respond to the Amnesty International report, setup by PM Barzani, myself, the secretariat and also several ministers and key security department chiefs in this region to respond to the Amnesty International report

Amnesty International Report is something we took seriously, we believe that there are shortages in many areas, but we also believe that the Amnesty international report must be somehow more specific and targetable, otherwise it would undermine its help to us. we have setup special committees to come back to make reform, we have already taken a number of practical steps for the last 2 years frankly, and PM Barzani is heading many meetings and many conferences and awareness in this region, to help to bring records of human rights to international standards

We took it seriously, and don’t forget that today Iraqi Kurdistan is open to all monitors and we have given access to all monitors to evaluate and scrutinize, this is something we have to get credit for, there are mistakes by officials, there have been mistakes due to shortages of laws and procedures, there are mistakes because law enforcement in some areas have been neglected, and this something that can not be resolved overnight. And we need to work to achieve it.

I have to admit that there is a well decision making body that is promoting the respect of human rights, and the we come back Amnesty Rights and other human rights reports, we want to be pragmatic, we want to be up to the responsibility, and we have to admit and take the report with an open heart and look for resolutions

One final question, with the upcoming elections in Kurdistan region, elections are always unique period, what is your opinion on how the next elections may strengthen the Kurdish democratic experience.

I believe these elections will be another addition to the legitimacy of the setup of this reign, elections always brings back credibility, transparency and trust, from the authorities to the people and also from the people to the authorities.

KRG has been a leady party of democracy in Iraq and we want to once more capable of doing so, KRG has a lot of peace, stability and security, and international minorities can use that peace and security to come in and help the process itself. We have invited the UN international community and a number of European countries to supervise these elections.

I believe that these elections will prove once more that this region is progressing, and the government is doing good and I believe the selection of the presidency of the region will also give another legitimacy to the region, and another reminder to international community and in Iraq of today, we are facing different realities, different type of government, there is a regional government and this region has its own vision and principles

This will serve as another commitment of Iraqi Kurds to the sovereignty and unity of the country.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Unprecedented elections mark turning point in Kurdish democracy

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Regardless of how opposition fares in elections, an important platform has been set for reform, prosperity and evolvement that should not be wasted.

The unprecedented, emotional and colorful election campaigns were concluded, and the time had come to cast votes on 25th July 2009, with millions of eager Kurds turning out on an historic Election Day.

While it may take days for result to be announced as the ballots boxes are counted, Kurds waiting anxiously can be sure of one thing, the election was just the right tonic to kick start sociopolitical development in the region, send a subtle jolt down the established elite in Kurdistan, embolden democracy in the region and crucially afford the Kurds the next platform on which to advance and prosper, in tentative and hostile times.

Regardless of how many seats Nawshirwan Mustafa’s refreshing political opposition, Goran (“change”) List, wins at these elections, they can be given huge credit for making the elections a competitive, energetic and taboo-breaking spectacle that can allow democracy and modernization in the region to assume the next gear.

Arguably, nowhere in the world have election campaigns been as passionate and colorful than in Kurdistan. The choice available at these elections, with 24 lists competing for 111-seats of the Kurdish National Assembly, ensured that political interest was rekindled in the region.

It is now the turn of the new political establishment after these elections to fulfill the promises to the people and ensure that the strong tides that have been created from these latest elections and the historic opportunity that it brings is not wasted.

The political battle scene

Traditional political heavyweights in the region, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) spearheaded by incumbent Kurdistan Region President, Massoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, may have been the fiercest of rivals in the past, but have united in recent elections under one banner.

This time under the Kurdistani List, they are expected to be confirmed as the victors at the polls once more. However, perhaps the fact that the two historic opponents have needed to battle side-by-side and unite as closely as ever to secure victory says much about the healthy nature of the electoral campaigning at this election.

The newest newcomer to the political fold in the region, the Goran List head by Mustafa, who broke away from the PUK leadership earlier this year, has proved to be greatest challenger to the status quo.

The influence of the new opposition

The support of the Goran List has seemingly gathered pace as the campaign bandwagon headed towards Election Day. The Goran List was as much of a political organization as a sociopolitical revolution in the region.

Their manifesto was simple, it promotes change in the political institutions and hierarchy of the region and is designed to serve as a different flavor and a distinct alternative for the Kurdish masses – arguably, what that they have lacked since the first historic Kurdish elections in 1992.

Goran has based its support on taking advantage of the disgruntled sentiments of large sections of the Kurdish population, who air common frustration at the current government.

