Category Archives: Kurdish Globe

With the numbers game so prevalent in Iraq, the national census will rock the political horizon

Leave a reply

The upcoming national census due to be held on 24th October 2010 holds additional significance for an Iraq that almost seven months after the staging of national elections has still failed to form a new government. The importance of this elusive and milestone national census, the first across all of Iraq since 1987, can not be underestimated.

Iraq is a disparate nation where statistics have huge significance. While in most places this event would be a question of numbers and not politics, in an Iraq that encompasses an enthralling and tense mosaic as a result of its artificial formation by imperial powers, it’s almost impossible to discount the huge significance of this census in shaping and influencing the political arena.

The conducting of a census has proved controversial for a number of reasons, none more so than its undoubted direct affect on the status of disputed territories. Under article 140 of the constitution the implementation of the census is the milestone step before a referendum can be held in Kirkuk and other areas fiercely contested between Kurds and Arabs.

As Baghdad has dragged its heels on the implementation of article 140, clearly for fear of seceding power and territory to the Kurds and due to strong pressure from neighbouring countries, the census in turn has been delayed a number of times.

At a time when the formation of a new government has proved painstaking at best and security is deteriorating exponentially, voices from predominantly Arab circles calling for yet another postponement of this elusive census was predictable.

In reality, if the census was to be held without the three Kurdish provinces as was the case in 1997, Baghdad would not hesitate to hold the census even under the current tense climate. Simply put, the census directly pits Kurds against Arabs in the fierce political stakes, hence the long-term apprehension of holding this critical national poll.

While the principle of a census itself is not politically driven, in Iraq numbers means power and power is a prelude to wrestling as much influence and share of the national cake.

Those who believe that a census would be the source of the polarisation of Iraq are simply wide of the mark. This census does not lead to a polarisation of Iraq, for it merely confirms the extent of the existing polarisation of Iraq.

No matter how the matter is viewed, Iraq is a bitterly divided country that houses a number of ethnic and religious groupings who existence under the Iraqi banner has been fraught with historical mistrust and animosity.

Furthermore, although masked under a different light, this is hardly the first post-Saddam census in Iraq. With the fragmented nature of the social horizon, each of the national elections held thus far have been nothing short of a high-level census.

The formula is simple. Kurds vote for Kurdish parties, Arab Shiites for Shiite parties, Arab Sunnis for Sunni parties and so on. There are of course general exceptions to this rule in Arabic circles with more cross-sectarian political coalitions in the last elections but the post-ballot patterns remain essentially the same.

Analysis of the previous election results will broadly determine the nature of the outcome from the census. For example, the recent national elections in Kirkuk were a direct contest between Arabs and Kurds jockeying for power. The current distribution of seats in the Iraqi national assembly is affectivity a snapshot of the demographic breakdown of Iraq.

The census will have by far the greatest implication on the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. With the normalisation process incomplete to say the least, there is a great chance that Kurdish ranks will be swelled further. In this case, the census essentially becomes the de-facto referendum that most Arabs and Turkmens have long feared and proactively attempted to stall.

The results of the census merely confirm the results of a referendum in Kirkuk and disputed territories. In this respect, even if article 140 is stalled further and referendums are never held in Kirkuk, a census that clearly shows a Kurdish majority naturally provides the best political ammunition possible for the Kurds.

A census that shows a Kurdish majority in the disputed areas can almost be taken as the will of the people to become annexed with the KRG as opposed to remaining under Baghdad control.

One of the reasons why the census pits Kurds versus Arabs as opposed to promoting inter-Arab friction is the fact the census omits sectarian based questions. It will show how many Arabs there are but crucially it steps a major landline in not providing a breakdown of Sunnis or Shiites within Arabic sphere.

Ironically, the census does propose the Yezidi’s and Shabbak’s as separate groupings so there is a danger this may harm Kurdish representation.

In addition to the all important step of deducing a rundown of Iraq’s ethnic identity, the census will also ascertain many other keys answers from the nation such number of widows, disabled people and orphans and those who have been forced to move.

While most parties point to the census as something that will further stoke tensions at a delicate tenure in the new Iraq, it is often forgotten that the census can actually be a factor for reconciliation.

After all, as long as the census count is vigilantly analysed and prepared by Iraqis with representation from all major groups and with key UN input and monitoring, facts do not lie.

Kurds and Arabs have bickered at length over the distribution of the national budget with the KRG receiving a portion that they deem equal to their numbers in Iraq which Baghdad has ubiquitously contested. However, no politician should doubt this breakdown on the back of clear evidence from the census.

In a similar vain, if the census shows clearly how the vote is going to be swayed in any future referendum on disputed territories, this provides no excuse to delay the implementation of the constitution forever.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

A referendum on the taste for change and the historical foundations of Turkey

Leave a reply

For a country seemingly in transition and an ideological tangle between its historical roots and the reformists intending to drag Turkey into the new millennia, the vote over constitutional amendments held extra significance.

Many had perceived the vote as a referendum on Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself and the thermostat by which to gauge the ruling party AKP’s likely showing ahead of next years crucial national elections.

A hard-fought and contentious campaign was followed by a tense vote as the Turkish people voted ‘yes’ to the constitutional reform package on the table. The polarisation of Turkey could not be painted better than the fact that although 58% of the electorate voted in favour, large section of the Kurdish south east boycotted the vote or voted no. Elsewhere, large sections of Istanbul, a secularist bastion, were weary of government measures to dilute historical state principles and ideals.

The AKP, who stormed to power in 2002 with a tight-hold on the Turkish political arena, faced stiff criticism from nationalist and conservative circles, especially from the main opposition party, CHP, who accused the Islamist rooted AKP of a de-facto Islamist coup and aiming to seize control of the judiciary.

Since the AKP assumed political ascendancy, many key reforms designed to facilitate EU accession have been passed. This has included loosening laws around restrictions on freedom of speech, allowing landmark if not limited and state controlled broadcasting in Kurdish and slowly clipping the wings of the powerful Turkish army, the long-time guardians of the secularist ideology.

One of the key aims was to limit the power of the judiciary and the largely independent hand of the constitutional courts, whose status at times has afforded a free hand in upholding the now mystical secular and nationalist ethos of the state, and who were even close to banning the AKP only a couple of years ago.

The new measures provide the government greater influence over the selection of judges and also include steps to try army officers in civilian courts.

In many ways, the constitutional referendum pitted an old Turkey against an aspiring new one.

Over the past decades since foundation of the republic, certain blueprints of Turkey such as its strong secularism, nationalist ideals and the almost sacred role of the military were almost deemed untouchable.

While the AKP and Turkey has a long way to go, the sense of new if not highly contentious dialogue has been a strong development for Turkey as it tries to reshape its strategic role and identity both in the Middle East and Europe.

Admittedly, many of these reforms have been forced by EU accession demands than pure free will but the change in the air in recent years has certainly rocked the established elite.

The same ideals that engulfed Turkey in the 1920’s can not be merely applied indefinitely. The advent of globalism, a new world order and more transparent economic unions, means that Turkey must simply change with the times, or become stuck in out dated ethos that will only prove counter-productive to its advancement and standing.

Eventual entry into the EU is a major carrot and one that will ultimately see Turkey make further constitutional changes required, no matter how hard they may be to stomach in certain quarters, let alone discuss at this sensitive juncture.

