Category Archives: Kurdish Globe

Will yet another electoral term in 2014 lead to any real change on Kirkuk and article 140?

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The Kirkuk has been at the historic forefront of the Kurdish nationalist struggle. It has been an area of contention for decades and formed a red-line for Kurdish negotiations with Baathist regime long before the liberation of Iraq in 2003.

Resolution of Kirkuk and disputed territories was a firm Kurdish condition since 2003, enshrined even in the Transitive Administrative Law (TAL), before the onset of the official constitution in 2005.

It has then served as the basis for negotiations with coalition partners in Baghdad in 2003, 2006, 2010 and more than likely in 2014.

Approaching six years since the passing of the deadline for Article 140, is Kirkuk any closer today to formal resolution and a return to Kurdistan than it was in 2003 (or indeed under the Saddam regime)?

The lack of progress in article 140, including the all-important national census is hardly an accident. The intentional foot-dragging is clear to see. Ahead of negotiations to form a coalition government in 2014, Kirkuk will once again be a key Kurdish stipulation. But will the new parliamentary term in 2014 witness anything different with regards to this issue?

The reality is that Baghdad will not give up Kirkuk or any additional territory that easily.

It is no coincidence that as soon as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) announced oil pipelines to Turkey much to the ire of Baghdad, Iraqi Oil Minister Abdelkarim al-Luaybi was roaming the Kirkuk province with BP CEO Bob Dudley as part of a recent deal between Baghdad and the oil giant to revive Kirkuk’s declining oil fields.

KRG reiterated their objection to the deal which it deemed against the principles of the unconstitutional and illegal.

Yet, in what has become a tit-for-tat, Baghdad also deemed Kurdish deal with foreign oil firms as illegal and had raised warnings over the new oil pipelines which increased the notches in the Kurdish autonomous drive.

Kirkuk sits atop of billions of barrels of oil reserves which have only added to the intensity of the fight over the province.

Baghdad’s move with BP, which had bypassed the KRG, is designed to show authority over disputed territories. This is similar to the onset of the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command by Iraqi Prime Ministry Nouri al-Maliki in 2012 designed to mark Baghdad’s sphere of influence, leading to dangerous escalations between Erbil and Baghdad.

The resolution of disputed territories is one of many unresolved and hotly-contested articles. Many other items such as the status of Peshmerga forces and a national hydrocarbon law linger much in the same shape as 2007.

Baghdad has sought to address the power balance in Kirkuk with electoral law whilst provincial elections have not been held since 2005.

But Kirkuk does not need short-term fixes or a council representation done on a special basis. The solution is already there – article 140. After that proper elections can be held like any other city.

The more that Kirkuk is treated as a special case – the more excuses that argue against article 140.

Mosul is also a mixed city, but where are special laws and equitable distribution of seats? The elections do the talking, as should be the case anywhere else in Iraq or as in any democratic country.

The same round-robin scenario promises to play out in the aftermath of the elections in 2014. Kurds play a hard-bargain, make clear conditions for their support and the Shiite powers agree. Yet soon after, a game of cat and mouse plays out for yet another 4 years.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Kurdistan oil pipeline cuts the remaining umbilical cord of Baghdad

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A consistent bone of contention between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad has been oil resources. The heated debates around exploration rights, revenue sharing and interpretation of constitutional clauses have seen the issue go round in circles for several years.

The jostle for control of oil has only grown as oil majors have flocked to Kurdistan, ignoring threats from Baghdad, and as Kurdistan has added continual billions to its oil reserve figures. Companies continue to make discoveries in the Region with Total and Marathon only recently announcing a fresh discovery.

The reasons for Baghdad’s unease with growing Kurdish economic independence are hardly a secret. Control of oil revenues and oil infrastructure is like an umbilical cord that Baghdad has over the Kurds. With the exception of control of oil revenues and resolution of disputed territories, Kurdistan would be all but independent.

In this light, Baghdad foot-dragging over the resolution of national hydrocarbon oil laws and Article 140 is clear to see.

The national budget and share of oil revenues is currently a tap which Baghdad can use to influence and pressure the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Oil production to date in Kurdistan has been stop-start at best owing to disputes.

Such is the ambition of Kurdistan that little before completion of the first historic oil pipeline to pump crude from Kurdish oil fields, a second pipeline was already actively planned for completion in 18-24 months that would drastically improve production capacity and bring the Kurds closer to their ultimate target of 3 million bpd.