A common theme has been Goran Lists determination to combat corruption and elitism in the region. It has accused key parties of been more interested in keeping power than undertaking necessary reform. Its support base has been mainly in the eastern parts of the Kurdistan Region, around the city of Sulaimaniya were it is expected to pose a huge challenge particularly to the traditional stalwarts of the area, the PUK.

It also has strong following amongst an expectant youth, who are frustrated with opportunities. Other frustrated voices have complained about living standards, bureaucracy and lack of employment.

The increasing productive role of the youth at these elections is most welcome, after all they are the very future of the region and as such political advancement, reform and prosperity cannot be achieved without their advent support, active involvement and direct interest.

The other key challengers are the Service and Reform List, an alliance comprising two Islamist parties, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and the Kurdistan Islamic Group and two leftist parties, the Toilers Party and the Social Democrat Party. They group has 18 seats in the current parliament, and a similar showing at the polls would significantly boost the power of the opposition alongside the Goran List.

The likely winners

Although Goran are expected to do make credible gains at the elections, this shouldn’t sway one away from the reality that both Barzani and Talabani still enjoy momentous support across the country. While the PUK support base may have been rocked around the Sulaimaniya region, it still enjoys popular support and the KDP still has formidable support particularly around Duhok.

The support base of the KDP and PUK is noticeable amongst old generation of Kurds, many of whom are veterans who fought in the tough days of discrimination and oppression, far from the relative prosperity and freedom of today.

The iconic and historic part that the KDP and PUK and their leaders have played in the situation of Kurdistan today is etched in Kurdish memory. However, this fact sits more deeply with the older Kurds, who suffered bitterly in the dark days of Baathist rule and feel a debt of gratitude and loyalty to the ruling parties.

While other supporters of the Kurdistani List point to the economic boom in recent years and Kurdish gains since 2003.

The youth inspired by opportunity, the possibility of migration to abroad and growing expectations are becoming less sympathetic to the nationalist card of these long-established parties.

Although, the added focus on the motion of change is a refreshing addition to the political scene and one which the Kurdistani List must pay heed, powerful and well-known incumbents are also a key prerequisite for Kurds to safeguard their gains in the region and in order to prosper economically and strategically in a hostile region.

Presidential elections

For the first time in Kurdish history, the president is to be chosen directly by the people. Kurdish nationalist icon and incumbent president, Massoud Barzani, is widely-expected to win the race by a landslide.

Much in the same as established parties give the region a stronger hand in difficult times, the appointment of Barzani in a second presidential term would serve as a boost to the region.

Barzani is a well known and respected figure, and one who airs the authority and experience that the fledging region still requires.

Barzani strikes the right balance between dealing strongly with neighboring countries whilst at the same time emphasizing the importance of mutual ties, which the region is greatly dependent upon. In particular, key issues with Baghdad such as article 140 and revenue sharing, requires a strong figure and a determined nationalistic mindset.

Barzani has expressed strong rhetoric in recent years on political reform and paying heed to the wishes of the people, there must now be strong pressure from the top in ensuring parliamentary promises are fulfilled. The example of reform and setting motions to deal with current perceived failings of the government must start from the very top.

The way forward

What is clear is that regardless of the election results, the next Kurdish parliament is under pressure to deliver, to change the system of government and press towards reform.

The Kurdistani List are likely to win the next elections, but they can rest on their laurels at their peril, with people now anticipating that the next 4 years will live up to the election campaign euphoria.

If there was any notion of political comfort from the ruling elite, then these elections should serve to change that. Certainly, if the people continue to be disgruntled with the KDP and PUK at the next elections, then their majority will erode even further.

The next government must ensure more transparency and accountability, with an independent and respected judiciary system underpinning the new order.

It is an ideal scenario for the region to finally have credible opposition in parliament. It not only emboldens democracy, but healthy competition is just the ingredient encourage to boost political progression.

The Kurdistani List will now have to contend with a major opposition in parliament, and the influence of the opposition will be noticeable on key regional policies, especially relations with Baghdad, where a more reconciliatory tone is likely.

These elections will undoubtedly server as a turning point in the Kurdish democratic experience.

Healthy competition from within, unity from the outside

No matter how competitive and heated election and political jockeying becomes, the main thing is to ensure that perception of unity is not distorted to the outside world.