As debate and a sense of anxiety in some nationalist circles continues to grip Turkey, perhaps it was fitting that the referendum was held on the day that marked exactly 30 years since a military junta took power 30 years ago and duly adopted the current constitution in 1982.

The current constitution drawn up by military influenced and ultra partisan actors with very specific objectives at the time is out-dated and simply incompatible with that of an EU aspiring country.

This common acceptance of the need for modernisation begs the question why all the fuss over the reform package? The answer is that although the reforms included only 26 amendments to the 1982 constitution, many which were widely expected and some now irrelevant, many hawks and nationalists fear that this may just be the tip of the iceberg as the AKP government manoeuvres further to imprint its ideology.

Critics will point to the way the reform package was rushed through earlier this year, and to the fact that citizens had a choice of ‘all or nothing’ over the proposed changes. While Erdogan has been heralded for spearheading economic and political advancement in Turkey, opposition camps point to his rigid style and view the Prime Minister with a degree of mistrust.

Ironically, while for some the constitutional amendments were too radical, for the impoverished Kurds struggling in the shadow of authoritarian and repressive laws and who largely abstained or voted “no”, the reforms simply do not go far enough. Many of the key laws and stipulations that continue to impinge Kurdish rights remain enshrined in legislature. For example, the key law that stipulates that any political party must attain a 10% threshold to enter parliament has continually blighted Kurdish political parties. Teaching and broadcasting in the Kurdish language are still limited and freedoms are still someway short.

Quite simply the changes simply do not quench the evident need of greater political reform in Turkey. However, particularly for the Kurds, who only decades ago were denied altogether, the gradual thawing of age-old mindsets is more significant than the limited reforms on the table at the current time.

It took many decades to usher even the notion of change and thus expectancy that the Turkish nationalist horizon will now suddenly tip upside down is optimistic at best. The democratisation of Turkey will continue, and as frustrating and tense as it has been, further changes will be painstaking, gradual and not wholesale.

For example the much anticipated ‘Kurdish opening’ ran out of steam as the government became paralysed by stiff opposition, perception of ‘succumbing’ to the PKK and also at the same time from instability and general mistrust in the south east, who argued the steps did not go far enough.

While disappointedly the iconic steps by the government to reach out to the Kurds never took any semblance of ascendancy, the channels of democratisation and dialogue are surely, if not slowly, taking root.

New democratic pages must be turned to ensure modernisation of Turkey’s south east and a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish question.

The EU must shoulder a lions-share of responsibility in carrying and pushing Turkey towards accession and prosperity, by loosening the nationalistic constitution further and particularly ensuring that Kurdish rights are advanced further. After all if Turkey joins the EU, it will be bringing its millions of Kurds with it.

While US President Barack Obama’s belief of “vibrancy” in Turkey’s democracy is exaggerated, in Erdogan own words, Turkey has at least “crossed a historic threshold”.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Will Iraq experience ‘withdrawal symptoms’

Leave a reply

A sight of departing US forces was a long-time dream for sections of the Iraqi population opposed directly and indirectly to the American occupation. However, as the remaining US combat forces trickle over the desertous border, ahead of the 31st August deadline as per their strategic agreement with Baghdad, what kind of an Iraq will they be leaving behind?

Back in April 2003 amidst short-lived euphoria, the ambition and vision for the new Iraq was bold and inspiring. Not only did the US overthrow a brutal dictator but aimed to induce a sense of western values and democracy to Iraq that at the same time would serve as a model for the greater Middle East. 

Seven battle-hardened years later with over 4,400 troops dead, 30,000 wounded and not to mention war costs that now run into trillions of dollars, the Iraqi adventure will always remain a blot on US foreign policy and one that will symbolise the contentious tenure of George W. Bush.

While the US was seemingly bogged in a quagmire and stuck in a vicious cycle between insurgents on the street and bickering politicians in parliament, the situation in Iraq was averted from a total failure with Iraq finally turning a corner, the appeal of sectarianism slowly waning and security improving dramatically.

However, the situation in Iraq is by no means irreversible and the crunch period for the stability and future of Iraq is yet to be seen. No better way sums up the continual frailties that remain than the current circumstances that encompass the US withdrawal.

Almost six months after the milestone national elections that was hoped to foster the first genuine post-war national government, Iraqis still bicker on the choice of prime minister lest forming a new government to deal with the decisive issues that loiter on the parliamentary shelf.

While Iraq may not necessarily make the front pages of the news as it used to, this shouldn’t mask the fact that Iraq is still tentative and has great strides to make. As such, even as Washington can breathe a sigh of relief after almost a decade of two brutal wars that stretched even the might of the world’s greatest army to its very limits, Iraq is far from a “job done”.

While certain circles have been all too frequently keen to highlight US deficiencies in Iraq, Iraqi politicians must take a lion share of the blame for protracted progress and slow reconciliation. The US is hardly responsible for every Iraqi misfortune and the controversy over the US occupation merely masked key issues on the ground that was tapered for decades by totalitarian rule.

The huge US presence particularly in the aftermath of the surge campaign was designed to offer Iraqis crucial “breathing space” that was hoped to cement political progress. However, much of the benchmarks set by the US failed to be achieved by the Iraqi government.

Even as Baghdad has progressively moved towards full sovereignty in recent years and become more confident to stand on its own feet, the same fundamental handicaps continued to undermine the Iraqi mission.

Iraq is a disparate nation with a deep history of mistrust amongst its ethnic and sectarian mosaic. Too often direct US influence in the Iraqi political chambers allowed key legislation and government forming to ensue. More strikingly, whilst progress and milestones were often hailed over the years to showcase Iraqi path to success, many achievements could only be ushered by brushing key political hot-potatoes under the political rug.

For example, seven years later, enmity and ideological divides on the running of the country plague relationships between Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite camps. The Iraqi oil industry, which on paper has the power to propel Iraq to great economic heights, continues to linger behind with a lack of a census amongst groups on a true way to share its immense oil wealth.

Years after the onset of the constitution, the implementation of key terms such as article 140 continues to gather dust. While for many years, the spotlight was on the Sunni-Shiite showdown resulting in almost all out civil war, the strategic differences between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad were not as relevant. However, one of the greatest dangers that continue to gather pace is the simmering tension in the disputed border regions in the north, particularly in Kirkuk.

Although, relatively calm for now, the growing issue is yet to bear its full fruit owed to years of foot-dragging in resolving key standoffs between Arabs and Kurds.

In reality, the US has invested too many lives, money and foreign policy to wave good bye just yet. Far from the end of an era, the presence of 50,000 full armed US soldiers is hardly a meagre figure. The US with its eyes on the growing menace of Iran and its ongoing war in Afghanistan, can not afford an Iraq that slips into deeper infighting and insurgency and drags the rest of the Middle East down with it.

In essence from the 1st September 2010 under its new label of Operation New Dawn, all that may be happening is a rebranding of the American escapade. Remaining “non-combat” troops have the legal jurisdiction to continue counter-terrorism operations, assists Iraqi forces and act in self defence.

Owed to the fractured nature of the state, Iraqis are very much susceptible to foreign meddling and without a strong government in Baghdad Iraq may well play a role of a client state for neighbouring countries in the years to come. Iran continues to exert strong influence on Shiite parties, Turkey continues to build and strengthen its ties with Kurdistan and Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan observe diligently to ensure that Sunni interests do not succumb to a new wave of Shiite revolutionaries on their eastern borders.

