Category Archives: Iraq

Maliki’s economic siege of Kurdistan shows that the only true friend of the region is the Kurds himself

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As the Erbil-Baghdad crisis reached new lows, Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani warned that the actions of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki amounted to “a declaration of war against the people of Kurdistan.”

With an increasingly independent oil infrastructure, all that remains between practical independence is control of oil revenues. Baghdad knows this very well and has displayed this leverage it still possess by refusing to pay share of Kurdistan national budget and even refusing to let two small airlines operate from Kurdistan, until Kurdistan agrees to Baghdad control of revenues.

This shows that while the rise of Kurdistan, particularly since 2003 has been phenomenal, until the Kurds can truly control their own destiny and become self-sufficient, they will always be at the mercy of Iraqi and regional rulers.

The famous Kurdish saying once reverberated that “Kurds have no friends but the mountains”. While this saying doesn’t hold true as before, after all there are dozens of consulates, hundreds of foreign companies and several oil majors operating in a booming area with Kurdistan enjoying growing strategic importance, it does remind the Kurds to keep their guard up, not take anything for granted and hold the view that the first friend and guardian is the Kurd himself.

This is certainly true of ties with the US, who under Barrack Obama has not only taken a step back but has hastily retreated from Iraq and the region. As events in 1975 and 1991 have shown the Kurds, US foreign policy (and indeed foreign policy in general) can be fickle and cruel.

Kurds sought strong ties with Washington and the US was all for working with the Kurds but with their focus on Iraqi sovereignty and not alienating or upsetting Baghdad. The US is no stranger to resolving many crises since 2003, many with the help of the Kurds, but has stayed out of recent disputes between Erbil and Baghdad even as the Maliki’s economic siege on Kurdistan threatens the livelihood of Kurdish families and the region.

The Kurds believed that the strategic relationship with the US was there to stay but ironically Washington hasn’t even removed the KDP and PUK from their terror list. With an obsession of keeping a united Iraq, the US has grown uneasy at the new closeness between Erbil and Ankara – yet they initially encouraged stronger ties after years of tension and mistrust between the two sides.

As for Baghdad, the Kurds regrettably endorsed a second term for Maliki in 2010 in spite of numerous failed promises. The fact that many of the 19 points of the Erbil Agreement that allowed Maliki to come to power remain unresolved tells its own story.

With the Iraqi elections just months away, Maliki wants new leverage among defiant Sunnis and disenchanted Shiites and the show of strength against the Kurds is one tactic. But let it be no doubt that sooner or later, Maliki will need the Kurds and once he has finished his sabre-rattling, he has to reconcile with the Kurds and seek a resolution for the current crisis.

In return, Maliki is attempted to politically blackmail the Kurds into a third term. But the Kurds have to wisely avoid repeating the mistake of trusting Maliki or any other power in Baghdad.

The Kurds must show that they are not at the mercy of Baghdad, if Maliki wants to play hardball and hold the region to ransom, then the Kurds must have and play their own card and leverage.

Kurdistan can ill-afford to have their future tied to the goodwill of Baghdad but even that of Ankara and Tehran.  The Kurds have had their rights and a freedom abused and withheld and 2014 is not the time, with the Kurdish national renaissance and newfound prominence, to be revisiting days of hold.

This is all the more reason for Kurdish leaders to finally form an elusive new cabinet, work in unity and put aside individual interest for the sake of the greater nation – after all, if the Kurds won’t help themselves, then certainly external forces cannot be trusted to come to their rescue.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Kurdish oil rift with Baghdad – not just a case of economy but political leverage and autonomy

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The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi federal government after months of negotiations failed to find a breakthrough over the issues of oil exports from Kurdistan, revenue sharing and the national budget.

The KRG was quick to refute claims by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister for energy Hussain al-Shahristani that Kurdistan had agreed to exports via SOMO, the federal government marketing vehicle. KRG spokesman Safeen Dizayee quickly downplayed such claims, “absolutely we have not reached any agreement to export oil via SOMO. The dialogue and discussions are still underway”.

Ahead of the all-important Iraqi national elections this year, Baghdad has politicised the issue of oil exports and withheld the Kurdish share of the federal budget as a show of strength.

Ultimately, it doesn’t come down to money and economics but down to control, autonomy and lack of trust. One must not forget that under the Iraqi constitution Kurdistan is only entitled to receive 17% of the budget. If 300,000 bdp or so has caused so much tension then imagine when it rises to 400,000 bpd and then the more ambitious targets set by Kurdistan of 1 million bdp by 2015 and 2 million by 2019.

Iraq reaps the benefit of over two-thirds of Kurdish output. Ironically, this is the same oil that Baghdad never really knew Kurdistan even had and is a lucrative bonus for Baghdad. The vast majority of the reserves discovered in Kurdistan have come in the period after 2003.

Does Baghdad rejoice that the national reserves have been boosted to such a large extent by Kurdish discoveries? Quite the opposite. Such discoveries have been met with doubt, lack of trust, threats and rifts. Why? Because such discoveries are literally the fuel for Kurdish independence and Baghdad loses one of the remaining nooses over the region.

What control would Baghdad have remaining on the region if they could export their own oil and receive funds in a non-Baghdad controlled bank account and actually receive much more than they ever could painstakingly get from Baghdad?

Hence, the new independent Kurdish pipeline to Turkey and the fact that 400,000 bpd is merely waiting to be sold at Ceyhan sent Baghdad’s anxiety into overdrive.

In reality, Baghdad would agree too many Kurdish terms. As already mentioned, they serve to receive the greater benefit anyway – just as long as Baghdad’s control is not compromised.

As we have seen with the failure to pay salaries and provide the regions share of the budget, Baghdad wants to be controlling the political shots. As long as Baghdad retains the upper-hand then Kurdistan will be under the mercy of Baghdad.

It came as no surprise that the Iraqi Finance Ministry has warned that it could not pay Kurdish salaries unless the region resumed oil exports. Of course, Baghdad will not have a “face a liquidity crisis” as they claim if they paid from such huge funds under their control. This is just for political leverage.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, wants to force the KRG into a deal. Withholding salaries or creating crisis in Kurdistan is a form of political blackmail to put the heat on the Kurds.