Many elements from within Baghdad and neighboring countries, wish to capitalize on instability and political uncertainty and at the current time when important national fundamentals such resolving disputed territories and oil sharing are contentiously debated, a weakening of the regions hands would be highly counter-productive.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Iraqi withdrawal symptoms

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As the continuous US adventure in Iraq enters yet another “new” dawn, the US can ill-afford to lose focus

Over the past six years or so, the US has have experienced many false dawns in their quest to attain success in Iraq. Many key milestones have been hailed in this time, in the hope that it would spark an elusive US exit strategy, but ominously Iraqi’s have too often failed to take real advantage.

 

Now it is hoped that the much hyped and celebrated US withdrawal from Iraqi towns and cities on June 30th 2009, would serve as one of the final “real” dawns of the new Iraq.

The withdrawal, as per Sofa agreement, was met with jubilation by Iraqis and subsequently declared a national holiday. While Iraqis rejoiced in public at the start of the end of a notorious occupation, behind closed doors in Baghdad and Washington, one couldn’t help but think that smiles in public were overshadowed with anxiety behind the scenes, particularly for the US.

After all, after so many years of sacrifice, lost lives and billions of dollars of investment that saw Iraq become a focal point of US foreign policy, the US can hardly just disregard or sidestep their Iraqi adventure. The US clearly has unfinished business in Iraq.

However, US President Barrack Obama has hardly kept his desire for a new stronger focus on the “forgotten war” in Afghanistan a secret, has consistently vowed for swift withdrawal and was opposed to the original invasion. This has fanned fears that the US is no longer focused on Iraq.

Biden’s calls for national reconciliation

 

The US has expressed their concern in recent days on the lack of political reconciliation and has openly urged Iraqis to make greater efforts. Public calls by US Vice President Jo Biden, the man charged with seeing out the Iraqi mission, for the need of more progress was rebuffed by Baghdad. The vice presidents comments came as he underwent a visit to Baghdad to strengthen diplomatic ties and push Iraqi leaders for greater political progress.

The response from Baghdad implied that they were unwilling to endorse US meddling in its internal affairs. The strong response from Baghdad, shows growing assertiveness from Iraqis as the assume the “real sovereignty” talked about in Washington and may be playing on the sentiments of the Iraq public ahead of January 30th general election, who are seemingly only too keen to see US forces depart, regardless of the demons that this may itself bring.

Al-Maliki’s office reaffirmed its commitment to the national reconciliation process. Al-Maliki had earlier stated that the countries had “entered a new phase” on the back of the US withdrawal.

In spite of Baghdad’s warning to its US counterparts about trying to influence internal Iraqi affairs, Biden suggested that the Iraqi leaders were “very anxious” to maintain strategic understanding and engagements with the US moving forward.

Obama’s message

 

Whilst hailing the significance of the withdrawal, Obama warned of “difficult days ahead” and once again reemphasised the importance of a “responsible” withdrawal. However, emphasise was equally placed on Iraqis new responsibility as they took control of their future. US combat divisions are due to withdraw from Iraq by September 2010 and all together from Iraq by the end of 2011.

In spite of public reassurance that the US had not lost focus, privately Biden gave the strongest indication yet that under their new “sovereignty”, the US was unlikely to come rushing back to keep peace if civil strife was to erupt in Iraq.

Biden has been a long-time advocate of federalism in Iraq, as a way of preserving peace and unity between Kurds, Sunni and Shiites, and it is somewhat unsurprising that he has focused on healing the national divide on his recent visit.

The end of the beginning

 

The beginning of the end for the US may well be the end of the beginning for the Iraqis. With the valuable cushion that the US has provided for so long, in spite of frequent criticism and backlash of their presence by Iraqis, ironically perhaps now as the US time in Iraq dwindles down, many Iraqis may now truly appreciate the relative if not forgotten comfort that the US has provided.

The US surge strategy was always a short-term measure designed to buy Iraqis time. It is ultimately down to the Iraqis to seek true compromise and build a new nation that can house such a contrasting array of views and ethnicities.

Regardless of the principles of democracy that now underpin the new Iraq, it is ultimately the true hunger of sides to settle their differences and end mistrust and animosity that will determine the future Iraq. This is easier said than done of course. Trying to keep an ethnic mosaic happy and working towards the notions of equality, are down to the individuals themselves and no amount of US military presence or political pushing can change that.

As the US have realised no amount of force or political pressure can make any side adopt any notion that they may not embrace at heart.

Key issues remain unresolved years after the advent of a new constitution and democratic elections. Growing discord between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over many fundamental issues such as oil production, federalism and disputed lands spell a clear long-term danger.