Political frustrations aside, security in Iraq is hardly clean-cut. One only has to point to the notion that there are now “only” 50 or so deaths a week. That is still 50 lives too many that Iraqi families have to endure. Although, Iraqi forces numbering over 600,000 are formidable on paper, by their own admission they are not ready to assume full responsibility for all aspects of security without US assistance.

Furthermore, just where loyalties lie within the forces is open to question. Until the security forces broadly comprise all three groups, sentiments will be cautious to the effectiveness and impartiality of the forces.

Above all else, as at least a phase of the US adventure comes to a close, people have lost sight of the overall picture. The new Iraq and foreign actors must realise that a brutal dictator, who killed thousands of his own civilians with chemical weapons, launched deadly wars, drained national resources and repressed three quarters of the population was removed thanks to the US. Just ask the Kurds in north at their gratitude towards the Americans.

The new Iraq can in theory excel economically and strategically. However, as the US has come to terms over seven years, they can only push Iraqis so far, the rest of the journey only Iraqis can assume whilst Americans anxiously watch. Iraqis must start to look at key differences that continue to blight progress and realise only they can muster a new dawn. There is nothing the US can do but hope that their grand and costly excursion in Iraq comes to fruition.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Epoch Times, Peyamner, Various Misc.

Discussion on UN decision on Kosovo Independence

Leave a reply

The murky distinction between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity – As UN rules Kosovar unilateral independence legal, a new precedent is set for nationalist struggles

The secession of Kosovo from Serbia concluded the bitter and bloody breakup of Yugoslavia. However, the onset of independence for Europe’s newest member of the family has been the most contentious.

Kosovo Albanians clearly suffered great atrocities under Serbian rule, leading to NATO intervention and UN protection thereafter. Despite strong opposition from a number of countries including Russia and China, Kosovar’s determination for statehood was undeterred resulting in a unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008.

Although, now recognised by over 69 UN member states, the issue of the legality of the Kosovar independence, facilitated with the support of its American and British allies, has stirred tensions and debate ever since; and crucially has initiated a sense of weariness for a number of countries with their own separatist headaches.

The recent ruling by the International Court of Justice, the first case of secession raised before the World Court, declared that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was in fact legal and did not contravene international law.

This was a highly significant development for Kosovo in its quest for full recognition and UN member status, but it also carries significant ramifications for future cases.

Key global powers in support of Kosovar’s rights have continuously pointed to the notion that Kosovo was a special case, that Serbia’s brutal campaign had forfeited their sovereignty over the province and, as a separate ethnicity, the Kosovar’s were free to choose not to reside with their Serbian counterparts.

However, no matter how this is masked, clearly a strong precedence has been set for nationalist struggles across the world. Furthermore, this is another demonstration of the stark double standards employed by western powers that plagues the notion of a new world order and the ideals of freedom and democracy that the West is desperately trying to promote.

Nowhere in the world is the case of Kosovo more significant than in Kurdistan. The similarities are striking. Ethnic Albanians have suffered under the hands of occupiers and dictatorships as have the Kurds. Albanian’s pose a minority in a number of countries, including Serbia, Macedonia and Greece as do Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey.

However, while Albanians may have suffered great crimes, their existence as a distinct ethnicity has never been denied and they have an independent state in the form of Albania. Not only was Kurdistan forcibly assimilated, but Kurds in Iraq suffered great campaigns of genocide under the noses of the West; and in Turkey they have never been officially recognised as having a separate identity.

To date, the Kurds still form the largest stateless nation in the world. This begs the question of the criteria for judging the merit of nationalist struggles and just who has the authority to determine and endorse such moves.

Clearly in the case of Kosovo, many countries still refuse to recognise their independence including the veto-holding powers of Russia and China. It was the ardent support of the US and key EU states that was all that was necessary.

The concept of self-determination is not new and was first championed by the then US president Woodrow Wilson after World War I. From colonialism and the fall of great empires, suddenly appeared numerous new countries in the international arena.

Even today, nationalist struggles rage in many countries including Russia, Spain and Georgia.

The issue of self-determination is evidently complicated as it in direct contrast to the principle of territorial integrity. By international law, nations have the right to full sovereignty and the enforcement of their borders but as highlighted in the past, international law can be misconstrued and misapplied based on the strategic goals of global players.

The Kurds, like numerous other nations that encompassed the Ottoman Empire, were afforded the right of self-determination under the Treat of Sevres but somewhat ironically within a few short years, the Kurds were scrubbed-off the map by the Treaty of Lausanne.

No Kurd was ever consulted about the division of its land or its people and the new borders that they were suddenly bound to. This was the decision of global powers and regional actors on the chessboard who held the Kurdish population as inferior pawns that could be ruled and submerged. Once great amounts of oil were discovered in Kurdistan this was the final nail in its quest for statehood as it’s carve up intensified and powers sought to reap the benefits of its immense wealth.

Ironically, although the Kurds have steadily risen in prominence and strategic standing in recent years, any notion of independence would gain no support from the US or other major powers due to geopolitical considerations. By the same token, it is doubtful whether it was purely legal considerations that saw the US support the secession of Kosovo or if it was strategic reasons.

More ironically, the same geopolitical constraints that the West allude to in justifying why Kurdish independence would create instability and a nightmare scenario was created by the West themselves.

Evidently, anarchy would ensue if the principle of self-determination was vaguely applied to all cases. This would amount to great global instability and further bloodshed. However, self-determination can only be applied based on its own merits and not double standards.

The basis of any nationalist struggle is primarily ethnicity. Any established nation has the right to unmolested existence, to decide its own affairs and to express cultural freedom. No nation has the right to submerge, rule-over or deny outright another nation.

These fundamental principles are one of the main reasons why the League of Nations and later the UN was created and why many wars have been waged against rogue regimes and dictators trespassing international charters.

No case demonstrates the lack of international standards than that of Turkey. With a highly nationalistic driven constitution and an oppressive military existence, the Kurds were historically sidelined or merely referred to as “Mountain Turks” and even today do not enjoy key rights granted by UN charters.

The best judge of a nationality is history, culture and heritage. Kurds have existed in the areas that they reside for thousands of years and have been recognised as a distinct nationality throughout history, with their own language, culture, customs and traditions.

In the example of Turkey, the Kurds could benefit immensely from a peaceful and prosperous coexistence with their Turkish counterparts and with it possibly the carrot of EU membership. However, this unison by the virtue of international law must be based on voluntary association, democratic rights, culture freedoms and an equal status.

It was highly significant that Turkey was one of the first countries to recognise Kosovar independence. It was also its flagship of Turkish Cypriot rights that led to the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the establishment of a state in Northern Cyprus that was widely condemned.

The Turkish Cypriot right to self-rule and peaceful existence was the vehicle for Turkish intervention. However, what the Turkish Cypriots desire is hardly clear given that they became outnumbered by Turkish settlers brought by the Turkish government.

The principle of “self-determination” is best explained in the words itself. However, by clear contradiction, it is still obvious that owing to the colonial mentalities of Western powers, it is not “self” that determines such a principle but “others”.

As the old English saying goes “what is good for the goose is good for gander”.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Online Opinion, eKurd, Peyamner, Various Misc.