With oil exports and revenues set to rise in greater Iraq, in theory so should 17% of the budget allocated to Kurdistan. If oil is equitably shared on an 83-17 split then both Erbil and Baghdad benefit. In other words, most of the Kurdish oil revenues would actually go to Baghdad.

But distribution of the national budget has been anything but clear-cut with the Kurds arguing that they receive closer to 11%, not to mention the billions of dollars in unpaid bills to foreign companies in the Region that the Kurds demand.

Independent control of oil exports puts the gloves firmly in the hands of the Kurds. While they can now achieve the 400,000 bpd or so demanded by Baghdad for share of the budget, Kurds will not be at the mercy of Baghdad – if it boiled down to it, Kurdistan could keep specific portion of its oil revenue (and any debt that it deems to have been unpaid) and only then pay Baghdad.

Baghdad has used the recent thawing of its difficult ties with Ankara to warn against any export of Kurdish crude through the new pipeline without its consent.

Ironically, as the Baghdad-Ankara ties nose-dived, the Erbil-Ankara relations were hitting new heights, underpinned by billions of dollars of trade and Kurdish strategic relevance in the changing Middle Eastern picture.

Recently, Kurdistan Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani visited Ankara and met with Turkish officials, where the topics were likely to be expanding economic ties, oil exports and the Syrian conflict.

For now, Ankara will aim to keep Baghdad sweet by promising no to import Kurdish oil without their consent. But in reality, Turkey is already arm deep in Kurdish oil and its booming economy. It has already supported the constitutional rights of the Kurds with regards to oil exploration and the 17-83 revenue split.

Ankara may not want to alienate Baghdad, as it has recently looked to kick-start relations with Baghdad and Tehran that it strongly needs for any favourable resolution to the Syrian conflict and to avoid any regional isolation at a critical juncture.

As for the Kurds, its new oil export infrastructure literally adds the fuel for independence. However, the real game-changer would be additional pipelines independent of the Iraqi Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline and exclusively on Kurdistan soil and once exports reach 1 million bpd, let alone the 3 million bpd that Kurds hope for.

It’s no secret that the billions of dollars that Kurds could then acquire would far outweigh any of the 17% (or less) that Baghdad would offer. This is not to mention any potential gas exports to Europe, which would further placate Kurdistan on the world energy map (and perhaps on the map as a new found independent state)

 

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Lessons of Yugoslavia in the unraveling of the Middle East

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The expanding Middle Eastern conflict in recent years and the merging of sectarian and ethnic front-lines may seem like a recent phenomenon, but in reality it is anything but that. The unraveling of the sociopolitical map of the Middle East is a by-product of the gradual end to dictatorships, which were an almost necessary ingredient to hold together the Sykes-Picot inspired Middle Eastern status quo.

Nowhere is this example more prominent than in Syria. The Sunni conflicts in Iraq and Syria are merging as one battle, with communal ties across the borders. The Syrian Kurdish battle and the fight for democratic rights naturally link to the Turkish and Iraqi Kurds across the border, especially the Kurdistan Region. The Shiite powers in Lebanon and Syria are grouping to defend their future and powerbase.

Syria has quickly become a series of war within wars in addition to a proxy battle between regional Sunni and Shiite powers.

With 100,000 dead and millions more people displaced, just when will the Syrian fortunes take a turn for the better? Unfortunately, in most wars, it is when enough devastation of lives, infrastructure, economy and society takes place when ethnic, sectarian or national loyalties are finally exhausted by a stark reality. A reality is that sooner or later, there is no option but to sit at the peace table and negotiate.

There is revived talk of Geneva II been held next month, but such negotiations are only successful when there is the realisation that things can never be the same again. The building of bridges must be based on a new reality. In Syria, it means that the days of a strong man, authoritarian rule and ultimately Bashar al-Assad is over.

Syria will only work with a decentralisation of power much like in Iraq. With artificial created borders comes a pooling of people that is unnatural and unsustainable. The pride of Syrian nationality becomes secondary to significance of ethnic or sectarian identity.

It is not just in Syria where such soft-partitions are inevitable, most countries whose dictatorial rule was ended by the Arab Spring risk this eventuality especially Libya. Most of these countries never tasted true democracy and thus regional splits and boundaries within each state could be masked. Iraq is a prime example, through the electoral polls, Shiites may now be the majority but Sunnis and Kurds would never accept rule of the Shiites by virtue of their electoral clout.

The unraveling of the Middle East needs no greater example than the fall of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia managed to mask numerous ethnic and religious fault lines through the use of force and an iron hand.