As we have seen with a rise in suicide bombings in recent weeks, the threat of terrorism and sectarian bloodshed are elements that can return to the stage ever so quickly. Too often long-term problems have been masked by short-term goals. An example of this are the Sunni Sawha councils, armed and founded by the US and a clear success story in the battle against al-Qaeda. If there demands are not satisfied, how long before they are keep onside?

The greater picture

 

Whilst the US may now provide added focus to Afghanistan, the US has to mindful of not needing to return to Iraq once they achieve a semblance of peace and unity in Afghanistan.

Issues and conflicts in the Middle East are delicately intertwined, and the US can ill afford to neglect the importance of the Iraqi domino in this puzzle. There is little in the Middle East that would have a greater ripple affect than instability and chaos in Iraq. The US has already underestimated the intricacy that is Iraq to its loss.

As future events will show, its unlikely that the US can simple afford to adopt a policy of “over to you now Iraqis” just yet.

As Obama’s speeches to the Muslim world have highlighted, however, the US is unwilling to put all its eggs in one basket. It needs the support of the greater Middle East in keeping the tentative and fragile peace. This is something that it simply can not do by itself.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

As unrest simmers further, what now for Iran?

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Over 2 weeks since the contentious presidential elections, Iran remains firmly on the news. The national fall out, which came as a result of a wide disagreement over the election results that saw Mahmoud Ahmadinejad re-elected by a landslide, has intensified with streets protests been met with crackdowns by the government that has seemingly only encouraged and increased the international spotlight.

Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned on Friday 19th June that a continuation of protests would not be tolerated and would be broken-up by security forces. Relative silence from the ruling elite was effectively broken with Khamenei providing public backing to Ahmadinejad and denouncing any notion that the infamous elections were rigged.

Ensuing violence on the streets of Iran, as protestors defied government warnings, increased the stakes and the deepened the national divide that has clouded Iran. Scores have been killed as a result with many more injured.

With the Guardian Council firmly dashing any hopes of a re-run of the elections, but admitting that a number of electoral irregularities did in fact take place, this only begged the question of what would happen next.

Splits within the ruling elite

The mass public demonstrations over past two weeks have been unprecedented as they have occurred in parallel with evident splits within the ruling elite. This has placed leading Iranian figures in a difficult predicament, with parliamentarians and the Assembly of Experts not appearing united in how to move to forward in this stand off.

Reports that some family members of influential former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, an ally of Mir Hossein Mousavi, were briefly detained further, underlined tensions even if ruling members have maintained relative silence.

The timeliness of the government in terms of responses and public rhetoric, suggests that leaders have been divided not just on the political row, but also how to combat the protestors. Limited concessions in the face of such mass-scale and well highlighted protests were always likely, but the government is unlikely to cave-in wholesale to public demands. The Iranian leadership will clearly look for ways at calming tensions and appeasing at least a section of the protestors, but at the same time they do not want to appear weak or losing grip of power.

The open admission that voting irregularities did occur is seen as a positive step, but a fundamental admittance that elections were flawed or a rerun of elections that significantly changes results at this stage, and thus proves the general “reformists” protestors right, would be hugely embarrassing.

What is certain is that Ahmadinejad is the new Iranian president and the stance of the revolutionary guard and ruling elite only emboldens this reality.

There have been public demonstrations before since the advent of the Islamist revolution of 1979 that established the Islamic republic, however, fractions within the ruling elite have never been channelled in a public way as this time around. Any quarrels or fractures within the powerful institutes in Iran have always been careful in preserving the very foundations of the republic, thus even reformist campaigns in the past, including that of Mousavi have generally supported this view.

Mousavi, a powerful aide of Ayatollah Khomeini, high-profile public break with the Iranian Supreme Leader has only led to an entrenchment of views in each camp.

So what now?

In the short-term, some violence and protests will continue but the size of any such movements moving forward is unpredictable. What is certain is that continuing defiance of the orders of highest powers in Iran, will fuel a bigger clampdown from the revolutionary guard this time around.

Iranian people, in the face of severe restrictions and clampdowns, may decide to take their protests to another level. Acts of civil disobedience, in terms of strikes and general disruptions that may harm the interests of the government are likely.

Although, protestors have already defied government orders, at the beginning they were clearly mindful to appear as peaceful citizens and held many demonstrations in relative silence. The message of the organisers of the demonstrations was that they only wanted to express their legitimate demands and wanted to be “heard”.

Further demonstrations, fuelling the wrath of the security forces, will take the battle to a new stage if protestors decide to retaliate en-masse or large-scale killings are witnessed. Such circumstances will turn the current events into much the same circumstances under the Shah.

However, it is much more likely that violence will eventually wane and it is unlikely that election results will change a great deal if at all, however, the political consequences of this saga will echo for years longer.

The aftermath of the presidential elections, will serve to symbolize the fracture present in Iranian society that the Iranian government would do well to contain. What is certain is that the Iranian leadership have been undermined in one way or another by the public consequences of this bitter stand off. Iranian leadership have shown that they would rather lose support of the population in the short-term than appear weak to the Iranian people, lest to the outside world, who have had Iran firmly under their radar for many a year.

Such large scale demonstrations and public protests are not simply attributable to western intervention. There has clearly been an ideological battle simmering between the conservatives and reformists within Iran for many years, and the size of the public discontent spells an underlying division that Iranian leaders must resolve.

The recent events will certainly provide a level of encouragement to those in Iran seeking change or indeed to Western powers. If Ahmadinejad second term was going to be difficult, this has made it even more intriguing. Underground reformist movements are likely to see a surge and Ahmadinejad, fulfilling his second term, will have to sufficiently appease reformists and contain their ambitions.

Straining of relationships with the West

The Iranian government has ubiquitously accused western governments of fermenting unrest and meddling in its affairs.

Of all the countries, Britain appears to be taking a brunt of the Iranian backlash, after Khamenei described them as the ‘most treacherous’ of their enemies.

Compounded with expulsion of two UK diplomats from Iran, Britain’s tentative diplomatic channels with Iran have become heavily strained. In a tit-for-tat move, the UK ordered the expulsion of two Iranian diplomats.

Prime Minister Gordon Brown refuted Iranian allegations and stated that “the onus is on Iran to show the Iranian people that recent elections have been credible and that the repression and curtailment of democratic rights that we’ve seen in the last few days will cease.”

The “neutral” stance of the US has been changing steadily and the events of the past week or so that have seen increasing violent crackdowns, has given US President Barack Obama plenty of reason to speak out and condemn “unjust actions” of Iranian leaders, and praise the “courage and dignity of the Iranian people”. Obama denied any meddling in Iranian affairs, but the general US view was best summarised by the White House spokesman who stated, “We’ve seen the beginnings of change in Iran.” It is hardly a great secret that general change in Iran or indeed regime change, would amount to sweet tunes in the ears of the US.

UN chief Ban Ki-moon was no exception to criticism of meddling after the Iranian Foreign Minister stated he had “damaged his credibility”, after Ki-moon had expressed worry and openly urged Iran to respect fundamental civil rights and the “will of its people”.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Deepening election crisis threatens ideological stand-off in Iran

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The worlds gaze was already fixated on the Iranian presidential elections like never before. Iran, as an emerging regional powerhouse with nuclear aspirations, has been a firm item on the international agenda. The global focus on the elections only intensified with the ensuing crisis around the election results, which saw Mahmoud Ahmadinejad re-elected by a surprising margin with 63% of the vote, well ahead of his nearest rival Mir Hossein Mousavi who managed 33% of the vote.

The election results were almost immediately condemned and opposed by Mousavi and the other two rival presidential candidates, Mohsen Rezaee and Mehdi Karroubi, alleging electoral fraud and corruption.

The opposition refused to acknowledge the election results and demanded a full re-run of the election.

What ensued on the streets of Iran thereafter turned a brewing political crisis into a symbolic clash of society, contested largely between conservatives and reformists that could determine the future orientation of the country.

Pro-Mousavi supporters have orchestrated a number of demonstrations in Tehran, which has fast spread to other cities, with the largest protests staged on Thursday. The rallies so far have been largely peaceful and have mainly seen tens of thousands of people march in silence through the centre of the cities. This “silence” has been carefully organised in order to underline the peaceful message of the protests, that the people are voicing their legitimate demands and that the rallies are not common opposition against the ruling system of Iran.

However, history has shown how quickly such situations can turn into wide-scale anger and hostility. The government forces have been careful not to be perceived to be violently suppressing the rallies. However, common resentment has already been stoked with a number of protestors shot last Monday by members of the pro-government Basij volunteer militia. A number of arrests of politicians, journalists and protestors have also been made.

Members of the Basij militia have also allegedly been involved in retaliatory attacks in a number of Iranian cities through university raids and beatings of students.

However, as much as the ruling elite in Iran have urged calm and tried to maintain control, the current crisis threatens to divide the very foundation of the Islamic Republic.

The most powerful figure in Iran, with control of armed forces, police and intelligence services, is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has fast become engulfed at the centre of a deepening crisis.

