Category Archives: Kurdish Globe

Kurdish oil rift with Baghdad – not just a case of economy but political leverage and autonomy

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi federal government after months of negotiations failed to find a breakthrough over the issues of oil exports from Kurdistan, revenue sharing and the national budget.

The KRG was quick to refute claims by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister for energy Hussain al-Shahristani that Kurdistan had agreed to exports via SOMO, the federal government marketing vehicle. KRG spokesman Safeen Dizayee quickly downplayed such claims, “absolutely we have not reached any agreement to export oil via SOMO. The dialogue and discussions are still underway”.

Ahead of the all-important Iraqi national elections this year, Baghdad has politicised the issue of oil exports and withheld the Kurdish share of the federal budget as a show of strength.

Ultimately, it doesn’t come down to money and economics but down to control, autonomy and lack of trust. One must not forget that under the Iraqi constitution Kurdistan is only entitled to receive 17% of the budget. If 300,000 bdp or so has caused so much tension then imagine when it rises to 400,000 bpd and then the more ambitious targets set by Kurdistan of 1 million bdp by 2015 and 2 million by 2019.

Iraq reaps the benefit of over two-thirds of Kurdish output. Ironically, this is the same oil that Baghdad never really knew Kurdistan even had and is a lucrative bonus for Baghdad. The vast majority of the reserves discovered in Kurdistan have come in the period after 2003.

Does Baghdad rejoice that the national reserves have been boosted to such a large extent by Kurdish discoveries? Quite the opposite. Such discoveries have been met with doubt, lack of trust, threats and rifts. Why? Because such discoveries are literally the fuel for Kurdish independence and Baghdad loses one of the remaining nooses over the region.

What control would Baghdad have remaining on the region if they could export their own oil and receive funds in a non-Baghdad controlled bank account and actually receive much more than they ever could painstakingly get from Baghdad?

Hence, the new independent Kurdish pipeline to Turkey and the fact that 400,000 bpd is merely waiting to be sold at Ceyhan sent Baghdad’s anxiety into overdrive.

In reality, Baghdad would agree too many Kurdish terms. As already mentioned, they serve to receive the greater benefit anyway – just as long as Baghdad’s control is not compromised.

As we have seen with the failure to pay salaries and provide the regions share of the budget, Baghdad wants to be controlling the political shots. As long as Baghdad retains the upper-hand then Kurdistan will be under the mercy of Baghdad.

It came as no surprise that the Iraqi Finance Ministry has warned that it could not pay Kurdish salaries unless the region resumed oil exports. Of course, Baghdad will not have a “face a liquidity crisis” as they claim if they paid from such huge funds under their control. This is just for political leverage.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, wants to force the KRG into a deal. Withholding salaries or creating crisis in Kurdistan is a form of political blackmail to put the heat on the Kurds.

This is where the ironic twist only intensifies. There is literally millions of dollar worth of Kurdish oil ready to be sold and yet the Kurds do not have funds to pay their own salaries?

Turkey recently reaffirmed its commitment to the symbolic energy deals with the Kurds. The Kurds cannot continue to be bullied over what is their national treasure.

What Iraqi oil funds did Saddam use to build Kurdistan and boost its infrastructure? Actually, it used the oil funds to destroy Kurdistan and kill Kurds. Now, in the Iraqi democratic age, the Kurds are expected to handover Kurdish oil to boost Iraq.

This is a defining moment in Kurdish history. The Kurds dare not succumb to the wills of Baghdad again. The Kurds have played a role in the creation of the Maliki hand. After dozens of failed promises, they must think twice before any post-election agreement or future concessions in Baghdad.

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Growing hope of elusive government formation in Kurdistan as the PUK internal crisis intensifies and endangers stability.

As the Kurdish public grow increasingly frustrated and impatient at the lengthy delay and protracted negotiations around government formation, there were recent signs that the deadlock can be finally broken.

The onset of 3 strong parties was unprecedented in Kurdistan’s democratic experience. Although, this is an encouraging sign of political and democratic maturity, this new ground brought with it new challenges.

As with any political or social landscape, the situation will constantly change and as such politics will have to follow suit. Finding a compromise on government formation has been difficult but this has been made even more difficult as the region and political parties became accustomed to new norms.

