Category Archives: Kurdish Globe

One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?

As ever, there is a fine line between a terrorist organisation and freedom fighters. As the old saying goes, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.

Perception and the country in question is key as are geopolitics and the context within which the struggles arise.

Many independent countries have come to the fore as a direct result of military uprisings by the people through rebel movements. Two recent examples are Kosovo and South Sudan, both of which their respective rebel movements formed a key part of achieving their nationalist goals.

The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Hamas are other groups who have sought to secure rights and goals through use of force and have tip-toed a fine line between nationalist struggles and terrorist activities. In the case of Hamas, they are in political power, have foreign relations and are even supported by a number of regional counties, yet many have denoted them as a terrorist organisation.

Now the Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebel movement in Syria, albeit not on the grounds of seeking statehood but nonetheless symbolic freedom akin to other rebel groups, has tremendous international support as did the Libyan rebel movement prior to the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi.

Ask the respective governments that these groups sought to overthrow, and the terms “terrorists mercenaries”, “armed gangs” etc come to mind. Yet ask those who supported the rebel movements, and they will have heralded as revolutionaries, democracy seekers and brave men who stood up to tyranny.

In Kurdistan, the Peshmerga are without a doubt a nationalist icon of the Kurds. Without standing up to the brutality of Saddam, the Kurds would never have achieved their freedom. For the Kurds, the rebel movement was about honour, self-sacrifice and bravery. Yet for Saddam, it was the Kurds and not his barbaric policies that were to blame.

Even the Americans rose up in arms against their British occupiers in the name of freedom as have many other nations throughout history.

The point is depending on what lens the world is viewed, the situation is perceived and treated completely differently and often hypocritically.

Murky definitions

It goes without saying that people often brand terrorism depending on a number of general factors, such as the mode of operation used to seek goals, motivations and characteristics of the group.

An important element here is the popularity and backing of the group. There is certainly difference between a popular national struggle that is waged through a national liberation movement and terrorism that is spurred on by a small minority whose goals is to be recognised, infamy and to generally strike a higher bargain from governments.

Generally speaking nationalist struggle seek to acquire often freedom and rights, while terrorist movements seek to destroy. Yet at the same time, terrorists still try to acquire through destruction, fear and violence.

In any case, the so called credibility and mode of operation of national struggles is a blurred line. How often have we seen bombings of buildings and use of IED’s and hit and run tactics in Syria and Libya, that result in civilian casualties? Rebel movements are no match for the sheer firepower of their adversaries and thus urban guerrilla warfare is almost a necessity.

The key thing is whether there is a purposeful and direct intent to harm the civilian population, which is the case with classic terrorism to gain media coverage and to strike fear. But such terrorist movements often lack true public following and are rarely representative of a large segment of society.

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)

Turkey has fought a bitter war with the PKK that is a little shy of 30 years. Throughout this time, Turkey has been unable to crush the “terrorists” that it has continuously labelled.

Just what are the PKK? A national struggle or a terrorist organisation? Again, it comes back to the argument of perception. Turkey and most of the west in strategic support of its key allies have been quick to blacklist the PKK as a terrorist organisation.

Others have merely jumped on the new “Assad is supporting and arming the PKK” bandwagon.

All this simply masks reality. The PKK have been around for much longer than the current revolutionary era in Middle East and the situation in Turkey is far from new.

This is not to doubt that the PKK has received backing from Assad or Tehran, indeed the PKK has been used and manipulated effectively by even the US and Turkey.

A life of any human being, Kurdish or Turkish is sacred and as much as a Turkish mother mourns the pain of the loss of her son, it is no different for a Kurdish mother. By no means whatsoever can violent struggles be condoned and in this new era the PKK must ultimately give up its armed struggled, but Turkey has seriously miscalculated the PKK issue and continuous to do so to its detriment.

The PKK started their operation in 1984 on the back of the military junta that gripped Turkey between 1980 and 1983. This was at a time when repressive policies against the Kurds were at their peak.

Now imagine, for one minute that there was never an Abdullah Ocalan or a PKK organisation in existence in Turkey, would there be peace today or would the situation be any different? The simply is an overriding no.

The PKK was born out of the situation, and the situation was not born out of the PKK. In simple terms, if there was no Ocalan or PKK, there would simply have been another leader and another Kurdish group that would have filled the vacuum.

More importantly, the PKK have merely continued the legacy of previous Kurdish revolts, uprisings and armed struggles. Only two years after the proclamation of the republic, Turkey crushed a revolt in 1925. This was just a flavour of what was to come.

Throughout Atatürk’s rule, conflict in the southeast of Turkey was a common feature. The last revolt of that era in Dersim was quelled by sheer force and use of chemical weapons.

It is Turkey that ultimately created the PKK and until this realisation hits home, there will never be peace, brotherhood and harmony in Turkey.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, in an apparent u-turn from his original stance of blaming Assad for rise in PKK violence, summed it up perfectly:

“Terror in Turkey did not appear as a result of the developments in Syria, it is a problem that has lasted for 30 years.”

Is the issue really 5000 or so PKK guerrilla’s or the 15 million Kurds? Lets say that Turkey was able to achieve its long-term goal of eradicating the PKK and 5000 rebels perished, can they guarantee under the current climate that another 5000 would not readily replace them?

Mere branding of the PKK as “terrorists” only services to mask the nationalist struggle that continues to plague Turkey.

Kurdish Rights in Turkey

There is no doubt that the situation of the Kurds in Turkey is a far cry from yesteryears but it has a long way to go, and although inconsistently employed the government has taken a number of bold steps. However, the polarisation of government policies and the military struggles runs too deep for wounds to easily heal.

Ankara has made a number of symbolic strides in addressing its Kurdish issue, but it has seemingly deemed these as sufficient to believe that there is no longer a “Kurdish issue”.

Ironically, the Kurdish issue if anything with the revolutionary winds in the Middle East has increased. Kurds in Turkey see Arabs and even their ethnic brethren achieve rights and yet how can they be expected to settle for the rights that Turkey deems “fair” to provide?

The bottom line is fear. Ankara has always feared the Kurds and for decades was able to effectively subdue them in line with the policies of neighbouring governments against their portion of Kurdish populations.

The more that Turkey continues along the lines of fear, the more that what they fear will come to light.

The violent struggle in Turkey serves no side and most Kurds are fed up of war, impoverishment and lack of investment in their region. Money is an important language and if the Kurds were able to enjoy employment, better standards of living, first class status then Turkey would see just how much the PKK would be supported.

Through the history of the Turkish republic, there have hardly ever been any significant Kurdish parties in parliament and most have been hastily shut down.

Now the BDP is facing the same plight as their predecessor. As violence has escalated in Turkey with August experiencing some of the highest level of confrontations since 1984, a BDP encounter with some PKK rebels caused inevitable uproar. Strangely, there were politicians, rebels and even the media but no state presence.

It is no secret that the PKK has a large support base amongst Kurds in Turkey but for many Kurds the PKK is their FSA, PLO or KLA. For them the PKK represents their national struggle. Not all Kurds agree with violence means but certainly see the PKK as their flag bearer, especially as the voted for AKP in large numbers but grew increasingly frustrated.

Whether open or private, it is not illogical that the PKK would have sentimental support from the BDP. After all they share the same cause and nationalism, if not the same platform.

Only when the grassroots support for the PKK is cut and Kurdish moderates are embraced can Turkey tip the balance against the PKK.

The end game

Most Turks are fierce nationalists and the mere idea of negotiating with the PKK or surrendering to their demands is a major red-line. The battle between the PKK and Ankara has become a question of pride and with sides are as entrenched as ever. No side is willing to cede with fear of their call for peace been perceived as a sign of weakness.

Turkey continues to reassure Kurds on the one hand and battle Kurds on the other, whilst trying to demarcate between a group of rebels and the general Kurdish population. Unfortunately, it is not about a group of rebels. If it was that simple the PKK would have been destroyed a long-time ago. It’s about addressing the root of the issue as opposed to cutting the branches of your problems.

It begs the question of just why Turkey has allowed the struggle to straddle for so long. Without a doubt the PKK has benefited many in the Turkish hierarchy as it has provided fuel to maintain the status-quo.

Times have dramatically changed and as the Middle East unravels, Turkey must either address new realities and influence the present or become swept as history is made.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd.net, Various Misc.

As the Middle-East unravels, Kurdistan displays its new leverage

Increasing Turkish dependence on KRG as a factor of peace and stability in the region. Kurdistan Region is no longer a threat but a ticket for Turkish stability, economic prosperity and to maintain their strategic influence in the ever-changing dynamics of conflict-torn Middle East.

Turks and Kurds have always been natural allies. It may have come decades too late and with much suffering for the Kurdish people later, but Ankara has grown to accept a reality, that was always prevalent, but they chose to mask in the pretext of narrow nationalist pursuits.

That reality is that as a major ethnic group of the Middle East both at present and throughout history, Kurds and Kurdistan have always existed as a key component of the region, regardless of constitutional stipulations, policies of repressive governments or a lack of statehood.

Natural Allies

Turkey spent years threatening the Kurdistan Region and making accusations against them. Now in the ever changing Middle Eastern climate, perhaps it is Turkey that is more in need of the Kurds as natural allies.

Ankara has acknowledged that strong ties with the Kurdistan Region are vital to maintaining stability in Turkey, the surrounding region and the Turkish quest for influence in the new Middle East. Turkish analysts mistakenly observe that their border with the Kurdish territories has increased from 800km to 1,200km. They are wrong. The border of the Kurds stretches much further when you include Iranian Kurdistan and remnants of soviet areas of Kurdistan.

Furthermore, the Kurdish border never “increased”, it is and always has been the same length.

In simple terms, Turkey was always engulfed by Kurdistan. While oppressive policies of the previous regimes in respective countries kept the Kurdish segments largely apart, these borders are been slowly eroded.

The Kurdistan Region is now the national hub of the Kurds and their economic, cultural and strategic centre. Movement between the parts of Kurdistan is becoming easier and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) economic boom and newfound prominence, is a gain for all parts of Kurdistan.

There is already an increasing labour, trade and employment benefits for Kurds outside of the KRG. Turkey needs the KRG to keep peace, stability and diplomatic channels in the parts of Kurdistan they commonly border.

Kurds over Iraqi Arabs?

Turkey is increasingly choosing Kurdistan over Baghdad. At the same pace as Ankara-Baghdad relations have deteriorated, Ankara-Erbil ties have accelerated.

Already boasting billions of dollars of trade between them, new energy deals and oil pipelines, in the face of fierce objections from Baghdad, adds new economic dimensions to already flourishing relations.

Just this week, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu paid a symbolic visit to Kirkuk. The fact this was the first of its kind in 75 years says it all.

This is the same city that for Turkey was a red-line and the city Turkey had threatened many invasions over. Now the visit was conducted, much to the anger of Baghdad, side by side with Kurds. Long-time Turkish aspirations for influence in the old Ottoman Mosul Vilayet that they historically crave, runs through Erbil, much in the same way as Turkey’s quest to promote Turkmen interests can only be achieved through Kurdistan.

The Iraqi foreign ministry issued a sharp rebuke to Turkey for “violating” its constitution as they claimed that Davutoglu had neither requested nor obtained permission to enter Kirkuk.

Baghdad repeated what Davutoglu already knew. But it’s the Kurds they need in Iraq right now, not Baghdad, hence why Turkey agreed to export Kurdish oil in a historic move, again, against a backdrop of a stern backlash from Baghdad.

The fact that in recent weeks the likes of Chevron, Total and Gazprom joined the rush of oil-giants, on the side-lines for so many years, is also an indicator of Turkish backing of the KRG for such deals.

Oil giants are fed-up of the waiting game with Baghdad and have signed lucrative contracts with the KRG knowing fully well what the Baghdad stance and risks would entail.

They effectively chose Kurdistan over Baghdad.

Syrian Kurdistan

Whilst the public Turkish rhetoric is understandable, if nothing to appease the nationalist hawks and military elite, in reality Turkey can do little to prevent the Kurdish autonomous advancement in Syria.

Much in the same way as it finally warmed to the reality of a Kurdistan government next door in Iraq, Turkey will come to realise that it needs to lure and work with the Syrian Kurds rather than alienate them.

Furthermore, it will be rather ironic, that they promote and support the democratic and freedom struggles of the Sunni Arabs, yet chastise the Kurds, who have suffered a lot worse than Arabs under Baathist rule, for wanting the same.

Too often for Turkey, a nationalistic Kurd has been synonymous with a PKK sympathiser. Most Kurds are nationalists but not all support the PKK.

While there is an undoubted PKK support base in Syria, there is also clearly a multitude of other Kurdish political parties in the mix. It’s not the Kurdistan Democratic Union Party (PYD) that solely rules the roost as many allege.

The PYD may actually serve as an opportunity and not as a threat to Turkey. Not only can it slowly bring the PYD to its sphere of influence with an affective carrot and stick approach, it can also use it as a way to diminish support of the PKK in Syria and indeed Turkey.

If Turkish Kurds can see that nationalist goals can be achieved in Syria without the PKK, it may well swing sentiments.

The root cause for endless circle of violence between the PKK and Turkey has been the failure of Ankara to address the roots of its problems.

Success against the PKK cannot be achieved by shooting them down from their mountains and strongholds, but it is to prevent their ascent in the first place.

Any military incursion by Turkey into Syrian Kurdistan will have dire consequence. It will further antagonise the PYD into a hard-line stance and certainly tip the scale for Kurdish moderates.

Even the PKK have renewed grounds for striking peace, if they can find a political voice in Syria, it may well change the tune of negotiations in Turkey, affording them with a unique opportunity to break from arms and their image.

Syrian Kurdish foster parents

Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani and Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu both warned in a joint statement that “any attempt to exploit the power vacuum by any violent group or organisation will be considered as a common threat.”

Barzani is unlikely to relinquish support and unity with PYD, but the statement serves as a warning to the party, to keep within a political path and uphold the terms of the Erbil Agreement.

Turkey may well accept the PYD as long as the PYD works closely with the Kurdistan Region. Some Turkish circles had expressed surprise at Barzani’s key part in the Erbil agreement that ensured Syrian Kurdish unity, but Ankara will in the background accept and encourage Barzani and the KRG to becoming the foster parents of the Syrian Kurds.

Increasing economic and political Turkish support for the KRG and perhaps even statehood will come under the trade-off that peace and stability can be maintained in Turkish Kurdistan and the surrounding Kurdish areas.

Turkey and Kurdistan may well become a de-facto confederation. It may seem strange and delusional, but how believable was senior Turkish leaders openly referring to the term Kurdistan and giving press conferences under the flags of Kurdistan and Turkey, just a few years ago?

Such strong alliances could well be win-win for Turks and Kurds. Turkey has access to Europe and the possibility of future European Union membership with all the benefits it entails, whilst Kurdistan has access to billions of barrels of oil, are secular Sunni’s like Turkey and form an increasingly important buffer against Shiite influence and in the ever hostile and conflict torn Middle East that is threatening to severely damage Turkish standing in the region.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Welcome to the Kurdistan Region of Syria

For thousands of Kurds in Syria, achieving basic rights and citizenship was a dream let alone witnessing the hoisting of the flag of Kurdistan on the historic soil of their ancestors.

For hundreds of years, Kurdish valour, passion and determination stood up to many forms of tyranny and the sheer force and military might of their oppressors. Often helicopter gunships, tanks, fighter jets and even chemical weapons were no match for the heart and pride of the Kurdish warrior.

After decades out of the limelight, it is the turn of the Kurds of Syria to seize their historic opportunity, to unite and liberate another part of Kurdistan from tyranny and dictatorship. As a series of cities succumb to Kurdish control, Kurds need to ensure that the last Arab troop to leave Kurdistan is the last oppressing force to ever be seen in their territory.

Much like the uprising of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991, Syrian Kurds must ensure that the newly hoisted Kurdish flags on-top of government buildings are the only flags that the region will ever see.

Liberation of Kurdistan

As Kurdish forces of the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) finally united via the recent Erbil agreement brokered by Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, the renewed vigour of the Kurds was on instant show.

The fall of Kobane, in the province of Halab (Aleppo) and close to the Turkish border, served as the first symbol of freedom. This quickly followed with the liberation of Amude, Afrin, Dêrik and the Cidêris district. Kurdish People’s Defense Unions (YPG) alongside the Kurdish citizens, were at the forefront of the liberation.

The battle for these cities was largely without any real confrontation. This is not because Bashar al-Assad’s government sees these areas as non-important. On the contrary, they dare not indulge in a bloody confrontation with a group of determined, passionate and patriotic Kurds, where the outcome was certain defeat. Instead, the Syrian army decided to regroup and focus their efforts in maintaining control of key cities.

With reported clashes in Qamishli, the iconic Kurdish power centre of Syria, it is unlikely that Assad will give up the city without a fight. However, with a united Kurdish offensive and the Syrian army already stretched in Damascus and in other battles with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Damascus can ill-afford a protracted and ultimately costly battle against the growing Kurdish brigades.

The Union of Kurdish Coordination Committees (UKCC) urged the members of the Syrian army to withdraw from the Kurdish areas or face consequences. Indeed some reports indicate that the Syrian army may well withdraw under certain conditions rather than risk a bloody conflict with the Kurds.

At this historical juncture, the Kurdistan Region must continue to support their brethren in Syria, both through a continuation of political efforts to bolster unity and harmony amongst the disparate Kurdish voices in Syria and also through logistical support and aid.

Erbil Agreement

Only a few weeks ago, there was a deep split in Syrian Kurdistan that threatened the nationalist goals of the Kurds, undermined their efforts at a key time to topple Assad and even threatened to break into civil war.

As part of the Erbil agreement, the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan formed an agreement for the join-administration of Syrian Kurdistan.

Maintaining unity is perhaps the biggest risk to nationalist goals of the Kurds in Syria. Even Assad is less of a danger that the danger of Kurdish disunity itself.

Through unity, the Kurds become a cohesive force and where their battle becomes one of ethnic and sovereign rights, rather than individual goals of political parties.

Kurdish parties seem to be well aware of the dangers of not fulfilling a united front. The importance of working together was recently echoed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Kurdistan Freedom Party.

Unity amongst such an array of Kurdish views will not be easy but any alternative is simply not an option.

Ankara Alarm

Whilst the Kurds in Syrian and throughout greater Kurdistan looks at the emergence of a Kurdish controlled region in Syria with great pride, Turkey is inevitably alarmed at such developments.

Regardless of greater Kurdish unity in Syria, there is no denying that a major force on the new Kurdish political maps is the PYD which has strong links to the PKK.  The PKK flags on display tell its own story,

Barzani has helped to reposition the PYD focus from one of anti-Turkey and supporting the PKK to one that can focus on the primary and historical objective of liberating Syrian Kurdistan.

PYD has changed its tone for now, but it has left Turkey in a precarious position. Does it remain idle and watch as the Kurds and particularly the PYD carve out a new bastion of Kurdish nationalism, or does it intervene and do something about it?

If Turkey does take military action to intervene then it almost certainly will alienate the Kurds further and may even lead to a greater cross border insurgency. It will also undermine their role as the main sponsor of Syrian oppositional if ironically they are seen to punish Kurds for ousting Assad.

Kurdistan Region on the other hand has the difficult job of keeping Syrian Kurds in tandem with their Region and working on their side and away from one that may incur the wrath of Turkey.

The Kurdistan Region will become the natural foster parent of Syrian Kurdistan and it will be interesting to see how Ankara reacts to this inevitable reality.

However, it may be a small price to pay if the Kurdistan Regional Government can manage to keep the PKK away from dominating the Syrian Kurdistan region.

Kurdistan First

The focus of Syrian Kurds must be on Kurdistan before the nationalist objectives of the Arab dominated Syrian National Council (SNC).

Syrian Kurds will be wary of taking any new power and influence for granted, knowing only too well of the Arab opposition to the idea of Kurdish self-rule let alone de-facto independence.

In this light, it was a wise move by the Kurds to prevent the FSA forces from entering their region and to limit the prospects of confrontation and thus damage to Kurdistan as much as possible,

While the Kurds should continue to do what they can to topple Assad from power, the very future of post-Assad Syria is far from certain.

How the array of opposition voices can be wedged together is a difficult undertaking. There are many echoes of Iraq in the new Syria, and once the euphoria of the eventual fall of Assad wanes, the battle to keep a united Syria will take centre stage.

Much like Iraq, Kurds in Syria would have a pivotal region with a plenty of oil reserves, and will work to safeguard and bolster their region before submitting to the sentiment of Arab nationalism once again.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd.net, Various Misc.

Syrian Kurds dare not waste historical opportunity

Fist fits, heated disagreements, deep divisions and widespread mistrust and this is before a new government even gets to work in Syria. “They are so different, chaotic and hate each other,” was a statement from an unnamed official of the Arab League that just about summed current plight of the Syrian opposition.

Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, has lasted by far the longest out of all of the leaders that have been submerged by the Arab Spring. Assad has held onto power for over 16 months, in spite of fierce international pressure, growing regional anger and a vicious rebellion, through a combination of hard-handed tactics but above all else, a fragmented Syrian opposition front and a lack of a true leadership.

Last week, hundreds of participants and dozens of different movements, gathered in Cairo with hope of forming a unified front against Assad.

The sheer number of parties and voices that were represented across the Syrian spectrum paints its own story. The session resulted in anger, physical fighting and chaos, with a delegate from the Kurdish National Council of Syria storming out of the meeting for failure to recognise the Kurds as a distinct group in a future Syria.

The aim was to unify the Syrian National Council with view to making it a viable and legitimate front in Syria, much in the same as the Libyan Transitional Council was able to successfully maneuverer international intervention and provided a credible representation of the Libyan people.

The failure to entice the Kurds en-masse into the anti-Assad fold, despite numerous overtures from the Syrian opposition, continues to undermine the strength and true cross-national appeal of the council.

International efforts

All the while, in the midst of Syrian opposition bickering, international powers continued to strive to gather momentum in the quest to oust Assad. The Syrian transitional plan agreed in Geneva fell short of expectations, under the now typical obstacle provided by Russia and China.

The Syrian National Council itself was largely disappointed in the outcome and framework of the Geneva plan.

The 100-member Friends of Syria conference this week spoke volumes about the international stance. However, for all the rhetoric and growing international uproar, this has not led to substantial change on the ground.

Assad continues to employ all measures under his arsenal and massacres and reprisal attacks continue unabated.

The defection of a top general this week, provided hope that cracks may start to appear at the top of Assad’s empire, but such false dawns have not been uncommon.

The Kurdish swing

The Kurds have by far the greatest influence to sway momentum in Syria, but are stuck between an Assad dynasty that has provided them with decades of repression and an Arab dominated Sunni opposition, largely backed by Ankara, that they don’t trust.

The Syrian opposition has failed to sufficiently persuade the Kurds, and the Kurdish viewpoint is largely understandable.

If the Arab nationalists that form a part of today’s opposition do not give Kurds the sufficient reassurance they seek over their recognition and rights at a time when they desperately need Kurdish support and are not yet in power, then how will they react in the future once they assume power?

Syrian Kurds only need to look across the border to Turkey to lose hope. Turkey is a major regional power, a Western style democracy and part of the European framework, and yet their Kurds have hardly had a glut of hope and freedom.

This makes it all the worse, as Turkey is the biggest sponsor and host to the Syrian National Council.

The Syrian Kurds, until sufficiently swayed, will keep their feet on both sides of the equation, both in a future Syria without Baathist rule and also in a Syria that continues under Assad rule.

Realising the power that the Kurds have, Assad has largely refrained from attacks in Kurdish dominated areas, provided some freedoms and concessions to Kurds, afforded growing support to the PKK and has at the same time attempted to divide Kurdish sentiment.

The Kurds themselves are divided further between a pro-Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) stance and an anti-Turkish camp.

Kurdish demands

The Kurds must remain firm on their demands for recognition and autonomy. If they fail to achieve their nationalist goals at this juncture, who’s to say when the next history opportunity knocks on the door?

Kurds have waited for decades to be rid of the shackles of tyranny and repression and dare not lose this opportunity. As the largest minority in Syria and a major partner in Syria, they must continue to press for autonomy and a status deserving of their numbers and ethnic distinction.

If the Arabs complain of harsh treatment under Assad, just imagine how the Kurds feel after decades of neglect and for thousands, not even basic citizenship rights or outright citizenship for that matter.

However, unless the Kurds get their own house in order, they will fail to achieve their goals. The Kurdish National Council and the Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) People’s Council must in one form or another agree on a common stance.

The PYD, with an affiliation to the PKK, have steadily grown in influence and power, and their presence can be felt across a number of towns and villages in Kurdish dominated areas of Syria.

The more that the divide between the Kurds become visible, the more that Assad, regional powers and the Syrian opposition will use this as a cane to reign in Kurdish demands and diminish their influence.

What now for Syria?

For several months, international powers have talked about Assad’s days been numbered and how Assad has lost credibility, yet if the international response does not become more concrete and more affective at directly cutting the arteries that support Assad or if efforts to unify the Syrian opposition do not gather pace, Assad could find himself still clinging onto power in another 16 months.

Ironically, the real bastions of hope on the ground, the Free Syrian Army, are hardly the greatest supporters of the Syrian National Council and had boycotted the Cairo talks.

Tip-toeing by the international community, especially to appease Russia and China will bear no fruit. Through international military intervention in the same was as Libya or through a full blown civil war, Assad’s empire will only crumble under sheer force. The idea that Assad will simply give up power through a democratic transitional process is a fantasy.

Regional and foreign powers are already supplying Syrian rebels with weaponry and logistics support, but a violent conflict with a divided Syrian opposition risks drawing out the war for years.

A brighter future for Syria?

The common conception that ousting Assad will lead to instant harmony and peace in Syria is delusional. International and regional powers must act now to do all they can to strike agreement and unity amongst the Syrian opposition.

Owed to its disparate factions, great animosity, sectarian divides and ethnic imbalance, Syria has all the hallmarks of an Iraq.

Much like Iraq, the real problem for Syria is its artificial creation as a result of the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Just like Iraq, the divide has been effectively stitched through barbaric regimes and use of force.

As the aftermath of the Arab Spring has proved, regime change is one thing and practical measures for a better future in those countries is another.

Foreign powers must brace themselves for a long-term hand in Syria. While the Kurds, must persevere with a hard-line negotiation stance and written guarantees and not fall for mere promises that can be backtracked at any time in the future.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

As the oil dispute heats up, time for Obama and the US to come off the fence in Iraq

In many ways, the US adventure in Iraq was marked by failure. Billions of dollars, thousands of lives and countless years later, and the Iraq of day is not much different to that of 2003.

The US had the painstaking task of stitching warring factions, striving for its elusive goal of national reconciliation and playing the mediator, but all they did was buy time.

The US relied heavily on the Kurds at their time of need, with the Kurds stepping up to plate at the height of the Iraqi civil war and with US grip on security in free fall. The Kurds will always be grateful for the ousting of Saddam but remain weary of long-term US intentions towards them and have not always been rewarded for their pro-American stance.

Too often in the past the Kurds have been cruelly played and it remains to be seen what position the US will take long-term.

It has tried to remain neutral but sitting on the fence in a place like Iraq has its evident limits. Months after the withdrawal of US troops and Iraq is in a fresh and escalating crisis that has left Iraq at breaking point.

Dispute over oil sharing and oil contracts has always been in the thorn of Baghdad-Erbil relations, but when US oil giant Exxon Mobil entered the fray, the landscape suddenly changed. Frequent rhetoric from Baghdad about the illegality of oil contracts signed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is nothing new but Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has tried to take the matter up a level by formally requesting that US President Barack Obama intervenes to stop Exxon Mobil from proceeding with its deal with the KRG.

Although, the letter has been received by the White House, Obama has not yet responded. Maliki had warned the deal would severely jeopardise the stability of Iraq.

The Kurds wait anxiously for Obama’s response, as they find out which side Obama will pick. Whenever a dispute has arisen, Washington has been quick to point out that all issues should be addressed based on the principles of the Iraq constitution and within its plural and democratic framework. However, clearly many aspects of the constitution have been continuously sidelined especially the implementation of article 140 and the US has remained largely idle.

Any oil in Iraq belongs to all of Iraq and the constitution is clear on rights of regions to control and explore oil. The notion of a disputed territory doesn’t necessarily mean that Baghdad has exclusive access as per the constitution.

While the Kurds have done more than their share in keeping Iraq intact, persevering with democratic channels and remaining patient, Baghdad works hard to display them as overreaching or jeopardising the unity of Iraq.

A man in Baghdad continues to amass power, control security forces, a number of ministries and breaks agreements with nonchalant ease, and yet has the audacity to write to the US to warn about the serious affects the Kurds are having on Iraq.

If the US endorses the Exxon Mobil-KRG relations, then this is a major feat for the Kurds and a de facto endorsement of their autonomy, strategic standing and rights under the constitution. If it sides with Baghdad, then it’s a warning sign for Kurdistan that as warm as their relations with the US may appear or have been, ultimately, the US will work to serve their greater aims, as witnessed on countless occasions in the past.

Hussein al-Shahristani has been as vociferous as anyone in his quest to derail Kurdish hydrocarbon ambitions, and warned French companies this week that their contracts with Baghdad would be deemed void if they inked deals with Kurdistan. French giant Total, appeared very keen to do business with the KRG, but it remains to be seen whether they have been sufficiently influenced to back away from Kurdistan.

From the outside, one would easily forget with the frequent attempts to shackle its development and onward drive, that Kurdistan is a part of Iraq. If Baghdad was really so intent on maintaining unity and serving Iraq, why would it be fixated on creating handicaps for the Kurds and limiting their ambitions?

According to al-Maliki’s spokesman, Ali Mussawi, the premier maintains that the oil deal between Exxon Mobil and the KRG region could mean the “breaking up the unity of Iraq” and the “outbreak of wars”. Such a statement resembles more as a threat than a warning. The deal was signed almost 8 months ago, but now with the immense political heat on Maliki, he is using all forms of tactics to divert attention and pressure.

Signing of oil deals between KRG and foreign companies is not new, and the only difference is that Exxon Mobil are a massive corporation whose entry into Kurdistan could spark a new phase for the oil industry in the region.

Even Ninenwa Governor Atheel Nujafi of Ninewa, has come to realise the benefits of the deal and has provided his crucial endorsement. Some of the Exxon Mobil exploration blocks may reside on disputed territories, but how long do the Kurds wait for the implementation of article 140 and let Kurds, that clearly form the majority of those areas, suffer?

When Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani warned Obama on the centralist tendencies of Maliki at a recent meeting in Washington, Obama only reiterated his support for a democratic Iraq that abides by the constitution and fell short of criticising Maliki, when clearly the writing was on the wall.

Now it would be interesting, if they side with the same man that is affectively strangling democracy in Iraq.

Maliki warned that the deal with Exxon Mobil would lead to conflict. Clearly, it is his actions that is the brewing the very wars he warns on. How long can Kurdistan stay idle when the issue of Kirkuk and other disputed territories is ignored, when there is no national hydrocarbon law or when the likes of Maliki in Baghdad continue to pursue the Arab nationalist policies of the past?

Is it the actions of Maliki or Kurdistan that smell of war?

Iraq does not want to see Kurdish growth and prosperity, but the aim of Kurdistan should not be to serve Baghdad but only its people. American policies serve their short-term interests and for Baghdad its Arab nationalist goals. Kurdistan is siding ever closer to Turkey with historic oil deals and a new move to build pipelines that would completely bypass Iraq.

Kurdistan must ensure it is never at the mercy of any regime or power, even one as powerful as the US. The days when it could be bullied or swayed are over.

With or without the help of Baghdad, the endorsement of US or even the Exxon Mobil contract, the Kurdistan project will not be derailed. At the end of the day, the oil is on Kurdish soil and is not the property of Baghdad or any foreign power.

According to Mussawi, “Maliki is prepared to go to the highest levels for the sake of preserving the national wealth and the necessary transparency in investing the wealth of the Iraqis, especially oil”. Such warnings are a bit rich coming from a man that at the current time, the vast majority of the Iraqi parliament is frantically trying to remove.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Turkish opposition in historical step to end Kurdish insurgency

Historical talks between the Turkish opposition party CHP and ruling AKP promises much, but without a change in ideology and outdated principles and new tangible measures, can a new political process really achieve a different end result?

While Turkey’s current Kurdish policy is a far-cry from the dark days of the past, its “democratic openings” have often stumbled to a halt before they have gained any real motion. Turkey has tried to implement bold measures without a real change in ideology, in parliament, in nationalist circles or in tangible measures.

Contrary to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan previous statements that there is no Kurdish problem but only a terrorist problem, the Kurdish problem rages on and if anything has gained new momentum.

With rapidly changing political realities in the Middle East, Turkey risks been left behind unless it readdresses its strategic role in the region, starting with its greatest problem, its Kurdish minority

Turkey has been waging a war against the PKK and trying to contain its Kurdish population for decades without success. It has to finally come to terms that its real problem is not a few thousand PKK guerillas but its millions of disenfranchised and largely impoverished Kurdish citizens. Its only solution is to resolve the Kurdish issue through parliament, with new legislature and through common dialogue. Turkey cannot continue its failed ideology that PKK can be destroyed by force alone and yet expect to resolve its Kurdish dilemma. You have to address the root of the problem, before wasting energy at merely cutting the branches.

New angle to Kurdish issue

The PKK is clearly enjoying a new lease of life with support from Damascus much to the dismay of Ankara and deriding the government’s belief that they will “render terrorists ineffective”. These days, the Kurdish issue in Turkey is far from been confined as a domestic issue. The Kurdistan Region, with its own escalating crisis with Baghdad, is heading closer to self-sufficiency and independence through new oil infrastructure and new sway on pan-Kurdish nationalism, and more importantly a new alliance with Ankara as Turkish relations have wavered with neighboring countries.

The situation of the Syrian Kurds, with or without Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, has drastically shifted and they will enjoy new leverage. The PKK is enjoying fresh support amongst the already fractured Syrian Kurds, serving to create another headache for Ankara. One way or another, the Kurdish issue is no longer a domestic issue and needs a fresh approach, and new forward thinking away from outdates ethos.

Opposition plan

Against a backdrop of the Syrian crisis, escalating PKK violence, Ankara’s cooling of ties with Damascus, Tehran and Baghdad and an increasing wedge between its Kurdish citizens, Turkey cannot stay idle.

As such, the main Turkish opposition’s proposed initiatives this week in tackling the Kurdish problem and ending the insurgency, the first time the opposition have instigated such measures, is a positive development.

The leader of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, had a historic meeting with Erdoğan of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) where he put forward a 10-point solution to the ending the vicious violence with the PKK that for decades has crippled much of the south-east and to reconcile with its Kurdish citizens.

The principle behind Kılıçdaroğlu approach is that a solution to the Kurdish problem requires a “national contract”. A measure he believes that can only be achieved through a parliamentary process.

Kılıçdaroğlu attributed blame to the political process for failure to resolve its age-old dilemma, “Why could this problem not be solved over the last 25, 30 years? Why could terrorism not be ended? The only responsibility for this is with politics as an institution,” he asked.

The proposed measures include the creation of create an eight-member cross-party Social Consensus Commission augmented by a 12-person non-parliamentary committee selected by the four parliamentary parties.

Both the Erdogan and Kılıçdaroğlu labeled the meetings as positive which also had support of the pro-Kurdish BDP. However, the nationalist handicap, one of the reasons why Erdogan backtracked on the 2009 Kurdish Opening against a backdrop of hawkish circles and nationalist anger, will likely derail the plans for cross-party consensus.

The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) did not take part in the talks with party leader Devlet Bahçeli accusing the government of “legitimizing terror”.

Change of direction from Opposition

Erdogan and Kılıçdaroğlu seldom meet and have often clashed over granting Kurds greater rights and thus their rapprochement is the right tonic to kick-start resolution of its Kurdish problem.

The seemingly change of heart from the opposition may not be purely due to a desire to finally come to terms with the Kurdish equation.

The CHP also sense a political chance to win-over the Kurdish vote at a time when frustration with the AKP is rife with the perceived insincerity of the government towards the unfortunate Roboski massacre and its stalled Kurdish initiative. It is an opportunity to build links in the south east where social-democrats are a scarcity and also tap into the liberal support.

It is also an opportunity for the CHP to weaken any reconciliation between the AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in particular over the new constitution. AKP controversial policies such as those proposed over abortion also serve as an opportunity for CHP to secure more points.

The bottom line is that CHP can no longer stay on the side-lines of the Kurdish issue and forgo the Kurdish vote if it has any aspiration for power for the sake of its outdated ideals.

The way forward

If the killing of 34 young villages of Uludere by Turkish forces in a case of mistaken identity was a sincerity test for the government, then the government has badly failed. This further alienated the Kurds and exposed limits to the AKP reach out to the Kurds.

However, above all else, it is lack of real intent and sincerity that has crippled previous democratic openings.

It’s not arriving at a political process that will resolve the Kurdish issue and put an end to the insurgency, but concrete measures and a new dose of reality in applying practical solutions.

Turkey cannot change the end result, no matter what process it ensues, with the same historical ideology.

On the one hand it reaches out to the Kurds, on the other it arrests thousands of Kurdish political figures including BDP mayors and most recently Leyla Zana under the same harsh penal code of yesteryear.

It has too often overlooked the BDP and its previous manifestations, and has been too quick to label any nationalist Kurd or Kurdish political party as a supporter of the PKK.

Ankara has also tried to end the insurgency without paying any relevance to serious dialogue with other party in the military equation, the PKK.

The PKK, in spite of a nationalist reprisal that will inevitably come, must form a direct part of this initiative. Their support base has swollen over the years, with the government playing a big part in this, and changes in Kurdish sentiment will not be wholesale overnight.

However, what is clear is that most Kurds are long-fed up of been caught between PKK violence and outdated and insincere government policies. The new initiative must give the Kurds a way out and a new vision that they can truly buy into. Pro-Kurdish should not automatically be labeled as pro-PKK.

Facing facts

Facing facts is the only way Ankara can shatter old conceptions and herald a new dawn with its Kurds. Millions of its citizens need to enjoy the same rights as anyone else in Turkey. The millions of its citizens should not be punished only because their ethnicity and heritage is not Turkish. Kurdish culture and history should be embraced as a core component of the Turkish landscape.

The Kurdish nationalist vehicle is gaining momentum and either Turkey can keep pace and try and influence events to its advantage, or it can be a passive bystander as winds of change rapidly rattle the very nucleus of the Middle East.

The initiative promises renewed hope, but is uncertain whether Turkey has the stomach for real compromise, swallowing of nationalist pride or swaying from the foundations of Kemalist ideology.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Turkey and Kurdistan’s new focus on “what unites us rather than what divides us”

As the political gulf between Baghdad and Kurdistan continues to grow at a rapid rate, and Ankara revaluates its position in Iraq and the Middle East, the alliance between Turkey and Kurdistan assumes a new dawn.

The Middle East crisis has meant that sectarian, political, economic and strategic tides have dramatically shifted.

As Turkey’s “zero problems” policy with their neighbours has slowly unravelled, this has continuously made Ankara and Kurdistan natural allies, a far cry from the more tenuous relations of just a few years ago.

In recent weeks both the Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani and Kurdistan Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani have participated in productive and high-profile visits to Turkey, a symbol of the growing respect and solidarity that is pushing the two parties together.

Too often relations in the past have been based on the ideals of “what divides us, rather than what unites us”. Turkey may have a historical fear of Kurdish nationalism but it has slowly come to terms with the huge benefits that stability and constructive relations with the Kurds bring.

While politics plays a big part, especially, as the political earthquake across the Middle East has left governments scurrying to revaluate their positions, ultimately money talks and no rational government can ignore the massive trade and energy opportunities that come with a growing economic power-house such as Kurdistan.

Iraq is already Turkeys biggest trade partner, with Kurdistan accounting for the majority of that trade.

Kurdistan is the next energy hub of the Middle East and with its immense oil and gas reserves, Turkey stands to benefit tremendously with a close alliance with the Kurds.

This led to an inevitable energy pact with Turkey and Kurdistan that was always going to stir tensions in Baghdad.

Oil pipeline enhances autonomy

Kurdistan and Turkey used the international energy conference hosted in Erbil to outline details of a new pipeline that will drastically alter the political and economic map of Iraq and the greater region.

Kurdistan Minister of Natural Resources, Ashti Hawrami, confirmed the proposal of a new pipeline to be built within the next 12 months with a capacity of 1 million barrel per day that will carry Kurdish oil and gas via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey.

The first phase of the pipeline scheduled for completion by October 2012 will carry crude from the Taq Taq oilfield. The second phase is due for completion by August 2013.

Kurdistan then plans to build a separate pipeline by 2014 that would connect to refineries in Ceyhan.

The new pipeline will greatly diminish Kurdistan’s dependence on Baghdad both for exportation of oil and import of refined oil products and also ensure that Kurdistan has an oil exportation infrastructure solely within their territory.

Baghdad unsurprisingly denounced the deal with a repeat of its usual rhetoric that all deals must be ratified by the federal government. Nechirvan Barzani reiterated the long-time Kurdish position that their oil deals fall within the remits of the constitution, while stating at the energy conference, “unlike some of the officials of the federal government in Baghdad, we believe that our policies in the field of energy and natural resources should be based on cooperation and coordination, and not on hostility, confrontation and retaliation.”

The fact that Turkey had a high-profile representation including Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz, demonstrated Ankara’s willingness to deal with Kurds directly at the expense of angering Baghdad.

The one last rope that Baghdad has over Kurdistan is over oil. By taking export infrastructure, size and format of exports and receipt of the respective revenues, Kurdistan seeks to break that rope. Currently, oil exports in Kurdistan are halted over dispute of payments to foreign parties.

However, dispute over oil exports is just tip of the iceberg as relations between Baghdad and Erbil have drastically declined, with Massaud Barzani in repeated remarks making it very clear that Kurds will no longer tolerate the policies of Nouri al-Maliki and will take matters into their own hands if the situation doesn’t change.

The fact that Barzani openly repeated this warning in Ankara to Turkish leaders shows an increasingly confident Kurdistan but also shows that Turkey is slowly coming to terms with realities on the ground.

Zero problems policy backfires

At the current time Turkey is far from its doctrine of zero problems with its neighbours. Its increasingly dragged into the uprising in Syria as its opposition to Bashar al-Assad has accelerated, especially as Damascus renews its ties and support of the PKK. Its relations with Iran has cooled as Tehran has sided with Assad, refused to backdown over its nuclear ambitions while becoming uncomfortable with the idea of Turkey hosting a NATO anti-missile shield just next door. Its relations with Baghdad have deteriorated with harsh exchange of words in recent weeks between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Maliki that were exasperated with Ankara affectively affording protection to exiled Sunni Vice-President, Tariq al-Hashemi and accusing Maliki of monopolising power and stoking sectarian tensions.

The end result is that Turkey needs the secular Kurds as a strategic political ally and as a key buffer to Shiite dominance, to put pressure on Iraqi Kurds to leverage influence over the Kurds in Syria to back the Arab dominated Syrian opposition, and as a way of maintaining equilibrium in a fast changing region.

In addition, as one of the fastest growing economies in the world, Turkish energy demands are increasing all the time. It has an overriding reliance on Russia and particularly Iran which provides a third of its gas supplies, for its energy needs.

Turkey is already a key part of the 1 million bpd Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea. Oil and gas supplies from Kurdistan will quench its own energy first but also allow it to diversify its current dependence on limited sources, whilst at the same time confirming its role as a strategic energy hub of Europe that will bring with its levies and taxes billions of dollars of revenue to Turkey.

Oil in Kurdistan belongs to Kurds

On paper Iraq is one of richest countries in the world with its immense oil reserves. However, for decades upon end the people have endured suffering as opposed to prosperity for their divine gift.

In the example of Kurdistan, oil revenues were used not to promote unity and brotherhood but to purchase apparatus to systemically oppress the Kurds and destroy their villages and livelihood.

One can only imagine what Kurdistan or the rest of Iraq for that matter would look like if vast oil revenues were used in a rightful and productive manner.

Now the pages of history have turned and a new dawn has arrived. Kurdistan can look to Baghdad for their rewards from the oil reserves and rely on Arab sentiments, or take matters into their own hands and use oil in Kurdistan for their own benefit.

This doesn’t mean that Kurds will not abide by the constitution or their allocated share of revenues; it just means that it doesn’t wait indefinitely for fairness and equitable distribution of wealth that Hawrami has alluded to.

Indeed the implementation of revenue sharing and Iraqis getting a fair slice of the cake whilst adhering to a constitution approved by the majority of the population can bring unity. But this is Iraq after all and one shouldn’t hold it breath with distant dreams.

Note of caution to Kurds

Whilst relations with Turkey are increasingly strong with the crisis in the Middle East and Turkey’s frosty relations with their neighbours pushing them closer to the Kurds, in the Middle East nothing is irreversible.

Turkey is still weary of Kurdish independence, anxious over the possibility of another Kurdistan developing on its doorstep in Syria and above all has a major Kurdish problem that it has failed to effectively address for many decades.

Furthermore, any ties or deal should be as much on Kurdish terms as Turkish terms. The need for unity in Kurdistan is as great as ever as is the need to become self-sufficient and protect their future and not rely on existing socio-political sentiment that can later undercut the Kurds as witnessed in the past.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Leaving the fate of Kirkuk to fuzzy democracy while Maliki taunts the Kurds

Iraq has been gripped by a grave political crisis for several months and there appears little intent on the part of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Malik’s government to sooth tensions by working towards national reconciliation and resorting to constitutional principles.

Maliki spearheaded an Iraqi Council of Ministers meeting this week in the Kirkuk province, which enflamed already tense relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

Such an assertive and brazen move by Maliki shows that he is willing to stand up and defy the Kurds in spite of fierce warning by Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani in recent months.

In the face of such development, Kurdistan can remain silent at its own peril. While Barzani has been vociferous both at home and abroad regarding the centralist tendencies of Maliki and the rapid drive towards Iraq’s collapse, the PUK and other opposition figures have been much more passive in contrast.

The issue of Maliki’s authorisation tendencies, lack of implementation of constitutional articles and his show of strength by strolling around disputed territories, is pertinent to the whole of Kurdistan and every Kurdish faction must unite and take a stand.

Stoking of hostilities in Kirkuk

The timing and significance of the ministerial meeting, the first of its kind in Kirkuk, is no coincidence. The move by Baghdad was designed to be provocative in nature and highlight clearly to the Kurdish leadership that the identity of Kirkuk is Iraqi and Baghdad’s dominance is far-reaching.

Obviously, people will be quick to point out that Kirkuk is already part of Iraq but it’s the identity of the city that Maliki is emphasising. In simple terms, he will not allow Kirkuk to become a Kurdistani city.

Maliki statements which failed to mention the constitution, is in contrast to Article 140 and principles that formed the very blueprint of the country. It is not for anyone to decide the fate of Kirkuk but the inhabitants themselves, this includes Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens and not specifically one group.

A constitution is the genetic framework of any country, it is the basis by which governments rule and laws are devised. However, in Iraq many articles continue to gather dust on the political shelf and constitutional laws are bypassed all too often.

The implementation of article 140 is not only significant for Kirkuk but for the whole of Iraq. If article 140 is bypassed then affectively the whole constitution is bypassed. Without implementation of all articles that make up the constitution or adherence to constitutional principles, then Iraq is dead.

Battle for Kirkuk

Kirkuk has been a key symbol of Kurdish history and identity for thousands of years – long before any discovery of oil, the fall of the Ottoman Empire or the rise of Arab nationalism.

It has been a historic redline for Kurdistan and to forgo claim to Kirkuk now would be akin to betraying Kurdish legacy, its martyrs and the immense sacrifices Kurds have made.

Of all the Kurdish cities, Kirkuk clearly suffered the most under Baathist rule. Harsh repression and Arabisation policies saw the forced deportation of thousands of Kurds. Kurds were forced to abandon their heritage and succumb to Arab domination in the province.

Ironically, it is now the Arabs that complain of been treated badly. Returning Kurds who seek to reclaim their historic and legal rights are now the ones outreaching. If Baghdad wants to truly entice the Kurds, turn a new page and is sincere about the principles of union with the Kurds, Kirkuk is the first and only place to start.

Unfortunately, it is appearing ever likely that Article 140 will not be implemented unless sentiments in Baghdad drastically change, which looks like a more unrealistic hope by the day.  The implementation of article 140 is overdue by almost 5 years, which tells its own story.

Furthermore, provincial elections in Kirkuk and importantly a national a census have long been delayed by Baghdad. A census is akin to a de-facto referendum on disputed territories, if the demography of Kirkuk shows the Kurds as a majority then it once again only confirms the Kurdish identity of the province.

Baghdad clearly acknowledges that implementation of article 140 would result in its return to Kurdistan. But one cannot pick and choose democracy as its see fit. Baghdad cannot refuse to implement a referendum only because it fears its inevitable outcome.

Kurdistan next steps

The patient waiting game played by the Kurdish leadership clearly has not worked. If Kurds had gone with instincts at the time and unilaterally annexed Kirkuk in 2003, then the issue of the status of Kirkuk would be a foregone conclusion.

Kurds adopted politics and democracy to resolve dispute territories when clearly Baghdad and Arab nationalists were not ready and did not have the stomach for such motions.

Kurdistan needs to be unequivocal in any negotiations in Baghdad – the time for mere threats and rhetoric is long gone. If article 140 is not implemented then the Kurds should back out of Baghdad altogether and hold a unilateral referendum on the city and annex the region.

The Kurdish opposition parties and particularly the PUK have lacked the punch in raising concerns at Maliki. As KRG-Baghdad relations plunge to new lows, the confrontation will only intensify. This requires all Kurdish parties to unite in Kirkuk, in the Kurdistan Region and in Baghdad.

According to the constitution, Kirkuk’s identity is disputed, therefore the KRG has an equal say on the province as Baghdad on political, social and economic issues. The Kurds should hold a KRG Council of Ministers meeting in Baghdad in the same way.

Maliki is clearly showing the Kurds the extent of his power in Iraq and intimidating the Kurds by demonstrating his reach within Iraq. The Kurds need to take action as much as rhetoric to show that Kirkuk remains a Kurdistani city and remains directly in their sphere of influence.

According to a statement, Maliki had quoted “The problem of Kirkuk cannot be resolved by force and interference, but by the will of its people and by keeping its Iraqi identity”. This in itself is contradictory. You cannot adhere to the will of the people and insistent on an identity at the same time – it’s the will of the people and voices of the masses that determine the identity.

Kirkuk having a Kurdish majority does not mean to deny the Arabs and Turkmen populations. Their rights should be closely guarded in any eventuality but as the referendum will highlight, and as history and geography clearly proves, Kirkuk is a Kurdish city. Many Iraqi cities such as Mosul contain large Kurdish minorities so it can clearly work both ways.

Maliki’s ulterior motive

Not only did Maliki intend to make a show of strength to the Kurds, but his move in Kirkuk where Sunni Arab nationalism is strife was designed to reach out and appease Sunni blocs. The Arab nationalist card against the Kurds has long been used to bridge the sectarian divide in Iraq.

The leaders of Arab parties, who strongly reject article 140, were clearly jubilant at Maliki’s visit and hailed its significance. Kirkuk has been largely neglected by Baghdad with the people suffering from a lack of security, employment, investment and poor public services. The Sunnis have suffered a great deal under recent Shiite domination, but clearly sentiments can be fickle as Sunnis were suddenly quick to praise Maliki.

If Sunni’s want best for Kirkuk then they should made strong demands from Maliki to improve security and the crumbling standard of living.

At the same time, if Maliki really wanted to improve conditions in Kirkuk then he should have insisted on initiatives to improve services. If Maliki wants to entice Kurds in Kirkuk, then he could have reassured them on article 140 and highlighted their tragic past as a reason to build new bridges in Kirkuk.

In addition to the Kurds, influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and other key Shiite groups critical of Maliki’s policies have backed Maliki into a corner. However, Maliki is manipulating the sectarian divide and using all his manipulative tendencies and experience in clinging to power in Baghdad to fight his corner.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Enjoy your natural right to statehood or prolong agony with an unrepentant Baghdad?

The current crisis in Iraq is anything but new. The past nine years have been shrouded in sectarianism, civil war, political bickering, shaky unity governments, animosity, distrust and agreements that were not worth the paper they were written on.

The Unite States helped mask some of the realities by acting as the crutches to support an Iraq that was broken and could not stand on its own two feet.

On the other hand, the Kurds chose to re-join the new Iraq after years of isolation on the premise of a partnership based on a voluntary union.

The Kurdish leadership on many occasions were the key intermediaries in a bitter cycle of violence between the newly-empowered Shiites and disenfranchised Sunnis. Key negotiations, initiatives and interventions from the Kurds often resulted in pivotal breakthroughs, notwithstanding the important role that Kurdish security forces paid in restoring stability in the south.

The Kurds, owed to their kingmaker role were the beneficiaries of a number of concessions and countless promises from Baghdad.

Here is the problem, what good is a comprehensive constitution, democratic frameworks, concessions and promises if the end product is failed implementation, by-passed legislature, half-hearted unity and empty gestures?

The Kurds find themselves in a position of deep mistrust with a Baghdad that continues policies that are detriment to the development of Kurdistan, of reconciliation and brotherhood.

The centralist tenancies of al-Maliki are not new, this was a frequent criticism of his first term in charge.

Despite reservations and widespread mistrust of his party, somewhat regrettably al-Maliki was given a lifeline and a brittle coalition with al-Iraqiya and the Kurds broke a world record for the formation of a government.

Ironically, as al-Maliki has come under more pressure from Sunnis and Kurds, he has conversely grown in power. He has successfully monopolised power, combined several powerful posts under the disguise of temporary cover and all but broken the coalition beyond repair.

Barzani’s ultimatum

The Kurds after playing the patient game and seeing a lack of change in Baghdad are now at a critical juncture were they dare not stay idle.

Do the Kurds continue to exhaust energy in the new Iraq, when clearly the basis for new Iraq is non-existent? After nine years of effort and perseverance, the Kurds cannot continue to ignore the writing on the wall. Iraq is not united, it’s not democratic, constitutional article are no binding and parties such as Maliki clearly do not believe in a true partnership with the Kurds.

Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani has made a number of bold remarks around the plight of Iraq, the critical political crisis and has warned that the Kurds will not tolerate a return to centralisation or dictatorship.

He repeated his stance in an interview with AP, where he warned that if a positive breakthrough was not achieved by local elections in September then he will turn to the Kurdish people for a decision and thus a referendum on independence.

Barzani has been critical of al-Maliki and Baghdad in the past, but simultaneous events has pushed the Kurdish leadership well beyond the limits of passive observation or tolerance.

Barzani’s visit to Turkey in recent weeks followed a keynote visit to Washington where met with U.S. President Barack Obama and Joe Biden. No doubt at the top of the agenda was Barzani’s growing worry over the consolidation of power in Baghdad and his message to his counterparts in Turkey and US was that the Kurds had reached breaking-point and were serious about threats to secede if the foundations that were a proviso for re-joining the new Iraq were continually disregarded.

Some critics viewed Barzani’s remarks as a mere ploy to extract concession from al-Maliki rather than any real threat to secede. Such views are narrow-minded and lack conjecture.

The Kurds have already received countless concessions and have already had many promises around power-sharing, resolution of disputed territories and hydrocarbon laws. More concessions alone are in fact just the tonic that the Kurds should avoid.

Empty promises are worthless as are positive agreements that are no adopted. What the Kurds must demand of al-Maliki and Baghdad in the key weeks and months ahead is real action, practical steps and tangible outcomes.

The visit of influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to Erbil and growing disillusionment of some Shiite factions on top of an already marginalised and bitter Sunni population shows that the current crisis is more deep-rooted than ever before.

Re-writing the wrongs of history

Kurdistan has a fundamental and unmolested right to two clear options. Either a truly democratic, federal and balanced Iraq or outright independence.

As the largest ethnic group in the world without a state, subject to a cruel and selfish partition of their lands and decades of repression, if any nation had a right to determine its destiny it would be the Kurds.

While other countries, some with populations numbering in the thousands and others gripped with immense poverty and a lack of infrastructure dot the global horizon, the Kurds are warned to tread carefully or that their time has not come.

After the end of the First World War, the concept of self-determination was the overriding principle of US president Woodrow Wilson that he imposed on the League of Nations and the Middle East.

For imperial interests at the time, Kurdistan was the only major nation not to be granted statehood.

Self-determination is one of the key international charters and by which repression, imperialism and subjugation is eradicated and free will is attained.

Some claim that Kurdistan does not have the infrastructure or conditions for statehood but just how much infrastructure does Palestine or Kosovo have compared to the Kurds?

Kurdistan is washed with immense amounts of oil, with a booming economy, a vibrant population and all the trappings of any state. It is a key strategic hub of the Middle East and with the influence and standing to play a key part in the evolution of the Middle East.

However, double standards of foreign are something that the Kurds can no longer accept. Kosovo was granted independence as special case where foreign powers had ruled that Serbia had forfeited the right of sovereignty due to their treatment of the Kosovars.

If anyone has forfeited the right to have any say on Kurdistan is Arabs and Iraq. After decades of brutal Arabisation, destruction and systematic repression, the Kurds deserve to be applauded for single-handedly standing up to one of the most powerful dictators of recent times.

Have the Kurds spilled countless blood, tears and tragedy to now return to centralist rule in Iraq or to have terms dictated upon them by other groups?

No Turk, Persian or Arab can intimidate the Kurds any longer. In reality, even Turkey has accepted that Kurdish statehood is not only a natural and inevitable reality but that Turkey itself may benefit from such a development.

The Middle East is in turmoil as governments jostle for power and influence. Turkey’s rapid decline of relations with Syria, Iran and ever increasingly Iraq, puts the Kurds in a strong position to be at forefront of shaping the Middle East socially, politically and economically.

At the first seismic shifting of the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were sidelined and had to painfully endure decades of suffering for their chance to rewrite the wrongs of history. They can ill-afford to be passengers as the evolutionary trains darts past this time around.

Way ahead in Iraq

Barzani has warned Maliki before, but it was the first time that a real timetable was set for action.

If Maliki is sincere about power-sharing and partnership with the Kurds, then he doesn’t need weeks to show his intentions.

However, even if Maliki does change his tune, it will be temporary at best. Arab nationalists such as Maliki will never want what best for Kurdistan, only what is best for himself and their party.

There is no threat of Iraq’s disintegration when it has already happened. A crisis between Kurdistan and Baghdad is just tip of the iceberg. Deadly bombings serve as a daily reminder that bloody sectarianism is not a thing of the past, with Sunni digging their heels and ready to battle for their slice of the cake, it begs the question of just what part of the new Iraq would any Kurd want?

Regional powers have continually served their interests at the expense of Kurdistan, it is time for Kurdistan to be selfish and solely focus on motions that exclusively serve their national interests.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

PKK enjoys new lease on Ankara-Damascus conflict

The Kurdish question is manipulated by Syria as it turns to their old PKK allies to undermine an increasingly hostile Turkey and simultaneously divide the potentially decisive Kurds back home. 

The Arab Spring may have stormed through a number of countries but for Syria it has not been such a straightforward transition.

Syria is not a clear-cut arithmetic as the popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt or even Libya. Syria finds itself at the crux of the complicated and intertwined web that is the Middle East and has a hand in a number of historic tensions that continue to plague the region.

It finds itself inhabited by a disenfranchised Sunni majority under the iron fist of minority-Alawite rule for successive decades. It has a powerful hand in the socio-political equation in Palestine and Lebanon and is a major ally of Tehran. To put the icing on the cake, it houses a significant Kurdish minority that has borne the brunt of government brutality and that makes the unfolding of a post-Assad era all the more sensitive.

Over a year since the uprisings first began and Bashar al-Assad continues to cling on to power. Even though the revolt against Assad enjoys popular support from Sunni Arab countries, most Western powers, the UN and particularly Turkey, the fall of the regime is not yet a forgone conclusion.

The Syrian opposition may receive funding and overlying diplomatic support but the Syrian rebels continue to lack real firepower, cohesion and a long-term ability to capitalise on any gains.

It is easy to forget that it was not Libyan rebels that overcame the rule of Muammar Gaddafi but the sheer might of NATO air power.

The prospect of foreign intervention remains the only real game changer in Syria. This looked unlikely with the stern opposition of both veto-wielding Russia and China at the UN table but this could all change as Turkish-Syrian relations take a nosedive with Turkey becoming increasingly engulfed in the Syrian hostilities.

Turkey already plays host to the Syrian National Council, the Free Syrian Army, and thousands of Syrian refugees and is embroiled in a bitter conflict with Syria’s new friends, the PKK.

The Kurdish card

Aside from regional proximity and Sunni majorities, both Turkey and Syria share a historic Kurdish problem that has been long been a thorn in the sides of the respective countries. Turkish Syrian relations greatly improved after a deal in 1998 whereby Syria withdrew its key support of the PKK and signed the Adana Agreement to preserve cross-border peace. Now with an ever increasing hard-line rhetoric and opposition from Ankara towards Assad’s ongoing rule, Syria has once again turned to the Kurds as a way of hitting back at Turkey, knowing fully well that this is one of the most emotive and sensitive bullets that Damascus can fire at Ankara.

By providing renewed support and rekindling ties with the PKK, Assad gains a key leverage against Turkey whilst simultaneously weakening the Kurdish voice back home.

One of Assad’s and Baathists key strengths has been the manipulation of sectarian sentiments in Syria to consolidate power both in the midst of the current uprisings and over the past decades. Along the same lines, Assad quickly reached out to the Kurds while the uprising was still in its infancy, knowing fully well that a united Kurdish opposition to his rule and active Kurdish participation in the revolt could easily break the back of the regime.

What the Syrian Kurds have been striving for decades, Assad promised in days as he vowed to resolve the case of stateless Kurds and increase freedoms.

The Kurds in Syria now find themselves at crossroads. The ill-fated treatment of the Kurds under the hands of the Baathists is something that the Kurds will hardly forget. However, at the same time, the Kurds are not convinced on their destiny in what will still be an Arab dominated post-Assad era.

Many Kurds feel that the Syrian National Council (SNC), with strong ties and backing from Ankara, is under pressure from Turkey to curtail Kurdish demands, particularly that of autonomy. The SNC has so far resisted key clauses demanded by the Kurds much to the dismay of Kurdish parties.

At the same time, the Kurds are mindful that they may suffer in the hands of Sunni Arab hardliners in a post-Assad era for a lack of direct support to the opposition.

It appears that under the new Syrian-PKK lease of life, the Democratic Union party (PYD), the PKK offshoot in Syria, has been given a platform by Damascus to operate and enhance its influence.

Meanwhile, a swathe of Kurdish parties united under the Kurdish National Congress (KNC) umbrella which is backed by Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), but in spite of their agenda to promote their demands and support the overthrow of Assad, action has not gained significant motion on the ground.

A more sincere reach out to the Kurds by Western powers, Arab League members and SNC could easily tip Kurdish scales in the battle to overthrow Assad.

The UN peace plan

The six-point plan that was brokered by the UN-Arab League envoy, Koffi Annan that should have led to a withdrawal of Syrian troops and firepower and a subsequent ceasefire, has been tentative at best.

Even if the UN plan, which has already been violated, was to work in the short-term it is always at risk of collapsing. Regardless of any such peace plans, the respective end goals of Assad or the opposition doesn’t change. The opposition and international powers will not rest until Assad leaves, while Assad will not go down without a fight or succumb to Western pressure.

Furthermore, both sides can easily manipulate the current peace plan and breach the peace. Assad forces will use the smallest of provocations to justify the notion of self-defence, while rebels will hardly want to see their hard work undone and return unarmed to their homes. The opposition know that large-scale demonstrations are the easiest and most sensitive way of testing government appetite for peace.

In truth, this is just the beginning of the conflict in Syria and UN peace plans are nothing more than preludes to justify stronger action in the future.

The current situation that awaits Assad is not too dissimilar to that of Saddam Hussein in 1991. In spite of strong opposition within Iraq and fierce diplomatic pressure at the time, a lack of real practical steps by foreign powers meant that the opposition petered out and Saddam lasted another 12 years. This is a scenario that the West is unlikely to want to repeat and the end-game is the quick downfall of Assad one way or another.

While the UN aims for peace, paradoxically there are attempts to arm the rebels and provide significant funding.

Prospects of a buffer zone

The likely scenario that would tip the scales and shatter the current picture in Syria is direct Turkish intervention. Ankara has threated to take action a number of times but hawkish voices grew as Syrian forces killed a number of civilians in Turkey in a cross-border fire exchange, including Turkish nationals.

The idea of a buffer zone has been touted for a while but owed to regional sensitivities and a number of risks were put on hold. However, it is becoming a more realistic possibility with a current spate of events that have angered Turkey and with Ankara’s lack of conviction that Assad will abide by the current peace-plan.

The creation of a buffer zone inevitably involves military deployment on Syrian soil and thus the possibility of direct confrontation with Syrian forces. Such moves may appear unilateral on paper, but will have the full backing of most neighbouring governments and Western powers with Russia likely to remain neutral.

The purpose of creating a buffer zone may appear humanitarian in nature but is intended to achieve nothing but the overthrow of Assad.  How Assad or their PKK allies will react in such an event may lead to intensified hostilities.

Either way, Ankara has go to come to terms with a post-Assad era that invariably means that the Kurds will be granted new freedoms in Syria in one form or another.

With the PKK or Kurdish nationalist question unlikely to disappear in either an Assad or post-Assad era, Turkey may find itself forced to adopt a new long-term hand in Syria.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.