Succumbing to broad pressure, Khamenei has agreed to a re-count of the votes in disputed areas, a sharp shift from his initial stance, but falling some way short of opposition demands.

Undoubtedly, it is the nature of the rallies, some of the largest since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 itself that have added to the fierce climate and ensured anxiety amongst figures in the establishment.

Reformists, particularly Mousavi are not an especial threat to the Islamic government. However, with the opposition keen to obtain nothing short of a full re-run of the elections, the current tense environment will not die down too easily.

This places the government into a very difficult corner. If they do nothing, than the perception of their deep grip, especially that of the ruling elite will be challenged. Regaining of control is paramount in these circumstances and the government may offer further concessions under a continuation of a “carrot and stick” approach.  However, any form of a violent crackdown, may well turn an election dispute into a challenge against the very foundations of the Iranian Islamic republic, which may well go beyond the influence of Mousavi. 

After all powerful figures in Iran will be well-aware of the circumstances that led to the historical events under the Shah, which ultimately culminated in the Islamic revolution. A crackdown pits influential Iranian security forces against the people, this itself is a very dangerous ploy since behind the scenes, the forces may well be divided to some extent and many are openly supportive of reformists. How they would react against their fellow sympathisers if any suppression gets out of hand, may open new doors and challenges in the current conflict.

Supporters of Ahmadinejad have also been out in force in a show of support, and if the situation escalates, this may result in direct confrontation between rival supporters.

The ruling clerical elite may try to employ a neutral view, but in reality in these circumstances this is almost impossible. A great example is Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, who is chairman of one of the most powerful institutions of the regime, the Assembly of Experts, which ultimately selects the Supreme Leader.

Whilst such figures have tried not to stoke any fires, Rafsanjani was involved in a recent confrontation with Ahmadinejad who accused him of corruption. More importantly, Rafsanjani, who has been a key cog of the Islamist regime from the outset of the revolution, is a supporter of Mousavi. He may have been less vocal but his more activist daughter, Faeza Hashemi, gave a speech in one of the “illegal” demonstrations.

Iranian officials have accused foreign media and governments, particularly, Washington, on an “interventionist approach” on the election issue. Such accusations of meddling have led to a foreign media blackout on coverage of the crisis.

The White House may unsurprisingly deny any charges of meddling, insisting on the surface that their may not be a great difference to them or in terms of Iranian policy who becomes the next Iranian president. Quietly, would it be any secret that they would prefer to see a long-time nemesis in turmoil and to witness events that challenge the very essence of the Islamic Republic?

All this begs the question of just how “illegitimate” the elections were. Although, it is hardly an indication of wide-spread fraud, some of elements of the election were rather unusual. For example, the votes were not announced province-by-province as in past elections but in percentages via blocks of votes, which seemingly changed very little as they were announced.

Such little changes in counting patterns would indicate that Ahmadinejad would have done well in rural and urban areas and even in home regions of the positioning candidates.

Ahmadinejad has support across Iran, but mainly in more rural and less off areas.  But the middle-classes of the major cities, acknowledged to be main supporters of Mousavi, are probably more integral components in deciding any election outcome.

All eyes are now on the conservative body, the Council of Guardians that has to sign-off on the election results within 10 days and is currently tasked to look into the electoral complaints.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Online Opinion, Peyamner, Various Misc.

Obama’s historic speech the platform for Middle Eastern peace?

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The birth of a “new beginning” with the Muslim world, hoped as a new beginning for the elusive peace process

It was no secret that improving ties with the Muslim world was to become a core component of US President Barack Obama’s new administration. On 4th June president Obama delivered his highly anticipated speech at Cairo University, where a “new beginning” for ties with the Muslim world based on “mutual interest and mutual respect” took on strong emphasis. A strong symbol of this new start is the peace process between the Israel and the Palestinians and the establishment of a Palestinian state. However, as we have seen many times before, emotive words and real action and tough decision making do not always translate to the same thing.

Furthermore, by looking at the greater whole of the Middle East, will parts such as Kurdistan miss out?

One of the greatest historical problems in the Middle East has been the establishment of elusive peace between Israel and the Palestinians that has become almost symbolic of the US relationship with the Muslim world. Obama’s seemingly new tough approach with Israel signalled a new phase in the peace process. Successfully achieving peace between the Jews and Arabs and ultimately the establishment of a Palestinian state may well prove to be the platform on which Obama is judged at the end of his term.

The speech was refreshing, warm and conciliatory. Any speech that even grabs the mood and attention of customary US nemesis, speaks volumes about the influence and importance of the speech. However, deep and powerful rhetoric is by no means a measure on how such broad goals will be achieved in reality.

New ties with the Muslim world

A frequent theme of Obama’s speech was his emphasis on the positivity and role of Islam on the global stage. He pointed out the significance of Islam on contemporary history and human development and indeed the part that Islam has played in America’s history, while referring to civilisations “debt” to Islam.

Relations with the Islamic world under George W. Bush and indeed before that became strained and introduced dangerous levels of animosity and mistrust. The perception of the US in the last several years has been tarnished by its foreign policy, with many Middle Eastern views portraying the US as “anti-Islamist”.

Obama downplayed such beliefs of an ideological clash and stated “America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles – principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.” Obama was evidently keen to eradicate somewhat negative stereotypes that surround both Islam and the US, and the cycle of distrust that had undermined common ties.

Obama frequently highlighted a great respect for Islam while aiming to show that there was more common ground than differences.

The whole is greater than the sum of the parts

From the outset, Obama has clearly been keen to reach out to the greater Middle East. A common theme of his tenure as president is that the US will aim to “listen rather than dictate” to the Muslims.

Indeed, the Middle East is as much of an interlinked web as ever, and no solution or stability in any one country will achieve the greater goals of the region.

Peace and success in the Middle East can not be achieved without a broad consensus amongst the social mosaic of the region. The American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that individual achievements will only ever be hampered by greater obstacles in the surrounding environment.

More importantly, US relations in the Middle East have reached a vicious and perilous cycle, which Obama has been clearly intent on breaking.

Obama tried to win the hearts of the Islamic audiences by making references to texts from the Quran, and by emphasising that with a “proud tradition of tolerance”, the positive role that Islam plays in solutions rather than as a source of problems.

Ties with Israel and Palestinians

In his quest to turn a new page with the greater Muslim world, there can perhaps be no greater starting point than resolving the historical Palestinian dilemma.

Peace between Israel and the Palestinians formed a core focus of the Bush era, however, the much-hyped peace road map never really started.

Obama speech echoed a neutral stance with regards to the present Israeli-Palestinian standoff. The Islamic view of America has long been defined by the strong historical support of the Jews, seemingly at the expense of Arab suffering and the deprivation of Palestinian rights.

This notion has only served to add to the view that US foreign policy was hypocritical and unequivocal.

In his keynote speech, Obama once again reaffirmed the strong bond between the US and Israel, which is “…based upon cultural and historical ties, and the recognition that the aspiration for a Jewish homeland is rooted in a tragic history that cannot be denied.” However, Obama was clearly keen to ensure that Palestinian rights and sufferings were treated on equal footing, describing the situation of the Palestinians as “intolerable”, who he believes “endure the daily humiliations – large and small – that come with occupation. ”

Shifting US ties with Israel?

Many have pointed to a shift in US policy towards Israel. However, this policy is needed if the overall “reach out” of his administration to the Muslims is to be taking seriously.

It remains to be seen how much political or public pressure, the US government is willing to place on their historical ally in the region.

US Middle East envoy George Mitchell, visiting Israeli and Palestinian leaders on the back of Obama’s speech, reiterated that the US views a two-state solution as the “only viable political solution” to the conflict.

A key note of Obama speech on the peace process was the firm need to halt all Israeli settlement building activity in the occupied West Bank, which is deemed illegal under International law.

This caused a potential confrontation with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who previously vowed to at least to accommodate “natural growth” building in the settlements. Furthermore, Netanyahu and his cabinet have appeared reserved to endorse the principle of a Palestinian state in public, much to the contrary of American support to the idea.

Netanyahu is due to deliver a key speech later this week, which will go a long way to underlining the path that his Israeli government will pursue. Either way, the Israeli government will need to make concessions in terms of cabinet personnel or policy, as they realign with the new realities in Washington.

Many in Israel are evidently concerned about the new shift of support from the US government. With Obama placing equal focus on both the Israelis and Palestinians, many will now be looking at the political movements and initiatives shown in each camp. On the back of the historical speech by Obama, there is now a danger for either side to be singled out depending on the steps they undertake.

Both the Israelis and Palestinians have been cautiously warm to the renewed efforts called for in Obama’s speech.

Moreover, Israel may need to make greater concessions not just in the face of US pressure, but also in their quest to win greater endorsement from the Arab world and particularly support against the growing Iranian nuclear threat.