The eventual break-up of Yugoslavia was brutal and bloody but ultimately the only solution was outright separation in most cases and soft-partition in some others.

The conflict in Bosnia that started in 1992 and ended with the Dayton Agreement in 1995, effectively split Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Bosniak and Croat federation and a second Serb entity, Republika Srpska.

With the untangling of borders comes a rush to form new identities and to consolidate power. As with Yugoslavia and particularly Bosnia, the result of that is ethnic cleansing and mass population movements.

It took countless lives, atrocities and suffering to finally realise that a negotiated settlement was the only way out of the Bosnian conflict and ultimately this will be the same for Syria. A soft portion of course casts doubts on real unity or the principle of a single state.

This example can be described no better than the recent Bosnian football team triumph that saw them reach the World Cup in 2014 for the first time. Football normally brings the country together but in spite of a truly historic achievement, the reaction of the Serbian entity, whose natural allegiance is to neighboring Serbia, was muted at best. The Croatian elements in Bosnia were hardly more inspiring.

This is the result of borders not reflecting split of ethnicities or sectarian components.

The ethnic group that has suffered the most from the artificial boundaries of the Middle East is the Kurds. With de-facto erosions in the Middle Eastern borders, they have a unique opportunity to build bridges between all parts of Kurdistan.

The Kurds must capitalize when the shape of the Middle East is in a fluid state by leveraging a strong had in the current crises they are exposed to and have significantly influence in. This starts with the protection of the Syrian Kurds and their newfound historic autonomy.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Kurdish reforms in Turkey should not be weighed with grim days of the past

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Just decades ago against a backdrop of assimilation policies, repression and Kurdish phobia, many of the democratic rights and freedoms that the Kurds enjoy today would have been unthinkable.

Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power in 2002, it is fair to say that the party has taken a number of bold steps to resolve the countries long-standing Kurdish problem.

The reforms packages of the past decade instigated by Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, may prove historical when placed into context but it is difficult to compare an era of improved rights to times when the existence of the Kurds was denied altogether or when even Kurdish names were banned.

Fast forward to 2013 with the PKK war reaching close to 3 decades and when the peace process and the new political climate in both Turkey and the wider Middle East has made the stage ripe to finally resolve the Kurdish conflict.

This year has been the least deadly in almost 30 years of conflict as imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan assumed a position of peacemaker. The PKK forces began to withdraw and a ceasefire was put in force. This time there was renewed hope and optimism that Ankara could finally Ankara take on its aged old Kurdish problem head-on with a dose of reality and away from an outdated nationalist ethos.

However, as the months have rolled on without concrete measures, Kurdish anxiety has steadily increased leading to disgruntled and disenchanted voices within both the PKK and the Peace and Democratic Party (BDP) and war of words between the Kurdish groups and the government.

By the time Erdogan announced his much anticipated democracy package on 30th September 2013 a new climate had already taken fold with the PKK halting their withdrawal from Turkey as retaliation for the labored nature of the peace process and the political and social scars that the highly-publicized Gezi Park protests inflicted on Erdogan’s government.

Of course, in relation to the past, the latest reforms announced are historic and a significant milestone. But this is the 21st century. Thousands across the Middle East are fighting for their rights and ever-expectant populations are not ready to settle for second-best.

The Turkish Kurds see their brethren in Iraq go from strength to strength with de-facto independence, new economic power and strategic and political clout. To the south, they see their Syrian Kurdish counterparts sowing the seeds of unprecedented power and autonomy.

Simply put, after a long wait, Erdogan’s package disappointed and is unlikely to appease long-term Kurdish aspirations or build meaningful bridges with the PKK that will see a genuine end to armed conflict.

Erdogan’s changes include allowing education in Kurdish in private schools, towns and villages now able to use their Kurdish form, abolishing the long-standing pledge of allegiance by school children, lifting of the ban on Kurdish letters not present in the Turkish alphabet and a promise to review the 10% threshold designed to hinder Kurdish footing in parliament.

Many key demands have not been met, especially in the field of judiciary. There can never be justice, social harmony or peace while anti-terror laws remain in their current form or judicial reforms are not enforced.

As long as such laws remain in place, an element of Kurdish phobia will always prevail.

Whilst the reform packages may disappoint, the timings and the implication of the announcements echoes beyond the short-term.