Balancing the ethno-social political triangle in Iraq

Leave a reply

Four months after the much anticipated national elections in Iraq that was hoped to foster the first all encompassing government in Baghdad, Iraqi politicians continue to jockey, debate and pursue tense negotiations with view to assembling the required majority to form government. Giving the Iraqi track record, a lengthy period of government forming is hardly surprising. However, the process was exasperated with contentious delays to the election itself, controversy over banned politicians on eve of political campaigning and then bitter disputes over the final election results.

In many ways, Iraq has made a lot of progress since the previous elections marred by Sunni boycotting, not least on the security and sectarian front. However, as the democratic process has become stalled in recent weeks, this has afforded a chance for insurgents to relay the road of instability and sectarianism. 

The critical government forming process has been giving added bite with the expected withdrawal of U.S. combat forces by the end of August. While the departing of foreign forces may have been a welcome sight for many Iraqis, the presence and influence of the U.S. all too often masked political and security cracks, and this has now become more evident than ever.

At critical times over the past several years Washington has used its substantial sway on Iraqi politics to ensure the Iraqi democratic bandwagon rolled on. Stability and success in Iraq shortly after the nightmare that ensued post-2003 became an American obsession. After all, in such an aftermath, anything short of peace, relative democracy and stability in Iraq would have catastrophic consequences, especially with neighbouring predators already circling with intent.

U.S. military presence will drop significantly from a peak of 170,000 just a few years ago. While the sheer U.S. military expenditure and involvement in Iraq may have been taken for granted in recent years, as the democratic journey continues to remain frail, the readiness, loyalty and impartiality of Iraqi security forces will be put to a firm test.

Government shaping has been further complicated with the lack of a clear winner at the polls. Although Ayad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya group won the most seats, it was marginally ahead of incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, and debate continues to rage on the party that has the legal jurisdiction to attempt to form government. Although Maliki did not win, he strengthened his claim to form government with an alliance with the religious based Shiite Iraqi National Alliance, meaning that his party was only seats away from attaining the majority needed to form a new government.

The Kurds, who continue to hold a key card in the formation of the new government, have taken their time over the selection of any alliance this time and aim to seek written guarantees on nationalistic issues before committing to bring another power in Baghdad. The natural and preferred alliance of the Kurds will be to work once more with their Shiite counterparts. However, persistent foot dragging on key Kurdish interests by Maliki put doubt in the minds of many a Kurd, especially as Maliki’s dominance and political standing solidified. However, the predominantly Sunni umbrella of Allawi is hardy the tonic that weary Kurds seek either. Al-Iraqiya was direct in competition to the Kurds in the tense oil-rich province of Kirkuk and has often voiced its intent against Kurdish attempts to annex disputed territories.

If Kurds do join the mainly Shiite coalition of Maliki, there is a danger that they may not receive their first choice government posts, as may have been the case a few years ago. However, more critically a Kurdish-Shiite alliance without the key Sunni parties and the ultimate victor of the polls, Allawi, will sow a new chapter of democracy in Iraq on shaky foundations.  After all, it was the sidelining of Sunni’s after their decades of near dominance that triggered Iraq to the brink of civil war. For years Baghdad and particularly the U.S. have sought to appease Sunni’s and bring nation reconciliation in Iraq.

While in theory US Vice President Joe Biden’s comments this week that Iraqi politics was “not a lot different” from other countries, may speak true on the surface. Unlike some other countries, democracy in Iraq produces brittle results. This is owed to the ethnic and sectarian disparity of Iraq. Regardless of election results, Kurds, Sunni or Shiites will still demand power in government. The ‘triangle’ can not always be massaged based on election results. Shiites will always form a majority in Iraq and Sunni’s will always refuse to succumb to all-out Shiite dominance, especially with the proviso of a strong Tehran hand in Baghdad. At the same time, Kurd will never submit to Arab dominance and influence, due to their autonomous existence, history and national interests.

This means that key posts must be divided carefully regardless of the election outcome. The sidelining of any major group will only spell trouble.  The elections themselves are generally formulaic, Kurds will always vote for Kurds, Shiites for Shiites and so on, even if the elections this time around swayed from a sectarian underpinning compared to before.

The triangle became more interesting in recent weeks with the thawing of relations between Allawi and Maliki, raising the prospect of what seemed an unlikely political marriage. A coalition of such proportions may seem a dramatic gain for democracy but this may also mean that key positions such as President and Prime Minister will go to Shiites. Furthermore, this has raised anxiety in Kurdistan that they lose political sway and key posts in Iraq to Arab coalitions.

The US has largely stayed out of the political manoeuvring this time around. However, Biden’s visit was a clear indicator that Washington is getting itchy feet. While their forces may withdraw, their high stakes in Iraq will not dwindle. Stability and prosperity in Iraq has become a keynote health gauge of the Middle East.

As for the political process itself, it is still better to endure more months of protracted progress and frustrations in hope of genuine gains, than short-term achievements under US pressure as witnessed too often, that may lead to shaky coalitions and more fundamental Iraqi issues been swept under the political rug.

It is these real issues such as oil sharing, broadly represented security forces, federalism and resolving of disputed territories that often become sidelined for the sake of progress on the surface. Any new government must make firm commitments to these aforementioned principles and critically to the implementation of the constitution that is after all meant to be the blueprint of the democratic existence in Iraq.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

The vicious cycle of ‘no peace, no war’ bites Turkey once more

Leave a reply

Hope and growing expectation that the age-old Kurdish issue could be finally resolved in Turkey, underlined by the government’s bold and historical undertaking referred to as the “Kurdish opening”, quickly evaporated.

The derailment of the brief positivity that was sewn in the much impoverished and conflict scarred east of Turkey is highlighted by the dramatic escalation of events in Turkey this past week.

The PKK have evidently escalated attacks in recent weeks, but the death tolls marked by a string of deadly attacks over the past number of days has rocked Turkey and stirred nationalist anger.

A bomb attack on a bus in Istanbul, claimed by an off-shoot of the PKK, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), brought the number of soldiers killed to 17 in less than week.

This has placed immense pressure on Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, already under broad attack from the opposition and nationalist circles for his attempts to reach out to the Kurds and ultimately reach out to the PKK to lay down their arms.

This all begs the question, where did it all go wrong? Surely, all sides would seek to capitalise on positive motions to bring peace to Turkey and a democratic settlement to such an age old problem that has left scars on both sides? The simple answer is no. This is Turkey after all, and cracks formed from decades of nationalistic policies, disenfranchisement, bitter feelings from both circles and a raging guerrilla war that has claimed thousand of lives, will not be papered over all too easily.

Turkey has finally come to the realisation that cutting the branches of your problem is not equivalent to cutting its root. As long as the PKK machine is fuelled by government policies, peace will not be achievable and bloodshed will continue.

The greatest goal of the Turkish government should be to isolate the PKK, not militaristically or economically but emotionally. Not all Kurds support the PKK and certainly only a very small minority of Kurds prefer bloodshed to peace.

However, even as Kurdish political parties with firstly the DTP which was dramatically ousted last year for alleged links with the PKK and was the first fatal blow to the peace process, and there successor the BDP, have had presence in the Turkish parliament, they have failed to become the true representatives of the Kurds and have succumbed under the great PKK shadow and persistent attempts in Turkey to clip their wings, before the political birds could even fly.