The US has been keen to emphasise to their Israeli counterparts that the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue must come hand-in-hand with the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians. What is certain is that no side can act against the Tehran government without a broad support of the greater Middle East.

Any Israeli unilateral action on Iran, as much as its nuclear programme is also feared by many Arab regimes in the region, would go a long way to ensuring further isolation of Israel.

The need for tough measures

For Obama’s brave new policies to become a reality, the US government must go beyond strong rhetoric and mixed this up with tough action and decisions.

For example, while the US have been insistent that no Israeli settlement building continues, what will they do if Israeli continues their justification of further construction in one form or another? Furthermore, the US should be clear on their exact policy regarding settlement building, so that there is no doubt or misinterpretation to suit one side. Does opposition to settlement building mean future settlement expansions or the presence of these settlements altogether?

In his speech, Obama was signalling the prospects of a new definition of ties with Hamas, if Hamas refuses to change its policy towards Israel and does not become an apart of a new unity Palestinian government, then how will the US react to the entity that affectively rules the Gaza strip?

If the peace process goes down a productive and positive path, then the stance of the US will look after itself, however, such similar paths in the past have seldom followed such positive motions. The position of the US will come under much scrutiny, if key differences emerge between Israel and the Palestinians or if indeed outright violence erupts again.

Obama is correct in that no ideology or principle, such as democracy can or should be imposed on a nation. It is indeed down to the real will of a nation, on what they choose to adopt or how they want to be ruled.

By that token, Israelis and Palestinians must make the real concessions and choose what kind of a future they want, but obviously the right US policy has great bearings on the decisions and directions taking by each nation. One thing that is certain is that the current status-quo will serve no side.

All sides, particularly Israel must realise that peace measures should not just be political, more opportunities and economic progression in the Palestinian territories will be a major influence to sway Palestinian sentiments.

The dangers for the Kurds

One side that has clearly benefited from the US foreign policy of recent years are the Kurds. A pro-American, democratic and secular nation does not come around too often and the US and Kurds have developed positive ties. However, many Kurds have grown disillusioned at lack of US support or appreciation of these bonds.

Clearly, when one takes a greater view of a subject matter, certain components that make up key parts of the whole, may miss out.

Too often in the past, the US has neglected so-called “smaller” actors to attain their bigger strategic goals with the perceived more dominant powers in the region.

The US must not forget that that as the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, the Kurds deserve recognition as a firm actor in the region and to be credited for their recent gains, their path towards prosperity and democratisation.

Too often reach-outs in the Middle East have been represented by Jews and Arabs. Reach out to the Muslim world, includes all such parties, including Kurdistan, which is after all a predominantly Muslim nation.

However, there is an inherent fear that the US can not keep all sides happy, which is next to impossible and as a result the Kurds have to be careful no to over rely on fickle foreign policies in the region, be it from the US or neighbouring countries.

By keeping the “major” parties happy in the Middle East, the US may well choose to do this at the expense of others. The Kurds have to ensure that they achieve self-sufficiency for their experience and reinforce their region based on a future that is not necessarily dependent on Western powers whose support is conditional and reserved at the best of times.

Support against extremism

Clearly, the war of the modern era has been the battle against terrorism and extremism. This new battlefield is one that is unconventional and high-impact. As the last several years have highlighted, it is one war that the might of ones military alone can not win in the long-term.

The battle against fanaticism and fundamentalist can be won on ideological grounds alone, by affectively winning the hearts and minds of the populations or uprooting the support base of these elements.

In Palestinian, Iraq, Lebanon, Iran and Afghanistan, it is indeed that battle against extremism that has handicapped reconstruction, social advancement and peace. In any of these cases, US can not win these “battles” by merely imposing their ideology or military might. In other words, they strongly need the support of the greater Muslim “moderates” to establish long-lasting peace.

It is only with the establishment of a strong moderate support base, that the extremists can then be uprooted. The previous cycle of animosity and alienation between the US and Muslim powers, further distanced such moderates and indirectly encouraged support for more radical elements.

Obama was quick to emphasis that violence is not a part of Islam. In the case of Palestine, Obama stated that violence was a “dead end” and that “resistance through violence and killing is wrong and does not succeed”.

Obama, although stating that America was not at war with Islam, openly warned that the US would continue to confront extremists that threatened its security. This is a clear reminder that the US has not necessarily gone soft on its determination to battle radicals or employing a complete shift in foreign policy, particularly against elements like the Taliban in Afghanistan or the regime in Tehran.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd, PUK Media, Peyamner, Various Misc.