This is particularly true of the PUK. Since the tragic illness to their leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, they have struggled to agree a common roadmap and way forward. It has been evident ever since the first notable split, when Gorran was formed in 2009, that there was increasing disagreement and disunity with the ranks about the future and strategy of the party.

However, as long as a constructive and reconciliatory tone is maintained, evolution and vigorous debate over the future of the party can be healthy. It is a sign of changing times and adapting to the new local and regional climate. After all, no party or political leader can expect that the policy and approach of yesterday can merely continue indefinitely.

PUK’s internal instability has accelerated in recent weeks with a growing media war. The decision to postpone the party elusive party convention caused rifts to deepen among its main council leaders Hero Ibrahim Ahmed, Kosrat Rasul and Barham Salih. Salih resigned soon after the postponement of the party convention and was particularly vociferous in the need for reform in the aftermath of the disappointing parliamentary elections.

Amidst the growing rifts in a major political party and an emboldened Gorran on the scene as the second largest party, the recipe for prolonged political wrangling and delays was there. How difficult would discussions on a wider level be if the PUK did not have united front at home?

After 20 or so rounds of talks around government formation, there was a glimmer of hope that concord was finally struck. Gorran would relinquish role of Deputy Prime Minister to the PUK, accept the position of parliament speaker and would symbolically attain the post of Interior Ministry.

The position of interior ministry would be a coup for Gorran especially as it means they can play a more pivotal role in government affairs and upholding their election manifesto, and can oversee security forces that they allege lean to the major parties.

The PUK internal struggle harms Kurdish stability in the region and Kurdistan Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani warned the security of the region and the stability of Sulaimaniya was a red line. The KDP can play a vital role in soothing cracks in its ally.

The situation is not helped that in spite of diluted seats, the PUK has sway over most of the security forces in Sulaimaniya province. No doubt that even some of these security forces have allegiances to Gorran and also sentiment towards certain party leaders within the PUK.

So what does all the internal party rifts and constant delays in forming a government mean for Kurdistan. For a start, if the Kurds are not united at home, how can they be united away?

The Iraqi national elections are fast approaching and with the continued illness of Jalal Talabani, it is not clear who the Kurds will even propose for post of President. Distribution of posts amongst the Kurds in Baghdad could well be another item of contention.

With continued clouds over Kirkuk and disputed territories, a new sectarian war between Sunnis and Shiites, and the continued stand-off over oil exports, Kurdish disunity will greatly harm their greater goals.

The need for a united approach in external affairs is evident in the different stance towards Syrian Kurdish autonomy. The PUK and Gorran have publicly supported the onset of autonomous cantons in Kurdish areas whereas the KDP have refused to recognise the new administration. In such a case, what is the official position of the KRG?

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Failure to form new cabinet threatens to harm Kurdish interests home and broad

The results of the Kurdistan legislative elections of 2013 changed the political dynamic of the region. The PUK-KDP dominance of the political arena was broken by the onset of Gorran as the second largest party with 24 seats. This placed the PUK into a difficult predicament with their diminishing influence as they claimed 18 seats.

For decades, the political cake was split roughly down the middle between the KDP and PUK as part of their strategic agreement. Now, faced with a new reality, the PUK has found it difficult to relinquish its partner status in government and historical control of Sulaimaniya province especially to its arch rival, Gorran.

In turn, this has placed the KDP in a difficult dilemma. The KDP cannot maintain its strategic relations and carry the PUK and at the same time appease Gorran and other opposition groups that have risen in ascendancy at the polls.

The PUK still holds considerable influence over security forces even if their political showing has been diluted. It is not ready to play second fiddle and relinquish political eminence where it previously enjoys several key ministries.

However, at the same time, any political accord that doesn’t place the electoral weighting of each party and the election outcome at the forefront of discussions is a setback to the political will of the people.

The PUK decline at the polls has coincided with the illness to their leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. In many ways, the PUK has struggled to adapt to the new political realities and evolve its strategy. Internal friction is one of the reasons the PUK has found it difficult to agree on a common position on cabinet formation.

It has been trying to convene the party’s forth congress since the last elections in Kurdistan but this was recently postponed. Prior to holding its 4th General Assembly, it has announced that Talabani will be replaced by a three-member council consisting of PUK Deputy Secretary General Kosrat Rasul, Second Deputy Secretary General Barham Salih and Talabani’s wife Hêro Ibrahim Ahmed. This will help alleviate the leadership debate that has intensified since the last elections, but does not provide the long-term remedy needed.

Distribution of ministry posts was never going to be easy with a key debate around the role of Deputy Prime Minister contested by both Gorran and PUK. The solution is to seemingly create 3 deputy positions for each main party but this brings with it other drawbacks. Gorran, whose stock has risen since 2009 as the PUK’s rival, was not about to accept a stronger PUK hand in the cabinet, having attained more votes.

Even in an opposition mode in a future government, Gorran would have a significant influence on political proceedings that may hamper the passing of laws that the KDP cannot ignore.

A national unity government may be in the best interest of the Kurdistan Region but it has led to months of wrangling and accusations amongst parties over the failure to reach an agreement. Such is the stakes of cabinet representation on a regional level that Iran has tried to exert pressure to ensure PUK retains relative standings.

Kurdistan is going through a crucial juncture amidst a reviving war between Baghdad and Sunni militants that threatens the security of the Kurdistan Region, fast approaching general elections in Iraq and heated debates between Erbil and Baghdad over national budget and exporting of oil via Turkey.

Solidarity, compromise and agreement are important to serve the interests of Kurdistan and its people aside from any partisan interests.

Such delays affect the confidence of the people who set out in their millions to cast their vote. At the same time, it places parliament in great limbo.

At the upcoming Iraqi national elections, Kurdistan must strive for unity especially in Kirkuk province and to maintain leverage in its many disputes with Baghdad.

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Prospects of Geneva 2, Syrian Kurdish Autonomy and why Syria will never be whole again

As representatives of the Syrian regime and the Syrian National Coalition met in Geneva, the prospects of an agreement to end the bitter 3 year civil war that has killed over 130,000 and displaced millions were dim.

The fiery exchanges at the opening of the conference in Montreaux and the deep reluctance to even meet face-to-face, never the mind the entrenched positions over the fate of Bashar al-Assad, underscored the challenges of securing any meaningful agreement.

Yet in so many ways, getting the opposing sides in the same room was an accomplishment in itself. With every bullet fired, every air strike launched and every death recorded, the animosity only deepens and reconciliation is pushed a step further. The profound emotional scarring cannot be patched in a few days in Geneva, but let there be no doubt, the regime and opposition have no choice but to reach a peaceful settlement sooner or later.

If there was a military solution it would have been achieved months ago. 3 years on, with the forces in a stalemate and with most of Syria lying in ruins and blood, no matter the eventual outcome, how can anyone truly feel victorious? What will they govern with some cities in literal ruin and billions of dollars needed to reconstruct the country?

More importantly, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that Syria can ever be whole again. Too much damage has been done and the polarization is now too great for Syria to ever return to any sense of unity.

In this light, it was symbolic and largely missed due to the intense focus on Geneva, that the Syrian Kurds declared administrative autonomy and a provincial governance on the eve of the conference.

The Kurds who have had relative self-rule since July 2012 are increasingly working towards safeguarding and formalizing their new found autonomy. The Kurdish area in Syria, or Rojava as most proudly refer to, is set to be ruled under 3 cantons, Kobani, Efrin and Jazira with an Autonomous Governing Council in each region.

Kurds are already preparing a local constitution and have their eyes on holding elections early this year as well as taking many steps to resume normal life in the region. Anyone would think this is taking place in a distant land, but this is taking place in the same country ruled by Assad and gripped by a deadly civil war.

The growing Kurdish confidence and assertiveness having successfully warded off Islamist forces, naturally unnerves Turkey and other regional players. The Syrian Kurdistan region is effectively governed by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) with links to the PKK and protected by the People Defense Units. This only adds to Turkish anxiety.

Yet with the Syrian Kurds stamping their authority, it was ironic that in Geneva the Kurds were refused a separate delegation or had any specific mention. Regardless of any political deal in Geneva, the Kurds are not about to take a step back into the dark days of the past and relinquish their hard fought gains.

With Alawites weary of Sunni backlash in any post-Assad era, there will almost certainly be a de facto sectarian delineation in Syria to add to the ethnic lines that the Kurdish self-rule promises.

The only way Syria can be truly patched is a loose federation where Sunni, Kurds or Alawites govern their own regions.

The problem in Syria is that the opposition is not represented by one group but a spectrum of forces with differing agendas. Take the SNC, they only agreed to attend the peace talks after dozens of their members walked out in protest and even if anything is agreed long-term, they have insufficient sway with the fighters on the ground.

This introduces the likely scenario that if a broader peace agreement was achieved, it would never be comprehensive and thus there is every chance that the opposition and regime forces may turn their guns on other forces, in particular the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and other Islamic groups that will never accept or recognize any agreement.

Unfortunately for Syria, the fighting has a long way to go before it reaches its course, regardless of any symbolic breakthrough in Geneva.

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Familiar dispute over Iraqi federal budget in 2014 but the Kurds are armed with new leverage

Perennial disputes over the Iraqi federal budget between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad are almost expected.  According to the Iraqi constitution, the Kurdistan Region is entitled to a 17% share, but Kurds argue this is never the true figure.

It was hardly surprising therefore that the Iraqi cabinet recently passed a budget bill in spite of Kurdish withdrawal and rejection.  This scenario is no different to the previous year when the cabinet again approved the budget without the consent of the Kurds, before it was later approved in parliament.

The 2014 bill sets the KRG a lofty target of 400,000 barrels per day and insists that all revenues are sent to Baghdad, threatening to cut the KRG share of the federal budget otherwise.

On the surface, Baghdad is continuing in its ethos of calling the shots, setting the expectations and a threatening rhetoric against the Kurds. However, the 2014 budget is drafted and passed with the new Ankara-Erbil oil contracts and new independent Kurdish pipelines firmly in mind.

Baghdad has been ratcheting the rhetoric against both Kurdistan and Ankara in recent weeks with Abdul Kareem Luaibi, Iraqi Oil Minister, even stating that the government was preparing legal action against Turkey and would blacklist companies implicating in such agreement without the consent of Baghdad.

Baghdad has already summoned Turkish consul in Baghdad to voice their displeasure and accused Turkey of preventing Iraqi oil ministry representatives of supervising exports at Ceyhan.

Luaibi further threatened to boycott Turkish companies and cancel contracts if oil exports went ahead. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki had already threatened to cut Kurdistan’s share of the federal budget if oil exports via Turkey went ahead.

Exports from Kurdistan in recent years have been stop-start to say the least owed to frequent disputes with Baghdad over payment of expenses to oil companies and share of revenues.

The current budget dispute may be along familiar lines but is certainly against a fresh backdrop. Kurdistan has new options and new leverage to use against the government. Its capacity from new oil pipelines are set to rapidly increase and before long Kurdistan could receive a lot more from their own revenue sources than Baghdad could ever give via the 17% share.

This new arrow in the Kurdish bow empowers the Kurds to have control over the destiny.  KRG deputy finance minister, Rashid Tahir, warned that “action begets reaction; if Baghdad cuts the budget then KRG…the Kurdish leadership will make their own decision.”

 

Exports from crude through the new pipeline were on track to start by the end of month and KRG were inviting bidders to register with Kurdistan Oil Marketing Organisation and not the State Oil Marketing Organisation as demanded by Baghdad.

What would KRG do if Baghdad cut their share of the budget, failed to pay Peshmerga salaries or amounts due to foreign oil companies? Simple – they deduct owed amounts from revenues set to go to Baghdad.

It remains to be seen how Turkey would react to prospect of lawsuits from Baghdad, but Turkey is already neck deep in Kurdistan with billions of dollars of trade and is not about to abandon the KRG. It knew the drawbacks of upsetting Baghdad, strategic repercussions and is aware of the hand afforded to the Kurds with the new ventures.

However, growing economic, political and strategic ties with Kurdistan is win-win for Turkey.  Ankara realises that ultimately the independence dream of Kurdistan cannot be held-back or ignored forever, but it serves to gain, not lose from the Kurdish national renaissance.

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Signed, tested, flowing and ready for world markets – Kurds will sell oil via new pipeline with or without Baghdad

The new pipeline linking crude oil from Kurdistan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan is signed, tested, flowing and ready to be presented to world markets. The only hitch appears to be elusive thumbs-up from Baghdad to officially dispatch and sell the oil.

However, having come so far from numerous contracts signed between Erbil and Ankara, millions invested in the planning and construction and testing of the pipeline, the oil gathering pace at thousands of barrels is not designed to sit in Turkish silo’s indefinitely waiting for Baghdad. It’s there to be sold and let there be no doubt, it will ultimately be sold with or without the consent of Baghdad.

Over the past few years, thousands of barrels were sold to Turkey, Iran and local markets via trucks and the oil pipeline doesn’t change the end outcome, only the method of transportation.

Turkey has been careful not to alienate Iraq, who has persistently voiced their discontent at increasingly closer ties Ankara has with the Kurds and with the Kurds growing independence, and has tried to reassure the Iraqi authorities in recent months.

Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, stated last week that they would wait for approval from Baghdad prior to shipping the crude and expressed hope that a deal can be reached this month.

But is Turkey really about to rip-up the contracts, abandon the pipelines and its high stakes and interests because Baghdad deems growing independence of the Kurds against their interests? In reality, Turkey is already neck-deep in Kurdistan and is not about to backtrack. It benefits tremendously from easy accessible Kurdish oil and gas, from billions of dollars of trade and having the Kurds as strategic partners at a time of great regional turmoil.

Turkey or any other major power cannot overlook a region that has at least 45 billion barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of gas. According to some estimates, Kurdistan Region would rank 10th amongst countries with most oil reserves. Ironically, this doesn’t take into account the Kirkuk province that the Kurds have long sought.

The flows to the pipeline are set to start at 300,000 bpd and rise to 400,000 bpd. The ambitious Kurdish government is targeting 1 million bpd by 2015 and 2 million by 2019.

Every year, the Kurds seemingly fight a battle to secure share of the Iraqi federal budget, and strikingly for Kurdistan, it could soon receive more via the pipeline than the share of the revenues it struggles to receive from Baghdad. Ultimately Baghdad seeks to gain significantly from Kurdish oil as revenue would be received centrally and then split according to previous revenue sharing agreements – a fact that stubborn Iraqi pride overlooks.

All this means is that the Kurds will soon cut the umbilical cord that keeps it reliant on Baghdad. It put the boot firmly on the feet of the Kurds. However, any side-stepping of Baghdad in oil revenues would increase hostilities and serves to ensure that Baghdad digs their heels in over article 140 and Kirkuk and other festering disputes.

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Disunity weakens the Syrian Kurdish hand in Geneva

When it comes to pivotal international conferences, particularly in Switzerland, the Kurds hardly have a colourful record. It was the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 that cruelly deprived the Kurds of an independent homeland that was promised as part of the earlier Treaty of Sevres in 1920. Today the Kurds are slowly regaining control of their destiny, but still suffer from the fate enforced upon them by world powers whilst they were deprived of a voice.

With this in mind, the upcoming Geneva II conference that foreign powers hope will lead to a peaceful political solution to the bloody Syrian civil war is an important platform for the Syrian Kurds.

Yet in spite of intense negotiations in Erbil to mend the Kurdish divide and unite the Kurdish stand in Geneva, unity appears as elusive as ever and it’s becoming increasingly evident that the Kurds will send two separate delegations to the talks, and worryingly one with the Syrian regime delegation.

After decades of repression and confounded to the shadows of the Syrian state, the Syrian Kurds have been great benefactors of the intra-Arab turmoil and afforded a unique chapter in their history.

Yet a lack of unity has been a severe handicap that has threatened to undermine the new Kurdish dawn and historical juncture.

Regional jockeying over Rojava between the PKK, Turkey, Kurdistan Region and neighbouring powers has added to the tension.

The talks in Erbil between the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which is more closely aligned with Massaud Barzani and is expected to attend Geneva talks with the opposition, and the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan (PCWK), which is spear-headed by the dominant Democratic Union Party (PYD) that refused to join the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), failed to produce a conclusive agreement despite earlier promise.

The Erbil Agreement of 2012 which united the Kurdish ranks with the establishment of the Kurdish Supreme Committee has all but eroded.

The PYD, who recently declared autonomy, is more closely aligned with the PKK and has been accused of monopolising power and has been the subject of strong criticism from the Kurdistan government,.

The Kurdish differences overshadow the fragile nature of the Kurdish gains in Syria. Thousands of Kurds continue to suffer in Syria and thousands more have sought refuge in the Kurdistan Region while fierce battles continue against Islamist forces.

The ideal position for the Kurds is to attend as a separate united delegation – this sends the strong message that the Kurds are a factor within their own right and not merely as a component of opposition struggle. In other words, fighting for your rights in a broader coalition dilutes the Kurdish cause by the leaving the Kurdish position to one of minority rights. The Kurds were often treated as second-class by Arabs in Syria and deserve a position as a distinct Syrian component. This will ensure Kurds are a separate topic where a separate solution is required with the ultimate goal of enshrining autonomy.

Of course, offering the Kurds such a position at the negotiating tables is likely to be blocked by Turkey, the US and some regional powers.

The need for a united and strong Kurdish position in Geneva is not that Geneva II is likely to herald the lofty goals expected. In contrary, a stubborn regime and a highly disjointed Syrian opposition are unlikely to strike an elusive political transition with such wide starting positions, but such a Kurdish position would be symbolic and send a strong message to the world that Syrian Kurdish rights and autonomy is not the end goal but a starting position.

The recent Erbil talks must continue with hope of bridging gaps, ensuring a share of power and decision making in Rojava, easing the suffering of the population through the opening of the border crossings and above all putting Kurdish national interests above any party or individual interests.

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Nelson Mandela’s virtues of peace, struggle and forgiveness in the Kurdish question

“Courageous people do not fear forgiving, for the sake of peace” – Nelson Mandela

Nelson Mandela, who died at the age of 95, will forever remain an icon of justice, peace, patience and perseverance. His life was a journey against the odds underlined by determination, belief and passion for the cause. In a remarkable transformation, Mandela went from imprisoned activist of 27 years,  18 years of those years in the harsh confinement of Robben Island, to freedom in 1990 and just 4 years later as South Africa’s first black president in the country’s first multi-racial fully representative democratic elections.

Mandela’s primary struggle was against the apartheid system of the all-white National Party of South Africa that oppressed the black population and whose policies “separated” the black and white societies ensuring contrasting lives and conditions.

The case and struggle of Mandela is certainly true for the Kurds. Whether discrimination is on racial, religion or ethnic ground, the end product and crimes are no different.

As the old saying goes “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. Mandela may have been despised by the white regime as a “communist” or “terrorist” but for thousands more he was a true revolutionary and a symbol of sacrifice, bravery and determination. Mandela was a true advocate of peace but he was not afraid to use other means when peaceful pleas went unanswered and when oppression against the blacks continued.

Much in the same way as the blacks in South Africa, the Kurds have suffered oppression at the hands of their rulers, often with a second-class label in their lands of forefathers. The Kurds did not desire violence to achieve their means but would the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey really be where they are today without the great struggle of their leaders and people?

There was uproar in many a Turkish circle when the Turkish government turned to imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan as a key interlocutor of the peace process.

But as Mandela put so wisely – “if you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner.”

When Mandela became president, in spite of his harsh ordeal, he advocated reconciliation, forgiveness and employed a lack of bitterness or hatred.

In Turkey, the Kurds and Turks can truly turn a new page by embracing the same ideals of forgiveness and reconciliation and swaying away from hatred or animosity. As Mandela put so well himself, “courageous people do not fear forgiving, for the sake of peace.”

A look at Turkeys past needs a balanced approach. Killings of Turks or Kurds are as tragic as each other. Is a mourning Turkish mother any different to a mourning Kurdish mother?

There can never be reconciliation in Turkey without reflecting on the past. Mandela did not oppress those who did wrong against him or side-line them from his government – after all, that would make him no better than the perpetrator of crimes against him but he created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate past human rights abuses and to ensure the past is not merely swept under the rugs of history but is purposely taking forward to build a better future.

In December 1993, in a symbolic moment both Mandela and Frederik Willem de Klerk, the leader of the National Party at the time, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. It highlighted that when it comes to peace, there should be no hero or villain or bitter taste.

Whether it is Nelson Mandela, Massaud Barzani or Abdullah Ocalan, they have all struggled for their people.

Mandela himself was acutely aware of the Kurdish struggle. In 1992, he refused the Atatürk Peace Award citing human rights violations, before later accepting the award in 1999.

In April 2009, Essa Moosa, the lawyer of Mandela on an official visit to Turkey, denounced the criminalisation of the Kurdish struggle for freedom, likening Ocalan’s struggle for the Kurds to that of Mandela.

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Attitude to Turkish atrocities of the past the real gauge of sentiment in the future

The Kurdish position in Turkey is a far-cry from decades of denial, persecution and second class status but has Turkey comes to terms with its past policies?

The carnival atmosphere last week in Diyarbakir with Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani side-by-side with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and famous Kurdish artists was an unprecedented event.

The theme was one of brotherhood, peace and a prosperous future of co-existence. The mere idea that a Turkish MP would utter the word “Kurdistan” was unthinkable just years ago, let alone by a Prime Minister.

The increasing conciliatory ties and a dose of reality from the Turkish state are welcome and take the Kurdish standing in Turkey to new levels. The reality of a population of over 20 million with a rich history, culture and separate ethnic identity was cynically ignored in Turkey to its detriment.

However, Turkey has a long way to go before national sentiments will truly sway. The Kurds have a bad label, a tainted image in Turkey and seen as the aggressors and overreachers. In 2013, with the Kurds as strategic actors on the Middle Eastern stage and with the Kurdistan Region long established, it speaks volumes when the word Kurdistan stills stirs such nationalist emotion.

The fact of the matter is that until Turkey comes to true terms with its past and its crimes against the Kurds, a new age and a new future based on unity and co-existence will never come to fruition. The account of the conflict is acutely one-sided with the media and state policy playing a strong hand in the psychology of the greater population against the Kurds.

The West of Turkey never had the full picture of the Kurdish issue and state atrocities. The scene of the battle always seemed like a distant, backward, lawless and secluded land, not a land that constitutes such a major part of Turkey.

Without forgiveness and understanding, brotherhood will never arrive. Turkey must at the same time look at its past with a deal of justice, repentance and regret.

Many dark chapters in Turkey’s history where concealed from the public eye. Only recently with some prosecutions and trials in the Kurdish region have of some these tales come to light. The Kurds have resorted to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the past, but it is the Turkish justice system that must take ownership and responsibility. Too often perpetrators of state injustices of the best have been sheltered and defended.

Recent trials have focused on the dark days of the 1990’s when the war with the PKK was at its peak. Thousands of villages were burned and destroyed, with millions of Kurds forced to migrate and with thousands killed or disappeared. Some of the horrid accounts were revealed by soldiers themselves.

Yet the acts of the 90’s scratch the surface. Only in 2011 did Erdogan take the bold and unprecedented steps of apologising for the killing of over 13,000 Kurds in Dersim in the 1930’s.

Violent means of achieving your rights should not be condoned and no war is without casualty but the whole Kurdish population was suddenly branded with the PKK or terrorist bush. If one village supported the PKK, it was as if the whole village supported such views.

Furthermore, the state repression of the Kurds goes back decades before the onset of the PKK.

If the Turkish government has genuine intentions to build a new future of brotherhood then the unbalanced view of the Kurdish struggle must be addressed.

The greater Turkish population must understand the crimes that were committed by state forces and the suffering that was inflicted on the Kurdish population.

Whether in Iraq, Syria or Turkey, the attitude to the repressive government policies of the past is an indicator of real sentiment in the future. Has the atmosphere really changed or is just been masked with mere rhetoric and policies that strengthens short-term goals of individuals?

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

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Syrian Kurdish administration – a historic step shrouded in controversy

The Syrian Kurds have suffered more than any other group under decades of Baathist dictatorship. The Syrian civil war opened an unchartered and once unthinkable opportunity for the Syrian Kurds, but the growing Kurdish assertiveness and power has not been without controversy.

The Syrian Kurdish region is dominated both politically and militarily by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and their announcement of an interim administration for the growing Kurdish areas under their control resulted in a backlash from many sides.

No doubt self-governance would placate the remarkable turnaround in Kurdish fortunes which on paper is a benefit for all of greater Kurdistan, so why such controversy?

Timing and the actors is of course key at such a delicate juncture in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and beyond. The Syrian revolution is at a sensitive stage but it is factors across the borders that are more pronounced. The Syrian conflict has ramifications across the Middle Eastern divide and this is no different for the Kurds.

Syrian Kurdistan may number no more than 10% of the Syrian population or 2 million people, but disunity with dozens or so parties is plain to see. There is a split of sentiment for the PKK of whom the Syrian Kurdistan population has enjoyed historic ties and groups more closely affiliated with Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

The current correlations between the PYD, PKK, Kurdistan Region, Ankara and even Baghdad add to the sensitive mix. Whilst the Kurdistan Region is enjoying increasing prominence in the region and greater strategic, political and economic ties with Ankara, the PKK is a headache for Ankara that in spite of the peace process will not go away.

Ankara’s anxiety and rejection of the unilateral declaration of autonomy by the PYD is no surprise. Ankara naturally prefers a KRG influence that they can trust in Syrian Kurdistan than the region becoming a de facto extension of PKK sphere of influence, that they would find difficult to combat.

Ultimately Ankara cannot ignore developments in Syrian Kurdistan and must at the same time not antagonise the PKK. The rocky peace process needs a jumpstart. Ankara may have taken a number of bold steps, but it won’t take much for emotions to re-spill into armed conflict.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has to manoeuvre wisely with the Kurds with fast approaching national elections in Turkey, knowing that the Kurdish vote holds a decisive swing.

President Barzani’s historic visit to Diyarbakir at such a critical juncture was no coincidence. Erdogan needs to sway Kurdish sentiment and the Kurdish vote in 2014 will speak volumes in how the peace process and the PKK conflict will unravel. Greater Kurdish vote for AKP sends a strong message to the PKK.

At the same time, it promotes Barzani as a credible leader of greater Kurdistan, and sends a warning to the PKK leadership.

President Barzani wrote a strongly worded statement upon the declaration of autonomy by the PYD. It is not that Barzani would not want to see a Kurdish region in Syria, in fact this would greatly placate Kurdish power within the Middle East and open a de-facto bridge between Kurds on both sides. It is the fact that it is the PYD who would ultimately hold control and sway over the region, further eroding the Erbil Agreement of 2012.

Barzani lamented the “marginalisation” of other Kurdish parties and the PYDs perceived collusion with the Syrian regime and stated “We only support the steps that have the consensus of all Kurdish parties in Rojava…we refuse to deal with unilateral actions.” Barzani urged all Kurdish parties to return to the principles of the Erbil Agreement as the “best option to strengthen the Kurdish position in Syria”

The relations between the PYD and Syrian opposition forces have been one of mistrust and the Syrian National Council has accused the Syrian Kurds of collaborating with Bashar al Assad many times.

In response to Kurdish plans for a transitional administration, the Syrian National Council labelled the PYD as a “group hostile to the Syrian revolution”, even as the Coalition announced its own plans for an interim government in rebel-held territory.

With growing divide and differing camps, the Syrian Kurds are naturally at risk of wasting this historical juncture.

It must be noted that the PYD enjoys strong support amongst the Kurds and their stock has risen as they have affectively pushed back Islamist forces in Kurdish areas. They cannot be ignored as a major actor. However, the PYD and ultimately Syrian Kurdish region will struggle against a backdrop of animosity from the KRG, Turkey and the Syrian opposition.

The sooner the PYD and KRG can mend their bridges along with other Kurdish parties in Syria the better. At the same time, the PYD needs Ankara. The last thing the Syrian Kurds need is an isolated region. Finally, Syrian Kurds must maneuverer carefully with a future Syrian in mind. They need all the support to ensure self-rule is wrapped in legislation and not controversy. Self-rule is a must and a minimum for the Syrian Kurds.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc