Category Archives: Kurdish Globe

Just how disputed are “disputed territories” in Iraq? Time to let a full nationwide census doing the talking

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There is no doubt that the already tenuous relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region reached new heights in recent weeks. As the Peshmerga and Iraqi army forces became deeply entrenched, respective positions hardened and the drums of war beat more loudly, the fear of a brutal war became a real possibility with the firing of a single bullet.

Frantic mediation in recent weeks by Iraqi political figures and the U.S. governmental have somewhat calmed the situation. Both sides have seemingly agreed to eventually withdraw troops, with local security forces to assume responsibility under committees that are intended to reflect the ethnic balance on the ground.

With any real sigh of relief quickly dampened by deep mistrust and lack of a long-term solution, short-term political arrangements merely buy more time.

The issue of disputed territories will not go away or become any easier to resolve the longer that constitutional articles gather dust on the Iraqi political shelf. On the contrary, it is becoming deeper and tenser with each delay.

The agreement to hand security over to local forces simply passes the problem on. Who should comprise of the local security forces? How do you determine ethnic quotas for such forces? Which group should have more influence over the “disputed areas” based on their assumed numbers?

The bottom line is that the problem once again becomes a numbers game. The makeup of local forces and arriving at this elusive ethnic balance is continuously based on assumptions and assertions, not actual facts.

The very foundation of resolving disputed territories lies in the conducting of a nationwide census. As the English proverb goes “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”. A new census in Iraq, which is a key constitutional provision, was delayed in 2007, 2009 and twice alone in 2010.

It is time to move away from claims, counter claims and assumptions and let the facts speak for themselves. Facts are just that, they are based on a reality and not on conjecture and help paint a true picture of the matter at hand.

In most democratic societies a census is a natural and fundamental exercise that helps governments to better understand their citizens, improve planning and to deliver better services to their local populace. Yet Iraq has shied away from a first full national census since 1987 with the pretext that it would inflame security conditions and ethnic and sectarian passions and would lead to the polarisation of Iraq. Any census will only confirm the extent of the polarization of Iraq, Iraq has been polarized from the moment it was artificially stitched together.

The truth is that much like the rest of article 140 where the census forms a key part, Baghdad has failed to implement legal obligations for fear of the reality that it unravels. There is no “technical” reason why a census cannot be held, the Iraqi Ministry of Planning has long trained thousands of enumerators and laid the basis for such a task.

When in a true democracy can someone pick and choose what it decides to implement to divert a decision away from a destined outcome? The real reason for a lack of implementation of a census is that a true picture of numbers in Iraq would tip the political and national landscape in Iraq upside down. In Iraq, the numbers game is everything. It means power, it means leverage and above all it ends “dispute”.

The very nature of the word “dispute” is underpinned by uncertainty and a lack of an official reality. The outcome is not clear so thus no side can make true assertions. In reality, a census in Iraq would mean a de-facto conclusion to all of article 140. If a census showed a clear Kurdish majority as most Kurds staunchly believe and that most Arabs fear, then what will the results of a referendum reveal? A certainty that such disputed territories would opt to be annexed to the Kurdistan Region.

This takes the argument a full circle to just how disputed the “disputed territories” really are and also to Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani’s decree this week to no longer refer to such territories as disputed but instead as “Kurdish areas outside of the Region”. Ironically, almost five years since the deadline for article 140 passed, it is still Baghdad that accuses the Kurd of constitutional violations over their claim to such territories. If Baghdad really wants to abide by the constitution, it should have the courage to hold a comprehensive census and show both Iraq and the international community the clear results.

A census with a true demographic picture of Iraq would also end annual disputes over the proportion of the Iraqi budget that the Kurds are entitled to. The uncertainty in actual figures of the Kurdish population has played to Baghdad’s hand by exerting pressure on the Kurds and diluting Kurdish demands.

The Iraqi national assembly itself is simply a gauge of the makeup of the Iraqi mosaic. Not only does the number of seats won by each group a reflection of the breakdown of the population, the number of seats allocated to each province is merely based on population estimates. Such estimates are further flawed and the result of guesswork as they are primarily based on food ration cards.

Such a basis for power sharing seriously handicaps true implementation of democracy. For example, Kurds in general are not as reliant on ration cards as the rest of Iraq or have not registered their children under such a system, whereas the food ration card have been manipulated and at times abused in the rest of Iraq.

The conducting of a census was a key Kurdish perquisite for joining Maliki’s coalition and was supposedly due to be done within a year. Kurds should strongly reject entering yet another general election without the fulfillment of this key condition.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

Globe interview with Saleh Muslim, Co-leader of the Kurdish Syrian PYD

Link to Interview in KurdishGlobe-2012-39-13 (English)

Link to Interview Hawler newspaper (Kurdish) – 18.12.12 Printed in Kurdistan Region (Kurdish Translation)

Syrian Kurds with new found autonomy and historic opportunity find themselves in the limelight and key actors in the Syrian struggle. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) is at the centre of the Kurdish struggle in Syria and in the Kurdish quest to capitalise on their new dawn. With rumours and scrutiny facing the party, Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel of the Kurdish Globe spoke exclusively with Saleh Muslim, Co-leader of the PYD on a number of issues to set the record straight.

 

Globe: At times the PYD is portrayed negatively, as a PKK-affiliated party who has not abided by power sharing agreement with other Kurdish parties, does not tolerate other Kurdish armed forces and has even allegedly collaborated with the Assad regime. What is your answer to that?

Muslim: The PYD is a political party established in 2003 and of course we have our way and our philosophy and our strategy for the works. I mean if our philosophy or strategy was the same as classical Kurdish parties, there would be no reason to establish a new party. We established PYD which is different from the classical parties inSyria. We have the philosophy of Mr. Ocalan and his ideas are adapted to the condition and situation ofWestern Kurdistan. Our works is different from a radical party or the philosophy of classic parties. So it’s usual for people who promoting the interest of regional and global powers to attack our party and to blame it, because we are promoting and working for the interest of the people in Western Kurdistan and all Syrians.

In 50 years the Kurdish parties could not submit anything to Kurdish politics or to the Kurdish people ofWestern Kurdistan. They could not organise themselves very well and especially for the critical duration facingWestern Kurdistan. So everything belonged to the PYD, all the responsibilities including defending the people and organising the people fell to the PYD. PYD is doing everything and because of that, we are been attacked not only by the classic Kurdish parties but also other sides that are against the Kurdish people and their struggle.

They are enemies of the Kurdish people. So we are under attack from all of them. There are many rumours and sayings, trying to affiliate us with the PKK where other than the general philosophy we are completely different from them. We have our own leadership, strategy, and work forWestern Kurdistan, we do not have any organic relations with the PKK or affiliations with them. But we support each other like any party, our relation with them is no different to our relations with the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) of Massaud Barzani or PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) of Jalal Talabani.

Globe: Do you have any problem working with other Kurdish parties or power sharing?

Muslim: No, not at all. We would like to share the power with all Kurdish parties. We can do everything together. We have been seeking the co-operation with them since we were established in 2003, where we knocked on all their doors, we met them one by one to build relations and to work together and to make agreements with them but we could not achieve this.

Globe: In terms of the Kurdish forces, do you have any problem in working with other Kurdish forces specifically the “Syrian Peshmerga” trained in Kurdistan Region? Is the force in Syrian Kurdistan, a PYD force or a national force for all Kurds?

Muslim: We have no problem to unite all the armed forces for the sake of the Kurdish people. InWestern Kurdistanyou can have many political parties, many organisations but when it comes to the armed forces, there should only ever be one armed force for the region. Otherwise if you have intra-fighting it’s a massive problem. Because of that, as part of the Kurdish Supreme Council we decided to unify all of the armed forces, including those Kurdish forces inSyriaor those trained inSouthern Kurdistan. We are trying to unify them and this is no problem as the forces belong to the people. They are protecting people ofWestern Kurdistan. Everybody has a right to join it to defend his family and relations. This is never a problem for us. But importantly, any force should only be under one commander.

We don’t refer to such forces trained inSouthern Kurdistanas Peshmerga, they are simply part of the Peoples Protection Unit, the defence units. It’s the same to us and we do not differentiate on the type of forces by referring to these specifically as “Peshmerga”. Those forces are in Syrian right now. Most of them are Kurdish soldiers who had defected from the Syrian Army and they are simply the army of the Kurdish people inWestern Kurdistanprotecting them. An important point, they do not belong to any political party, nor the PYD or even Democratic Society Movement (Tev-Dem). They are established by (Tev-Dem) but they belong to the Syrian Kurdish people, because they take orders from the Kurdish Supreme Council.