However, the Turkish government hardly helped their cause, in spite of what initially seemed positive developments between the AKP and the now defunct DTP last year.

Nationalists and Kemalists have gulped at the mere idea that the Kurdish problem should be drawn on a democratic or ethnic basis and have persistently acknowledged the battle with the PKK as a fight against terrorism. In truth, the root of this battle is for greater cultural and democratic rights, freedoms and social development in the Kurdish region.

As such, these democratic openings and initiatives can only be attained in the Turkish parliament, not in the mountains or by the sheer military might of any army. Therefore, the more the Kurdish issue is rendered to a battle in the distant mountains, whilst the situation on the ground deteriorates, this only entices Turkey into a vicious “no peace, no war” cycle that as history has shown has blighted both sides.

In spite of widespread public pressure and the recent attacks, Erdogan maintained his pledge to the Kurdish opening and the broadening of Kurdish rights. However, as violence escalates, Erdogan will have a fight on his hand to instil any motion in parliament against a backdrop of opposition and sheer animosity. Constitutional changes, the fundamental aim of the Kurds, will become almost impossible in such a tense and nationalistically polluted climate.

In reality, ongoing tension in many ways supports the nationalist and Kemalist circles, the Turkish military as well as the PKK. As peace and democratic moves falter, the PKK continues to be the flagship of the Kurds.

It is important for Turkey not to rescind on its pledges, lest allow the PKK to take centre stage again. It must support and encourage Kurdish political evolvement, which has historically been starved and facilitate true representation in the Turkish parliament, rather than pressure, alienate or as has been common place, shut down Kurdish parties all together.

The peace initiative took a great blow when the government was largely embarrassed, as what should have been a milestone for the Kurdish opening with the surrender of a number of PKK rebels last year turned into a pro-PKK ceremony.

Currently, there has emerged a huge vacuum in the peace process that can not be so easily bridged. The Turkish government will simply refuse to ever negotiate directly with the PKK, let alone be seen to succumb to the rebels. The war with the PKK has become far too bloody, too many scars have developed and too much pride is at stake for that to ever happen.

Yet as long as the PKK continues to be the representative voice of the Kurds, then the process is stalled without true recognisable and widely respected Kurdish interlocutors on the ground.

The aim of Turkey should remain unhindered. Reach out to the Kurds and entice them into a genuine alternative between separatism and violence on the one hand, and historical repression by successive Turkish governments on the other.

The tears of a mother, whether Kurdish or Turkish, are sacred. Violence serves no gain and only deepens scars. The more deaths that emerge, the more that both sides reach deeper into the position of no return.

When the Kurds see development of their region, democratic rights, employment and a firm place as true partners of the Turks, Kurds will themselves turn on separatists or those who seek violence or bring instability.

For now, the situation will get worse before it gets better. With imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan openly abandoning efforts to seek dialogue, this has culminated in a fresh wave of violence, with the PKK threatening more attacks until its demands for greater rights are fulfilled.

While Erdogan remains persistent on his bold and historical opening, he can not at the same time watch as attacks escalate and pressure mounts. A dismayed Erdogan accused European countries of not doing enough in its combat against terrorism.

This was an all too frequent criticism of the US in the past, even as the US have openly denounced the PKK and publicly defended the Turkish government while often overlooking Turkish actions in Iraq.

As Turkey continues to flagrantly breach Iraqi sovereignty with military incursions and air raids, this places the Iraqi Kurds into a more precarious predicament. Iraqi Kurds, who have often been blamed for aiding the PKK, have repeatedly refused to fight fellow Kurds.

However, with the much welcome thawing of relations between Turkey and Kurdistan in recent times resulting in the landmark visit by Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani, the Iraqi Kurds may well have a price to pay for the new strong bond with Turkey.

Barzani pledged “all efforts” to assist Turkey on his visit, and the Turkish government may well give the Iraqi Kurds more support and official recognition, including annexation of disputed territories, for their hand in further alienating the PKK.

This places the Kurdistan government into a tough situation. It needs the strategic support and recognition of Turkey to prosper and develop, while at the same time it does not want the PKK problem to become a greater Kurdish issue. After all, no matter how you look at it, the Kurdish dilemma in Turkey is a cultural and democratic one, specific to Turkey alone and can only be resolved in the Turkish parliament – and no where else.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd, Peyamner, Various Misc.

Barzani’s landmark visit to Ankara symbolises new historical passage between Kurds and Turkey

Leave a reply

Three years is a long-time in any part of the world, but can be equal to a lifetime in the Middle East. Although, economic ties have been relatively strong between Turkey and the Kurdistan Region for many years, political ties became strained and contentious as Iraqi Kurds assumed a new “official” role in the new Iraq and with it considerable power and strategic standing.

The visit this week of Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani to Ankara, the first since the US invasion in 2003, bears significant ramifications for both Turkey and Kurds all over the region and not just in Iraq.

For a long while it seemed that Turkey would remain obstinate on old mentalities and was ever-reluctant to recognise the new reality across the border, even as other major powers flocked to open consulates, assume bi-lateral trade ties and build political cooperation.

While Kurdistan has been affectively autonomous since 1991 and not 2003, Turkey could live with that reality as to a great extent the region was under a firm eye, strategically confined and required support of Turkey.

However, its one thing acknowledging a reality behind closed doors and another openly accepting and recognising that reality. This is Turkey after all – a country that for many decades denied even the existence of the Kurds, let alone the establishment of a Kurdistan Region and who has fought deadly battles against the PKK Kurdish rebels since 1984.

Witnessing first-hand what initially appeared to be the materialisation of their greatest fear in 2003 would not have been easy to stomach. Especially as images of Peshmerga forces storming triumphantly into Mosul and Kirkuk in April 2003 under the Kurdistan flag, were flashed around the world.

Turkey has long feared greater Kurdish autonomy or even outright independence. This anxiety would have hardly been eased as Iraqi Kurds assumed key positions in Baghdad, negotiated historical terms in the constitution and became invaluable allies to a U.S. that had been stuck in a quagmire and short of genuine partners.

As Turkey has plunged deeper into its battle with the PKK in recent years, hawks in the Turkish military squarely pointed the finger at Barzani for sympathising and even aiding the Kurdish rebels.

Turkish military commanders openly threatened to invade the region many times and in 2009 decided to do just that. This was probably the lowest point in the post-2003 ties between the Kurds and Turkey. Some Turkish politicians and especially the ultra nationalist military elite were astonished at what they saw as Barzani overstepping his power and daring to “stand up” to them, after heated exchanges over the PKK and status of oil-rich Kirkuk.  After all, how could any Kurdish “tribal” leader have the audacity to remain outspoken and firm against the mighty force of Turkey? A proud nation built on strong sense of nationalism and enormous ethnic pride.

For Turkey, it has simply been a case that whether you publicly accept a reality or not, that reality is still true. An internationally recognised Kurdistan Region exists and is enshrined in official legislature. The existence of a Kurdistan is no longer a taboo, even if it continues to be a common one in Turkey, but a reference to an internationally recognised political entity. The Kurdistan flag is no longer a symbol of “separatism” but a symbol of a federal region. The Kurdish language is not only spoken but is now one of the official languages of the Iraqi state. The Peshermrga forces do not belong to political groups but are an official force of the Iraqi state. This list can continue and continue.

The overwhelming basis is that Turkey can ignore the new developments and this new reality to its own detriment. Closer to home, decades of conflict in the east has seen no gain but bloodshed for both Kurds and Turks.

Bound by age old principles and Kemalist foundations, Turkey seemed unwilling to waver from its historical stance. However, Kurds are a fundamental part of the Turkish state and key partners in the development and prosperity of Turkey. A Turkish drive for political reform and a new roadmap to resolve its age old dilemma is the best chance in many decades of a new true social basis that will allow Turkey to flourish economically and politically.

More importantly, Turkey has come to realise that Iraqi Kurds will not forgo strong ties with Ankara even at the expense of ties with Baghdad. The bustling trade between Turkey and Kurdistan reached a remarkable $9 billion in 2009. This will only increase further. Iraqi Kurds rely heavily upon Turkey for a number of strategic reasons and ironically the Turks are by far the best partners the Kurds can muster. Turkey is their door to Europe, to economic prosperity and the regions vision of becoming a de facto part of Europe.

Equally, the support of the Iraqi Kurds will no doubt help to finally resolve the PKK dilemma in Turkey. Turkish Kurds look eagerly for new job opportunities and development of their cities. With the much anticipated door to the EU opening sooner or later, the Kurds of Turkey can only gain by been a integral part of the Turkish picture and will benefit tremendously from the strong ties with their Turkish brethren, as long as Ankara can finally free itself from age old taboos and embrace Kurdish ethnicity and culture as part of its official framework.

A peaceful, stable and flourishing region is not only good for Iraqi Kurds but an essential buffer and access point to the Gulf for Turkey. Kurds, who share similar political and religious ideology, are just what Turkey needs against the ever changing picture in the Middle East and growing Shiite power both in Baghdad and Tehran. Ankara’s hand in Erbil will ultimately ensure equilibrium against Tehran’s hand in Baghdad.

Its time to realise that Kurds and Turks are natural allies and the best of strategic partners. Why create enemies of each other, when clearly both in the present and the future, they must both work hand in hand for mutual prosperity and protection?

Kurdistan Region can be an affective arm for Turkey, and form a de facto confederation. Iraqi Kurdistan has immense potential, hunger and oil. The much touted Nabucco pipeline will be the glue between both sides of the borders.

Such a partnership, which only recently seemed far from an ideal match after growing friction, is slowly unfolding into a partnership that will not only take Turkey and Kurdistan forward, but will be a momentous and landmark gain for the greater Middle East region, starved of positive developments and stability.

For Kurds and Turks, it has become very evident that it’s a case of our differences are small, but our similarities are huge.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

How the land of fire and ice brought Europe to standstill

Leave a reply

With a technologically wondrous world encapsulating our modern society, I often marvel at how people coped with the much more limited and strenuous forms of communication and travel in the past era.

Often travel between two cities even in a small region could prove a tiresome trek, taking literally days if not weeks and much effort. However, with the advent of technology, the world has become exponentially smaller. Nowadays, an incident on one side of the world can cause public stir on the other side within minutes. Or within a matter of hours we can reach new lands, continents and horizons.

However, my natural wonder and inquisitiveness was about to take a turn for the worse. On Thursday, April 15, packed, excited, suited, booted, and ready to leave the front door, I got a call that I thought was a prank. “All flights have been cancelled” exclaimed my sister! I merely brushed it off, and just said very funny. I have a flight to catch and I don’t have time for jokes! However, little did I know that the joke was on me!

My sister called again, and this time with more seriousness and firmness in her voice. The grin on my face quickly evaporated. As I immediately checked the news, it become apparent that a volcanic eruption in Iceland had caused such a colossal amount of ash to drift across the UK that the aviation authorities had no choice but to place a blanket ban on all flights.

I somehow felt unlucky. My flight was a mere 45 minutes after the blanket ban came into affect. However, as the immense consequences of that ban soon unravelled, a sense of relief and “luckiness” quickly sunk in. I hadn’t left the house, and unlike hundreds of thousands of others, I did not find myself stranded beyond despair and out of pocket.

However, I now had the not-so-joyous task of calling my friend to advise that my eagerly awaited trip would not be going ahead. “All flights have been cancelled.” I sympathetically explained. However, to her it probably just felt like a bad excuse or at worse a not-so-funny joke. When she checked the news, she was just as startled. After all, the idea of needing to completely close airspace across all of the UK and much of northern Europe seemed surreal if not a touch apocalyptic. This wasn’t due to a war or a global catastrophe-no, this was due to a cloud. Well, an ash cloud, to be precise.

While it may seem unreal to most, this was an evident and unprecedented reality that cost the combined economies almost $2 billion dollars and brought Europe to a virtual standstill. It left thousands of families, holiday makers, and various passengers stuck en route and with few options.

What was hoped to be a short-term measure dragged on for close to six painful days as European governments came under fierce pressure from various sides. What danger could be so great that it left the authorities with no choice but to issue a total ban on all flights?

This question become more painstaking in the minds of thousands of stranded passengers by the hour. For many, it became an unwanted and unplanned adventure as they sought whatever route they could to go home. Ferries, trains, and other means of transport saw manic demand. Some people literally paid thousands of pounds and took days to get to their final destinations.

With the ashes from the volcano dominating news for almost a week, the Eyjafjallajokull volcano in Iceland–the source of the wide-scale discomfort and the dangerous ash plumes that covered European skies, which scientists feared could damage jet engines–became common knowledge.

As brutally as Eyjafjallajokull resonated and as devastating as its affects on civilisation, it was not the most explosive of volcanoes. However, never in European history has a single volcano had such far-reaching influence on inhabitants.

Iceland, a small island north of the UK, straddles two tectonic plates; as a result, it is home to a number of volcanoes that have made the place a land of potential fire and combustion.

The eruption resulted in tons of ash being released in the air to heights of 35,000 feet. The fine, abrasive particles that form the ash cloud include tiny amounts of rock, glass, and sand that can melt to form glassy deposits upon impact with jet engine instruments that operate at searing heats, resulting in clogging of fuels and eroding of vital metals. In fact, in theory much of the machinery and components of a plane can be affected.

Intent on proving that the whole airspace ban was a complete overreaction and was merely an over-cautious miscalculation by the government, many airlines operated test flights, seemingly without any problems.

So the question on everyone’s lips was how serious was this ash cloud after all, thousands of miles from its source? This question was only exacerbated with the fact that on Tuesday, April 20, the UK surprisingly decided to open all airspace and many European governments quickly followed suit.

The area around Heathrow Airport, normally deafening due to the number of planes and flights in the skies that come as part of the package of being the busiest airport in the world, was strangely quiet. All around, it felt that something was wrong; the mood was too subdued. Therefore, when the first plane touched down on Tuesday night, natural jubilation could be felt as stranded passengers could finally go home.

However, while affects of the ash cloud were devastating and unprecedented in aviation history, the post-mortem may prove more painful and longer lasting for authorities. The decision to open airspace again was due to a sudden recalculation of guidelines concerning levels of ash tolerance and safety after test flights and analysis with engine manufacturers and experts.

The great question remains as pertinent as ever: Was the ban ever necessary? With huge public safety ramifications, in the short term you would have to say yes. Daunting memories of a BA flight in 1982 that mistakenly flew into an ash cloud shutting down all four engines would have played in the mind of officials. However, six days of transport turmoil was unnecessary and steps were too slow to ease chaos with decision-making by the government laboured at best. Finally, as the crisis deepened, the British government even sent Navy ships to rescue stranded Britons. Although not quite a dramatic Dunkirk-style rescue, the people were getting increasingly desperate to get home, and the government was desperate to be seen as assisting its hapless citizens abroad.

With flights, staff, and people in the wrong destinations at wrong times and with thousands of flight backlogs to clear, normal service will take weeks to resume. For the time being, people and aviation officials can breathe a sigh of relief. However, before we get back to taking the wonders of modern technology for granted, the sigh of relief may well be short-lived.

The last time Eyjafjallajokull erupted in the 1800s, the eruption lasted not weeks or even months, but years! To compound matters and fears, the real concern for many lies in the neighbouring much larger “brother” volcano, Katla. There is always a danger that Eyjafjallajokull could trigger this bigger volcano. Heaven forbid what impact this would bring.

However, in reality and in addition to highlighting how powerless human beings continue to be against the forces of nature, lessons must be learned and applied fast. I for one will forever appreciate modern aviation that allows me to reach my destination in hours!

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

As kingmakers, ensuring the right king is made is paramount to the Kurds

Leave a reply

Months of painstaking preparations for the national elections and weeks of the controversial counting of the votes are finally over. However, before the Iraqi political bandwagon ponders a breather, the real work starts now.

The final election results encapsulated an enthralling, tense and close contest. This was a crucial milestone for the new Iraq and even more so as all sides of the Iraqi ethno-sectarian mosaic turned out in good proportion, striving to make a difference from years of frustrating post-war turmoil, instability, sectarianism and lacklustre living standards. The elections provide hope of a declined sectarian divide in Iraqi politics and the possibility of the establishment of the first all encompassing coalition in Iraq housing the embittered groups.

In reality however, the process of government forming will prove protracted and could well linger for many months longer.

None will be more weary of the future political shape and eager to strike the right alliance than the Kurds. The Kurds will likely be kingmakers again, as the only other distinct ethnic group with power, their support to the remaining Arab political rivals in Iyad al-Allawi, Nouri al-Maliki and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim will hold crucial sway to surpassing the all-important 163 seat mark to form government.

As such, their role as “kingmakers” carries enormous responsibility on Kurdish aspirations and the Kurdish people. Been kingmaker is one thing, ensuring the right king is “made” is another.

In the aftermath of the last elections, Kurds were in a more powerful bargaining position than in today. After a Sunni boycott and a larger allocation of seats per population for the Kurdistan region, the Kurds decided to side with Maliki’s Shiite alliance in what initially seemed to good affect.

The Kurds were able to assume the posts of President, Foreign Minister and Vice Prime Minister. However, as the months and years rolled by, while the Kurds dug their heels in at times to the desired affect and many bills reflected Kurdish jockeying, the key disputes and national goals of the Kurds become increasingly distant and stagnant in resolution.

As Maliki’s influence and credibility slowly rose, especially in light of improving security conditions from the brink of civil war, the Kurds who supported Maliki at key times, become increasingly despondent with the more hard-line government stance and Baghdad’s laboured approach to the implementation of key articles of the constitution.

However, this should not come as a great surprise. While Maliki may hardly be first choice for a Kurdish partner based on the tenuous political marriage, Allawi is hardly the flavour of the month either. The same foot-dragging was employed by Allawi as Interim Prime Minister of Iraq prior to the 2005 legislative elections, which saw slow progress on Kurdish-sided disputes. The growing nationalist stance of Allawi’s al-Iraqiya group, particularly concerning Kirkuk and other disputed territories is hardly an ice breaker either. Although a secular Shiite, the tough nationalistic tone of Allawi and his non-sectarian basis saw his alliance as a new logical platform for the Sunni voice.

This places the Kurds into a difficult predicament, which in theory has been made more challenging by the structure of the elections this time around. Firstly, disunity within Kurdish ranks with Change Movement (Gorran) running on a separate list to the KDP and PUK, potentially cost the Kurds a number of seats. Gorran won over sixty-thousand votes in Kirkuk but ultimately did not meet the necessary threshold to gain seats.

The other crucial factor was the Kurdistan Region receiving a modest rise in the number of national assembly seats which were increased from 275 to 325, with the rest of the south picking up the majority of the allocation of extra seats. Furthermore, bigger Sunni turnouts in the north and north-western provinces also contributed to a dilution of Kurdish power in these mixed provinces, which they had assumed almost by default in the last elections.

Kurdish support should not come cheap, and if its means that the coalition building process drags on for another few months, then so be it. It is better for Kurds to get firm and written guarantees this time around even if they are perceived as stalling the political process and pressured by Baghdad and Washington to “back down”, rather than to wait another four years for the resolution of key issues impacting the Kurdistan Region to be further sidelined and become stale.

The Kurdish alliance won 43 seats with other Kurdish parties claiming another 14 seats in total. The voting was generally well-spread with no party coming through as clear winners. Ultimate victors were Allawi’s al-Iraqiya group with 91 seats but this was only two more than Maliki’s State of Law coalition. As a result, this means that the permutations for coalitions are more ajar and thus the negotiation and bartrering process will be as delicate as ever.

Certainly, marginalising any bloc will come with its own headache, while attaining a broad reconciliation will still prove to be a bitter pill to swallow for the new Iraq.

Adding to the heated mix is the tricky allocation of the key ministerial posts. While the Kurds enjoyed a fair share of key positions in the past government, distribution of key posts to appease Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni sentiments will not be so straightforward. The running for the next President, held by Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, is already gathering heat with some Arab sides proclaiming that the President as a representative of the Iraqi nation should be an Arab. However, more crucially, the Kurds need to focus on positions that will ultimately hold influence and sway within Iraq itself. For example, the posts of Ministry of Oil or the Interior Ministry will be a lot more beneficial to the Kurds than positions that are high on paper but may do little to directly favour Kurdish interests in reality.

Meanwhile, as credible as the newfound opposition is to the Kurdistan Region, this will almost certainly have negative connotations if Kurds enter Baghdad divided. With the rise of Arab nationalist parties, Kurds can ill afford disharmony on the national stage. Disputes over article 140, national budget, status and funding of Peshermarga forces and not to mention the oil sharing, are only going to get fiercer before any resolution becomes more likely.

Attempts by Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani to ensure a united front in Baghdad, and pledges by Gorran leaders to maintain unity on Kurdish national issues is an absolute minimum if Kurds expect any fruit from any prospective alliance they strike.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Hewler Post (Kurdish), Peyamner, Various Misc.

The Iraqi political machine’s tricky path

Leave a reply

As the painstaking election process stumbles to a close in Iraq, the intricate political work has just begun.

Resolution of Iraq’s issues not without their “perils and dangers”

Arranging and preparing for the national elections in Iraq was complicated enough. The elections finally held on 7th March 2010 were hailed by western powers and generally observed as successful, however, this was after much wrangling over the election law that saw the elections postponed, a highly contentious decision to ban hundreds of alleged ex-Baathist weeks before the elections and not to mention deadly suicide bombings on Election Day designed to deter would be voters.

However, the convoluted and tricky path for the Iraqi political machine is very much ahead. If the holding of relatively successful elections in the face of a number of challenges was painstaking itself, the formation of a new government to appease embittered Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites against a backdrop of mistrust will be an even tougher task that  will drag on for months longer.

Political jostling, with only handful of ballots left to be counted, has already commenced with the key parties vying for power already well on the path of seeking coalition partners, with no group alone likely to win the 163 seats required to form government. The power for government is augmented with the fight for the key positions of President, Prime Minister and Parliament speaker. The position of President for example has already become heated by remarks in some nationalist circles that since Iraq has an “Arabic” identity, the post should be held by an Arab.

However, even before tiresome negotiations ensue, the Iraqi High Independent Electoral Commission (IHEC) will have its work cut out to address claims and counter-claims of voter fraud and irregularities, particularly in Kirkuk. The IHEC is already under-fire for the laboured nature of announcing the votes, which has aided to claims of electoral mishaps and even to calls for a full recount in some circles.

A different flavour

At least on paper, the elections present a good prospect of facilitating cross-national reconciliation. The political parties attempted to undercut the sectarian divides, with Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition and his closest contender and former premier Iyad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya, encompassing a number of political parties across sectarian lines.

With the Sunni turnout showing a marked increased from the boycott of 2005, the competitive nature of the elections was evident with divisions present within traditional Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish alliances.

The race for the hotseat

Whilst Maliki’s hard-line leadership alienated a number of groups, he was equally heralded for installing security in Iraq and possessing the right credentials as the nationalist leader that Iraq required. On the back of the highly successful showing at the 2009 provincial elections, results revealed to date put Maliki in prime position to win a majority once all votes are tallied up.

State of Law coalition is ahead in the symbolic Baghdad constituency, which remarkably represents one-fifth of the overall seats on offer. Al-Maliki was ahead in another several Shiite-dominated provinces with the predominately Shiite Iraqi National Alliance (INA) a close second in a number of these provinces, as well as leading in three southern provinces.

Against the popular view that religious parties have not fared as well, the Sadrist bloc of the INA has gained a credible number of seats and their influence as well as that of neighbouring Iran may well dictate the shape of the future coalitions. A strong showing by Moqtada al-Sadr is particularly bad news for Maliki, who instigated the infamous and bloody crackdown of his militia in 2008.

Whilst Maliki may be a leading contender, his quest to reassume power in Baghdad is far from sealed. His old foes and newly created adversaries will almost certainly jokey ardently to ensure that he does not win a critical second term in office.

In contrast, the surprising contender for the hot seat is Allawi. Results show that the secular and nationalistic agenda of al-Iraqiya bode strongly amongst Sunni voters in north and western provinces, many who remain sceptical at Maliki’s Iranian connections and Shiite control of security forces. Al-Iraqiya gains include Nineveh, which has the second highest number of seats up for grabs. As a result of the strong electoral showing, Allawi is neck-to-neck in the votes counted to date with Maliki. Allawi could well strike a coalition agreement with the Kurdish groups or the INA, as well as other smaller parties.

In this respect, the coalition opportunities on the table have far greater significance than ever before. Depending on who can be enticed into the political fold, a number of coalitions can be struck and thus the jockeying promises to be as intensive as ever.

Kurdish wildcard

The Kurds are widely acknowledged to assume the role of kingmakers once more. With the Kurds looking to achieve between 60-65 seats, this will have significant bearing on who ultimately assumes the premiership in Baghdad.

As far as the Kurds are concerned, if you have the power to make a king, then you have to ensure the “right” king is “made” at all costs.

Any future coalition will almost certainly require the support of the Kurds, and this places great leverage on the Kurdish bargaining position. The Kurdish support for Maliki at crucial times arguably helped to salvage the Baghdad government, especially when Iraq was on a fierce downward spiral between 2006 and 2007.

A number of Kurds grew increasingly sceptical of Maliki, but with al-Iraqiya vying directly for power with the Kurdistan Alliance in Nineveh and especially in Kirkuk, where they have based their support on promises to ward off Kurdish attempts to annex Kirkuk, Allawi is hardly a firm favourite either. Comments from al-Iraqiya liking Kurdish attempts at wrestling control of Kirkuk to Israeli settlements was hardly the right tonic to sweeten the growing bitterness.

Either way, the Kurdish aspirations of peacefully implementing article 140, resolving the issue of disputed territories and agreeing a national hydrocarbon law, will certainly hold fundamental importance to any prospective Baghdad partnership.

With growing pressure from the Kurdish public and political competition at home, the KDP and the PUK under the Kurdistan Alliance umbrella can ill afford to leave Baghdad without Kirkuk and the key Kurdish demands.

Kurds must stay as close as they can to the throne of power to safeguard Kurdish interests and may well support any legislation and lobbying further south, as long as their status quo is maintained and ultimately enhanced.

Race for Kirkuk

If the hotly-disputed race for Kirkuk needed any incitement, the close race between al-Iraqiya and Kurdistan Alliance for the province is increasing in intensity all the time. If the Kurds assume a majority as they did in 2005 and as they anticipate once more, this will aid their claim to annexing Kirkuk to Kurdistan, with many eying the elections in Kirkuk as a de-facto referendum.

While the final figures may well be disputed under contentious guidelines outlined in the election law specific to Kirkuk, the planned census in October 2010 will ultimately serve as the real battle to secure the future status of the city.

Change in Kurdistan

The three provinces that officially make up the Kurdistan Region had the highest turnouts across Iraq. With the new Kurdish opposition Change Movement (Gorran), entering the fray in dramatic circumstances in 2009, the race for votes in Kurdistan took on additional importance.

As expected Gorran faired well in the province of Sulaimaniya, but the contest with the PUK was as close as ever, with the PUK performing strongly in Kirkuk where Gorran was expected to make inroads.

It is too early to say to what extent the fractious nature of the Kurdish vote this time around hindered their quest for influence in Baghdad, but what is clear is that without a united Kurdish voice in Kirkuk and particularly Baghdad, the new political competiveness within the Kurdish scene may well hamper Kurdistan.

Gorran may well use their newfound leverage in Baghdad to indirectly pressure the Kurdistan Alliance for the much hyped “changes” they propose in Kurdistan itself.

Furthermore, with the much higher turnout of Sunnis than in 2005 and with increased number of seats in parliament not resulting in the anticipated number of seats in Kurdistan in proportion to the population, the Kurdish position becomes more tentative as the dust settles on the new political climate in Iraq.

American Withdrawal

Months of protracted negotiations and heated discussions will take place, all the while as the US increases its demobilisation efforts in anticipation of its iconic withdrawal by the end of August 2010.

While the next government will be the first under full Iraqi sovereignty and under relative blanket of security, this does not mask the key constraints and challenges that may hinder Iraqi progress once more.

Progress is very much reversible in Iraq and with emotive and historically entrenched angles on critical national issues, the resolution of these issues will not be without their perils and dangers.

Regardless of any election outcome, entities in Iraq will still decree a significant share of the Iraqi cake. While the system of proportional representation is designed to reflect the overall will of the electorate across the mosaic, the common policy of appeasement will be evident. For example, to keep Sunnis on the political stage, the expectation is they will still assume key posts, key percentage of the armed forces etc. This appeasement policy was a key reason for the decline in Sunni insurgency and the newfound security in Iraq, not necessarily just strong handed tactics by al-Maliki.

The greatest danger for America is that while Iraqis bicker and the US military arsenal wanes, this may yet give the encouragement for insurgents to reassume centre stage.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.