Category Archives: Iraq

Further Stalling by Iraqi Politicians, Leaves Great Danger of US Suspension in Iraq

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After Iraq’s Political Council for National Security stalled in successive days to approve, the presumed ‘take it or leave it’, final draft of the SOFA agreement, US officials once again pressed their Iraqi counterparts to accept the deal. 

It is hoped that if approval is obtained by the council, which practically brings together key political heads across Iraq, from presidency to the heads of major blocs in parliament, ratification by parliament would be a formality.

However, in Iraq where finding broad political agreement is notoriously painstaking, this may be easier said than done.

Dramatic Consequences

In a stark warning, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, stated that without the Status of Forces Agreement (Sofa), then the US activities would be effectively suspended.  Such “dramatic consequences” noted by Gates, should give the Iraqi political process a firm jolt.

However, Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh had earlier claimed that leaders were “still hesitant to approve or reject” the deal, placing uncertainty on the chances of a fast turn-around, if not rejection of the draft altogether.

According to al-Dabbagh, ministers would meet in the days ahead for consultation and put forward suggested amendments.  It is hoped that the amended draft can then be sent back to the negotiation table. With US expressing “great reluctance” to renegotiate, the table may remain bare.

Intense Negotiations

After months of negotiations and compromise, an agreement in principle stretching as far back as late 2007 and a missed target of the end of July originally earmarked for the approval of the strategic framework agreement, hopes for a swift pact evaporated.

After months of tense, protected and at times controversial negotiations and over 5 years of what should now in theory at least represent a blossoming partnership between the US and Iraqi governments, the absence of the strategic agreement strikes a blow to future cooperation and will undoubtedly undermine ties.

The original perception from the both governments was that the draft agreement, after concessions from both sides and a multitude of meetings, was now in its final format and can only be accepted or rejected by the Iraqi parliament. US certainly believe that they have done all they can to appease Iraqi anxiety over its sovereignty.

Fragmented Iraqi Landscape

After pushing US compromise to the limit, there is a general consensus amongst some Iraqi parliamentarians that the current form of the deal is the best they can attain.

However, even this reality may not be enough to enforce agreement. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that in the diverse ethnic fabric that is Iraq, establishing such an agreement with the Americans has proved a thorny national issue and the source of much debate.

The fragmented nature of the Iraqi landscape is best depicted, when one-side of the Iraqi divide, namely the Sadrist block are dead against an agreement in any form with the American “occupiers”, whilst conversely for the Kurdish Coalition, a long-term US hand in Iraq is strongly advocated and actively supported.

Only this weekend, thousands of supporters of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr demonstrated against the security agreement.

After deadly-conflicts between the Mehdi Army and US forces in past years, Sadrist opposition is hardly surprising. However, rising voices of discontent from the main Shiite coalition, United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), has clouded the chances of concord.

Iranian meddling in this affair is more than likely. After all they will certainly use all their “friends” within Iraqi government circles, to drastically dilute, if not revoke such an agreement affecting their sphere of influence, and at times of such animosity with the Bush administration.

US Reassurance

At the pinnacle of Iraqi concern, and the main cause of delays, is the issue of sovereignty. A growingly confident Iraqi government has continually strived to assert its dominance in recent times. The primary question, for sceptical Iraqis is who will really call the shots in Iraq, the Iraqi government or the US administration?

US Ambassador Ryan Crocker once again defended the draft agreement and tried to provide reassurance that Iraq will assume its sovereignty in full.

US officials had pressed hard not to include a definitive timetable for withdrawal, but under the watered-down agreement still to be published, it is envisaged that US forces will leave Iraqi cities by June 2009 and withdraw from Iraq altogether by the end of 2011.

The other Iraqi obstacle to agreement is wording around the liability of US troops and contractors from Iraqi prosecution. Phrasing on the conditions for immunity has been drastically altered, but has still failed to strike the right sentiments with the main Shiite alliance.

The key message from the US administration is that the security pact was always designed with Iraq’s best interests in mind, and based on a voluntary Iraqi endeavour to request continuing US assistance, rather than a forcibly-applied US presence.

What now for the security agreement?

If chances of renegotiation of the draft are slight, then the probability of major concessions at this stage is almost certainly out of the question. However, something must give in this impasse.

If no agreement is reached by the end of this year, when the ‘final’ UN mandate ends, either the current powers afforded continue under a new mandate, which by Gates own admission is not a “clean” option, or the US leave altogether. Ironically, Iraqis do not seem to want both these scenarios.

In recent times, the much-pressurised Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, has tried hard to be portrayed as a strong nationalistic leader, rather than a tool of the US administration. Al-Maliki has expressed his desire to see the draft pass by a two-thirds majority in parliament, to win wider national endorsement.

But such a contentious issue, and the diversity of opinion across the Iraqi social mosaic, means that pleasing all sides is always going to be impossible no matter how agreements with the US are dressed.

High-stakes

Clearly, the US can ill-afford to hastily cut their losses in Iraq, after 5 years of sacrifice and much effort to establish stability and elusive national reconciliation. Security achievements remain brittle and certainly gains are reversible as quickly as they were yielded.

The US administration must ensure that a minimum they keep a strategic-hand, albeit in less-militaristic terms, for years to come, to prevent their Iraqi and more importantly their greater Middle Eastern project, from dramatically falling to pieces.

However, the popular belief that US will remain under any circumstance is misleading. Growing US public discontent, a daunting economic recession, rampant unemployment, a global credit crisis and the impeding change of president, coupled with the billions of dollars spent every month in Iraq, will mean that the US will want to cut back their Iraqi adventures sooner rather than later, without leaving civil anarchy behind.

On the hand, the security agreement represents the best terms that the Iraqi government can get. They have won major concessions and can ill-afford to see their US counterparts leave the country in haste at such times of deep national vulnerability. It is true that Iraqi politicians will aim to be viewed as strong national leaders and thus try to surmount a tougher stance, least to be seen to succumb to US “occupiers”, but they need the US more than ever.

Growing frictions between the KRG and Baghdad, the lack of a hydrocarbon law, bitter disputes over Kirkuk and the implementation of the constitution, and not forgetting the potentially disastrous ramifications if the incorporation of the Sunni Sahwa councils is not treaded with utter caution, all highlight the dangerous road ahead in Iraq.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Amidst Political Wrangling, the Existing Guiding Light in Iraq, the Constitution, is sidelined.

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Hopes for a swift ratification of the provincial election law, after parliament’s summer recess, have been dashed with the negotiations assuming the same protracted path.

Further attempts at reaching a compromise agreement have only culminated in heightened emotions in rival camps. Earlier this week Kurdish lawmakers rejected amendments to the elections law regarding Kirkuk, a city fast becoming the Iraqi thorn most dreaded. The UN envoy, led by Steffan de Mistura, in tune with their Iraqi counterparts have been slow in  proposing solutions acceptable to all sides, almost a year after been charged with resolving the crisis over article 140.

However, disputes over Kirkuk and the shaping of the election law is just a tip of the iceberg in mounting friction between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region. Debates still rage on claims of Kurdish advances beyond their “zone” of influence, the share of the Iraqi budget, status and integration of Kurdish forces into the Iraqi army and the formation of a new hydrocarbon law, which with the record oil prices on the global stage has added extra bite to the distribution ofstaggering oil revenues.

Somewhat ironically, Kurdish-Shiite relations were strong as the fledgling democratic motion took grip in Iraq. Both sides formed a productive and solid alliance in the mayhem that ensued after the Iraqi liberation. Understanding was commonplace on the blueprint of Iraq, non-better highlighted than the passing of the Iraqi constitution in 2005, despite some key differences. 

So much as agreement on federalism, Kirkuk and definition of the new Iraq highlighted the promising signs of democracy and all the trappings of classic compromise at the time, in hindsight the tentative agreements only veiled a ticking time-bomb.

It is no coincidence that as Nouri al-Maliki’s government has grown in power and military confidence, their stance has been continually more authoritarian and rigid in execution. Whilst al-Maliki can certainly be accredited for installing growing security and taking impartial action against rogue elements as an Iraqi strongman, it must not be forgotten that he is only the head of a coalition cabinet and is appointed to serve the whole of sovereign Iraq.

Clearly, a strong government in the midst of many destabilising elements in Iraq and contentious neighbours is a necessity for Iraqi progression. However, this must be based on the virtues of democracy and pluralism. Swaying of a military might and the associated threats this brings is simply unacceptable.

Beyond all the issues currently tainting relations between Kurdistan Region and Baghdad, lies the quandary of power. The Kurds, after a painful and unforgettable experience in the Iraqi experiment, are naturally careful to safeguard their gains as well as their future. The thirst for Kurdish strength comes in the quest for self-sustainability and self-sufficiency. For them, only greater autonomy as part of a federal structure will enforce that.

Mistrust and animosity, simply can not be wiped by a mentally-scarred nation. Conversely, it’s unwise to assume that all the Baathist elements that created Saddam Hussein and Arab hegemony have simply disappeared because Saddam statues and pictures are no longer in sight.

As Kurds strive for protection and implementation of a strong region, in turn this rattles the cages in Baghdad who in fear of inhibiting a weak status and losing national sway, invariably want to show who is still boss in Iraq.

If the rest of Iraq is genuine about partnership and a harmonious existence, then any achievement or gains in Kurdistan should be heralded and not despised.

The negative campaign to discredit the Kurdistan region and tarnish the image of the Kurds is unwelcome. Clearly, some politicians in Baghdad have been inducing and taking advantage of bitter stand-offs, with the aim of weakening the Kurdish position.

A future based on dialogue and federalism is the safety-net for all of Iraq, from Arbil to Basra. If Kurds ask for anything more than stated in the adopted constitution, then Baghdad will have a point.

Much of the current disputes including Kirkuk, oil sharing and federalism were already agreed and approved by 80% of the Iraqi population. There is already a strong basis for the shaping of Iraq.

Although US officials have continuously backed the constitution, after all it represent the exact democratic beacon that they claimed to bring, they have avoided taking sides in the debacle – even as democracy they have doggedly heralded is undermined, to safeguard their own achievements in their troubled adventures in Iraq.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Fuzzy Democracy is a Prelude to National Disaster

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As attempts to defuse the current crisis over Khanaqin intensify, it alludes to a more extensive web of tension and animosity between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Baghdad Ministry.

It appears that enmity between both parties, undoubtedly fuelled by certain elements in Baghdad and abroad, is not isolated but threatens to rip Iraq apart.

Almost all major negotiations and key parliamentary bills have been over-shadowed by heated exchanges between both sides. No other dispute is better illustrated than the current stalemate over Kirkuk.

Politicians scamper to intact a “democratic” and “fair” solution to the disputed territories, yet ironically millions of Iraqis have already adopted their democratic solution via a national constitution. Beyond the mask of greater security achievements and an improving national picture, lies much political uncertainty and an Iraqi practice of fuzzy democracy that is making national reconciliation in real-terms an improbable task.

Clearly, behind the Iraqi political veil, there still exists a deep-rooted problem in the mentality of some politicians in Baghdad. The totalitarian regime may have collapsed five years ago, but it’s unwise to assume its historical legacy vanished with it.

The Kurds make a significant portion of the Iraqi coalition and are in theory the partners in the new Iraq. However, the recent uncoordinated moves to employ Iraqi forces in disputed territories, the order for Kurds to evacuate offices in Diyala and the passing of the provincial election bill on 22nd July 2008 amidst a Kurdish boycott, does not just highlight puzzling motives in the Baghdad camp but smacks of a great deal of insincerity towards the Kurds.

Furthermore, coupled with the non-adoption of article 140, attempts to nullify oil exploration contracts awarded by KRG oil ministry and the annual squabbling over the Kurdish share of the national budget, this clearly does not just represent common democratic disputes but points to a general agenda against the Kurds.

There is currently a feverish campaign to discredit the Kurdish administration. This anti-Kurdish hysteria is designed to undermine the Kurds, and promote the perception of the Kurds as over-reaching, encouraging problems in ethnically mixed-cities and as obstacles to Iraqi progression.

This motion places pressure on Kurds to over-compromise or even cede certain demands. But the moment Kurds accepts crumbs, when they are entitled to their share of bread, then the ultimate result is Baghdad hegemony over the north, and in turn a heavy reliance by Erbil for economic and social support.

If Iraq is democratic as the brochure entails, then the Iraqi constitution is a real achievement for the Iraqi nation and should be heralded. However in Iraq, there is an ironic perception that abiding by such democratic values is the actual threat, not the solution.

As such Kurdish demands for the adoption of the constitution are a fair and legal obligation. Any article of the constitution should only be amended by a popular vote, not by hasty pro-Arab politicians. The constitution is the legal red-line. If Baghdad decides against any portion of the constitution and national power-sharing, then they are again choosing authoritarianism over democracy and Kurds should have no part of this project.

Kurdistan President, Massaud Barzani, in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat issued a damning assessment, and raised doubt that Baghdad views them as partners. The increasingly frustrated Barzani accused the Iraqi government of “monopolising authority” while pointing to a prevailing totalitarian mentality and has warned that voiding any part of the constitution will rip Iraq apart.

Kurds have proved a vital cog since the fall of Saddam when Arab factions were pointing guns at each other, by ensuring security and promoting national reconciliation. Now with the security improving in places such as Diyala, the Iraqi forces now threaten to point the gun at the Kurds. All this denotes to a campaign to diminish the Kurdish role in mixed areas and thus make political resolutions more one-sided.

Kurds could have taken advantage of the Iraqi bloodshed by annexing disputed lands, now their quest for legal justice may have worked against them.

Iraqi lawmakers that are genuine about driving the new Iraq must root out elements and ill-intentioned hands pushing for escalation and confrontation. Any Baghdad conspiracy to return all Kurdish forces to the blue line is a sure way of provoking armed conflict sooner or later. These are early doors in the new Iraq, if the right moves are not taken at its foundation, then there is really no hope.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Battle for Kirkuk Continues

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The Iraqi Mindset is, as long as there is no democracy in Kirkuk, there is no chance of a Kurdish cictory

After years of foot-dragging by Baghdad over the status of Kirkuk, Kurds have decided to dig their heels in. The heated-battle for Kirkuk continues apace with decisive concord out of sight.

Iraqi leaders, after weeks of deliberation within the Baghdad political chambers and with much pressure from George Bush and other senior US officials, failed to strike a deal on the provincial election law that would facilitate the progression of crucial elections, raising great doubt that the elections could be held this year. 

After failed attempts at forming elusive concord via extraordinary parliamentary sessions on a number of occasions in past weeks, the last session on 6th August before politicians enter summer recess, was almost perceived as a last throw of the dice with politicians optimistic that an agreement could be finally reached.

However, the heated session was adjourned without a vote on the provincial law, serving as a major setback to the Iraqi political landscape and the US administration. The debate was closed after it was decided to form a committee composed of the heads of parliamentary blocs to find acceptable text for the provincial election bill.

Mahmoud al-Mashahadani, the parliament’s speaker, a source of much controversy over the past couple of weeks, announced September 9th as the start of the second legislative term of parliamentary sessions for 2008.

The tense stand-off amongst Iraqi parliamentarians hinges on the hotly-disputed issue of elections in oil-rich Kirkuk. In spite of frequent pledges by Baghdad to abide by the Iraqi constitution, which under article 140 calls for the normalisation in Kirkuk and the suburbs followed by a referendum to decide eventual control of the district, deadlines and extensions to the implementation of this article have continuously ended without any real progress.

Now the issue of Kirkuk, which Baghdad has left simmering for far too-long, threatens to come to the boil in spectacular fashion. Seemingly, against the will of the Kurds, Arab blocs have sought to delay the process of dealing with Kirkuk even further.

Baghdad foot-Dragging

Even as another six months were added to the implementation of article 140 after it missed its original 31st December 2007 deadline, it was hard not to feel a great deal of pessimism that any real change in attitude would be witnessed on the ground.

Indeed, somewhat inevitably the six-month deadline passed and Iraq appears no closer or eager for that matter, to resolving the status of Kirkuk than the decades that preceded it.

Foot-dragging and a lack of desire to implement a constitution adopted by millions of Iraqis in a legal and democratic fashion, has understandably compounded Kurdish frustration.

Now, lawmakers in Baghdad are suggesting methods to resolve the dispute in Kirkuk that are simply too little, too late and which Kurds see as a sure formula of getting the short-straw again.

Intense negotiations in past weeks, was designed to finally bring a level of compromise between all parties, but the level of sentiments expressed suggest that the time of further compromise on the status of Kirkuk may have passed.

Article 24

Ironically, article 24, a special addition to the provisional and governorate law pertaining to provincial elections is designed to effectively cancel article 140 and suppress Kurdish ambitions to winning formal control of the city.

The inclusion of article 24 in the provincial law was seen as a red-line by Kurds, leading to angry demonstrations throughout Iraqi Kurdistan. However, although in latter sessions the text contained in article 24 was watered down significantly, this was simply not enough to appease weary Kurds.

Under Arab proposals, article 24 would mean that the elections in Kirkuk would be essentially prefixed with the Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens sharing the same number of seats. In addition, existing security forces in the region would be replaced by those in the centre and south – a clear attempt to undermine the mainly Kurdish security forces protecting the province.

Although, the law that was passed in spite of mass boycott by Kurdish lawmakers was always going to be vetoed, it was passed by Arab lawmakers more as a message to Kurds rather than in hope that it would by-pass the Iraqi presidential council.

Ruffling Kurdish Feathers

Controversial calls in Baghdad for a delay in the elections in Kirkuk, replace Kurdish security forces and non-implementation of the constitution is designed to ensure Kurds do not wrestle control of Kirkuk. Suggestion and notions such as article 24 are a flagrant attempt to destabilise Kurdish ranks and is specifically aimed at ruffling Kurdish sentiments.

Once Kurdish anger has been stoked, Arabs are aiming to induce a harsh reaction from them. The mass walkout is one example. This naturally places the Kurds as the representation of the spanner in the Iraqi machine. This perception continued in recent parliamentary sessions with Kurds unwilling to cave in to pressure for greater compromise.

Baghdad has failed to implement satisfactory measures to tackle article 140 for many years, and are now blaming the Kurds for the current stand-off.

Increasingly, this places Kurds in the context of over-reaching and as an obstacle to Iraqi reconciliation which could not be further from the truth.

The persistent disputes around the hydro-carbon law, which still has not been passed, and the provincial elections law, has been used as a marketing ploy by Baghdad to discredit the Kurds as genuine partners in the Iraqi union.

Cases of injustices against Arabs and Turcoman minorities in Kirkuk under the hands of the Kurds have been greatly exaggerated. Clearly, foreign proxy elements as well as political factions in Baghdad have sought to influence proceedings by creating instability and promoting an environment of mistrust.

There is plenty of Arab and Turkmen representation in the provincial council as well as security forces for that matter. In fact, many Arabs and Turcoman groups have been in support of implementing article 140 and the eventual annexing of the region to Kurdistan region.

The end-goal of the anti-Kurdish bandwagon, is to create an environment where holding an election would be unfeasible and against the interests of security gains in Iraq. For the Arabs it is simple, as long as there is no democracy in Kirkuk then there is no chance of any Kurdish victory.

Role of the UN

U.N. special representative Staffan de Mistura was appointed to help resolve the issues in Kirkuk by providing mainly “technical” assistance and to study alternatives to implementing a referendum on the status of Kirkuk, which many have touted as a one-way ticket to bloodshed.

However, after six-months of ‘fact-finding and analysis’, UN suggestions fell short of many expectations and provided solutions that were unrealistic and in some cases lacked the right level of political, ethnic and geographical grounding. In either case, Iraq moved no closer to stopping the “ticking time bomb” that de Mistura so boldly claimed to have done at the turn of the year.

Now the UN has entered the provincial council debate by promoting a postponement of elections in Kirkuk until a proposed committee can decide the best method for dealing with the current stand-off.

However, if the current track record of resolving the Kirkuk debate is anything to go by, the Kurds will miss the chance to solidify their hold on Kirkuk and yet nothing more will have been done in another six months time.

Why not hold elections in Kirkuk?

On the surface, according to lawmakers in Baghdad, holding elections in Kirkuk is technically and politically difficult due to working out registrar of voters in Kirkuk coupled with the prospect of holding elections in a volatile climate.

However, in practice, the fear is that an eventual and almost evitable victory of Kurds in the provincial elections in Kirkuk would make implementation of article 140 even more contentious. In many ways, holding elections at the current time would be perceived as a de facto substitute for holding a referendum on the status of the city.

Even if a referendum was never arranged, a Kurdish majority in the Kirkuk council would make things that bit more complicated for Baghdad. It would reinforce the Kurdish view that Kirkuk is a Kurdish city and would lead to more public efforts at annexing of the region.

Furthermore, the recommendations of de Mistura were formulated based on a number of factors such as historical influences but principally previous election results, when devising his suggestions to resolve disputed territories, including Kirkuk. A Kurdish victory at the polls in Kirkuk would make de Mistura’s analysis an interesting reading to say the least.

Kirkuk should be not treated differently to any other place in Iraq. All mutterings in Baghdad around the delay of the vote, is centred around ensuring Kurds do not get their hand on the substantial oil-reserves. This is hardly Iraq’s best kept secret.

If it was not about oil, article 140 would not even appear in Iraqi newspapers, let alone dominate the agenda of neighbouring foreign ministers.

Mosul a different example?

While minority Arabs and Turkmens state their opposition to living under Kurdish control, Kurds living under Arab control is now seen as a formality and a historical expectation in Iraq.

If minority Kurds asked for Mosul to be given special dispensation for the upcoming elections since it’s also a volatile and ethnically mixed city, Arabs would chuckle at the idea.

Then how are the voices of the majority in Kirkuk dampened by unsubstantiated fears of the minority in Kirkuk.

Kirkuk Provincial Council Threat

Almost before the Kirkuk provincial council could finish their threat of requesting to be annexed to the Kurdistan region, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was on the phone to voice his concerns.

External interference has only hampered democracy in Iraq, and neighbouring countries have served to only stoke tensions ad influence proceedings for their own benefit, rather than promote a new dawn across their border.

Turkey, in particular has been vociferous in its opposition of any moves toward Kurdish control of Kirkuk. Only this week Turkey called for more UN involvement in Kirkuk and stated the Turkish government was watching all developments in Kirkuk.

However, as Baghdad pressured the council not to follow their threat, Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani congratulated their stance.

Kurds have always stated Kirkuk as a red-line, but now appear increasingly more agitated in the face of the lack of desire by Baghdad to resolve long-standing disputes.

Democracy – the only solution

Ultimately, the one and only solution to the Kirkuk stand-off should not be decided by Kurdish leaders, the Iraqi national Assembly or even the Kirkuk council, but by the people themselves.

The wills of the million is far great than the will of a small number of politicians, who have been elected to serve them. If people in Kirkuk decide to vote in favour of joining the Kurdistan Region, then Baghdad has no basis to confront legal and democratic measures, other than to ensure minority rights are respected.

All talk of complex proposals by the UN and the need to place Kirkuk under special consideration is unnecessary and is only designed to complicate matters. The only viable solution is to let the people decide.

The US should then do its utmost to be the supporter and protectorate of the wishes of the people. Although, the provincial elections is as much vital to George Bush leaving his tenure as president on a positive as much as a move the they consider essential to reconciling Iraq’s ethnic and religious communities, elections should not be placed to appease US political interests but should be in the best interests of all groups in Iraq.

It is also ironic that Turkey as the role-model of democracy for the region is unwilling to accept legal and democratic principles chosen by millions of citizens by a neighbouring country. If there is genuine interest in seeing a stable, plural and democratic age in Iraq, then at the minimum true democratic ideals must be encouraged and not hampered by the US and their so-called allies.

If the voting in Kirkuk should be suspended then voting in all of Kurdistan region should be suspended. More extensions to the resolving elections in Kirkuk would be fruitless without any real desire.

Baghdad wants to slip the Kirkuk rug from under the feet of the Kurds. Kurds should be warned, after all they have had enough time and suffering to read the writing on the wall.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

‘Eternal Slavery’ or a Mutually Necessary Pact?

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Iraqis look for an agreement respecting their rights and serving their interests 

Discussions between U.S. and Iraq authorities on a status of forces agreement, essentially a legal framework defining the rights and obligations of militaries operating on foreign soil, are deadlocked.

The intense US-Iraqi negotiations on the “status of forces agreement” (SOFA) has increasingly turned into an acrimonious public debate. As the details of the first draft were released, it was almost immediately met with wide condemnation by Iraqi politicians and aroused fears and uncertainly in the general public.

The brunt of the anger has been aired by Shiite politicians, particularly the Sadr movement, who have accused the US of wanting to colonise Iraq and labelled the pact as “eternal slavery of Iraq”. While Iraq’s most influential Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has urged for rejection of such moves.

Iraqi politicians have been much more public about description of the talks, which has been used to stoke popular anger at the agreement. The focus of the debate has turned into the question of who is actually in charge of the country, the US or Iraq.

This growing alarm has seemingly prompted Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to adopt a tougher and more decisive stance in the negotiations.

Al-Maliki’s stance can be compared with the new tough approach on Shiite militias, which has seen him make some ground as a “national” leader. Al-Maliki is stuck between winning the necessary support needed from the US to ensure Iraq’s stability and in turn perhaps even keep him in the political hot-seat, whilst at the same time acting like a strong-nationalist leader who can stand up for his country and the wills of the nation.

Even his visit to Iran was dominated by the US strategic agreement, with Iraq split further by its crucial Shiite neighbour who is vehemently opposed to any Iraqi security arrangement with the Americans.

The initial draft was strongly rebuffed by Iraq, who deemed many of the stipulations within the agreement as a gross violation of its sovereignty.

The harsh-line adopted by Iraqi leaders has in turned forced the US to adopt a more flexible approach to negotiations and vitally downplay fears that they would seek anything than an understanding that was in the best interests of the Iraqi nation. This view was reinforced by President Bush, who stressed respect for Iraqi sovereignty, the will of its people and his keenness to assist Iraq in the challenges ahead.

Despite the public rhetoric, inside the political chambers, the Iraqi leaders realise that the valuable gains to date, including improved security, heavy damage on al-Qaeda and crackdown on militias and insurgents, are as fragile as ever. Unable to self-sustain stability and with political reconciliation ongoing, in the absence of US firepower, Iraq could stand to erase much of these gains.

Conversely, a lack of a long-term legal foothold in Iraq, places the US Middle-Eastern project, achieved to date with immense sacrifice in both costs and lives at great risk. In reality, both Iraq and the US need each other as much as ever.

Under continuing negotiations, some progress was made. Both the Iraqi and US officials have stressed importance of concluding a security pact before end of July as planned. It is hoped that a SOFA will be in place by 1st January 2009, where the current UN mandate expires, effectively putting the US involvement in Iraq under a legal vacuum.

The possibility of prolonged stand-off seemed high, when al-Maliki described the talks as reaching an “impasse” and emphasised multiple choices if no agreement was reached by the end of the year, including ominously even asking the US to leave outright. Iraqis have insisted that no agreement is affective without endorsement by the 275-member Iraqi parliament, which giving the hostilities to date may prove a challenge.

Iraq is insisting on the right to veto any U.S. military operations throughout its territory, maintain control of Iraqi air and sea space, place US contractors under Iraqi law, and has stated the importance of prior agreements before any US action. This in firm contrast to original US stipulations.

The agreement is reportedly only valid for 2 years, which would be aimed at removing ambiguity on US presence, although the US have continually emphasised that they do not envisage long-term bases.

For the US itself, the negotiations and their future course in Iraq is under intense spotlight. Many democrats have criticised Bush for the tying the hands of the next administration and view Bush’s insistence that no legislative approval is required with much scepticism. There are tough times ahead for the US as well as Iraq, while immediate withdrawal may certainly prove catastrophic, open-ended commitment is not a viable alternative any longer with increasing public displeasure and unbearable financials burdens.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Did the UN Really Stop the Clock?

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In December 2007, as the deadline for the implementation of article 140 of the Iraqi constitution unsurprisingly passed, UN special envoy to Iraq Staffan de Mistura claimed: “…the question of Kikruk was a ticking time bomb. The United Nations has stopped the clock”. In reality however, the UN never stopped the clock, they only added more time to the “ticker”.

After Iraqi political figures agreed to “technical” assistance from the UN, it was hoped that a breakthrough could be finally reached on the hotly-contested territories including oil-rich Kirkuk. That aside, officially article 140, despite Turkoman and Arab rhetoric, is still the only legally binding paradigm for solving land disputes. The decision in December was to extend the deadline by another 6 months. However, only the deepest optimist would have thought that a referendum would be held by 31st June 2008.

The fact that Iraq is unwilling to follow democratic principles adopted by a clear majority speaks volumes about the level of mistrust and animosity gripping the national horizon and lack of genuine appetite for egalitarianism. Iraqis should never have allowed the interference of outside parties in internal affairs, let alone that of the UN. Simply, the UN lacks an adequate understanding on the level of differences rooted amidst the socio-political landscape.

The Kurds have never had representation in the UN and have been commonly persecuted while the UN Security Council has taken no action. Whilst 250,000 Kurds were kicked and beaten without remorse from their historical homes, “compromise” was not a word uttered by Baathist forces. Now those same Kurds, wishing to return home, are been told their legally-enshrined demands constitute overreaching and they must compromise.

In tandem with political progress on article 140, even the UN missed their own deadline to table suggestions to Iraqi leaders by weeks. Finally, those widely anticipated suggestions arrived in Baghdad last week.

Even the first phase of a methodology designed as a stepping-stone for dealing with Kirkuk by resolving less-contested areas was met with much apprehension. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) “first analysis” recommended putting Akra and Makhmour districts under Kurdistan Region control and with the districts of al-Hamadaniya and Mandali to be administered by central government.

The recommendations were based on “the administrative history of the areas and the change that have taken place after 2003 March along with the population structure and 2005 elections”. No matter what historical trajectory is analysed, UNAMI suggestions will always be based on approximations, until the people of every town are consulted in true democratic terms. This simply takes the argument a full circle – no technical agreement can formulate an all-encompassing basis for each region without an unambiguous consultation.

The suggestions were almost immediately criticised by Iraqi lawmakers on both sides of the Arab-Kurdish divide. There was general Arab census that the recommendations were “unconstitutional”, complicated the issue and had no legal basis. The Kurds themselves are unlikely to be happy without the prize asset of Kirkuk returning.

For the Kurds, this is a historical juncture. This is a chance to correct the wrongs of the past in a democratic and legal manner. If Kurds were unwilling to compromise in 1975 over Kirkuk, then any deal in the “new” Iraq of 2008 not involving its rightful return would represent a huge setback. The UN is an international yet generic taskforce when it comes to fiercely-contested regional matters. They will adopt a formula to try and please all parties, regardless of the weight of historical argument. If the UN is truly a taskforce capable of ensuring equal rights and safeguarding stability, then Kurdistan would have been independent long-ago.

The UN formula seemingly side-steps the fact that article 140 is synonymous with Kirkuk. A solution to deal with other less-emotive areas under dispute does not alter the picture a great deal.

Recently, Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, stated his administrations willingness for power sharing. If realised, such concessions are likely to be weighted with many caveats. Possibly, for greater compromise by Baghdad on the hydrocarbon-law or the return of all other disputed lands without question. Concessions would give Kurds productive short-term gains as well as a major boost of ties with the Turkish administration, yet the sense of regional defeat may be unavoidable.

Kirkuk has been a historical red-line and remains a future icon of Kurdish prosperity and survival. The will of the majority must not be sacrificed as a political token or gesture.
Regardless, the ticking time-bomb continues its countdown.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

The Enduring US Presence in Iraq

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Long-term US occupation in the “midst of a frail Iraqi landscape” was always likely

As Iraq and the U.S. continue negotiations, long-term strategic ties have never been more critical for both parties.

Five years of a contentious occupation, thousands of US casualties, billions dollars of expenditure, and unabated battles against insurgents mixed with ever-elusive national reconciliation, paints its own picture. 

However, despite the heavy price that the US has continued to pay, their vision of Iraq as a pluralistic, stable and democratic bastion to act as a model for the volatile Middle-East is far from been realised.

In truth, amidst all frequent calls amongst some Iraqi factions, Iraqi neighbours and rivals in the US Senate to end the occupation, the long-term presence of US troops in Iraq has never been more inevitable.

Simply, a significant troop cut let alone complete US withdrawal at the current time would spell disaster. The US is far from executing its project in Iraq and the short-term goals alone may require 7-10 year of active US military presence. Indeed, any hasty withdrawal in the next 24 months would undo much progress that US has painstakingly attained.

The US without a long-term legal foothold in Iraq, is in danger of seeing the pack cards it has implemented with immense sacrifice, topple at a glance.

Critical issues remain as tentative as ever. Despite, the losses inflicted on al-Qaeda and the small but sturdy strides towards national unity, Iraq remains a magnate for foreign terrorists. The general animosity within the patchwork that is Iraq runs high and radical figures continue to execute influence. More importantly, Iran, Syria and its proxy forces throughout the region continue to pose the greatest danger to the strategic-objectives of the US, its national security and to undoing all the hard-work in Iraq.

Declaration of Principles

In late 2007, George Bush and Nouri al-Maliki signed a somewhat controversial “declaration of principles” to serve as a basis for current talks with view to defining the legal basis for the long-term relationship between the two countries.

The proposed agreement to be completed by a deadline of July 31st, is designed to augment the final UN mandate for the presence of multinational forces which expires at the end of 2008.

The framework of the initial deal included the basis for deterring foreign aggression against Iraq, assisting Iraq against terrorism, and encouraging much-needed foreign investment, primarily American, into Iraq.

With an insurgency fuelled by the presence of “foreign occupiers” and a battle, sometimes violently by Iraqi groups to end the occupation, the idea of such a deal naturally caused much of a stir. 

Ongoing Negotiations for Security Agreement

Negotiations have been ongoing between the Bush administration and the government led by Nouri al-Maliki on two key accords, with view to reaching a final framework which will take affect from 2009.

The first accord is referred to as a “status of forces agreement” (or SOFA), which will serve as a legal framework for the status of the US military in Iraq. As part of this accord, it would allow US forces to launch unilateral military operations, to detain Iraqis and would provide immunity to US contractors from Iraqi law.

The scope of agreements on these articles is unclear. Iraq has in the past month, stressed the need for US compromise on “sensitive issues”.

Although, it is was agreed that specific troop numbers will not be stipulated as part of any accord, it is expected that negotiations will indirectly determine how many of the existing 160,000 troops will remain in Iraq. Giving the current plight of the Iraqi government and future reliance of Iraqi forces, it is likely that at least 50,000 troops will be needed in the years to come. As such, it is unlikely that the agreements will contain timetables for the withdrawal of US forces, which is sure to fuel sentiments in some Iraqi circles.

The second agreement is seen as a long-term “strategic framework”, which will outline US cooperation in the key fields of security, politics, culture and economy.

It is widely believed that the Iraqi government accepted the accord on the basis of certain conditions. The US would need to recognise Iraqi right to secure deals with other countries, US should avoid using Iraqi territories for military campaigns and no large scale bases should be established.

In the coming years it is likely that the US troops will be out-of the public limelight but will serve to support and train Iraqi troops.

Permanent Bases

The idea and in-turn definition of ‘permanent bases’ has caused much debate. The majority of Iraqis have frequently objected to the idea of a full-time military presence in Iraq.

However, although a much looser definition of the word ‘permanent’ will be adopted in the agreements, in all likelihood the agreements that both sides hope to sign envisage just that.

In the same manner as Japan and South Korea in the past, it is unlikely that the US would have cut all its military ties in Iraq and withdrawn all forces. In fact, for the US it would have been a little short of strategic suicide.

Despite, the US seemingly in search of an exit strategy once Iraq has stabilised and democracy has been established, in reality US dreams in Iraq, let alone the Middle East, will take decades.

The US was never likely to wash its hands all together. Iraq is part of a wider picture that is crucial for long-term security and regional stability. Giving the scenario that US forces leave, in the current climate with sectarian tensions high and lack of a strong national army, Iranian agents would have a field day. The country will be at the mercy of its neighbours, with Turkish aggression only exasperated in the north and Syrian elements keen to complement Sunni influence.

US backing in the long-term is intended as a message to neighbouring countries that the US sees Iraq as a vital factor in regional stability. However, the risk is that this will induce a vicious cycle – the US are in Iraq to keep Iranians and other foreign forces in check, whilst foreign agents will not leave Iraq until such Western “occupation” has ended.

Even if no military presence was advocated in the rest of Iraq, in the Kurdistan Region the idea of fermenting long-term US bases would have been highly-popular and a strong possibility. The Kurds strongly encourage US presence and protection, to safeguard their hard-fought gains.

Iraqi Objections

Unsurprisingly, the onset of such deals with the Americans was bitterly opposed in some Iraqi circles. The idea of a long-term US presence, for groups such as the Sadr Movement who based their following on ending foreign occupation, is a testimony to their claims that US wants to “colonise” Iraq.

It seen as a move that would violate the countries sovereignty and would put the country under de-facto US hegemony.

Senior clerics, including Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Haeri and Iraq’s most revered Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have strongly objected to a ‘security accord’ between the US and Iraq. According to some sources, the Grand Ayatollah has insisted he would not allow Iraq to sign such a deal with “the US occupiers” as long as he was alive.

The Sadr movement, fresh from deadly battles against government forces, accused the government of unnecessarily turning Iraq in a battle front with many countries.

Objections at Home

The elusive battle for stability and success in Iraq has turned Iraq as a centre stage for growing US public discontent. Clearly, the presidential race has been by-far dominated by the Iraq war blamed on sky-high fuel prices and economic recession.

With President Bush under the firing line for tying the hands of the next administration by passing his mistakes, the long-term arrangements have been criticised by Democrats and some Republicans and raised fear amongst the public.

Although the deals, claimed as ‘non-binding’ by the Bush administration, are within the executive powers of the president, congressional Democrats have called for Senate ratification.

U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker moved to dampen fears by describing the framework as a “political document” and reassuring Congress that they will be fully briefed on all negotiations.

The Bush administration have emphasised, that any deal will not tie the next US administration or commit the US to defend Iraq, as either side could cancel the deal at any time.

However, some members of Congress, criticised the administration for making obligations without understanding the consequences of not fulfilling assurances, regardless of whether they are legally binding.

Conclusion

Despite the focus and controversy such security deals may receive, in reality it was a necessity for both the US administration and particularly the new Iraq.

Although, conspiracy theorists will be working overtime, long-term US occupation in the midst of a frail Iraqi landscape, the current regional mire and the greater US Middle-Eastern project, was always very likely.

Although, the US have tried to played down the agreement by pledging it will not stipulate specific U.S. troop numbers or “permanent” military bases, reality and not definition of terms, will determine their future role in Iraq.

With an already volatile and disenchanted nation who has suffered immensely, the provisions of the agreements were always going to be introduced with a degree of ambiguity, as transparency would have fuelled an outcry at the worst possible time for the Iraq regime.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Sadr City at peace… for now

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After weeks of intense fighting in the Shiite district of Sadr City in eastern Baghdad, the Iraqi government and forces of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr reached a jittery truce, believed to have been brokered with the mediation of Iran.

The bloody conflict was a byproduct of a highly contentious crackdown on Shiite militias by the Iraqi government that began in Basra in late March.

The deadly street-to-street fighting, aided by U.S. firepower, proved costly for both sides. Weeks of fighting led to hundreds of deaths, countless wounded, and a population of over 2 million largely isolated and without basic commodities.

Under the ceasefire between the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and the Sadrist bloc, a list of 14 points were agreed upon, which in essence gave both sides much-needed breathing space in a rapidly unpopular encounter.

After a period of hostility post-2003, the Sadrists were initially swayed into the political fold and formed a shaky alliance with other majority Shiite powers, but later boycotted their six ministerial positions.

The Mehdi Army, which in the past has waged fierce battles against U.S. forces on a number of occasions, has enjoyed a mostly unchallenged role in the new Iraq as the Shiite-dominated government is weary of inducing Shiite-on-Shiite violence while reliant upon the Sadrist bloc in the ruling coalition. Unfortunately, the long-term dilemma of dealing with the Mehdi Army was only delayed.

The controversial ideals of al-Sadr and his bitter stance toward the U.S. presence in Iraq have often proved a nasty thorn in an already-fractious political landscape. The decision by the Iraqi government to launch operation ‘Knights Assault’ was formulated for a number of key reasons.

With the Sadrist movement enjoying substantial influence in the Shiite south, Nouri al-Maliki’s tough approach was designed to undermine the group with the pivotal upcoming provincial elections in October fast approaching.

The well-armed Mehdi Army is widely known to receive training, arms, and funding from Tehran. With an Iranian regime intent on derailing U.S. forces, a proxy war has been raging in Iraq. Efforts by Baghdad to drive out al-Sadr, under pressure from the U.S. administration, is designed to send a warning message to Iran and show that Baghdad will no longer tolerate free spirits hampering national reconciliation.

As al-Maliki launched his assault on outlaws and militias to many a surprise, it introduced much hope that Baghdad may finally have the valor to deal with core issues.

Al-Sadr’s form of Shiite radicalism coupled with Arab nationalism has often formed a political barrier. Sidelining al-Sadr from the political fold may consolidate support of Kurds, whose key demands of federalism and a referendum on Kirkuk was heavily opposed by the Shiite cleric.

On their part, Sunnis naturally welcomed the advent of an impartial administration. The Sunnis have often complained of a lack of protection and bias from a largely Shiite security force. Such a move is seen as vital to strengthening the political arm of the administration.

However, contrary to the new atmosphere of optimism, the recent battles have also highlighted the fractious nature of the armed forces. With Iraqi armed forces dominated by Shiites and pockets of al-Sadr sympathizers, hundreds of troops deserted fighting on the first day in Basra alone.

Although the crackdown was a positive turning point, it also highlighted that Iraq was not ready to fight its own battles and was forced to rely on indirect U.S. airpower to overcome militants.

The cease-fire may also in essence reflect the fact that the Iraqi army, which only just launched a crucial new offensive in Mosul against al-Qaeda militants, is unable to fight on multiple fronts.

In Sadr City, an ever-present battleground, sporadic clashes continued. Further suffering will unfortunately persist regardless of any truce. Militias continue to act as a time bomb, which will take more than weeks of infighting to clear. In either case, however deadly, Baghdad may have no choice but to carry on the battle if Iraq, let alone the U.S., can escape the current quagmire.

The U.S. surge, which has resulted in greater security, is owed to a large extent to the cease-fire declared previously by the Mehdi Army, and long-term peace is tied to the fate of Sadrist forces.

Whether the new calm is a result of the deadly storm or just a deadly calm before a new storm is open to debate. A revered religious figurehead or a 60,000-strong militia cannot be dislodged all too easily.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

The Countdown to the Inheritance of Bush’s Headache

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It is proving for the US that one man can take a horse to water but a thousand can’t make him drink. 

Five years of a conflict with seemingly no end-sight has taken its toll. With the cost of operations in Iraq at $10billion a month, a US economy in recession, rocketing fuel prices, over 4000 US casualties and protracted political progress in Iraq, disgruntled voices in the Senate and general US public are understandably growing by the day.

Much like their Iraqi counterparts in their transition to democracy, the US has often taken one step forward and two steps back. This view was reinforced after President Bush as widely expected announced his intention to freeze troop withdrawals from July and allow senior commander General David Petraeus time to evaluate and assess the next steps.

With Petraeus unwilling to commit on troop numbers and Bush’s wait and see approach, it is apparent that at least under his presidential tenure, Bush has no strategy for ending America’s highly contentious and costly involvement in Iraq.  

The Democrats have accused Bush of handing over the headache to the next president by side-stepping tough decisions. The announcement to halt troop drawdown means that US troop levels will remain above 140,000 well into 2009 at the minimum. Although Democrat-presidential hopefuls Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton have signalled their intention to withdraw as soon as feasible, the next administrations hands may well have been tied for the foreseeable future.

Even in the face of other critical concerns at home headed by looming economic recession, it is easy to see why Iraq has dominated the presidential race.

Bush may well be executing his own exit strategy as he hailed a “major strategic shift” in Iraq.  Bush’s stance was notably more encouraging than that of Petraeus and Crocker, as he delivered an upbeat speech pointing out to military, political and economic progress in Iraq.

However, although the surge has reaped dividends in Iraq, the ultimate goal of political reconciliation in Iraq has been instigated at a leisurely pace. Whilst the US has too-often hailed what has been achieved, the emptier half of the glass is of far greater weighting. Key benchmarks such as a representative national government, oil sharing and provincial powers are proving as elusive as ever. On the ground, reconstruction is slow and heavily reliant on US funding.

As Bush may have tied the hands of the next administration, Baghdad has effectively tied the hands of Bush.   The Iraqi military, riven by sectarianism, is still heavily reliant on the US and unable to function effectively as a ‘central’ force. Meanwhile, the fractious Iraqi political landscape is plagued by common mistrust with the cancerous influence of numerous militias proving a major time-bomb. Recent violence in Basra only highlighted the tentative and volatile climate in Iraq.

Violence has certainly dropped and al-Qaeda has taken a major blow, thanks largely to the onset of Sunni councils. However, this may yet haunt Iraq in the future if Sunni demands for a bigger slice of the political cake are not fulfilled.

Petraeus has warned that any hasty pullout would undercut security, while the US institute for Peace claiming “the U.S. is no closer to being able to leave Iraq than it was a year ago”, warned of mass chaos and genocide in such an eventuality.

While more troops can enforce valuable security, at the end of the day any sacrifice is in vain if Iraqis do not capitalise on the windows of opportunity afforded. Even with all the time and money in the world, the appetite of the Iraqi factions for reconciliation and compromise, is far more empowering than the might of any army.

If the current US vision of a democratic, prosperous and peaceful Iraq is to be realised, one can forget withdrawal in the next 10 years. Ominously, even then such full US-engagement may prove inconclusive or even powerless to avoid civil war.

The only way the US can withdraw in the next 1-2 years is to implement a drastically fuzzier interpretation of “success”, then possibly opt to allow nature to run its course in Iraq. Bush may be accused of creating the current mayhem in Iraq, but in reality they only lifted the unceremonious lid. Iraq’s problems are far more deep-rooted and artificial. Century’s old sectarian and ethnic tension can not be papered over by Western values.

If the Iraqis do not advocate the same ideals, the US can dream all it likes. 

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

‘Time for Realism’ But is it Really the Kurds in Need of a Reality Check?

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Evidently, the Kurds have excelled under de-facto autonomy since 2003, whilst the rest of Iraq has been in turmoil and insurgency. However, it is often forgotten that Kurds have been practicing self-rule and increasing prosperity since 1991. Kurds chose to rejoin Iraq under a ‘voluntary’ union, whilst inheriting their pre-2003 status.

Depending on your source of news and political oratory, Kurds may be portrayed as a rather small rebellious group that has consumed more than its entitlement and has made unlawful gains whilst subsequently blocking national reconciliation. Common reference to ‘time for Kurdish realism’, Kurdish unilateralism, overreaching, land grabbing and disproportionate share of power, portrays a rather indifferent, greedy, inconsiderate and outrageous picture of the Kurds. 

Perhaps, neighbours, politicians and foreign analysts, simply fail to observe eight decades of Kurdish history let alone the rich-history and culture dating back thousands of years. Admittedly, the rise to prominence is unparalleled in a remarkable short period of time in comparison to their lost and neglected existence for several decades before that. However, by no means should a tale of rags-to-the-riches be perceived as over-ambitious tendencies or overreaching.

The Kurds were harshly treated as second-class citizens and obstacles to the ideals of successive regimes. Neighbours Iran and Turkey and other Kurdish critics with their own agendas, should take note that the real parties in need of a reality check are not the Kurds. Days of denials, systematic persecution and crimes against humanity in the knowledge that the world would turn a blind eye is over.

Clearly the Kurds are reaching a critical conjecture in their history. After enduring decades of pain and sacrifice to rewrite partial wrongs and misfortunes of history, the Kurds must do all they can to patiently safeguard their historical gains and strategic standing. Swaying to the pressure and unjust rhetoric of Arabs, Turks and the like may well set the Kurds back decades more.

This is an opportunity for the Kurds via democratic and diplomatic means, in true contrast to their oppressors, correct the wrongs of the past and stand-up to chauvinism, aggression and belittling by other nationalists in the region.

Kurds must not allow foreign parties to dictate their fortune and destiny once more or be used as pawns in the greater schemes of global powers. This is nothing short of political suicide.

In Iraq, where the Kurds control the only stable, prosperous and peaceful part of the country, Arab Sunnis and Shiites after battling each other relentlessly for years, are now slowly uniting against the Kurds.

With a political memorandum issued by Arabs parties, the aim was clearly to halt Kurdish gains and impede their ‘overreaching’. A normalisation of Kirkuk, jurisdiction over oil, distribution of budget and regional authority had all been key conditions for Kurdish coalitions in government. Baghdad has been dragging its feet for years over Kirkuk and now Baghdad’s self-imposed actions that culminated in the missed referendum in 2007, are been used to annul article 140 of the constitution.

Reversal of past policies and crimes is the first litmus test of whether Arab mentalities really have changed or democracy can really be achieved. However, rather than stick to constitutional principles, Baghdad and their neighbours are simply looking at the unilateral aspect of Kurds inheriting oil in Kirkuk. Oil or no oil, money should not tamper the rights of inhabitants to return to the homes of their fore-fathers and to decide their fate.

The Iraqi flag imposed by Baathist leaders should have been the first to change and not grudgingly in 2008. After all it is the very symbol of a country. Yet more strikingly, the Iraqi national budget continues to remain stalled due yet again to a perception of transgression of boundaries by Kurds.

Disputes over provisional powers and rights of regions to explore oil, are again designed to put a spanner in Kurdish advancement. Clearly, Baghdad is now deflecting the blame for a lack of national reconciliation onto ‘uncompromising’ Kurds.

Ironically, as Kurds should be commended for their hard-fought gains, democracy, economy and a model of religious tolerance, they are been harshly judged as overstepping the mark.

Anywhere else, rectifying wrongs of the past, embarking on economic achievements and prominence against remarkable odds would be applauded, however clearly this would not happen in Iraq or neighbouring countries, only simply because in this instance it is the ‘impudent’ Kurds who stand to endure benefit and prosperity.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Hewler Post (Kurdish), Peyamner, Various Misc.