Globe: Some have accused you of collaborating with Assad’s regime in Kurdish areas, can you set the record straight on that?

Muslim: We have been fighting this regime since we were established in 2003. We have had our people killed under torture, when the Syrian uprising started in March 2011 we had about 1,500 people under arrest and tortured by Assad’s security apparatus. Because of that we cannot say we have relations with them. But because our strategy is different from other organisations and other parties, they try to find a reason to blame us. Only because we refused to become soldiers for the others as on many other occasions in Kurdish history. Kurds have always been soldiers for others, fighting for them, dying for them and at the end they receive nothing. So we refuse to follow that historical trap. Now they point the blame at us as we refused to be their soldiers. We have no relations with the regime at all, nor would we ever open the hand of the gladiator that is killing us.

Globe: Turkey has been closely observing the new found Kurdish autonomy in Syria with great unease. Do you have any contact with the Turkish authorities? Do you see any threat in a direct Turkish invasion?

Muslim: We are on the side of dialogue with anybody, not just Turkey. Anyone involved in the Syrian conflict or the Kurdish case, we are open to negotiations with them and we do not have any objections. Today, we don’t have any contact with the Turkish authorities but we don’t refuse contact or meetings with them, if the Turkish regime accepts us. As for any invasion, I don’t think international conditions make sense for any invasion, they will not allow such an invasion nor is it convenient for any military intervention inSyria. But the Turkish hand is clearly inSyriafrom the beginning of the uprising. They are trying to be involved and are supporting armed groups to destabilise relatively peaceful Kurdish region and the Turkish intervention has succeeded in turning the peaceful uprising into an armed uprising against the regime. This was only possible with Turkish support of armed groups.

In the Kurdish case, we have already seen what happened inAleppo, Afrin and Sere Kaniye where armed groups have invaded the Kurdish areas fromTurkey. They are supporting them and they are sending them to mix the Kurdish areas and to destroy peaceful situation of the Kurdish areas. Groups such as Al-Nusra Front and Ghuraba al-Sham are all related to the Turkish regime, affiliated, supported and sent by them.

And even in Sere Kaniye when they were going to escape to get back toTurkey,Turkeyclosed the border and said to these armed groups you either have to fight or die. So they didn’t allow them to go back and still those forces are there. Just yesterday there was an air attack by regime forces on those armed groups, but they have nowhere to escape becauseTurkeyclosed the border and they are unable to move out, so they are hemmed in. More than 20 of them were killed yesterday by that air attack.

Globe: What is your message to Turkey?

Muslim: Turkey must step away from their Kurdish phobia. Kurds can live together with the Turkish people, we have no problem with any Turk. We are friends and neighbours with Turkmen inSyriaand the same with the Turkish people. We have no problem with the Turkish people and we can co-exist peacefully. The Turkish government should understand that and build on the brotherly ties between the two nations, instead of been driven by a phobia of Kurds.

Globe: Recently, there has been much violence between FSA, particularly their Islamist wings and PYD forces in Sere Kaniye and within Aleppo itself. Why such hostility and general animosity? What must happen before you will work with the FSA?

Muslim: If they leave us alone, then we don’t have any problem with the Free Syrian Army. They are mostly compromised of soldiers defecting from the Syrian Army and to protect the civilians. But it is only specific armed groups that are fighting and attacking the Kurdish areas even when there are no regime forces in such areas. They are attacking civilians and such groups do not belong to the FSA at all and even the FSA have issued declarations that they are not affiliated with them. They are different groups to the FSA and they are only using the name of FSA, but nobody recognises them as FSA. They belong to the Turkish regime. Especially, in Aleppo, Afrin and Sere Kaniye, these groups were clearly supported by Turkey with weapons, with facilities of movement and they are coming from across the Turkish side.

Any Kurdish peoples captured, such as the leader of YPG who was captured in Aleppo, are taken to Turkey for interrogation by Turkish authorities. Even in Sere Kaniye, the injured and captured people were taken to Turkey and investigated by Turkish authorities. We may not be fighting Turkish soldiers directly, but they are proxy forces instigated by Turkey.

In Syria, you have Kurds, Arabs and other nationalities. If everyone liberated his place then all of Syria is liberated. Kurds cannot go to Damascus and liberate Damascus but we can liberate our part where we live. And that’s what we have done. There are no regime soldiers or forces in Kurdish area, so why would rebel forces attack here?

Globe: What is the wait to liberate Qamishli and all of Syrian Kurdistan from Assad’s forces? What is the next step in your struggle to liberate all of Syrian Kurdistan?

Muslim: For us it’s not a case of liberation. If we push away the Syrian forces, then we are simply living with Syrian people and all Syrians within the Syrian state. For Qamishli, the situation is very sensitive. We are not fighting the Arabs but the Syrian regime. Our liberation is not from Syrian people but from Assad forces only.

While we are concern of fighting between the Kurds and Arabs, in sensitive places like Qamishli and Sere Kaniye and to prevent this sectarian war, we could not afford to attack to regime, as we are worried that some Arabs may side with the regime. We don’t want to end up in a conflict between Arabs and Kurds, as opposed to fighting the regime.

Qamishli is a Kurdish city and the capital of Western Kurdistan and the city is a hub for Kurdish activities.  The plan is still to eradicate Qamishli of regime forces. But at the same time we never reject to live side-by-side with Arabs in Qamishli and we don’t want Qamishli to be a place of fighting between Kurds and Arabs. When the conditions are right and when the Arabs in and around Qamishli leave with those that are against the regime, we will also extend our control to Qamishli.

Globe: The Kurdistan Region is your neighbour and brethren, with growing strategic power and regional influence. Can the Kurdistan Region leadership do more to help the Kurds and political parties in Syria?

Muslim: The Kurdistan regional Government is doing what it is doing in their areas and they are controlling their areas in South Kurdistan. But our conditions are very different. We are not looking for a system like in Southern Kurdistan. So we can have very good relations but we have different conditions and our solution is different from them. Their governance is based on federalism whereas what we strive for is democratic self-governing which is different. We don’t have to draw the border between Syrian Kurdish areas and the Arab areas.

A Kurd can always do more for a Kurd in terms of support. We are one nation, whether in the south, west, north or east. But for each part we have different conditions. We can help each other in the spirit of brotherhood and build our future strategy. What we are looking for in future is Kurdish parts to be unified in a democratic confederation in the Middle East. The Kurdish parts can be a reason to unite the Middle East, much in the same way as Europe came closer together through a union whilst slowly eroding their common borders. Today we have 27 countries all living together. Why can’t we the same thing in the Middle East?

At the point we have the Middle East united in a democratic confederation, at the same time all of Kurdistan will become united. This is our long-term strategy for the Kurdish people.

Globe: What is the absolute minimum that the PYD will settle for in a post Assad Syria?

Muslim: There are two points. One is constitutional recognition of the Kurdish people in Western Kurdistan. And secondly, guarantees for our democratic rights that is included in the constitution. In terms of self-governance model, the name is not important; it could be termed self-governance or democratic federalism. As part of democratic rights, there should be provision of self-protecting defence units such security units, essentially civilians protecting the areas.

The Kurdish case in Syria is different. Everybody is assessing the Syrian situation and talking about the Syrian problem, but nobody is looking at the Kurdish side of it. We are part of the Syrian people, we have our rights and any solution for the Syrian people must also contain a solution for the Kurdish conflict also. It is impossible to have democracy in Syria without solving the Kurdish problem. Everybody should be clear that once there is a solution of the Kurds, only then can democracy be attained in Syria.

Globe: It cannot be overlooked that the majority of Syrian oil is in Kurdish areas and Western Kurdistan is oil rich. Do you have any control over the oil fields at the moment and what’s your view on natural resources that Kurds have never benefited from?

Muslim: Those oil wells are protected by our people over there. And we are still getting fuel from the refineries in Homos and Baniyas, so we protect. Of course in a future Syria, such natural resources need agreement with benefit for local community and a portion of revenues should be spent on the local areas. Revenue sharing will need negotiation and agreement, but it will be managed centrally for all Syrians.

The Kurdish hand in creating the Maliki monster

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Kurds rubber stamped two Maliki terms of power while Maliki has frequently reneged on agreements and sidelined Kurdish demands. After 6 years in power and frequent accusation of centralist tendencies, is the current situation a surprise?

A sharp escalation in the already tenuous relations between the Erbil and Baghdad after a deadly skirmish in Tuz Khurmato between Kurdish and Iraqi forces was followed by frantic efforts to calm a crisis that had seen an unprecedented military build-up from both sides in the disputed areas.

However, an eventful week after negotiations between Kurdish and Iraqi military leaders and political figures, mediated by Speaker in the Iraqi Parliament, Osama al-Nujaifi and a high ranking American General, ended with talks collapsing and no agreement, despite promise of a breakthrough after an initial 14 point agreement was earlier agreed.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki scuppered the prospect of any deal, unwilling to meet the key Kurdish condition to abolish the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command, the very heart of the conflict.

According to Secretary General of the Ministry of Peshmerga, Jabar Yawar, the federal government reneged on the agreement reached earlier in the week after originally approving 12 out of 14 of Kurdistan’s demands but later only agreeing to three.

The Dijla command was created by Maliki for no other reason than to stoke Kurdish sentiments, win over Sunni support and create an Arab nationalist bandwagon that would allow Baghdad to mask a deep political crisis, corruption allegations and the increasing isolation of Maliki, even amongst traditional Shiite allies.

The Dijla command was a way of demonstrating a show of strength to the Kurds and to highlight the extent of Maliki’s powers. If unopposed the Dijla forces would severely dilute and harm Kurdish interests in the disputed territories. In spite of the current sabre-rattling, it is unlikely that Maliki will call the Kurdish bluff. However, Maliki will not back down until he is pushed to the edge or has achieved his political goals.

A show of force to increase sway over the resolution of disputed territories is also a big nail in the Iraqi constitutional coffin and article 140. Either way, Maliki’s actions show that he is not serious in resolving problems with the Kurds and that he is unwilling to relinquish his growing unilateralist hand. When constitutional violations and consolidation of top positions of power goes unhindered, then this spells the death of democracy in Iraq.

For all of Maliki’s faults, the Kurdish parties must also take blame for the current predicament awaiting Kurdish nationalist interests. They knew as far back as 2008 with deployment of Iraqi forces to Khanaqin and in a number of similar instances that Maliki would resort to force to exert his influence and to achieve his goals. This is the same Maliki that Kurdish politicians had saved at key crisis points in the first government.

Kurds frequently accused Maliki of centralist and dictatorial tendencies in his first term of power, long before Kurds essentially rubber stamped his second stint in power and before ironically he accumulated further power by consolidating control over a number of powerful positions under the pretext of a “caretaker”.

Maliki was a key factor in the continuous foot dragging of Baghdad over the implementation of article 140 and the failure to hold a census decreed by law. Maliki’s government frequently objected to Kurdish oil deals while ensuring that efforts to resolve a national hydro-carbon law were left stagnant. Maliki and his government have violated the Iraqi constitution a number of times when it has served their interests, and refused to pay for the budget of Peshmerga forces while on an annual basis striving passionately to reduce Kurdistan’s share of the budget.

Kurdish support for the latest coalition was on the back of guarantees for the implementation of 19 key points that formed the basis of the Erbil Agreement, conditions that Maliki has paid continuous lip service to.

Kurds can hardly be surprised at the predicament they find themselves in. Key Kurdish conditions as part of their support for the first coalition in 2006 were also largely sidelined.

Yet remarkably, fast forwarding to 2012 and 6 years of Maliki rule, Kurds still managed to miss their opportunity to unseat Maliki through lack of unity and lack of clear political accord when it came to promoting Kurdish interests in Baghdad.

A strong motion spear-headed by Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani was essentially thwarted by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, leader of the PUK which ironically has a strategic power sharing agreement with the KDP, while Kurdish opposition forces such as the Gorran movement also failed to support the initiative.

Maliki triumphed even at a moment of great weakness and this political victory by managing to conserve power only served to embolden his quest to solidify his sphere of influence.

The Kurdish leaders must use the current crisis as a wake-up call to preserve their unity and to ensure no matter how varied or passionate disagreements within Kurdistan may reach, disunity in Baghdad is a red-line.

The current stand-off between Iraqi and Kurdish forces saw perhaps for the first time unity amongst all Kurdish divisions and this greatly strengthened the Kurdish hand and galvanised their bargaining power in the crisis.

It has stirred the PUK and KDP leadership and particularly Talabani to readjust their positions, which had seen disagreement over the 2007 power sharing agreement, Kurdistan draft constitution and regional relations with Baghdad.

If talk that Barzani had “lost” Talabani had any grounding, Talabani’s revised position is a welcome step for the Kurdistan President.

Maliki has continuously shown his expertise to muster his way out of tight political corners and it is no coincidence that Maliki’s bold actions in the disputed territories coincides with a key political year fast around the corner. 2013 promises a number of key milestones that will act as a gauge for the alliances within Iraq that have shifted drastically and will no doubt dramatically alter the political landscape.

The first key milestone is the nationwide provincial elections in April, followed by regional parliamentary elections and not forgetting the national elections in 2014. There are also crucial provincial elections across Kurdistan Region in 2013 which will reveal the ever-changing balance of power in Kurdistan.

Maliki is in a race against time to conduct the provincial elections and beat any no-confidence vote. When a smart politician loses friends, he works hard to make new ones.

Maliki needs to rethink his alliances that have shifted considerably since 2010. He single-handedly alienated the Sunni’s this year through the issuance of a death warrant on Iraqi Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi and exchanged fierce rhetoric with al-Nujaifi, ironically mediator in the current crisis between the Kurds and Maliki and a number of other prominent Sunni figures.

His own State of Law alliance is shaky at best and Maliki may well need to reach out to Sunnis to cling to power. His onetime Sadrist ally, Moqtada al-Sadr, is drifting further and further from Maliki and his recent statement spoke volumes,   “the Iraqi spring will come against corruption, sectarianism, and those engaged in corruption and terrorism.”

Maliki in a way scarified the trust and support of Talabani by opting to reach out to Sunnis, and Talabani’s angered stance was on clear display when he recently called on the governing Shiite bloc to either apply pressure on Maliki to change his stance or replace him outright. Talabani accused Maliki of effectively announcing a state of emergency through the establishment of Dijla command, which is not within Maliki’s powers.

But such is the unfortunate situation of Iraqi politics, that even if they oust Maliki, it will take them several more months to agree on a new leader and build a new alliance.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

As Kurd-Arab relations hit rock bottom, tensions reach dangerous heights

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With a language of confrontation, the writing for conflict is always on the wall.

With tension over the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command already at boiling point, the writing for open confrontation was always on the wall. Violent skirmishes between Peshmerga forces and Dijla forces in Tuz Kkurmatu, resulting in two casualties and many wounded, could be the tip of the ice-berg in what may embroil into serious conflict between Kurds and Arabs if sentiments do not dramatically change.

Any escalation in conflict has the potential to drastically alter the face of Iraq and indeed the entire region. Kurdish and Arab forces have come close to blows in the past, but the establishment of the Dijla forces was an open intent to ruffle Kurdish feathers and use military might to achieve goals.

The Dijla forces which Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki setup in September after promising he would not go ahead with the move, illustrate alarming boldness and arrogance by Maliki as he seeks to solidify his growing grip on power.

The escalation in the disputed territories and the rapidly deteriorating relations between Erbil and Baghdad comes as no surprise. Maliki has been consistently interested in preserving his sphere of power, has successfully consolidated a number of powerful roles under his helm and has affectively manipulated political actors and played on sectarian emotions when backed against a corner. If in moments of weakness he can prevail, then Maliki’s capabilities and confidence at times of strength have little bounds.

Weeks after a cross-party Kurdish delegation returned from Baghdad in what many deemed as a “final attempt” at resolving the crisis between Kurdistan and Baghdad, relations have plummeted to new lows.

The Kurdish delegation promised a united stand should negotiations prove unsuccessful and it is time for Kurdish political forces to show solidary and a clear plan of action as Kurdish interests are threatened more than ever.

Only in April of this year, a vote of no-confidence on Maliki failed in spite of cross-party support in Baghdad, with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani playing a big part in thwarting the measures to remove al-Maliki. How a betrayed Talabani, who received promises from Maliki about new national dialogue and a halt to Dijla forces, must now regret that.

The reason for the Dijla Operations Command was supposedly to address “poor” security coordination in the areas that had witness violent attacks. But as always with Maliki, timing of the moves and initiatives is the clue to real intent.

There have been terrorist attacks in the northern disputed belt for years, with residents long complaining about a lack of government protection. For the large part, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces had been relied on to affectively protect disputed areas as Iraqi national forces were bogged down in a fierce sectarian civil war further south for a number of years.

None of the Dijla commanders had been appointed by the council of representatives and most of the leaders have allegiance to Maliki. In fact the majority of the military commanders across the Iraqi army are carefully hand-picked by Maliki, making them increasingly a sectarian and not a national force.

Coordination was already a common feature under years of American mediation with the setup of join patrols and commands between Peshmerga and the Iraqi army. Kirkuk province’s Kurdish governor Najimaldin Omar Karim refused to cooperate with the new command and tensions have been brewing slowly towards open confrontation. Lt. Jamal Tahir, the chief of police in Kirkuk, refused to take orders from the command and warned about any Dijla meddling in Kirkuk.

It is no confidence that new measures by Baghdad have come as relations between Baghdad and Erbil have dramatically declined, with internal disputes and a difference in regional strategy widening all the time as Kurds have moved closer to Turkey, reaffirmed their anti-Assad stance and have grown ever more independent with new energy deals.

The new manoeuvres in the disputed territories are political and have little to do with provision of security. Maliki’s increasing sabre-rattling is designed to dilute Kurdish power, undermine Kurdish security forces and strengthen Baghdad’s hand in the jostle for control of disputed territories.

Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani had stated in recent remarks, “the formation of the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command in Kirkuk and Diyala is an unconstitutional step by the Iraqi government,” whilst warning that “the intentions, aims, formation and actions of this command centre are against the Kurdish people, the political process, co- existence and the process of normalising the situation in the disputed areas.”

The years of delays in the implementation of Article 140 and constitutional articles was already clear gauge of Baghdad’s appetite to conform to democratic principles that go against their interests. This latest move is nothing but further measures to hinder a clear resolution of disputed territories and to derail Kurdistan’s growing economic and political strength.

Barzani said in a recent statement “I want to reassure the people of Iraq, and especially the people of Kurdistan, that after consultation with the Iraqi President and other concerned parties, we will make our position clear and take appropriate steps against this unconstitutional action and any actions designed to impose unconstitutional arrangements in the disputed areas”. The PUK leadership had also warned that the Kurds would resort to other means if Maliki did not rectify and backtrack from his “mistakes”.

Warnings by the Kurdish leadership are not new and the desire to adopt patience must surely be running thin. It is also signifies the importance of Kurdish solidarity and a united stand to protect Kurdish interests. Lack of Kurdish unity in disputed territories and particularly Baghdad over the past several months has already harmed Kurdish goals.

The move led by Barzani to oust Maliki under his growing abuse of power was wrongly seen as “personal” in some circles with Maliki’s track record over the past number of years telling its own story.

When backed into a corner or on the negotiation table Maliki and the State of Law Coalition make all the right overtures and gestures. But almost a decade under the new Iraq, Kurds have to finally realise that promises are not worth the paper they are written on in Baghdad.

The Kurdish security forces had warned that they will respond harshly and this was met with Maliki’s own stern warnings for the Peshermrga forces not to provoke Iraqi forces. Maliki had ominously insisted in the past that “there are no restrictions on the movements of the Iraqi army, which according to the constitution is a federal army and has right to be present in Basra or Zakho. And no one has the right to prevent that.”

As Maliki came under renewed pressure over the Dijla Operations Command, he boldly added the Salahaddin province under its command.

The growing rhetoric from Maliki, the likes of Yassin Majeed and other Shiite leaders and new assertiveness that their powerbase stretches to all corners of Iraq is an open threat of war.

In a sign of growing hostility towards the principle of the Kurds as the sole guardians of Kurdistan, Abdul Salam al-Maliki, an MP from the State of Law bloc, urged the Iraqi Prime Minister to open a “North Operations Command” to “protect” Kurdistan Region, under the pretext that the Peshmerga are unable to secure the province.

It is ironic that the Peshmerga who receive no funding or support from Baghdad or a share of weapons purchases are been advised of their lack of strength. Peshmerga had the capability to repel the might of Saddam and are capable of securing Kurdistan both now and the future.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

Turkish fears of Syrian Kurdish autonomy already a reality

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As the bloody uprising in Syria intensifies by the week, Syrian Kurds have tried to keep a distance from the ever violent conflict by safeguarding the region from fighting and consolidating their newfound autonomy.

Control over parts of the Kurdish region sees a remarkable turn of fortune for Kurds in Syria but has been viewed with great suspicion by Turkey, whose leadership yet again warned that they will not tolerate Kurdish self-rule.

Owed to great distrust between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Kurdish forces predominantly of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Kurds have largely stayed out of the Arab-Sunni revolution, and have prevented the FSA from entering Kurdish controlled areas. The Kurds have in the main tried to leverage strategic positions by cutting deals with both rebels and Assad forces.

However, as the rebel control of areas within Aleppo and the greater Aleppo region grows and with it the supply routes from the Turkish border to key rebel held areas, it naturally trespasses grounds of Kurdish forces and thus the seeds of conflict are evident.

With deep animosity that underscores both camps, Kurds fearing a second marginalization when Sunni rebels assume power and rebels accusing the Kurds of supporting Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the situation was always on a knife edge.

Fighting that erupted in Aleppo’s Kurdish districts and later in the village of Yazi Bagh and near other Kurdish towns close to the Turkish border, threatened to open a second unwanted front in an already complex and increasingly brutal civil war.

Kurdish Autonomy

With the Kurds suffering more than any other group in Syria and natural components of any anti-Assad movement, it is ironic that the Kurds feel like a marginalized part of the Syrian National Council (SNC) or the uprising on the ground. This is partly owed to shrewd manipulation by Assad by bolstering Kurdish power, sowing disunity amongst Kurds and driving a wedge in the opposition but is also down to the failure and lack of significant efforts within the SNC to entice the Kurds.

The Kurds continue to look beyond the present, with the future posing the greatest dilemma. What role will the Kurds be afforded in a post Assad era and what mechanism will be in place to protect Kurdish rights? Can Kurds be sure that they won’t suffer the same fate under Sunni Arab rule?

Some elements of the SNC and the FSA have openly opposed the idea of establishing a Kurdish autonomous entity, while certain groups within the FSA have openly threatened to turn guns on the Kurdish forces once they are finished with Assad.

A stronger Kurdish buy-in and reassurance to the Kurdish community would have certainly expedited Assad’s downfall. And Turkey, a flag bearer of the Syrian opposition, must take some blame for the current friction between Kurds and Arabs.   Turkey’s remarks, anxiety and threats against Kurdish autonomous development, that naturally weights on SNC sentiments, has alienated the Kurds further. It has left the Kurds stuck between Assad, FSA and Turkey.

Unless strong reconciliation efforts takes place between Kurds and Arabs, not only will the “Lebanonisation” of the Syria conflict became ever nearer, but Syria will be finding itself fighting another deadly war after Assad’s downfall.

Erdogan’s warning

Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, warnings amidst the increasing power and autonomy of Syrian Kurds is hardly new. He warned previously that Turkey would “not allow a terrorist group to establish camps in northern Syria and threaten Turkey”.

This week Erdoğan warned that Turkey would not allow the formation of a Kurdish autonomous region in Syria, in the same way as it has for Iraq. “We cannot let playing of such a scenario here [in Syria]. We told this to Barzani too. We wanted him to know this,” stated Erdoğan.

In spite of the Turkish stance, Syrian Kurds have already attained de-facto autonomy and although not enshrined in legislature, Syrian Kurds are unlikely to revert back after tasting self-rule.

Erdogan’s and Turkey’s clear concern is the PYD and the growing re-emergence of the PKK influence in Syria and Turkey. However, the issue goes much deeper than the PYD and narrow-minded policies of Turkey fail to comprehend the bigger picture in Syria.

There are dozens of Kurdish parties, many with representation in the SNC and who Turkey have enjoyed dialogue, and while the PYD has the upper hand at present, control of Kurdish regions is not exclusively in the hands of the PYD.

More importantly, what can Turkey, or for that matter the Kurdistan Region, do to prevent Kurdish autonomy in Syria? Of course the Kurdistan leadership has strong influence on the Syrian Kurds, but the fact of the matter is that Syria Kurds under democratic rights cannot have rules or conditions imposed on them from inside Syria let alone from Turkey.

Kurdish autonomy in Iraq was also a frequent Turkish red-line but Turkey had no choice but to succumb to geopolitical realities on its doorstep. In one way or another, Turkey will have to accept also a Kurdish region in Syria.

Aside from the rhetoric, there is little Turkey can do to prevent Kurdish autonomous advancement in Syria. If it intervenes directly both now and in the future, it will spark a deadly cross border battle with Kurdish forces. The PKK in particular would work hard to safeguard Kurdish gains in Syria, and solidify its growing influence. Any war in the Kurdish areas of Syria would mean even greater violence in Turkey.

It makes Turkey’s position all the more ironic, on the one had it supports the rebels against dictatorship and promotes a free Syria, and on the other hand it tries to subdue the pluralistic dimension of Syria.

Turkey must work harder to entice Kurdish moderates and stop its exclusive focus on the PYD. There are dozens of Kurdish parties and with an autonomous Kurdish entity an unavoidable reality it should build relations with parties and individuals that it can work with and trust.

The starting point should be Turkey’s strong denouncement of growing Arab-Kurd violence, to reassure Syrian Kurds of Turkey’s support and build more alliances with Syrian Kurdish parties.

When you cannot directly prevent a reality, you should do your best to influence it to your advantage. For this Turkey must lean heavily on the Kurdistan Region leadership. Barzani can have a strong influence on the PYD and the autonomous Kurdish region in Syria and dilute the PKK influence on the region.

If the Kurds become stuck between distrusted Sunni rebels, an unbalanced SNC, a hostile Turkey or a distant Kurdistan Region, then their natural protectors become the PKK.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

Cleaning polluted political waters in Iraq when streams are rising

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The Kurds prepare to send yet another delegation to Baghdad but can the same formula produce a different answer?

The political forces in the Kurdistan Region are preparing to send a delegation ahead of Eid Ad’ha to Baghdad, hailed as a “final attempt” to solving the crisis.

The delegation, which was intended to represent a cross-spectrum of Kurdish political voices, is charged with reaffirming the Region’s adherence to the constitution and former deals concluded but also on the other hand to warn the government over its damaging monopolisation policies.

Kurdish political forces have agreed to take a united stand should attempts to find a solution prove futile.

While looking for factors to remain hopeful or positive, it is difficult to overlook the fact that such delegations, negotiations and attempts at reconciliation are hardly new.

Furthermore, they come at a time when a Kurdish olive branch has been severely burned by brazen and worrying statements from a leader of the State of Law Coalition, Yassin Majeed, who attacked Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani as a “a real danger to Iraq’s economy and national security” just as the Kurds were preparing their reach out.

While the statement from Majeed may not be reflective of the overall view of the State of Law Coalition, it severely derails any positive motions that are initiated and makes the bridge towards reconciliation and understanding all the more slippery.

Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, severely reprimanded Majeed for his statements, deeming them as a “call to war”. Talabani blasted Majeed’s “provocative” and “reckless” statements at a time when the Kurdish government was working to send a delegation to reignite dialogue with the National Iraqi Alliance (NIA) and other groups.

The Kurdistan Alliance (KA) also hit back at Majeed saying his stance was designed to cover the failures of the government, and as Barzani is against the onset of a totalatarian regime spurred towards sectarianism and the corruption that is rife in Baghdad.

The problem is Majeed’s stance is unlikely to be an isolated view and too often dialogue has proved fruitless and met with insincere ears. Nouri al-Maliki is the real danger in Iraq and his centralisation tendencies have too often been masked under narrow political or security pretexts.

All of the problems that grip Iraq today including issues between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad have been discussed before with agreed mechanisms for their resolution.

The problem in Iraq is not finding agreements amongst parties but the implementation of such agreements. The Iraqi constitution already lays the groundwork for the resolution of disputed territories, oil sharing, federal powers and the distribution of the federal budget. The Erbil Agreement and the 19 points that underpinned the agreement that formed a key precondition for the formation of the current coalition and broke the unprecedented political stalemate, already make the terms and basis for political partnership clear.

Why does an already settled and accepted Iraqi constitution or clear political basis for partnership need to be revised or restudied? How many more agreements need to be formed for a solution to the current differences or discrepancies to be adopted?

The issue is not striking agreement but the stomach and genuine intent to fulfilling the terms of such agreements. Until such a time, dozens more agreements will not be worth the paper they are written on.

This makes the Kurdish position all the more precarious. From the Transitive Administrative Law (TAL), the Iraqi constitution, to the Erbil agreement, they have watched as successive Baghdad governments and particularly Maliki have paid lip service to honouring such legally binding covenants.

The Kurdish leadership have emphasised that should the latest Kurdish delegation fail to yield solutions with the Baghdad government this time round, they will take a “united stand”. However, the manner of such a stance was not clear and ambiguities of reprisals in the face of broken Baghdad promises have hurt the Kurds on countless occasions before.

Any responses or actions by Kurds should they deem negotiations a failure should be met with definitive action. Conversely, if any agreements are struck, these should be measured by clear timetables and a join committee to monitor the implementation of the terms of agreement. What good is any political concord, such as the Erbil Agreement, if a little over a year to new national elections, the terms are not implemented?

Both internal developments as well as growing regional shifts and crises that are drastically changing the political and strategic outlook of the Middle East is pushing Iraq further apart with the stance of various factions becoming more engrained. Iraq does not have a coherent and commonly accepted domestic vision or strategy yet alone a national foreign policy and divisions are becoming more paramount.

While Iraq threatens Turkey as relations have nose-dived, the Kurds are growing ever closer to an economic and political alliance with Ankara. As the Kurds, favour an overthrow of Assad and have helped their ethnic brethren, Baghdad sought to the secure the Syrian border to avert any steps against the regime.

Baghdad remains ever weary of looking too far west by striking a new alliance with Russia and strengthening its ties with Shiite regimes in Damascus and Tehran. Sunnis remain wary of Shiite domination and naturally look towards their Sunni neighbours.

All in all, resolutions on Kirkuk, disputed territories and oil sharing become even more difficult to resolve.

Just this week, Exxon-Mobil was mooted to sell its interests in the West-Qurna field in Southern Iraq, seemingly removing itself from the political chaos between Baghdad and Erbil. Exxon was affectively asked to take sides and it is appearing to do so in favour of lucrative returns in Kurdistan.

More than ever, Kurdistan and Iraq are two distinct and distant entities and the policies of Baghdad and Maliki should assume a lion’s share of the blame.

Maliki continues to act as a Shiite leader rather than a leader of Iraq and recent arms purchases raises doubts on whose security Maliki is trying to boost.

Iraq national budget in 2013 is set to be a record, but where are the billions of dollars been spent as Iraqis continue suffer from a lack of services and infrastructure? While Iraqi oil and defence budgets dramatically grow, Kurdistan is asked to cater for all its expenses, including defence forces which should fall under the national budget, out of its own portion of the budget.

Baghdad has set aside billons to develop oil field further south, but criticises the Kurds for any moves to bolster its oil industry.

Kurdish leaders have emphasised their adherence to the constitution and have warned repeatedly that they will not accept violations or neglect of constitutional principles. This is the same message that the Kurdish delegation will convey once more and it is time to show whether these warnings are just empty rhetoric or the basis of real intent.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd.net, Various Misc.

 

New Iraqi arms deals stoke natural Kurdish anxiety

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With a dark memories of an Arab Iraqi military might firmly on their mind, Kurds fear an extended Baghdad military arm, especially with Maliki at the helm, sectarian divisions that run rife and growing disputes between Erbil and Baghdad.

On the back of a recent multi-billion deal with the U.S. to supply 36 F16 fighter jets including training of Iraq pilots, Iraq signed further multi-billion arms deals with Russia and Czech this week with the intent to bolster its weak air defences but to ultimately reinvigorate its role as a major regional power.

Iraq hopes to have an eventual fleet of 96 F16s, with the first shipment of the planes due next year, which it aims to start flying by 2014-2015. Under the current agreement between the U.S. and Iraq, the Arizona AAir National Guard’s 162nd Fighter Wing is well on the way to training the quota of 27 Iraqi pilots.

Under normal circumstances a state aspiring to boost aspects of its armed forces it deems weak or its defensive capabilities is hardly unnatural, so what’s the big deal with Iraq when it comes to the recent procurement of arms and the bolstering of its air force?

The answer is simple. Iraq is not a normal state and history has cruelly shown the consequence of such a supposed right to build armed forces.

More crucially, arms purchases are masterminded by Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who is renowned for centralist tendencies and monopolisation of power, while consolidating a number of powerful posts under the guise of “acting” cover.

Under the constitution, the national defence forces are for the whole of Iraq, and when the Iraqi army was resurrected in 2003, the aim was to make it inclusive of both Arab and Kurdish officers. However, such is the effect of sectarianism and animosity that has gripped the disparate Iraqi social mosaic, that forces are unlikely to serve the benefit all of Iraq.

The danger of the ever growing Iraqi army been used in the political sphere cannot be discounted. Whether the army has an allegiance to a sectarian pooling or political faction as opposed to the greater nation of Iraq will always be an underlying uncertainty.

Kurds and particularly Sunnis have complained in the past about the disproportionate Shiite leverage and sectarian influence on the makeup of the Iraqi security forces.

Baghdad arms deals

The symbolic arms deals with Russia and later Czech Republic amounted to billions of dollars.

As part of the deal with Moscow Iraq is to obtain 30 Mi-28 attack helicopters and 42 Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile systems for a reported fee of $4.2 billion dollars. Although with such a significant commercial arms deal, Russia sought to reposition itself as a major arms supplier in the Middle East and rekindle old ties with Iraq that had turned somewhat stagnant since 2003, it was more of political relevance than anything else.

Moscow hailed the Russia-Iraq relations, as ties “based on traditional friendship,” with Maliki quick to emphasise the importance of their partnership with the Russians.

Baghdad has had to play a rather tricky game of keeping both Tehran and Washington happy. Tehran has a powerful political hand in Baghdad, whilst it was the U.S. that Baghdad greatly relied on for so many years and of whom Baghdad built what seemed solid and long-term strategic ties.

However, as Baghdad has slowly spread its wings in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal, and while it has tried to keep the US on its side, it has also sought put its foot down.

The deal makes Russia the second largest arms supplier to Iraq after the US. In this move, Baghdad sought to diversify its dependence on U.S. arms and thus the associated long-term training and rearmament of US weaponry that would be necessary but to also demonstrate that it would work on its own terms and not as a regional puppet of America.

Hot on the heels of the Russian arms deal came a $1 billion agreement with the Czech government to deliver 28 L-159 fighter jets.

The deals come in the midst of a deadly Syrian war, where Russia has been a staunch ally of the Syrian regime while Baghdad has tried to maintain a perception of neutrality. However, Baghdad has anything but a neutral position towards Syria and mindful of not upsetting its Iranian partners, it has remained part of the pro-Assad camp in one form or another.

Russia and Iraq clearly share the same view on Syria on ensuring non-Western intervention and potential break-up of Syria that would greatly change the sectarian and political balance in the Middle East.

At the same time, Iraq has had to succumb to the pressure of their American partners. This could be seen when the Americans insisted of an Iraqi inspection of Iranian passenger jets flying over Iraqi air space, which they suspected of carrying arms shipments to Damascus.

Kurdish fear

Whenever there is any motion to strengthen the hand of Baghdad, there is almost a natural unease that runs down the spine of Kurdistan.

Just what is the reason for Baghdad’s hunger for renewed military might? While Iraq wants to be a revived force to be reckoned with in the Middle East and to take an influential and powerful position in the region, the first Kurdish fear is that an extended Baghdad military arm means a direct threat to their population, their autonomy and their new found prominence. In others words it is not defence that Baghdad seeks with its new military quest but offence.

Iraq argues that it needs a revitalised and new air force to deal with terrorism and to protect what they deem vulnerable airspace. Baghdad has already warned that it won’t be able to protect its airspace until 2020 and that it cannot fully protect its borders and territorial waters. However, counter-insurgency is hardly about acquiring a deadly new air force. Iraq had the huge might of the Americans on its side for several years and yet failed to defeat insurgents.

The image of Iraqi forces repressing the Kurds, destroying Kurdish villages and bombing civilians with chemical weapons is hardly a distant memory.

Furthermore, a rapid rise to regional fame under Saddam Hussein with the amassment of a powerful military force led to an arrogance that launched a deadly war with Iran, an invasion of Kuwait and successive destructive civil wars with Kurdistan.

Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani has already voiced great concern on the likes of F16s falling into the hands of Maliki, warning in April 2012 that “I feel Kurdistan’s future is in severe danger because of (Maliki)…F-16 (jets) should not reach the hands of this man (Maliki).”

Barzani claimed that in meetings with his military advisers, Maliki showed chilling readiness to strike the Kurds with his new weaponry when the time was right.

Kurdish guarantees

The Kurds have sought guarantees from Western powers who have sold billions dollars’ worth of arms to Iraq, but remain unconvinced about the real intentions of Baghdad.

Worryingly for the Kurds, recent deals with Russia and Czech do not have the same clauses they forced on U.S. arms deals that newly acquired arms will not be used on the internal population.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has urged Baghdad to keep them informed and in the process around any such deals.

Furthermore, since the Iraqi defence forces are for the whole of Iraq, it is thus not only logical but a constitutional right that a portion of these defence forces goes to Kurdistan. It is not clear how and to what extent Baghdad supplies arms to Kurdish security forces or military training to Kurds, leading to a danger of imbalance and Kurdistan been in a position whereby it is forced to take defensive measures in light of the growing power of Baghdad.

The Kurdistan Peshermrga forces are part of the national Iraqi forces and thus the responsibility should clearly fall on Baghdad for the financing, military enforcement of the Kurdish regiments as well as providing Kurds with air defence training and capability. However, Baghdad has continuously objected to not only the size of the Peshermrga forces and its level of arming but to the actual funding itself.

Such is the alienation and mistrust that runs between Kurdish and Iraqi forces that often it is like two armies of two sovereign nations rather than a national army with two strands. There is a growing threat of an arms race, and continuing ploy by Baghdad to reinforce military capabilities will only stoke hostilities.

Furthermore, with a new air force to protect its vulnerable airspace, it will be interesting to see what Baghdad does to protect any violations of Kurdistan airspace or borders by Turkish or Iranian forces.

The agreement with Maliki and Russia must be referred to parliament as stipulated by parliament, and it waits to be seen how inclusive the political process will be.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd.net, Various Misc.

The many regional dimensions of the Syrian war

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Syria was always going to be a special exception to the Arab Spring. In contrast to Egypt and Libya, its religious and ethnic framework, political alliances, strategic location and above all else its potential to instigate heat waves across the region was always going to make regional and foreign powers tip-toe that much more carefully.

However, directly or indirectly, the battle in Syria is hardly restricted to Syrians themselves. A deep underlying proxy war is already taking place in Syria that brings together many influential parties with their own interests in the conflict and the eventual outcome in Syria.

Turkish alarm

Relations between Bashar al-Assad’s regime and Turkey rapidly faded after the start of the revolution. Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia and other pro-rebel foreign powers and Turkey itself, have been supporting the rebels indirectly from Turkish territory.

Regional powers have restrained from direct intervention in Syria, but a Syrian mortar attack that landed in the Turkish border town of Akcakale last week killing 5 Turkish civilians, resulting in retaliatory attacks by Turkey for a number of days, showed just how quickly the fire of civil war can burn across a far reaching forest.

Cross border tensions in the north are hardly new and other stray Syrian bullets and mortars have already fallen across the border in Turkey, and in Jordan and Lebanon for that matter, not forgetting the hotly-disputed downing of a Turkish jet reportedly in international waters fresh in the memory.

But the deaths in Akcakale were a red-line and Turkish parliament was quick to authorise symbolic cross-border operations if the needs arise to serve as a strong warning, even if in reality Turkey is far from jumping in to the drums of war.

Matters were hardly helped as further stray Syrian mortars landed in Turkish fields in the Hatay province on Saturday, just days after Syria had offered a rare apology and vowed not to repeat the incidents.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned that Syria would pay a “big price” and that Turkey would not shy away from war if provoked, stating “those who attempt to test Turkey’s deterrence, its decisiveness, its capacity, I say here they are making a fatal mistake.”

Clearly, Turkey and its allies do not have the stomach for direct intervention at the current time, due to the intense regional escalation it would cause. On another day, Turkey may well have had the pretext to strike back with more fire-power or even declare all-out war, but such a solitary move without some allied coalition would be detrimental to Turkey both politically and in terms of its own stability and security.

UN and NATO response

Both the UN and NATO issued a strong rebuke to Syrian actions.

NATO demanded “the immediate cessation of such aggressive acts against an ally” and pressed the Syrian regime to “put an end to flagrant violations of international law.”

While the UN Security Council strongly condemned the provocations by the Syria regime in rare agreement after hours of negotiations and stated that the incident  “highlighted the grave impact the crisis in Syria has on the security of its neighbours and on regional peace,” and “demanded that such violations of international law stop immediately and are not repeated.”

If it was not for the staunch support of Russia and China, a Western backlash on Assad would have been much more stern and direct. However, the UN text that was issued showed the increasingly difficult predicament of Moscow as it was forced to make concessions over the cross-border crisis whilst trying to maintain calm.

Regional ramifications

The war in Syria has already split the West along Cold War lines and polarised the region. The latest escalation in tensions between Syria and Turkey threatened to introduce a whole new dimension to the Syrian conflict but is not a unique danger.

Clashes have already taken place in Lebanon between pro-Assad and pro-rebel groups inside Lebanon and border skirmishes are not rare as the battle has ubiquitously spilled over. Both Iraq and particularly Lebanon have similar sectarian connotations that introduce vested interests in the Syrian conflict.

The influential Shiite group Hezbollah based in Lebanon and closely aligned with Iran, has reportedly assisted Syrian forces but in spite of stirring of old sectarian wounds in Lebanon, the major factions have shown restraint with the bitter 15-year civil war still etched in the memory.

Baghdad, who is closely entangled with Tehran, has come under pressure from its dismayed US ally for its Syrian position and pressed to cease underhand support of the Syrian regime or allow Iran logistical access to send arm shipments to Syria. While Nouri al-Maliki is careful not to alienate foreign partners, they are clearly in favour of the current regime and not the Sunni dominated rebel movement. Some even ascribe the resurgence of Sunni attacks and groups in Iraq to the deepening sectarian conflict in Syria and the rise of Sunni power in Syria.

Israel with its occupation of the Golan Heights on the direct doorstep of the Syrian conflict, and with Iranian supported Hezbollah on the other flank, knows it can also be easily dragged into the battle.

While the Syrian crisis may have split the Arab world largely under sectarian lines, it is perhaps the Kurdish issue that may prove the most destabilising of all.

The Kurdistan Region has provided a natural helping hand to its Syrian Kurdish brethren, with Syrian Kurds using the security and political vacuum to claim de-facto autonomy and break from the shackles of Arab suppression.

On the other hand, Assad’s forces, weary of Turkish intervention or even the creation of a buffer zone in northern Syria, have strategically ceded Kurdish border areas to avoid bloodshed with the Kurds and to delimit the rebel movement and at the same time create their own buffer zone.

Turkey has already suffered to a great extent with the establishment of the Kurdish region and renewed support of the PKK in Damascus, which was a ploy by Syria to only deter a Turkish incursion but was also a tool to punish the Turks for their support of the Sunni rebel movement.

Turkey is acutely aware, that with PKK attacks on a rapid rise in Turkey and Kurdish passions running high across the Syrian-Turkish divide, a unilateral incursion may open up unwanted new fronts.

A Turkish move into Syria could well see Iran ratchet its increased support for Kurdish rebels or embolden the Syrian forces with renewed military assistance.

With Iraq, Iran and to a lesser extent Lebanon on one side, Sunni dominated Saudi Arabia, Gulf countries, Jordan and Egypt have promoted and aided the rebel cause through proxy forces while at the same time trying to keep the conflict at arm’s length.

Syrian game changer

No war drives on indefinitely and something will have to give sooner or later. While the West and pro-rebel regional forces have been largely passive, how long can the world view a humanitarian crisis, a growing refugee influx and escalating violence in Syria as an internal issue and without ultimate intervention or the setup of some kind of no-fly zones?

The fall of Assad’s regime in Syria will have far reaching ramifications, may well see the break-up of Syria and drastically alter the political, strategic and sectarian map of the Middle East.

Both within the current crisis and in the aftermath of the war, regional powers will flock to make their stake and influence in the new Syria. Syria is far too important both now and the future to be simply left aside as a distant war.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd.net, Various Misc.

With their time to shine, Syrian Kurds must seize the moment

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Many observers often describe the Syrian Kurds as sitting on the fence in the Syrian conflict, waiting on a clear outcome before choosing sides. It may be true that Kurds have not necessarily taken a more natural anti-Assad position but this is more to do with the political climate and strategic ploys than any adoration of the regime.

If Sunni’s feel that they have got a raw deal under the current dictatorship then how must the largely repressed and disenfranchised Kurds feel?

This makes it all the more ironic that Kurds continue to remain divided and are slow in taking measures that necessitate decisiveness to capitalise on the historical opportunities on the table.

It also says much about how the Kurds view the predominantly Sunni Arab nationalist Free Syrian Army (FSA) or Syrian National Council (SNC) when many preside with the mentality of “better the devil you know” due to their lack of conviction for a new Syria.

Then there is the Turkish connection. Clearly, a lot of Syrian Kurds look at both the SNC and Turkey with suspicion. The PKK has a firm fan base amongst Syrian Kurds and coupled with Turkey’s track record with their own restive Kurdish population, they remain sceptical that the autonomy or rights they demand would be enshrined in a new Syria.

Coming off the fence

Sometimes if you sit on the fence for too long waiting to make your move, the fence may break forcing you to unwillingly land on one side.

The Kurds have been widely acknowledged as the wild card in the struggle against Assad and a force with considerable numbers and sway that can tip the scale of revolution.

However, the Kurds have been too disparate, at times too slow, spending much time quarrelling amongst one another and lacking clear leadership.

There are only 2 million or so Kurds in Syria, yet dozens of political parties. The Erbil agreement in July that brought the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council of Syria (KNCS) together under the stewardship of Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani was more than a welcome step, but it remains brittle, inconsistent, unbalanced in its implementation and lacking a real nationalist feel.

A cloud still remains on the PYD and with its powerful support base and responsibility as the only real armed group, it must work on enhancing the Kurdish cause in Syria and becoming a real nationalist icon. However, it still remains shrouded under the shadow of the PKK and has hardly taking the bulls by the horns against Assad.

It must not be forgotten, that the Kurdish population in Syria is far by the smallest amongst the four major parts of Kurdistan. Nationalism never really had firm roots in terms of a definitive movement, Kurdish inhibited areas are much more geographically spread-out, and more importantly the Kurds do not have international or regional support for their own autonomous entity let alone from Sunni Arabs.

The Kurdish struggle in Syria must for now be disconnected from Kurdish struggles elsewhere. Kurdish groups and the PYD in particular should deviate away from too much focus on Turkey or the PKK struggle that resides there.

This is a historical moment for Syrian Kurds and all energies must be channelled to overcome constraints and within nationalist goals and not narrow minded party politics.

Ousting or working with the regime?

The Kurds made headlines when they took historic control of some Kurdish towns and districts in July, shortly after the Erbil Agreement. However, it was hardly a whirlwind revolution with an all guns blazing legacy but a largely peaceful transition.

No doubt a deal was made between the Assad government and the Kurdish forces for relinquishment of these areas. At the time, there was much talk of the Kurds seizing Qamishli and other Kurdish towns but months later Syrian Kurdistan remains relatively quiet and subdued.

Assad has much to gain by working and seceding territory to the Kurds and the new Kurdish administration is as much to do with a new Kurdish drive as smart manipulation by Assad.

By ceding control of border territories to the Kurds, Damascus seeks to server a double blow to Ankara. Firstly, it creates a buffer against any future Turkish incursion with Kurdish fighters well positioned and secondly it creates a fertile cross-border ground for the PKK to swing the pendulum in their favour against Turkey.

Assad further continues to create cracks in the SNC by splitting Kurdish sentiment and at the same the withdrawal was calculated by the need for Assad forces to focus energies on the battle against Syrian rebels in the key economic hub of Aleppo.

Finally, as a last measure and bare minimum fall back position for Assad, an Alawite region or even state would be established, with the proviso of a Kurdish region aiding division and establishment of future regions.

Now is the time, not the future

A lot of Kurds seem intent to save their firepower and energy for what they deem the real battle – once Assad is overthrown and a new scramble for power in Syrian ensues akin to Iraq. Kurds seem convinced that once the FSA finish pointing their guns at Assad, they will simply reposition the barrel at the Kurds instead.

While some of these fears and concerns have substance, after all Sunni opposition groups well before the Arab Spring began, hardly supported the Kurdish cause or united with Kurdish opposition groups and remained loyal to Arab unity and nationalism than any promotion of the Kurdish struggle.

The time for Kurds to act is now. Waiting for a clear outcome in the battle leads to an uncertain conclusion. If the rebels advance and beat Assad, then the Kurds will be backed in to an uncomfortable corner and diluted bargaining position and if Assad manages to stay in power, then how can the Kurds trust a dynasty that has seen them suffer mercilessly with thousands not even worthy of a citizenship status.

The Kurds in Syria must unite and set aside there differences for the sake of the Kurdish people, Kurdish nationalism and the decades of pain and tears endured under dictatorial rule. The insistence on promoting party based political agenda will see all Kurds fail.

The Kurds do not need to take sides with the SNC or Assad; the real side they should choose are the Kurds themselves.

Now is the time to charge into Qamishli and oust Assad forces, followed by all Kurdish towns and cities in Syria.

The Kurdish forces, both those loyal to the PYD and those consisting of largely Kurdish defectors from the Syrian army under a united front and can easily assume control of Kurdish population in Syrian. Assad can hardly contain one battle front in Syria, let alone two.

The passive Kurdish stance in Aleppo

Much of the Syrian revolution has congregated around Aleppo over the past several weeks. Aleppo is home to a significant Kurdish population but they have remained largely idle. There are contrasting reports of a new battle field opening in the predominantly Kurdish neighbourhood of Sheik Maksoud, with some reports claiming that PKK affiliated militias with leverage in the district had supported regime forces while others stating they had stayed out of the battle.

Whilst, Kurds look at the FSA with suspicion, the Kurdish support is a wildcard that could easily tip the war in favour of the rebels. The Kurds must use this opportunity to drive a hard bargain with the SNC and FSA in return for direct support in ousting Assad.

A continuation of passive Kurdish stance or worse resistance against Syrian rebels in Aleppo gives an undeserving hand to Assad.

Syria is ablaze and will dramatically alter not only the political map of Syria itself but also the whole region. Tip-toeing with peaceful motions, insistence on narrow minded party interest or sitting on the fence is akin to political suicide for the Kurds. Having suffered brutally for decades and waited patiently to rewrite the wrongs of history, the Kurds dare not waste this historical opportunity.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd.net, Various Misc.

A long-term oil law, the making or breaking of Iraq

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“This deal cannot solve all the problems currently but it is considered a good step,” Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani

One of the greatest items of contention in Iraq has been a formula to share its immense oil wealth amongst its distrusted and fragmented ethno-social mosaic. Since oil was discovered in Iraq almost a century ago, it has been akin to more of a curse than a blessing for the ordinary people.

It’s difficult not to imagine what Iraq would have been like today if its oil wealth was not in the hands of tyrants and those who have abused Iraq’s treasure.

Kurdistan oil is home to estimated 45 billion barrels of oil and trillions cubic feet of gas, yet ironically the Kurds have seen the oil in the past used to purchase arsenal in their repression them and destroy their villages and livelihoods. It is a little wonder that the Kurds were keen to muster a level of autonomy on their energy reserves as part of the Iraqi constitution negotiated in 2005.

Although, the Iraqi constitution has clear stipulations around oil exploration, revenue sharing, export and control of federal regions, oil has been a contentious thorn in relations between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad.

Oil minnows have flocked to the region as the early pace-setters and for the like of Gulf Keystone Petroleum, Addax, Heritage Oil, Western Zagros, Genel Energy and many more, the early bird really does catch the worm. Such is the spectacular promise and potential of energy in Kurdistan that akin to a rags-to-riches story, juniors have become majors in their own right almost overnight.

Oil giants coming off the fence

Any oil company anywhere in the world would have been misguided not to see the unravelling of the newest and perhaps last global oil frontier before their very eyes. However, while some smaller companies jumped in with both feet at the rewards and the lucrative terms of the Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) on offer, oil majors, while licking their lips at what was on offer, sat on the fence to preserve their interests and contracts further south and to appease Baghdad.

In spite of Baghdad’s fierce rhetoric against the KRG deeming their contracts signed with foreign companies as “illegal” and sending stern warning to oil companies, oil majors could simply no longer remain idle.

A spate of oil majors such as Chevron, Total and Gazprom have recently joined the fray with ExxonMobil’s oil deal a little short of a year ago serving as the ice breaker. Whilst from 2003 onwards there was a rush of juniors, now there appears to be a rush of majors keen not to lose out on the limited spots remaining at the Kurdish oil counter. Royal Dutch Shell is the latest major rumoured to be in discussions with the KRG which will serve as another symbolic feather in the cap for Kurdistan.

The possibility of Shell signing an agreement with Kurdistan, after twice coming close in the past before pulling back, comes as Baghdad continued to threaten ExxonMobil this week. As part of the timelines of the PSA with the KRG, ExxonMobil is starting logistical preparations to dig its first exploration well.

In reality none of the oil majors need to be reminded about the threats on offer, they are all fully aware. Furthermore, they have first class law teams and their confidence in the legal dealing with Kurdistan is a major endorsement to KRG policies. The fact that Baghdad effectively asked these companies to take sides makes the feat all the greater.

ExxonMobil has a major interest in the southern lucrative West Qurna-1 oilfield and Shell has its supergiant Majnoon field in addition to a multibillion gas venture.

But just what can Baghdad do to actually implement their threats? What would be left for Baghdad if it blacklisted all these oil majors? Simply put, Baghdad will do some sabre-rattling but ultimately it can’t afford to shoot itself in the foot and lose out.

Resolution over oil payments

The Kurdistan oil export taps have been frequently used in recent years for political gains, threats and concessions. While the production rate has been modest, it has the potential to significantly ramp up output.

Last week an agreement was ratified between the KRG and Baghdad ensuring that oil exports could continue and a dispute over oil payments could end with the Kurdistan receiving 147,000 barrels of oil products per day.

Lack of payment to foreign oil companies in Kurdistan and the stop-start nature of oil exports and thus oil revenues for these companies has been the only major blemish in an otherwise spectacular rise of the Kurdistan energy sector.

Kurdistan will keep export at around 140,000 bpd per day this month before ramping up to 200,000 bpd for the remainder of the year. In turn, Baghdad would pay around $857 million owed to foreign companies working in Kurdistan.

“It was agreed to form a permanent committee to follow up on the terms agreed, and give the committee authority to resolve any obstacles blocking implementation,” a KRG statement confirmed.

This committee is perhaps the most important step of all. If any side has any reason to doubt any elements of the oil revenues or the activities of any party, including foreign oil companies, then it must address them legally, politically and with clear audits, accounts and evidence to eliminate any doubt, accusations or grey areas.

While this agreement serves as a major relief or in the words of KRG Oil Minister Ashti Hawrami “a big breakthrough” and a promising step towards a new oil law, it is hardly comprehensive and may serve as another false dawn.

The bones of contentions stretch much deeper than just payments to oil companies. The question of federal autonomy and more importantly territorial disputes are etched much deeper. The issues of oil, article 140 and disputes territories and KRG foreign policies are very much intertwined.

Baghdad’s last remaining grip on Kurdistan is in the oil sector. It was naturally alarmed with the signing of landmark oil exportation deals between the KRG and Turkey in recent months. With the proviso of an independent oil pipeline under implementation, Kurds have much more control over the energy sector.

The national hydrocarbon law has stalled since 2007 and without formal ratification of an oil sharing law the Iraqi energy sector will remain rocky at best.

Iraq’s oil infrastructure is in urgent need of revitalisation and Iraq is in urgent need of additional revenue for it’s much needed and delayed reconstruction.

Oil for all of Iraq

Ironically, whilst Baghdad has accused the Kurds of manipulating its oil reserves, the oil in Kurdistan belongs to all of Iraq. The KRG has made it clear from the outset that they will abide by the 17% ratio agreed with Baghdad.

It is outdated mentalities that prevent Baghdad from realising that should Kurdistan gain then so does the whole of Iraq. Arab nationalists are quick to remind Kurds that Kurdistan is actually on Iraqi soil but then by the same token, treat Kurds like they are trespassers on their own soil, even if the Kurdish rise to prominence is essentially a major gain for all of Iraq

Kurdish oil exports and payments of foreign companies was actually on the of key prerequisites of the Kurdish political parties supporting Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and joining the coalition and thus there was already agreements in principle, but in Iraq agreements are not always worth the paper they are written on.

The successful passing of a national oil law in Iraq could be the making or breaking of Iraq such is the immense oil resources Iraq has at stake. If it was not for oil, Baghdad would have given disputed Kurdish territories back to the Kurds many months ago, would have implemented article 140 and would not have implemented its Arabisation policy in the first place.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.