This is where the ironic twist only intensifies. There is literally millions of dollar worth of Kurdish oil ready to be sold and yet the Kurds do not have funds to pay their own salaries?

Turkey recently reaffirmed its commitment to the symbolic energy deals with the Kurds. The Kurds cannot continue to be bullied over what is their national treasure.

What Iraqi oil funds did Saddam use to build Kurdistan and boost its infrastructure? Actually, it used the oil funds to destroy Kurdistan and kill Kurds. Now, in the Iraqi democratic age, the Kurds are expected to handover Kurdish oil to boost Iraq.

This is a defining moment in Kurdish history. The Kurds dare not succumb to the wills of Baghdad again. The Kurds have played a role in the creation of the Maliki hand. After dozens of failed promises, they must think twice before any post-election agreement or future concessions in Baghdad.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Familiar dispute over Iraqi federal budget in 2014 but the Kurds are armed with new leverage

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Perennial disputes over the Iraqi federal budget between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad are almost expected.  According to the Iraqi constitution, the Kurdistan Region is entitled to a 17% share, but Kurds argue this is never the true figure.

It was hardly surprising therefore that the Iraqi cabinet recently passed a budget bill in spite of Kurdish withdrawal and rejection.  This scenario is no different to the previous year when the cabinet again approved the budget without the consent of the Kurds, before it was later approved in parliament.

The 2014 bill sets the KRG a lofty target of 400,000 barrels per day and insists that all revenues are sent to Baghdad, threatening to cut the KRG share of the federal budget otherwise.

On the surface, Baghdad is continuing in its ethos of calling the shots, setting the expectations and a threatening rhetoric against the Kurds. However, the 2014 budget is drafted and passed with the new Ankara-Erbil oil contracts and new independent Kurdish pipelines firmly in mind.

Baghdad has been ratcheting the rhetoric against both Kurdistan and Ankara in recent weeks with Abdul Kareem Luaibi, Iraqi Oil Minister, even stating that the government was preparing legal action against Turkey and would blacklist companies implicating in such agreement without the consent of Baghdad.

Baghdad has already summoned Turkish consul in Baghdad to voice their displeasure and accused Turkey of preventing Iraqi oil ministry representatives of supervising exports at Ceyhan.

Luaibi further threatened to boycott Turkish companies and cancel contracts if oil exports went ahead. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki had already threatened to cut Kurdistan’s share of the federal budget if oil exports via Turkey went ahead.

Exports from Kurdistan in recent years have been stop-start to say the least owed to frequent disputes with Baghdad over payment of expenses to oil companies and share of revenues.

The current budget dispute may be along familiar lines but is certainly against a fresh backdrop. Kurdistan has new options and new leverage to use against the government. Its capacity from new oil pipelines are set to rapidly increase and before long Kurdistan could receive a lot more from their own revenue sources than Baghdad could ever give via the 17% share.

This new arrow in the Kurdish bow empowers the Kurds to have control over the destiny.  KRG deputy finance minister, Rashid Tahir, warned that “action begets reaction; if Baghdad cuts the budget then KRG…the Kurdish leadership will make their own decision.”

 

Exports from crude through the new pipeline were on track to start by the end of month and KRG were inviting bidders to register with Kurdistan Oil Marketing Organisation and not the State Oil Marketing Organisation as demanded by Baghdad.

What would KRG do if Baghdad cut their share of the budget, failed to pay Peshmerga salaries or amounts due to foreign oil companies? Simple – they deduct owed amounts from revenues set to go to Baghdad.

It remains to be seen how Turkey would react to prospect of lawsuits from Baghdad, but Turkey is already neck deep in Kurdistan with billions of dollars of trade and is not about to abandon the KRG. It knew the drawbacks of upsetting Baghdad, strategic repercussions and is aware of the hand afforded to the Kurds with the new ventures.

However, growing economic, political and strategic ties with Kurdistan is win-win for Turkey.  Ankara realises that ultimately the independence dream of Kurdistan cannot be held-back or ignored forever, but it serves to gain, not lose from the Kurdish national renaissance.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Kurdistan to Maliki – your last (last) chance?

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As Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki landed in Erbil to chair a rare but symbolic meeting of the Iraqi cabinet in the Kurdish capital and discuss a number of issues with the Kurdish leadership, expectations appeared high.

However, Maliki has shown political shrewdness when backed against a corner in the past, making concessions, striking agreements, renewing promises and proposing committees when the heat has been on, only to prove that rhetoric prevailed over real action and practical steps.

A delegation to Baghdad led by Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani in May culminated in a decision to form seven committees all geared towards addressing specific issues between Kurdistan and Baghdad which also ended the boycott of Kurdish MPs in Baghdad.

The committees, to be directly by Maliki and Barzani, include ones to oversee reviews of the federal budget, draft oil and gas law, article 140 and overseeing of parliamentary work and Baghdad and Erbil relations.

Kurdistan Massaud Barzani emphasized that the latest round of negotiations are a final chance and that Kurdistan will be forced to seek a “new form of relations” with the central government in Baghdad if negotiations fail to resolve key disputes.

The issues between the KRG and Baghdad have become so deep-rooted, cyclic and predictable that it is hard to see why this time around will be any different.

The Kurdistan leadership has played a role in reaching the current predicament and the lack of progress on historic issues such as disputed terrotories. KRG has rubber-stamped two terms of power for Maliki in return for strategic partnerships.

Yet several years since the first Iraqi elections and over 10 years since the liberation of Iraq, the strategic agreements have not been fully implemented and if anything disputes have become more protracted, entrenched and distant from resolution. Kurdistan should have given a “last chance” to Maliki and Baghdad many years ago.

Maliki was accused of centralist tendencies, inciting sectarian tensions and foot-dragging on constitutional implementation in his first term of power, never mind the second term (or even in a third term if he gets his way).

The relations between Erbil and Baghdad have been shrouded by formation of committees, agreements and political road-maps. But how many more meetings and committees do the Kurd want to participate in?

Kirkuk and disputed territories is a prime example. It is understandable if there are technical delays to implementing complex constitutional articles. But should there be a delay of several months or 6 years? And since there were delays, any sincere government would adopt a plan to meet its legal obligations in the quickest possible time.

This is the same for hydrocarbon law which has gathered dust since 2007, status of Peshermrga forces, national budget etc. In the case of Kirkuk, even a national census, delayed on so many occasions, would have at least marked one achievement. Even that has been sidelined as Baghdad knows it would serve as a de-facto referendum on disputed territories.

Now is the time for practical steps and firm timelines for implementation of issues by the Kurdistan leadership. Until Baghdad resolves disputed territories, KRG and Peshmerga forces have the right to jointly govern and control these regions.

The bitter Sunni protests and the latest cycle of sectarian violence has redrawn sharp lines between Shiites and Sunni and coupled with sectarian polarisation in the wider region, may prove to be even greater than peaks reached in 2007.

Maliki can ill-afford to carry on antagonising ever corner of Iraq (including his own Shiite alliance) and for Iraqi Kurds the time is ripe to seek real concessions. If Baghdad refused to succumb to Kurdish demands when it is at its knees, it will never implement agreements at its peak.

The recent provincial elections only served to highlight the deepening polarisation of the county and weak political picture. Forming a new government and choosing a Prime Minister after elections in 2014 will prove as daunting as ever.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Kurdish oil exports, one remaining Baghdad noose that Kurds must break

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The latest action by the Iraqi parliament to pass the national 2013 budget despite a boycott by Kurdish MPs is just the tip of the ice-berg in Iraq.

Tensions have been brewing to dangerous levels between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad for some time and the lack of real intent to mend bridges and cool tensions is testament to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s reluctance to enact a government of partnership and to pursue national reconciliation.

Fast approaching a decade since the liberation of Iraq and the fragmented Iraqi horizon, continuously poisoned by common distrust, lack of unity and lack of true compromise, continues to blight Iraqi society in 2013 much in the same way as it did in 2003.

Maliki’s growing authoritarian policies and the latest decision to pass the budget without Kurdish involvement and approval may have severely irked the Kurds, but it’s wrong to focus merely on the Erbil-Baghdad divide as the source of Iraqi troubles.

The majority of MPs from al-Iraqiya had also boycotted the budget vote and the coalition and power sharing agreement in Baghdad has all but evaporated. Tensions with long-time disaffected Sunnis, greatly encouraged by the Syrian Sunni ascendancy to power, is steadily gathering pace and Sunni demonstrations since the back-end of 2012 still run rife in Sunni strongholds with protestor deaths at the hands of predominantly Shiite forces adding fuel to the fire. Even Shiites within the State of Law, including influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, have expressed concern.

Finance minister Rafa al-Essawi and agriculture minister Izzeddin al-Dolah are two high-profile Sunni resignations in recent weeks over the current protests.

Kurdish ire

The strong Kurdish reaction to the passing of budget in Baghdad was understandable.

With only 168 out of 325 MPs present due to the boycott, the bill may have been passed due to a “technicality” with a thin majority obtained but not involving the Kurds who are such vital components of the coalition and in the union with Iraq is a dangerous development.

Oil sharing and foreign oil contracts are not new bones of contention between the Kurds and Baghdad. Oil exports in Kurdistan have been very much stop-start for a number of years. The source of discontent in the 2013 budget was the amount set aside to pay oil companies in Kurdistan, with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) insisting it is owed $3.5 billion for costs accumulated by foreign oil companies over the past 3 years whilst Baghdad has allotted only $644.33 million in the latest budget.

This issue was one of the main reasons the 2013 budget was not ratified although the Iraqi cabinet approved the budget in October.

The frequent theme from Baghdad over the past several years is that oil contracts signed by KRG are illegal, in spite of the stipulations afforded in the national constitution. Therefore it is hardly surprising that Baghdad continues a hard-handed approach in dealing with the oil sharing issue. Ironically, passing a national hydrocarbon law gathering dust since 2007 that would end all disputes is not even seen as an immediate priority.

The State of Law had argued that Kurds were not entitled to compensation as they had not contributed their fair share to national exports.

As Kurds have insisted for years, any revenue from oil exports in Kurdistan will go to a central pot where Kurds will take their allotted share. Narrow-minded political goals in Baghdad, has failed to realise that a strong oil industry in Kurdistan is a bonus for all Iraqis. Baghdad may have costs of foreign oil companies to cover but what about the billions of surplus revenue that follows? Anyone would think Baghdad is taking a financial loss in dealing with Kurdish oil.

Budget imbalance

Baghdad has continuously refused to pay Peshmerga costs which are stipulated in the constitution. Yet it has been paying salaries of Sahwa Council Sunni militia for a number of years to appease Sunnis and has even increased their salaries in this year’s budget to try and dampen Sunni demonstrations.

Furthermore, whilst Kurdistan develops at a rapid pace but fails to receive fair share of revenues it needs, the province of Nineveh failed to spend around $6 billion of its $10 billion share in the 2012 budget. There is a similar pattern in other provinces.

Next steps for the Kurds

Undoubtedly, the budget issue will make prospects of reconciliation worse between Erbil and Baghdad. The continued halt of oil exports by Kurdistan may seem logical, but it’s counter-productive as Kurdistan needs to press-ahead with its oil industry and economic growth.

The KRG oil ministry confirmed it will not send any agreed quantities of oil unless Baghdad pays the relevant costs to foreign companies.

Control of oil exports is one remaining noose that Baghdad has around the Kurds. If the Kurds have an independent oil infrastructure and an oil pipeline purely on Kurdish soil, it greatly diminishes Baghdad’s bargaining power.

Kurdistan has greatly flourished in recent years whilst the south continues to lag behind, do the Kurds continue with ties in Baghdad or take unilateral measures in deciding national interests?

It begs the question of whether Baghdad sees the Kurds as true partners and looks to Kurdish achievements as an achievement for all of Iraq or does it want to see Kurdistan undermined, regress and stagnate? The Kurds would say recent disputes over Dijla Operations Command, halting of oil exports and now the national budget answers that question.

Baghdad has been intent on scaring oil companies from working in Kurdistan for a while. Giving the option to oil companies of either “us or them” is anything but the tone of partnership.

Kurdistan needs to break that noose, develop an independent oil pipeline and accumulate revenues directly and pay foreign companies from their own budget.

This stance was also suggested by Iraqi Kurdish MP Muhsin al-Saadoun as a measure against the federal government for side-lining the Kurds.

Naturally, Maliki led coalition hit back by threatening to deduct Kurdistan Region’s share of the federal budget.

Either way, something has to give and inaction by the Kurdish leadership is a non-starter. Kurdistan must ensure the destiny of Kurdish affairs is determined by Kurdish hands.

What real benefit have the Kurds ever received from Iraq’s immense oil wealth since Iraq’s creation? Now Kurdish oil must be the source of Kurdistan’s prosperity and to give back to its long-time suffering people and should not be viewed as somewhat of a curse.

Other issues

The Shiite-government announcement of the formation of a new military force under the name of the “al-Jazeera and Badiya Force” situated in the disputed city of Sinjar, which borders Syria is yet another confrontational step by Maliki. A pro-Assad Baghdad is vying for control of its Syrian borders, possibly due to pressure from Iran, with signs this week that the violence is spilling across the border. Kurds have a far different view of Assad and are unlikely to relinquish border control in their own territories to propel Baghdad’s goals in Syria.

Baghdad decision not to pay foreign companies could well be a punishment for Kurdistan’s growing partnership with Turkey and its anti-Assad stance.

Since Maliki assumed a second term in office, Iraq has been in decline. With Sunni’s growing boldness in standing-up to Shiite dominance, who will be around to broker the next government or mediate between Sunnis and Shiites? It certainly won’t be the Kurds.

A previous statement by Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani summed up current sentiments, “Iraq’s citizens are simply tired of Baghdad’s … language of threat and intimidation, which in the cynical pursuit of narrow political agendas only serves to create division and strife.”

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Sunni protests in Iraq reopen sectarian wounds and historic fault lines

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The elusive quest of enticing the disenfranchised Sunni population after the fall of Saddam Hussein plagued the Iraqi transition to democracy. The brutal civil war that peaked between 2006-2007 centred on the failure to reconcile with Sunnis and bring them into the political fold after Shiite supremacy replaced decades of Sunni rule almost overnight. The sectarian bloodshed may have declined dramatically from its peak, but realities were merely masked and the political picture never really changed.

The lack of Sunni power in government and their bitter political decline coincided with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s drive to monopolise power, break an already fragile political framework and initiate drums of war against the Kurds.

The Arab Spring has transformed the Middle Eastern political climate, and emboldened by the rise of Sunnis in Syria, Iraqi Sunnis see this as a chance to ignite their own spring and wrest control from Iranian backed Shiite domination of power.

Sentiments around lack of Sunni power in Baghdad have been worsened by Maliki’s failure to deliver basic services, improve living conditions and address high unemployment. Iraq has immense natural resources and a relatively high national budget, yet much of southern Iraq has languished behind.

Mass demonstrations continued in Sunni dominated parts of Iraqi, including in al-Anbar, a hub of the Sunni population and indeed the vicious civil war that beset Iraq. Other provinces that witnessed protests were Salahaddin, Nineveh and Anbar with the cities of Fallujah, Tikrit, Ramadi and Mosul taking center stage.  While the recent wave of protests may be new, Sunni disgruntlement is anything but that.

Sunni passions and anger were evident merely months after the withdrawal of US forces, with the arrest warranty of Sunni Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, attempts to stifle Sunni Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq and more recently the raid and arrest of body guards of Rafie al-Issawi, Iraq’s Finance Minister.

Sunnis clearly perceive anti-terror laws as orchestrated to diminish their power and see the Shiite dominated security forces as sectarian biased.

As the intensity of Sunni demonstrations and its inevitable manipulation by extremists and Baathists increase, so does it role in shattering any chance of reconciliation in the government’s present form. Depending on the response of the Iraq security forces and any hard-handed attempts by Maliki to quell the protests, it may well put Iraq back to square one.

Maliki’s coalition has shown willingness to dissolve parliament and embark upon new elections to coincide with provincial elections in April. However, this is not the real solution nor will it sufficiently appease Sunnis or Kurds for that matter. Iraq has now held a number of milestone elections yet the same problems have continued to hound the Iraqi political landscape.

New elections will not dilute Shiite political domination as the major components of Iraq, nor will it address the age-old question of how to share power in a way that will appease Kurds, Sunni and Shiites. The record time taken to form the present government says it all.

Sunnis, who largely boycotted the first elections, were never happy with the outcome of the second as it meant playing second fiddle to Maliki once more. Far from enacting the Erbil Agreement and power sharing principles, Maliki assigned to himself a number of powerful “caretaker” positions and distrust with al-Iraqiya only depended.

One result is certain, unless Iraqi politics take a drastic turn for the better and Shiite and Sunni moderates as well as U.S. and foreign allies mediate effectively, the ensuing bloodshed will be even worse than before.

Such is the nature of Iraqi politics that even a caretaker government which should be led by the Presidential Council is riddled with difficulties, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani is receiving medical treatment following a stroke and Vice President Hashemi is in exile and convicted of murder.

The recent surge of Sunni discomfort clearly shows that it was never just the Kurds who were at great unease over Maliki’s growing centralist tendencies and even Shiites have become increasingly weary of Maliki. The only surprise is that it took so long for all sides to wake up to the realities that have gripped Iraqi for many a year.

Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani should be lauded for standing up to Maliki while ironically some saw such grave national developments as “personal”. Maliki has come to the brink of war with the Kurds and has been willing to antagonise Sunnis at the same time. At the current rate, not only is war and more bloodshed inevitable but also the breakup of Iraq.

Just where Iraq goes from here is far from certain, power sharing on paper alone will not satisfy Sunni demands, and the Kurds, who have been patient while much of the implementation of the constitution has been neglected, can ill-afford to get sucked into another sectarian mayhem in Iraq or wait indefinitely for Baghdad to enact agreements such as oil sharing and resolution to disputed territories.

With new elections almost a certainty, the intense jockeying for power has already begun. Influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, heaped blame on Maliki and supported Sunnis in their demonstrations and also reached out to Christian minorities.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

As the United States turns its back on Iraq and ‘Bush’s legacy’, Kurds and democracy left to suffer

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The United States and their allies took a bold step in 2003 amidst strong international opposition to free a country from decades of tyranny and a dictator that was the ultimate weapon of mass destruction, to build the foundations of a new Iraq that most Iraqis never thought they would see.

The legacy of former US President George W. Bush on Iraq is in stark contrast to that of Barrack Obama. For all his critics, Bush was highly determined to “last the course” in Iraq and oversaw an Iraq that had a series of historic elections, a new constitution and a new dawn of liberation that could not have been better symbolised than in veteran Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani’s appointment as Saddam Hussein’s successor.

Talabani’s instalment as president was poetic justice as it represented the ironic twist of the oppressed replacing the oppressor, Kurds who were long denied equal rights were now at the forefront of the new Iraq. The US adventure in Iraq was often plagued for everything it didn’t fulfil, not for all the historic opportunities that it unravelled.

The US invasion of Iraq had many success stories for Washington, non-more illustrious than the Kurdistan Region. From impoverishment, oppression and suffering, the Kurds have built a secular democracy with increasing economic and strategic clout in Iraq that most US politicians in 2003 dreamed about.

When Iraq’s was descending into all out civil war, Bush took the bold move to call upon thousands more troops, when the budget was blown billions more dollars were approved and when Iraq was falling apart, the determination of the US only grew further. Iraq was simply at the centre of US foreign policy and a project that it could ill-afford to abandon. US intervention on many occasions allowed Iraqi politicians to reach compromise and democratic progress to continue, whenever the Kurds, Sunnis or Shiites were on the negotiating table, the fourth would be a keen and willing US.

The Iraqi baton was passed to Barrack Obama in 2009, and the contrast in approach could not be greater. Iraq is hardly in the media, in the US public eye or a priority of Obama as Washington has distanced itself from the role of the foster parents of the new Iraq.

Of course, it was somewhat inevitable as Obama’s election campaign was always centred on Iraqi withdrawal and anti-meddling in Iraqi affairs and due to changes in the global political climate. It has tried to play a supportive and neutral role in Iraq, whilst stating its support for a plural and democratic Iraqi that adheres to its constitution.

It is no coincidence that shortly after US withdrawal in Iraq, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki’s stance toughened with a consolidation of power, the fallout over Sunni Vice President  Tariq al-Hashemi began, already fragile political agreements weakened and relations between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad plummeted.

A little over a year after US forces departed, the immense sacrifices and efforts of the US are in great danger of been wasted. The delicate and often tenuous balance that the US managed to achieve over the years is fast evaporating. Bush warned in one of his last speeches that the Iraq “war was not over”.

In a recent interview with Time magazine, Kurdistan Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, emphasising the moral responsibility of the US, underlined Kurdish disappointment on the current US position “…America came to this country, spent huge amounts of money and have sacrificed lives. But they handed over the keys to others…”

Whether the current administration likes it or not, they have a level of responsibility to the Kurds and the new Iraq they helped to create.

Washington cannot simply send thousands of troops like before or throw billions more dollars that it doesn’t have, but it cannot be a bystander in Iraq either. A Baghdad that is increasingly distancing itself from US influence has a man at the helm that holds the position of acting interior minister, acting defense minister and acting national security minister as well as the role of Prime Minister.

The US always referred to potential conflict between the Kurds and Arabs as the greatest danger in Iraq. The very reason that tense stand-offs were averted in the past was due to US intervention and the advent of join patrols in disputed territories.

Now that very danger is perilously close to reality, with both Kurdish and Iraqi troops amassed in a stiff showdown that not only threatens to put Iraq back to square, but whose ramifications will serve to shake an already edgy Middle East.

The Obama administration has repeated its support for an Iraq that abides by the Iraqi constitution many times. However, what happens when the same constitution is violated or constitutional principles such as article 140, hydrocarbon law or power sharing are neglected?

It is not to say that the US has a magic wand, but its influence could and should still go a long way in Iraq. The US cannot wash a hand that was deeply tainted in the Iraqi struggle for so long.

The oil dispute typifies the new US stance of sitting on the wall. While the rest of Iraq has lingered behind, Kurdistan is developing and raring to go. Yet the US has repeatedly warned Turkish companies against direct deals with the Kurds claiming it threatens the “integrity of Iraq”. It is Baghdad’s lack of commitment to the constitution and not the Kurds who threaten the integrity of Iraq.

Ironically, the biggest coup for Kurds was to get US oil giant Exxon-Mobil onboard and who are ready to drill in highly-contested areas in 2013, amidst a backdrop of familiar warning by Baghdad.

The Kurds remain reliant on Baghdad for exportation of oil and oil revenues and this has been somewhat of a stop-start tap in recent years and has become the source of Iraq’s carrot and stick approach against the Kurds.

The Kurds are by far the biggest pro-American group in Iraq and their flourishing economy, secularist nature and pro-western ideals is exactly what the US should have embraced. Yet Kurds feel let down, dejected and to a large extent weary of what the US will do if Iraqi forces turn their guns and arsenal on the Kurds once more.

Not only has the US supplied Baghdad with F16’s, modern tanks and weaponry, the Kurds fear a passive US stance should Kurdistan come under attack once more.

The increasing self-sufficiency drive of the Kurds, with an independent oil infrastructure at its heart, is the key to its long-term survival and prosperity. It is no wonder that surrounded by hostile forces and with a distant Washington administration in the background that they have increasingly needed to rely and capitalise on growing ties with Turkey. As Kurdistan Prime Minister emphasised in the same interview “we have a door of hope, which is Turkey. And if that door, that hope is closed, it will be impossible for us to surrender to Baghdad. We will do something that will put in danger the interests of all those concerned.”

The US needs no reminding that the Kurds helped keep Iraq together at key times when security situation descended into chaos. The Kurds were often the factor for compromise on the negotiating table, supplied thousands of troops to protect southern areas and adopted a patient game while Iraq stabilised.

The Kurds cannot simply wait for Iraq to determine when it will implement a democratic constitution, oil laws and power sharing agreements.

The US is against Kurdish independence yet it also acknowledges the importance of a plural Iraq that abides by its constitution. Kurds cannot remain stuck in this paradox indefinitely. Either it is independence or full implementation of the constitution. Barzani reiterated this position in recent warnings, “…there is no doubt if and when we lose hope that the constitution is not adhered to, certainly there are other options.”

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

Just how disputed are “disputed territories” in Iraq? Time to let a full nationwide census doing the talking

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There is no doubt that the already tenuous relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region reached new heights in recent weeks. As the Peshmerga and Iraqi army forces became deeply entrenched, respective positions hardened and the drums of war beat more loudly, the fear of a brutal war became a real possibility with the firing of a single bullet.

Frantic mediation in recent weeks by Iraqi political figures and the U.S. governmental have somewhat calmed the situation. Both sides have seemingly agreed to eventually withdraw troops, with local security forces to assume responsibility under committees that are intended to reflect the ethnic balance on the ground.

With any real sigh of relief quickly dampened by deep mistrust and lack of a long-term solution, short-term political arrangements merely buy more time.

The issue of disputed territories will not go away or become any easier to resolve the longer that constitutional articles gather dust on the Iraqi political shelf. On the contrary, it is becoming deeper and tenser with each delay.

The agreement to hand security over to local forces simply passes the problem on. Who should comprise of the local security forces? How do you determine ethnic quotas for such forces? Which group should have more influence over the “disputed areas” based on their assumed numbers?

The bottom line is that the problem once again becomes a numbers game. The makeup of local forces and arriving at this elusive ethnic balance is continuously based on assumptions and assertions, not actual facts.

The very foundation of resolving disputed territories lies in the conducting of a nationwide census. As the English proverb goes “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”. A new census in Iraq, which is a key constitutional provision, was delayed in 2007, 2009 and twice alone in 2010.

It is time to move away from claims, counter claims and assumptions and let the facts speak for themselves. Facts are just that, they are based on a reality and not on conjecture and help paint a true picture of the matter at hand.

In most democratic societies a census is a natural and fundamental exercise that helps governments to better understand their citizens, improve planning and to deliver better services to their local populace. Yet Iraq has shied away from a first full national census since 1987 with the pretext that it would inflame security conditions and ethnic and sectarian passions and would lead to the polarisation of Iraq. Any census will only confirm the extent of the polarization of Iraq, Iraq has been polarized from the moment it was artificially stitched together.

The truth is that much like the rest of article 140 where the census forms a key part, Baghdad has failed to implement legal obligations for fear of the reality that it unravels. There is no “technical” reason why a census cannot be held, the Iraqi Ministry of Planning has long trained thousands of enumerators and laid the basis for such a task.

When in a true democracy can someone pick and choose what it decides to implement to divert a decision away from a destined outcome? The real reason for a lack of implementation of a census is that a true picture of numbers in Iraq would tip the political and national landscape in Iraq upside down. In Iraq, the numbers game is everything. It means power, it means leverage and above all it ends “dispute”.

The very nature of the word “dispute” is underpinned by uncertainty and a lack of an official reality. The outcome is not clear so thus no side can make true assertions. In reality, a census in Iraq would mean a de-facto conclusion to all of article 140. If a census showed a clear Kurdish majority as most Kurds staunchly believe and that most Arabs fear, then what will the results of a referendum reveal? A certainty that such disputed territories would opt to be annexed to the Kurdistan Region.

This takes the argument a full circle to just how disputed the “disputed territories” really are and also to Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani’s decree this week to no longer refer to such territories as disputed but instead as “Kurdish areas outside of the Region”. Ironically, almost five years since the deadline for article 140 passed, it is still Baghdad that accuses the Kurd of constitutional violations over their claim to such territories. If Baghdad really wants to abide by the constitution, it should have the courage to hold a comprehensive census and show both Iraq and the international community the clear results.

A census with a true demographic picture of Iraq would also end annual disputes over the proportion of the Iraqi budget that the Kurds are entitled to. The uncertainty in actual figures of the Kurdish population has played to Baghdad’s hand by exerting pressure on the Kurds and diluting Kurdish demands.

The Iraqi national assembly itself is simply a gauge of the makeup of the Iraqi mosaic. Not only does the number of seats won by each group a reflection of the breakdown of the population, the number of seats allocated to each province is merely based on population estimates. Such estimates are further flawed and the result of guesswork as they are primarily based on food ration cards.

Such a basis for power sharing seriously handicaps true implementation of democracy. For example, Kurds in general are not as reliant on ration cards as the rest of Iraq or have not registered their children under such a system, whereas the food ration card have been manipulated and at times abused in the rest of Iraq.

The conducting of a census was a key Kurdish perquisite for joining Maliki’s coalition and was supposedly due to be done within a year. Kurds should strongly reject entering yet another general election without the fulfillment of this key condition.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

The Kurdish hand in creating the Maliki monster

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Kurds rubber stamped two Maliki terms of power while Maliki has frequently reneged on agreements and sidelined Kurdish demands. After 6 years in power and frequent accusation of centralist tendencies, is the current situation a surprise?

A sharp escalation in the already tenuous relations between the Erbil and Baghdad after a deadly skirmish in Tuz Khurmato between Kurdish and Iraqi forces was followed by frantic efforts to calm a crisis that had seen an unprecedented military build-up from both sides in the disputed areas.

However, an eventful week after negotiations between Kurdish and Iraqi military leaders and political figures, mediated by Speaker in the Iraqi Parliament, Osama al-Nujaifi and a high ranking American General, ended with talks collapsing and no agreement, despite promise of a breakthrough after an initial 14 point agreement was earlier agreed.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki scuppered the prospect of any deal, unwilling to meet the key Kurdish condition to abolish the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command, the very heart of the conflict.

According to Secretary General of the Ministry of Peshmerga, Jabar Yawar, the federal government reneged on the agreement reached earlier in the week after originally approving 12 out of 14 of Kurdistan’s demands but later only agreeing to three.

The Dijla command was created by Maliki for no other reason than to stoke Kurdish sentiments, win over Sunni support and create an Arab nationalist bandwagon that would allow Baghdad to mask a deep political crisis, corruption allegations and the increasing isolation of Maliki, even amongst traditional Shiite allies.

The Dijla command was a way of demonstrating a show of strength to the Kurds and to highlight the extent of Maliki’s powers. If unopposed the Dijla forces would severely dilute and harm Kurdish interests in the disputed territories. In spite of the current sabre-rattling, it is unlikely that Maliki will call the Kurdish bluff. However, Maliki will not back down until he is pushed to the edge or has achieved his political goals.

A show of force to increase sway over the resolution of disputed territories is also a big nail in the Iraqi constitutional coffin and article 140. Either way, Maliki’s actions show that he is not serious in resolving problems with the Kurds and that he is unwilling to relinquish his growing unilateralist hand. When constitutional violations and consolidation of top positions of power goes unhindered, then this spells the death of democracy in Iraq.

For all of Maliki’s faults, the Kurdish parties must also take blame for the current predicament awaiting Kurdish nationalist interests. They knew as far back as 2008 with deployment of Iraqi forces to Khanaqin and in a number of similar instances that Maliki would resort to force to exert his influence and to achieve his goals. This is the same Maliki that Kurdish politicians had saved at key crisis points in the first government.

Kurds frequently accused Maliki of centralist and dictatorial tendencies in his first term of power, long before Kurds essentially rubber stamped his second stint in power and before ironically he accumulated further power by consolidating control over a number of powerful positions under the pretext of a “caretaker”.

Maliki was a key factor in the continuous foot dragging of Baghdad over the implementation of article 140 and the failure to hold a census decreed by law. Maliki’s government frequently objected to Kurdish oil deals while ensuring that efforts to resolve a national hydro-carbon law were left stagnant. Maliki and his government have violated the Iraqi constitution a number of times when it has served their interests, and refused to pay for the budget of Peshmerga forces while on an annual basis striving passionately to reduce Kurdistan’s share of the budget.

Kurdish support for the latest coalition was on the back of guarantees for the implementation of 19 key points that formed the basis of the Erbil Agreement, conditions that Maliki has paid continuous lip service to.

Kurds can hardly be surprised at the predicament they find themselves in. Key Kurdish conditions as part of their support for the first coalition in 2006 were also largely sidelined.

Yet remarkably, fast forwarding to 2012 and 6 years of Maliki rule, Kurds still managed to miss their opportunity to unseat Maliki through lack of unity and lack of clear political accord when it came to promoting Kurdish interests in Baghdad.

A strong motion spear-headed by Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani was essentially thwarted by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, leader of the PUK which ironically has a strategic power sharing agreement with the KDP, while Kurdish opposition forces such as the Gorran movement also failed to support the initiative.

Maliki triumphed even at a moment of great weakness and this political victory by managing to conserve power only served to embolden his quest to solidify his sphere of influence.

The Kurdish leaders must use the current crisis as a wake-up call to preserve their unity and to ensure no matter how varied or passionate disagreements within Kurdistan may reach, disunity in Baghdad is a red-line.

The current stand-off between Iraqi and Kurdish forces saw perhaps for the first time unity amongst all Kurdish divisions and this greatly strengthened the Kurdish hand and galvanised their bargaining power in the crisis.

It has stirred the PUK and KDP leadership and particularly Talabani to readjust their positions, which had seen disagreement over the 2007 power sharing agreement, Kurdistan draft constitution and regional relations with Baghdad.

If talk that Barzani had “lost” Talabani had any grounding, Talabani’s revised position is a welcome step for the Kurdistan President.

Maliki has continuously shown his expertise to muster his way out of tight political corners and it is no coincidence that Maliki’s bold actions in the disputed territories coincides with a key political year fast around the corner. 2013 promises a number of key milestones that will act as a gauge for the alliances within Iraq that have shifted drastically and will no doubt dramatically alter the political landscape.

The first key milestone is the nationwide provincial elections in April, followed by regional parliamentary elections and not forgetting the national elections in 2014. There are also crucial provincial elections across Kurdistan Region in 2013 which will reveal the ever-changing balance of power in Kurdistan.

Maliki is in a race against time to conduct the provincial elections and beat any no-confidence vote. When a smart politician loses friends, he works hard to make new ones.

Maliki needs to rethink his alliances that have shifted considerably since 2010. He single-handedly alienated the Sunni’s this year through the issuance of a death warrant on Iraqi Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi and exchanged fierce rhetoric with al-Nujaifi, ironically mediator in the current crisis between the Kurds and Maliki and a number of other prominent Sunni figures.

His own State of Law alliance is shaky at best and Maliki may well need to reach out to Sunnis to cling to power. His onetime Sadrist ally, Moqtada al-Sadr, is drifting further and further from Maliki and his recent statement spoke volumes,   “the Iraqi spring will come against corruption, sectarianism, and those engaged in corruption and terrorism.”

Maliki in a way scarified the trust and support of Talabani by opting to reach out to Sunnis, and Talabani’s angered stance was on clear display when he recently called on the governing Shiite bloc to either apply pressure on Maliki to change his stance or replace him outright. Talabani accused Maliki of effectively announcing a state of emergency through the establishment of Dijla command, which is not within Maliki’s powers.

But such is the unfortunate situation of Iraqi politics, that even if they oust Maliki, it will take them several more months to agree on a new leader and build a new alliance.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.

As Kurd-Arab relations hit rock bottom, tensions reach dangerous heights

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With a language of confrontation, the writing for conflict is always on the wall.

With tension over the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command already at boiling point, the writing for open confrontation was always on the wall. Violent skirmishes between Peshmerga forces and Dijla forces in Tuz Kkurmatu, resulting in two casualties and many wounded, could be the tip of the ice-berg in what may embroil into serious conflict between Kurds and Arabs if sentiments do not dramatically change.

Any escalation in conflict has the potential to drastically alter the face of Iraq and indeed the entire region. Kurdish and Arab forces have come close to blows in the past, but the establishment of the Dijla forces was an open intent to ruffle Kurdish feathers and use military might to achieve goals.

The Dijla forces which Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki setup in September after promising he would not go ahead with the move, illustrate alarming boldness and arrogance by Maliki as he seeks to solidify his growing grip on power.

The escalation in the disputed territories and the rapidly deteriorating relations between Erbil and Baghdad comes as no surprise. Maliki has been consistently interested in preserving his sphere of power, has successfully consolidated a number of powerful roles under his helm and has affectively manipulated political actors and played on sectarian emotions when backed against a corner. If in moments of weakness he can prevail, then Maliki’s capabilities and confidence at times of strength have little bounds.

Weeks after a cross-party Kurdish delegation returned from Baghdad in what many deemed as a “final attempt” at resolving the crisis between Kurdistan and Baghdad, relations have plummeted to new lows.

The Kurdish delegation promised a united stand should negotiations prove unsuccessful and it is time for Kurdish political forces to show solidary and a clear plan of action as Kurdish interests are threatened more than ever.

Only in April of this year, a vote of no-confidence on Maliki failed in spite of cross-party support in Baghdad, with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani playing a big part in thwarting the measures to remove al-Maliki. How a betrayed Talabani, who received promises from Maliki about new national dialogue and a halt to Dijla forces, must now regret that.

The reason for the Dijla Operations Command was supposedly to address “poor” security coordination in the areas that had witness violent attacks. But as always with Maliki, timing of the moves and initiatives is the clue to real intent.

There have been terrorist attacks in the northern disputed belt for years, with residents long complaining about a lack of government protection. For the large part, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces had been relied on to affectively protect disputed areas as Iraqi national forces were bogged down in a fierce sectarian civil war further south for a number of years.

None of the Dijla commanders had been appointed by the council of representatives and most of the leaders have allegiance to Maliki. In fact the majority of the military commanders across the Iraqi army are carefully hand-picked by Maliki, making them increasingly a sectarian and not a national force.

Coordination was already a common feature under years of American mediation with the setup of join patrols and commands between Peshmerga and the Iraqi army. Kirkuk province’s Kurdish governor Najimaldin Omar Karim refused to cooperate with the new command and tensions have been brewing slowly towards open confrontation. Lt. Jamal Tahir, the chief of police in Kirkuk, refused to take orders from the command and warned about any Dijla meddling in Kirkuk.

It is no confidence that new measures by Baghdad have come as relations between Baghdad and Erbil have dramatically declined, with internal disputes and a difference in regional strategy widening all the time as Kurds have moved closer to Turkey, reaffirmed their anti-Assad stance and have grown ever more independent with new energy deals.

The new manoeuvres in the disputed territories are political and have little to do with provision of security. Maliki’s increasing sabre-rattling is designed to dilute Kurdish power, undermine Kurdish security forces and strengthen Baghdad’s hand in the jostle for control of disputed territories.

Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani had stated in recent remarks, “the formation of the Dijla (Tigris) Operations Command in Kirkuk and Diyala is an unconstitutional step by the Iraqi government,” whilst warning that “the intentions, aims, formation and actions of this command centre are against the Kurdish people, the political process, co- existence and the process of normalising the situation in the disputed areas.”

The years of delays in the implementation of Article 140 and constitutional articles was already clear gauge of Baghdad’s appetite to conform to democratic principles that go against their interests. This latest move is nothing but further measures to hinder a clear resolution of disputed territories and to derail Kurdistan’s growing economic and political strength.

Barzani said in a recent statement “I want to reassure the people of Iraq, and especially the people of Kurdistan, that after consultation with the Iraqi President and other concerned parties, we will make our position clear and take appropriate steps against this unconstitutional action and any actions designed to impose unconstitutional arrangements in the disputed areas”. The PUK leadership had also warned that the Kurds would resort to other means if Maliki did not rectify and backtrack from his “mistakes”.

Warnings by the Kurdish leadership are not new and the desire to adopt patience must surely be running thin. It is also signifies the importance of Kurdish solidarity and a united stand to protect Kurdish interests. Lack of Kurdish unity in disputed territories and particularly Baghdad over the past several months has already harmed Kurdish goals.

The move led by Barzani to oust Maliki under his growing abuse of power was wrongly seen as “personal” in some circles with Maliki’s track record over the past number of years telling its own story.

When backed into a corner or on the negotiation table Maliki and the State of Law Coalition make all the right overtures and gestures. But almost a decade under the new Iraq, Kurds have to finally realise that promises are not worth the paper they are written on in Baghdad.

The Kurdish security forces had warned that they will respond harshly and this was met with Maliki’s own stern warnings for the Peshermrga forces not to provoke Iraqi forces. Maliki had ominously insisted in the past that “there are no restrictions on the movements of the Iraqi army, which according to the constitution is a federal army and has right to be present in Basra or Zakho. And no one has the right to prevent that.”

As Maliki came under renewed pressure over the Dijla Operations Command, he boldly added the Salahaddin province under its command.

The growing rhetoric from Maliki, the likes of Yassin Majeed and other Shiite leaders and new assertiveness that their powerbase stretches to all corners of Iraq is an open threat of war.

In a sign of growing hostility towards the principle of the Kurds as the sole guardians of Kurdistan, Abdul Salam al-Maliki, an MP from the State of Law bloc, urged the Iraqi Prime Minister to open a “North Operations Command” to “protect” Kurdistan Region, under the pretext that the Peshmerga are unable to secure the province.

It is ironic that the Peshmerga who receive no funding or support from Baghdad or a share of weapons purchases are been advised of their lack of strength. Peshmerga had the capability to repel the might of Saddam and are capable of securing Kurdistan both now and the future.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources:  Various Misc.