Erdogan came out of the summer protests bruised but not defeated. However, a backlash over the summer has placed Erdogan into a difficult predicament with elections just months away. He has to balance the secular, nationalist and minority voices in a way that almost gets him past the crucial milestone of upcoming local elections in March, presidential elections in August and parliamentary polls in 2015.

More radical reforms to appease Kurds would almost certainly have been met with a nationalist backlash. At the same time, a lack of reform would have threatened an abrupt end to the peace process and an almost instant return of violence.

The same dilemma applies to appeasing secular voices whilst at the same time not betraying the Islamist principles of his party and his millions of Islamist supporters.

Clearly there was a lack of real consultation with the various groups including the Kurds and the reforms will not please all sides but it’s a gamble and balance that Erdogan is prepared to take.

The PKK and BDP were quick to criticize the reform package but it’s not clear whether it will derail the peace process altogether or merely delay and hinder the initiative.

The latest reforms can only be labeled as a new dawn if they serve as the precursor and basis for future reforms rather than a solution in itself.

An ever expectant and resurgent Kurdish population will not settle for token democratic gestures that they should never have been deprived of in the first place.

Furthermore, minority rights have to be put in perspective. You cannot apply equal weight or the same brush to Alevi, Assyrian or Christian demands and the much deeper and fundamental Kurdish question.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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The new politician dawn of Kurdistan and its ramifications

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The Kurdistan legislative elections of 2013 promised to mark a historical milestone in the Kurdish political and democratic evolvement and the outcome was no different.

Kurdistan has moved from the predictable electoral nature that underscored the duopoly of KDP-PUK control of the Kurdish political sphere where political control could be almost split in the middle, to a new political horizon with more healthy competition and need for different permutations and alliances.

This duopoly was broken in 2009 with the emergence of the Movement for Change (Gorran) adding an opposition element to the Kurdistan government previously unseen.

The success of Gorran was at the expense of the PUK in their traditional backyard of Sulaimaniya and indeed this was a reoccurring theme in 2013.

The KDP as most expected proved the overall winners of the polls, with preliminary results indicating over 37.5% of the vote. But crucially, such was the more balanced nature of the electoral outcome that the KDP must work with other parties, including Gorran to form a new cabinet.

Much focus has been placed on the demise of the PUK, but the fall from joint rulers of Kurdistan to a third-placed position cannot be underestimated.

With the end of the Strategic Agreement, the PUK failings could not be veiled by prospect of a coalition list with the KDP as was the case in recent years. Running independently meant the strength of each party was easier to gauge.

However, talk of the PUK as a new weak or insignificant actor is premature. When one political door closes, with the right leadership, strategy and resolve many new doors can open.

But any PUK revival must be underpinned by forward-thinking and a new reality and away from its past status. In this light, although the KDP clearly prefers to keep intact its partnership with the PUK and form a new cabinet with the Kurdistan Islamic Union, this is may do more harm in the long-term to the PUK.

The Strategic Agreement may have made sense when both the KDP and PUK were on roughly equal footing and the region was effectively split into two administrations and the government was split into two terms. but the rules have changed and PUK would have to work under new diluted terms and mainly under the KDP umbrella of policies and dominance.

The PUK and KDP have many historical differences including political ideology, control of security forces, foreign alliances and government policies, and with a weaker PUK hand this cannot be masked as before.

The PUK can serve as an effective force in opposition movement. As Gorran has shown, the opposition tag can be a key magnet for a vital voice in Kurdistan. Much can change in the next 4 years and a move to opposition would also allow the PUK to regroup over the next years, lick their wounds and move on.

The PUK leaders to their credit have been quick to acknowledge their disappointment at the polls and the new reality that beckons. The loyal PUK voter base would prefer a new fight and the realisation of a new dawn than a continuing an outdated and now uneven strategic alliance with the KDP.

As for Gorran, their status as the second largest party in Kurdistan is a remarkable feat. However, much in the same way as the PUK, they are about to embark on a new chapter and a new identity. How they fare with their new status and political clout will determine whether they can continue to grow as a political force or whether their support base rescinds in 4 years’ time.

Gorran are in a tricky position. With such a large proportion of votes, its support base does not expect them to continue to work on the peripherals of power as an opposition force. At the same time, joining the government places Gorran into unchartered territory. They have to work with the KDP and been against the ruling parties is somewhat easier than working side-by-side with them.

An option that cannot be overlooked with the number of seats combined is Gorran and the PUK joining forces to form a new cabinet at the expense of the KDP.

However, these would mean the PUK mending bridges amidst a fierce rivalry with Gorran and PUK alienating the KDP, even though the KDP has reaffirmed their support and commitment to the PUK.

The ideal scenario, at least on paper, is a broad based political coalition amongst the major parties. However, this would deprive Kurdistan of a decisive opposition and will make the government brittle and susceptible to differences, bickering and prolonged decision making.

With the new political reality, rivalries and passions may intensify, especially in Sulaimaniya. A factor that should not be discounted is that the PUK may have lost political power but still have allegiance and influence of most of the security forces in Sulaimaniya province.

More political competition and jockeying for power must not be at the detriment, unity or stability of Kurdistan or ultimately the serving of the people who voted them into power.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Upcoming Kurdistan elections set to spark shift in political horizon

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Kurdistan is no stranger to holding parliamentary elections since it was free from the clutches of Baghdad, but the legislative elections set for 21st September 2013 provide a different flavour for a number of reasons.

The electoral climate is tense, the passions are as elated as above, the stakes are high for the political parties involved but above all else it is the uncertainty at the polls that is most intriguing, placing Kurdistan at a critical juncture.

The tense battle for the 100 seats on offer (11 are reserved for minorities) is set to change the political landscape of Kurdistan.

This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, in an unprecedented step, the ruling parties will run on separate lists swaying from their traditional power–sharing agreements. This is a positive step for the democratic evolvement of Kurdistan and means that the KDP and PUK have to fight their own respective corners, the strength of both sides will be clear to gauge and ultimately no side will need to “carry” the other.

The second key area is whether the Change Movement (Goran) can better the 25 seats it managed to achieve in 2009, particularly at the expense of the PUK in their traditional Sulaimaniya stronghold. Jockeying for votes in Sulaimaniya province has been as fierce as 2009 and the outcome will transform the destiny of either party. Finally, elections will be held under a semi-open electoral system.

Kurdistan finds itself with a new and expectant generation who are harder to appease and demand more from the government. The government has been under pressure to tackle corruption, provide reforms, improve public services, ensure transparency and afford more opportunities for the youth. The election battle will hinge on undecided voters – have the ruling parties made good on their promises in the last 4 years and made enough progress on well-documented areas of improvement and if the voters believe otherwise, are they convinced that Goran can take Kurdish politics to the new level?

The advent of a strong opposition party was a boost for democracy in the Kurdistan Region.  The parliamentary sessions may have been much tenser, squabbling more common place and political agreements less straightforward, but Kurdistan needed the angle of political rivalry and less certain decision making. A firm opposition also ups the political ante and ensures ruling powers are not complacent.

However, despite the lofty electoral goals they have set, doubts remain whether Goran can step up from an opposition force to a new force ready for governance and legislative authority.

The current elections will also be unique for the uncertainty not just before the polls but also long after it. This makes coalitions, compromises and negotiations all the more delicate. It is unlikely that any party will assume enough votes to form a government alone.

The Islamic parties, who attained 10 seats in 2009 are likely to increase on this figure. Although, much of the talk of future governments has resided on the ruling parties and Goran, the seats of the Islamic parties will provide a key angle to the political makeshift of parliament.

 

The KDP may still attain the most votes with a core support base in Duhok and Erbil and with their dominant mark on the political, economic and strategic map of Kurdistan, but it will need to work with the PUK or Goran in forming a new government.

Due to wider spread of seats, even a coalition between the PUK, Goran and other opposition forces to form a new cabinet cannot be discounted.

Without the figurehead of their historic leader, Jalal Talabani, and the safety net of the KDP, the PUK is most exposed and the elections may well prove a turning point for the party.

When the number of seats is more balanced and distributed more tightly, this makes future coalitions more fragile and may lead to political instability. The idea of a government that includes all parties makes sense on paper but will be difficult to maintain in reality. The relationship between Goran and the ruling parties since 2009 has hardly been a rosy affair.

No matter the election outcome, politicians and political parties must not lose perspective of their ultimate duty of serving Kurds and Kurdistan.

Political competiveness, disagreements and tension is fine to a certainty extent, but it must not jeopardise unity or weaken the Kurdish hand in an already volatile region. Kurds have much left to achieve at home and abroad, narrow-minded party interests must not compromise the Kurdish hand at a critical historical juncture for Kurds and the Middle East.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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The Kurdish angle a paramount part of any Middle Eastern debate

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The much heralded “Arab Spring” has swiftly morphed into an Arab nightmare. The successive lauded popular uprisings across the Middle East were to an extent only the end of the beginning and not a quick-fire solution to the complex network of Middle Eastern disputes.

The aftermath of the Arab Spring has been far bloodier, protracted and troublesome than many expected. The new Middle Eastern horizon has brought with it new crises and new rules. One in which the US and the West are struggling to take a view on.

The uprising in Syria has unearthed a deadly civil war that has directly or indirectly sucked in most players of the Middle East. The short-lived euphoria over the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt has been replaced by social turmoil and a deep-rooted battle over political Islam that threatens to send Egypt into full blown conflict. The removal of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya was seen as reality straightforward by the West but his removal has witnessed more instability and violence. In Tunisia, an oppositional leader has been assassinated in renewed friction.

All the while in Iraq, sectarian violence threatens to return to levels not seen since the peak of 20007.

The rapid plunging of the Middle East into conflict has drawn many analysts to the roots of conflict, the role of Western powers in sowing the seeds of today’s strife in the aftermath of the First World War and historical vendettas.

But while typically the arguments point to the artificial boundaries of Middle East and sectarian fault-lines, the greatest travesty of the Middle East is often ignored – the failure to give the Kurds, the fourth largest nation in the Middle East, a nation of their own.

Too often the recent Middle Eastern fault lines are ascribed to Sunni-Shiite sectarian conflict and secular versus political Islam; somewhat replacing the old focus on the Arab-Israeli struggle.

Conflicts in Syria and Iraq are narrowed to sectarianism. The polarisation of Turkey is generalised as between Islamists and those who uphold the mystical secular foundations of the republic.

Yet it is the selfish and ruthless carving of the Kurdish lands that will always serve as a critical destabilisation factor in the Middle East. The ethnic angle of the Middle Eastern conflict is not just between Jews and Arabs. It’s a travesty that in the 21st century that the Kurds have the unfortunate distinction of been the largest nation without a state.

It’s remarkable that the Kurds have to struggle for even “minority” rights in the lands of the forefathers, yet so much of the world’s focus is on Arab strife and Islamist positioning in governance. The Arabs view the lack of a 22nd state in Palestine as a great injustice whilst the Kurds are often viewed suspiciously or as overreaching when seeking rights. This sums up why equitable dealing of arguments or disputes is non-starter in the Middle East.

Syria is viewed as a confrontation between the Alawite minority and Sunni majority, whilst the Kurds who were roped into the state boundaries are often overlooked.

The redrawing of the Middle Eastern map is not just a necessity but a natural unravelling that would always happen at some point. Iraq is the starting point for such unravelling, with Kurds finally able demonstrate strategic and political clout in terms of new geography.

Yes, the new Middle East is hardly the advert for harmony and communal peace, but all that has been done is to let the cat out of the bag. All the problems and ingredients for conflict where always there, but they were caged and held tightly by dictatorial regimes supported by the West.

The Middle East is at an acute cross road, unfortunately with players intent on resolving differences the region knows all too well – conflict.

Ironically, as the West has found out bitterly in Iraq and Egypt, democracy and religion is not always the perfect tonic. What happens when the people select a party or system of government that the West never wants or fears?

It will take decades for the dust from the new Middle East to settle, but contained for so long it won’t be easy for such a crisis zone filled with high emotion, history and natural resources to take its new shape.

But let there be no doubt – the Kurdish question is central to any prospects of real peace and stability in the new Middle East.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Chilling echoes of Halabja in Syria as the world watches on

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The tragic and deplorable chemical attack on Damascus on 21st August 2013 by the Syrian regime brought echoes of the unforgettable Halabja massacre in 1988. Over 5000 innocent Kurdish civilians dropped where they were in an attack that crossed all boundaries, with thousands more injured and suffering life-long ailments.

Yet, as the shocking as the chemicals attacks are in Syria, some of the world looks on with doubt that Bashar al-Assad’s regime would perpetrate such action, even accusing the rebels of “fabricating” the event pointing to the timing of the attacks with UN weapons inspectors having just arrived in the country on their long awaited mandate, mere miles from the affected zone.

But a dictatorship is just that, it will not stop at nothing to cling to power or realize narrow minded goals. Terror is a rule not an exception. More importantly, why would the Syrian regime hoard some of the largest chemical weapon stockpiles in the world if it was afraid to use them? The US and most EU powers have already confirmed the use of chemical weapons by the regime during the bitter conflict.

Going back to Halabja, the West knew very well the chemical might and arsenal of Saddam, after all they were his allies against Tehran. Saddam’s forces reverted to chemical weapons on a number of occasions to desperately repel advancing Iranian forces. The regime had already destroyed thousands of Kurdish villages, terrorized the Kurdish population and committed mass murder, why would they hesitate at other means to annihilate the Kurds?

However, strategic interests of the West at times play a more crucial role in foreign policy than real justice or protection of human rights. In the aftermath of the Halabja massacre, Western governments and media were initially muted. The US intelligence agencies even blamed Iran for the Halabja attack. Ironically, Halabja was used 15 years later by the US and the coalition to justify the overthrow of Saddam.

In Syria, the ever thick and moving “red line” of US President Barrack Obama has been crossed many times. However, Washington has done all it can to avoid becoming embroiled in the complex Syrian conflict.

The fact that the Syrian regime would even contemplate such attacks speaks volumes about their perceived threat of international intervention. This sets an even more dangerous precedent for other so called “rogue states” keeping a close eye on Western response.

If the US and its EU allies finally act, it would be because they are dragged and shoved unwillingly than any real passion for action. Over 100,000 have already died and human suffering in Syria has become an acceptable norm without any concrete international response.

Of course, the dangers of regional spillover will intensify with any Western military response and the risk of an uncertain and Islamist led post-Assad Syria hardly soothes Western hesitancy, but one must place politics, sectarianism and strategic interests firmly to one side when hundreds of innocent children are suffocating to death under toxic gases.

If the Syrian regime has a grain of credibility left then it must urgently allow UN inspectors access to the scene. If they are innocent, then what have they to hide?

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Syrian Kurdish anguish a burden for all parts of Kurdistan

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In the face of deadly battles between Syrian Kurdish forces and Jabat al-Nusra and other Islamist forces in Western Kurdistan, Kurdish civilians have suffered brutal reprisal attacks and murder across a number of Kurdish towns and villages.

The neighbourhoods of Tel-Abeyd, Sere Kaniye, Tel- Aran and Tel- Hasel amongst others across Kurdish populated areas have been the subject of kidnappings, killings, lootings and terror.

The Kurdish areas have been relatively quiet since the Syrian uprising began but the latest developments not only serve to deepen the conflict between al-Qaeda affiliates and Kurds but increasingly pitch an ethnic battle between Kurds and Arabs, opening another theatre and dimension in the already complex conflict.

The Syrian National Council (SNC) and its leader Ahmed Jabra, as a legally recognised body and the supposed flag bearer for freedom, democracy and the fight against tyranny, has to shoulder the responsibility to condemn the attacks, protect Kurds and ensure Kurds are enticed into the political fold and not alienated in the fight against the Syrian regime.

However, the stance of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and elements of the SNC have hardly taking kindly to the Kurds. They have failed to address the general mistrust and anxiety of the Kurds and have looked at Kurdish gains with great suspicion.

With so many players on the Syrian chessboard, the recent conflict between Islamist forces and Kurds has seen a number of foreign powers weigh into the equation.

It was hardly surprising and somewhat ironic that Russia and Iran were quick to highlight the massacre of Kurds to the world, but this is chiefly in their quest to discredit the Syrian revolution and show the world the dark side of the opposition than any for any true affection for the Kurds. Iran and Russia were distinctively quiet whilst Kurds were persecuted for decades in Syria.

By the same token, the U.S. and its E.U. and regional allies have been rather muted and cautious in the face of the atrocities as it seemingly serves as an embarrassment for the pro-opposition camps and specifically for some Arab states and Turkey that have supported such groups to varying degrees.

In the face of Syrian Kurdish isolation and despair, the statement last week by Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani condemning atrocities and vowing to support Syrian Kurds,  was welcome, bold and the just the tonic to stir sentiment and any notion that Kurds will be bystanders amidst the plight of their ethnic brethren.

Barzani had warned that “If the reports are true, showing that citizens, women and the children of innocent Kurds are under threat from murder and terrorism, Iraq’s Kurdistan region will make use of all of its capabilities to defend women and children and innocent citizens.”

For too long, the forcibly divided Kurds have struggled for national rights within the constraints of localised mechanisms than as a national force or coherent ethnic group. It has become too easy and politically correct to label each portion of Kurdistan with a Syrian, Turkish, Iraqi or Iranian prefix.

The lands may be artificially divided but a fence, border post or de-facto delineation of territory doesn’t change the soil composition, geography, nature or heritage of territory. Do the border fences that randomly separate Nusaybin or Qamishli actually mean that the historic land, the people, or the families on either side are any different?

If there is a massacre of Turkmens in Iraq tomorrow, will Turkey remain idle? Sunni states and Gulf countries flocked to support Sunni rebels in Syria while Hezbollah and Iran rushed to support their Shiite brethren.

Why should Kurds across greater Kurdistan remain idle? The crucial step by Barzani was to ensure a delegation was formed by the Kurdish National Conference Preparation Committee from members across greater Kurdistan – this national response demonstrates a common voice and a united stand but almost underscores the seeds for a Kurdish League.

Washington amongst others was quick to warn Barzani against intervention and it is not clear what measures will be taken by the Kurdistan Region if the current delegation visiting Syrian Kurdistan bring back conclusive proof of massacres and atrocities against Syrian Kurds.

No doubt the Kurdistan Region leadership will warn and increase pressure on the West to act and intervene, but if the response is negative then the leadership must match rhetoric with action.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Ankara must embrace new Syrian Kurdish reality

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A year after Syrian Kurds took historic control of their territory, proposed plans for an autonomous Syrian Kurdistan region sent fresh shivers down Ankara.

Any anxiety towards the establishment of de facto autonomy for Kurds is amplified all the more by the PKK connections with the dominant Democratic Union Party (PYD) that exercises the greatest political and military influence in the region.

Turkey has fought a bitter 3 decade war with the PKK and to see PYD flags proudly hosted atop buildings clearly visible from Turkish soil was difficult to stomach. Turkey rushed to kick-start the peace process with the PKK and Ocalan in the full knowledge that they could soon be swamped with PKK forces enjoying not just mountain passes but theoretically an autonomous area.

However, a dose of reality is greatly needed if Turkey is to achieve its strategic and political goals, away from out-dated ethos or phobias. In the same manner that red-lines, ubiquitous threats and harsh rhetoric towards Iraqi Kurds was in the end replaced with a revised policy and ultimately a strong and flourishing political and economic relations with Kurdistan.

Last year, Ankara refused to even engage or acknowledge the PYD. The historic visit to Turkey by Saleh Muslim, leader of the PYD, in this regard, was certainly a step in the right direction, but Turkey must start to warm to the Kurds and the new political order rather than antagonise them or even choose sides, as many have claimed of their indirect support of Islamists against the Kurds.

The People’s Defense Units (YPG), widely acknowledged as the armed-wing of the PYD, has been pitched in fierce battles with Jabat al-Nusra and other al-Qaeda affiliated groups for months. However, fierce battles in recent weeks saw the Kurds gain control of the strategic border town of Ras al-Ayn amongst others.

Muslim was warned in Ankara against taking “wrong and dangerous” by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and intelligence chiefs.  Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu also warned the Kurds against any “fait accompli” declarations that would further destabilise and complicate Syria until an elected Parliament is formed in Syria

Ironically, in the same week Ahmet Davutoğlu denounced radical groups, some whom Turkey has supported, for “betraying” the principles of the Syrian revolution.

In spite of the relative positivity in the aftermath of Muslim’s visit, Turkey should have done much more to reach out and entice the Kurds from the outset and worked to include them as vital components of the Syrian opposition and the drive to oust Assad, rather than the frosty treatment and Syrian opposition’s failure to provide firm guarantees to Kurds in the post Assad era.

Stuck between Arabs they didn’t trust, Islamists intent on setting up a base in Syrian Kurdistan with its vital borders crossings and oil resources and a Turkish government ever-wary of more Kurdish leverage and power on their border, Kurds largely leant towards the devil they knew – Assad.

The reality is that Syrian Kurds, with renewed vigour and standing, are not about to go away, with or without Assad. The resurgence of the Syrian Kurds and potential autonomy should if anything be just the tonic to kick-start the peace process in Turkey.

If Turkey fails to implement the peace process in Turkey, then the PKK leverage would always have been a greater hand in Syrian Kurdistan or even a derailing of Ankara goals in the Syrian revolution.

For the Kurds, it is natural to try and preserve their region from violence and destruction and certainly the population has needs and warrant a system of governance. Any attempts at autonomy, temporary or not, is a logical move, however, the region must be for all Kurdish groups and not specially the PYD.

All Kurdish groups must be represented and the people must ultimately decide on their governance. Any unilateral drive by the PYD to assert control or use force for it its aims will severely diminish the legitimacy of the new Kurdistan Region of Syria.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc