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Fuzzy Democracy is a Prelude to National Disaster

As attempts to defuse the current crisis over Khanaqin intensify, it alludes to a more extensive web of tension and animosity between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Baghdad Ministry.

It appears that enmity between both parties, undoubtedly fuelled by certain elements in Baghdad and abroad, is not isolated but threatens to rip Iraq apart.

Almost all major negotiations and key parliamentary bills have been over-shadowed by heated exchanges between both sides. No other dispute is better illustrated than the current stalemate over Kirkuk.

Politicians scamper to intact a “democratic” and “fair” solution to the disputed territories, yet ironically millions of Iraqis have already adopted their democratic solution via a national constitution. Beyond the mask of greater security achievements and an improving national picture, lies much political uncertainty and an Iraqi practice of fuzzy democracy that is making national reconciliation in real-terms an improbable task.

Clearly, behind the Iraqi political veil, there still exists a deep-rooted problem in the mentality of some politicians in Baghdad. The totalitarian regime may have collapsed five years ago, but it’s unwise to assume its historical legacy vanished with it.

The Kurds make a significant portion of the Iraqi coalition and are in theory the partners in the new Iraq. However, the recent uncoordinated moves to employ Iraqi forces in disputed territories, the order for Kurds to evacuate offices in Diyala and the passing of the provincial election bill on 22nd July 2008 amidst a Kurdish boycott, does not just highlight puzzling motives in the Baghdad camp but smacks of a great deal of insincerity towards the Kurds.

Furthermore, coupled with the non-adoption of article 140, attempts to nullify oil exploration contracts awarded by KRG oil ministry and the annual squabbling over the Kurdish share of the national budget, this clearly does not just represent common democratic disputes but points to a general agenda against the Kurds.

There is currently a feverish campaign to discredit the Kurdish administration. This anti-Kurdish hysteria is designed to undermine the Kurds, and promote the perception of the Kurds as over-reaching, encouraging problems in ethnically mixed-cities and as obstacles to Iraqi progression.

This motion places pressure on Kurds to over-compromise or even cede certain demands. But the moment Kurds accepts crumbs, when they are entitled to their share of bread, then the ultimate result is Baghdad hegemony over the north, and in turn a heavy reliance by Erbil for economic and social support.

If Iraq is democratic as the brochure entails, then the Iraqi constitution is a real achievement for the Iraqi nation and should be heralded. However in Iraq, there is an ironic perception that abiding by such democratic values is the actual threat, not the solution.

As such Kurdish demands for the adoption of the constitution are a fair and legal obligation. Any article of the constitution should only be amended by a popular vote, not by hasty pro-Arab politicians. The constitution is the legal red-line. If Baghdad decides against any portion of the constitution and national power-sharing, then they are again choosing authoritarianism over democracy and Kurds should have no part of this project.

Kurdistan President, Massaud Barzani, in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat issued a damning assessment, and raised doubt that Baghdad views them as partners. The increasingly frustrated Barzani accused the Iraqi government of “monopolising authority” while pointing to a prevailing totalitarian mentality and has warned that voiding any part of the constitution will rip Iraq apart.

Kurds have proved a vital cog since the fall of Saddam when Arab factions were pointing guns at each other, by ensuring security and promoting national reconciliation. Now with the security improving in places such as Diyala, the Iraqi forces now threaten to point the gun at the Kurds. All this denotes to a campaign to diminish the Kurdish role in mixed areas and thus make political resolutions more one-sided.

Kurds could have taken advantage of the Iraqi bloodshed by annexing disputed lands, now their quest for legal justice may have worked against them.

Iraqi lawmakers that are genuine about driving the new Iraq must root out elements and ill-intentioned hands pushing for escalation and confrontation. Any Baghdad conspiracy to return all Kurdish forces to the blue line is a sure way of provoking armed conflict sooner or later. These are early doors in the new Iraq, if the right moves are not taken at its foundation, then there is really no hope.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Russia Solidifies Influence Over Georgia

Russia’s battle for regional supremacy comes at a price, as ties with West reaches crisis-point

In latest developments, NATO foreign ministers have warned Russia that there will be “no business as usual” unless Russia pulls its troops out of Georgia immediately. The Russian onslaught in Georgia sparked international outcry, but Russian appears determined not to pull rank as the regional superpower while teaching the Georgians a lesson.

The Georgian-Russian conflict in the strategically vital Caucasus region threatened to open a new deadly front on what is already a volatile global stage. 

However, although the conflict which erupted when Georgia attempted to regain control of South Ossetia, a breakaway region technically a part of Georgia but de facto independent since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the tensions have been simmering for well-over a decade.

The provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have long-held separatist struggles with the Georgian government and crucially have been politically and militaristically backed by successive Russian governments.

Further Russian attempts to solidify their influence over both regions, particularly South Ossetia, resulted in more than half of South Ossetia’s estimated 70,000 citizens taken Russian citizenship offered by Moscow. This guaranteed Russia as stakeholder in future affairs.

Russian Response

The Russian response was swift and decisive. Although drawing strong rebuke from almost all Western countries for what appeared a disproportionate show of force, the Russian response was designed to send a number of key messages to Georgia, other bordering states and also NATO and the West.

Georgia was never going to be a match for the powerful Russian war-machine, but the Russian response showed that they were unwillingly to relinquish de facto control and influence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia but also primarily to demonstrate that Georgia and many of the old Soviet republics remain within its sphere of influence.

Georgia has close ties with the EU and particularly the US and its attempts to join NATO have been met with stiff resistance by the Russians, overwhelmingly opposed to the eastward expansion of NATO, where Ukraine, another contentious neighbour has also been bidding to join the alliance.

Russians are keen to show that they are still a force be reckoned with, even as the demise of Communist rule took its toll.

Evidently, any eastward expansion of NATO would strike a great blow to historical Russian hegemony over the region. Russia, still suffering from the side-affects of its Soviet past and the new world order in the aftermath of the Cold War, has never quite lost the distrust of its former Capitalist arch-nemesis.

Russian opposition to the proposed US missile defence system over Europe is one example of this. With somewhat ironic timing, Poland and the US announced an agreement whereby a key missile defence unit would be deployed in the Polish state, formerly under the stewardship of the soviet juggernaught.

Although, the US has emphasised that the missile defence system is aimed at rogue states such as Iran, Russia remains unconvinced.

The Russian response at such a deal was sharp and chilling, effectively threatening a potential nuclear strike at Poland. Perhaps it was just a war of words, and emotions getting the better of politicians. The cold war, on the brink for so long, was dramatically avoided, so now the idea of a greater Russia-Europe battle is surely unthinkable.

This may be the case but certainly Russian rhetoric and the bullying tactics seen in Georgia sent a chill down the spine of Europe.

Russia, is also heavily reliant on the West to sustain its historically fragile economy, any show-down with the West would not serve any great long-term gains. However, with proposed expansion of NATO and Russia ceding influence in the region, it threatens to become isolated but also lose strategic significance.

Battle for Energy

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Caspian oil pipeline, built by Western oil majors at a great cost was never going to hit the right cord with Russian paranoia.

Russia controls a sizable proportion of oil flowing to mainland Europe and an effective dominance over European gas supplies. The Caspian oil-pipeline was designed to over-ride the heavy European reliance on Russian natural resources.

With Russian controlling the taps to the European market, it also controls a political wild-card. Only recently, European gas supplies were severely affected when a Russian dispute with Ukraine on transit taxes for the pipeline exporting gas through Eastern Europe, threatened mayhem on European markets.

Russian Withdrawal

After Russian occupied much of the key cities and entry points into Georgia, effectively threatening to strangle Tbilisi, EU and US representatives put tremendous pressure on Russian forces to withdraw.

A six-point ceasefire agreement was then brokered by the current EU president, Nicolas Sarkozy, however, it has taken many days to witness the first signs of Russian withdrawal, and for NATO ministers this was simply not enough.

Russian has been employing the terms of the ceasefire reluctantly and at a leisurely pace. Russians still control entry and exit points of many key roads and some forces are still reportedly stationed in Iqueti, near Tbilisi.

The notion of Russian withdrawal from Georgia is itself open to interpretation, with a vague ceasefire deal leaving uncertainty.

Russian forces were already deployed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia under a peace-keeping mandate. Agreement to withdraw from Georgia will certainly not mean withdrawal from these provinces under Russian influence.

Furthermore, Russia will likely keep a buffer-zone into Georgian territory around South Ossetia as part of any compromise agreement.

Western Pressure

The US has been particular tough on its response to what it has labelled a disproportionate Russian response.

US president George Bush warned his Russian counterpart that bullying and aggressive tactics did not belong in the modern era.

The EU and US threatened isolation but increased their pressure in the face of a slow-Russian willingness to abide by the terms of the signed agreement and withdraw quickly.

This week U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice urged Russia not call its trust into doubt.

In a further rebuke, the US administration warned that such actions put Russia’s reputation as a potential partner “in tatters”.  While the EU warned of “serious consequences” if Russian do not bide by the terms of the cease-fire.

NATO secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer warned that co-operative programmes with Russia would soon be at risk.

Future status still unclear

After the debris from this current stand-off has settled, the situation would not have changed a great deal, other than becoming more emotionally charged than ever.

It is now very unlikely that South Ossetia and Abkhazia would ever rejoin Georgia proper. Emboldened by Russia, the leaders of both break-away regions will seek new solutions to the crisis.

Whether they will be granted independence or if they choose to be annexed with Russia is open to question. What is clear is that question of right to intervention makes future conflicts evitable, unless lasting settlements can be achieved.

Both provinces contain a large proportion of Russian citizens, and that itself is a sure guarantee that Russia will not walk away all too easily.

Georgians aim to strike conciliatory tone

The media campaign from both sides has been fierce. In heated exchanges, both the Georgians and Russians have accused each other of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

However, while Georgia President Mikheil Saakashvili, demanded full Russian withdrawal, he also tried to strike new conciliatory tones, Russian Dmitry Medvedev on the other hand warned that any aggression against Russian citizens would face a “crushing response”.

Russian immediate objectives achieved?

Russian immediate objective from the military confrontation was to achieve the overthrow of Saakashvili’s and deal a deadly blow to the Georgian army.

In this light, some critics have claimed that the Georgina army escaped without serious fatalities or military damage. In some Russian quarters the invasion would even be labelled a defeat as the strategic aims were not achieved.

On the contrary, this may create political pressure within Russia itself. The economy will undoubtedly take a hit in the face of possible Western sanctions.

More importantly, Georgia could witness a strengthening of ties with the US and more economic investment and support. US and its allies my well bolster Georgian military in the background, and future Russian offensives may not only be met with a war of words between the West and the Russian hierarchy. An express application to NATO can not be discounted for Tbilisi.

In the short-term, Russia will certainly have subdued Georgians and made their mark, while almost guaranteeing influence over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but at what price remains open to question.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Battle for Kirkuk Continues

The Iraqi Mindset is, as long as there is no democracy in Kirkuk, there is no chance of a Kurdish cictory

After years of foot-dragging by Baghdad over the status of Kirkuk, Kurds have decided to dig their heels in. The heated-battle for Kirkuk continues apace with decisive concord out of sight.

Iraqi leaders, after weeks of deliberation within the Baghdad political chambers and with much pressure from George Bush and other senior US officials, failed to strike a deal on the provincial election law that would facilitate the progression of crucial elections, raising great doubt that the elections could be held this year. 

After failed attempts at forming elusive concord via extraordinary parliamentary sessions on a number of occasions in past weeks, the last session on 6th August before politicians enter summer recess, was almost perceived as a last throw of the dice with politicians optimistic that an agreement could be finally reached.

However, the heated session was adjourned without a vote on the provincial law, serving as a major setback to the Iraqi political landscape and the US administration. The debate was closed after it was decided to form a committee composed of the heads of parliamentary blocs to find acceptable text for the provincial election bill.

Mahmoud al-Mashahadani, the parliament’s speaker, a source of much controversy over the past couple of weeks, announced September 9th as the start of the second legislative term of parliamentary sessions for 2008.

The tense stand-off amongst Iraqi parliamentarians hinges on the hotly-disputed issue of elections in oil-rich Kirkuk. In spite of frequent pledges by Baghdad to abide by the Iraqi constitution, which under article 140 calls for the normalisation in Kirkuk and the suburbs followed by a referendum to decide eventual control of the district, deadlines and extensions to the implementation of this article have continuously ended without any real progress.

Now the issue of Kirkuk, which Baghdad has left simmering for far too-long, threatens to come to the boil in spectacular fashion. Seemingly, against the will of the Kurds, Arab blocs have sought to delay the process of dealing with Kirkuk even further.

Baghdad foot-Dragging

Even as another six months were added to the implementation of article 140 after it missed its original 31st December 2007 deadline, it was hard not to feel a great deal of pessimism that any real change in attitude would be witnessed on the ground.

Indeed, somewhat inevitably the six-month deadline passed and Iraq appears no closer or eager for that matter, to resolving the status of Kirkuk than the decades that preceded it.

Foot-dragging and a lack of desire to implement a constitution adopted by millions of Iraqis in a legal and democratic fashion, has understandably compounded Kurdish frustration.

Now, lawmakers in Baghdad are suggesting methods to resolve the dispute in Kirkuk that are simply too little, too late and which Kurds see as a sure formula of getting the short-straw again.

Intense negotiations in past weeks, was designed to finally bring a level of compromise between all parties, but the level of sentiments expressed suggest that the time of further compromise on the status of Kirkuk may have passed.

Article 24

Ironically, article 24, a special addition to the provisional and governorate law pertaining to provincial elections is designed to effectively cancel article 140 and suppress Kurdish ambitions to winning formal control of the city.

The inclusion of article 24 in the provincial law was seen as a red-line by Kurds, leading to angry demonstrations throughout Iraqi Kurdistan. However, although in latter sessions the text contained in article 24 was watered down significantly, this was simply not enough to appease weary Kurds.

Under Arab proposals, article 24 would mean that the elections in Kirkuk would be essentially prefixed with the Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens sharing the same number of seats. In addition, existing security forces in the region would be replaced by those in the centre and south – a clear attempt to undermine the mainly Kurdish security forces protecting the province.

Although, the law that was passed in spite of mass boycott by Kurdish lawmakers was always going to be vetoed, it was passed by Arab lawmakers more as a message to Kurds rather than in hope that it would by-pass the Iraqi presidential council.

Ruffling Kurdish Feathers

Controversial calls in Baghdad for a delay in the elections in Kirkuk, replace Kurdish security forces and non-implementation of the constitution is designed to ensure Kurds do not wrestle control of Kirkuk. Suggestion and notions such as article 24 are a flagrant attempt to destabilise Kurdish ranks and is specifically aimed at ruffling Kurdish sentiments.

Once Kurdish anger has been stoked, Arabs are aiming to induce a harsh reaction from them. The mass walkout is one example. This naturally places the Kurds as the representation of the spanner in the Iraqi machine. This perception continued in recent parliamentary sessions with Kurds unwilling to cave in to pressure for greater compromise.

Baghdad has failed to implement satisfactory measures to tackle article 140 for many years, and are now blaming the Kurds for the current stand-off.

Increasingly, this places Kurds in the context of over-reaching and as an obstacle to Iraqi reconciliation which could not be further from the truth.

The persistent disputes around the hydro-carbon law, which still has not been passed, and the provincial elections law, has been used as a marketing ploy by Baghdad to discredit the Kurds as genuine partners in the Iraqi union.

Cases of injustices against Arabs and Turcoman minorities in Kirkuk under the hands of the Kurds have been greatly exaggerated. Clearly, foreign proxy elements as well as political factions in Baghdad have sought to influence proceedings by creating instability and promoting an environment of mistrust.

There is plenty of Arab and Turkmen representation in the provincial council as well as security forces for that matter. In fact, many Arabs and Turcoman groups have been in support of implementing article 140 and the eventual annexing of the region to Kurdistan region.

The end-goal of the anti-Kurdish bandwagon, is to create an environment where holding an election would be unfeasible and against the interests of security gains in Iraq. For the Arabs it is simple, as long as there is no democracy in Kirkuk then there is no chance of any Kurdish victory.

Role of the UN

U.N. special representative Staffan de Mistura was appointed to help resolve the issues in Kirkuk by providing mainly “technical” assistance and to study alternatives to implementing a referendum on the status of Kirkuk, which many have touted as a one-way ticket to bloodshed.

However, after six-months of ‘fact-finding and analysis’, UN suggestions fell short of many expectations and provided solutions that were unrealistic and in some cases lacked the right level of political, ethnic and geographical grounding. In either case, Iraq moved no closer to stopping the “ticking time bomb” that de Mistura so boldly claimed to have done at the turn of the year.

Now the UN has entered the provincial council debate by promoting a postponement of elections in Kirkuk until a proposed committee can decide the best method for dealing with the current stand-off.

However, if the current track record of resolving the Kirkuk debate is anything to go by, the Kurds will miss the chance to solidify their hold on Kirkuk and yet nothing more will have been done in another six months time.

Why not hold elections in Kirkuk?

On the surface, according to lawmakers in Baghdad, holding elections in Kirkuk is technically and politically difficult due to working out registrar of voters in Kirkuk coupled with the prospect of holding elections in a volatile climate.

However, in practice, the fear is that an eventual and almost evitable victory of Kurds in the provincial elections in Kirkuk would make implementation of article 140 even more contentious. In many ways, holding elections at the current time would be perceived as a de facto substitute for holding a referendum on the status of the city.

Even if a referendum was never arranged, a Kurdish majority in the Kirkuk council would make things that bit more complicated for Baghdad. It would reinforce the Kurdish view that Kirkuk is a Kurdish city and would lead to more public efforts at annexing of the region.

Furthermore, the recommendations of de Mistura were formulated based on a number of factors such as historical influences but principally previous election results, when devising his suggestions to resolve disputed territories, including Kirkuk. A Kurdish victory at the polls in Kirkuk would make de Mistura’s analysis an interesting reading to say the least.

Kirkuk should be not treated differently to any other place in Iraq. All mutterings in Baghdad around the delay of the vote, is centred around ensuring Kurds do not get their hand on the substantial oil-reserves. This is hardly Iraq’s best kept secret.

If it was not about oil, article 140 would not even appear in Iraqi newspapers, let alone dominate the agenda of neighbouring foreign ministers.

Mosul a different example?

While minority Arabs and Turkmens state their opposition to living under Kurdish control, Kurds living under Arab control is now seen as a formality and a historical expectation in Iraq.

If minority Kurds asked for Mosul to be given special dispensation for the upcoming elections since it’s also a volatile and ethnically mixed city, Arabs would chuckle at the idea.

Then how are the voices of the majority in Kirkuk dampened by unsubstantiated fears of the minority in Kirkuk.

Kirkuk Provincial Council Threat

Almost before the Kirkuk provincial council could finish their threat of requesting to be annexed to the Kurdistan region, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was on the phone to voice his concerns.

External interference has only hampered democracy in Iraq, and neighbouring countries have served to only stoke tensions ad influence proceedings for their own benefit, rather than promote a new dawn across their border.

Turkey, in particular has been vociferous in its opposition of any moves toward Kurdish control of Kirkuk. Only this week Turkey called for more UN involvement in Kirkuk and stated the Turkish government was watching all developments in Kirkuk.

However, as Baghdad pressured the council not to follow their threat, Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani congratulated their stance.

Kurds have always stated Kirkuk as a red-line, but now appear increasingly more agitated in the face of the lack of desire by Baghdad to resolve long-standing disputes.

Democracy – the only solution

Ultimately, the one and only solution to the Kirkuk stand-off should not be decided by Kurdish leaders, the Iraqi national Assembly or even the Kirkuk council, but by the people themselves.

The wills of the million is far great than the will of a small number of politicians, who have been elected to serve them. If people in Kirkuk decide to vote in favour of joining the Kurdistan Region, then Baghdad has no basis to confront legal and democratic measures, other than to ensure minority rights are respected.

All talk of complex proposals by the UN and the need to place Kirkuk under special consideration is unnecessary and is only designed to complicate matters. The only viable solution is to let the people decide.

The US should then do its utmost to be the supporter and protectorate of the wishes of the people. Although, the provincial elections is as much vital to George Bush leaving his tenure as president on a positive as much as a move the they consider essential to reconciling Iraq’s ethnic and religious communities, elections should not be placed to appease US political interests but should be in the best interests of all groups in Iraq.

It is also ironic that Turkey as the role-model of democracy for the region is unwilling to accept legal and democratic principles chosen by millions of citizens by a neighbouring country. If there is genuine interest in seeing a stable, plural and democratic age in Iraq, then at the minimum true democratic ideals must be encouraged and not hampered by the US and their so-called allies.

If the voting in Kirkuk should be suspended then voting in all of Kurdistan region should be suspended. More extensions to the resolving elections in Kirkuk would be fruitless without any real desire.

Baghdad wants to slip the Kirkuk rug from under the feet of the Kurds. Kurds should be warned, after all they have had enough time and suffering to read the writing on the wall.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Obama’s Global Image Taking Shape?

 

Can Obama win “vital election points” for his tour?

As the young U.S. senator begins his first major foreign tour as a presidential candidate, the Republican machine may gethe chance to hammer him on a massive public scale for several of his policies concerning Iraq and Afghanistan.

All eyes were on U.S. Democratic presidential hopeful Sen. Barack Obama this week, as he undertook a major foreign tour, including his first visit to Baghdad, in the countdown to the November 4 U.S. presidential elections.

The “war-torn” tour comes at a crucial time as the feverish election campaign gathers pace.

It is likely that as much as this visit can win Obama vital election points as well as seemingly address his alleged foreign policy “Achilles heel,” it could serve just as much as a Republican stick to hamper his presidential quest.

On paper, Obama’s ascent to prominence and candidacy for the White House helm is almost poetic. While the U.S. global image has suffered immensely in the shape of a controversial foreign policy and a war on terror, with President George W. Bush perhaps serving as the personification of that, Obama represents a taboo-breaking and fresh outlook to the international community.

His victory as the Democratic presidential candidate over New York Sen. Hillary Clinton highlighted his political astuteness and growing confidence, a campaign undoubtedly augmented by the unavoidable fact that he is a young black from a deprived background.

Dress rehearsal as next American president?

Although Obama’s foreign visit in light of the possibility of winning the election in November was always going to depict him by some circles as the visiting next U.S. president, he was very quick to play this down.

Obama is careful to bolster his election chances with an effective medium campaign, by appearing as a confident but modest U.S. senator and not in an arrogant tone as the next president. Obama emphasized that he did not have a “message” as such to Afghan or Iraqi leaders, as he was “more interested in listening than doing a lot of talking.”

The Iraq effect

There is no doubt that the Iraq War has centred heavily in the U.S. election campaign, and Obama’s objection to long-term troop presence and repeated calls for a withdrawal within 16 months has formed a central spotlight of his campaign.

Obama has capitalized on the fact that he was against the war from the outset, while his Republican presidential rival, Arizona Sen. John McCain, supported the Iraqi invasion from day one and has vowed to keep troops in country as long as necessary rather than set any unrealistic benchmarks or timetables.

A firsthand analysis in Afghanistan and particularly Iraq is served to signal his desire to be seen as in touch with the realities on the ground and to foster crucial political understanding with key leaders.

Before his visit to Iraq, Obama promised to make “a thorough assessment” that could ultimately influence a “refinement” in his policy. Critics lost no time in accusing him of laying the foundation for future changes in his stance on Iraq, but in reality, with much changing in Iraq, it is hard for Obama not to adjust his viewpoint as much as it may play against him.

Meeting with Iraqi leaders

Obama arrived in the heavily fortified Green Zone as part of a congregational delegation, where he met with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Iraqi President Jalal Talabini, as well as the top U.S. military commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus.

Clearly, the security situation in Iraq and the prospect of troop withdrawals was a common interest. In Iraq, a swift American withdrawal is a hotly contested debate with some figures keen not to incept a premature withdrawal by the onset of a fixed timetable at a delicate stage in Iraq’s recovery and with Iraq still far from political reconciliation, while others, such as Moqtada al-Sadr, have used this to assemble significant following and influence.

Al-Maliki quickly denied claims that he supported Obama’s plan to withdraw combat troops within 16 months. However, at the time when Iraqi leaders are under intense public pressure to assume prime sovereignty, thy will press Obama for clarity on his long-term vision.

Obama has previously stated that he wants Iraq to assume responsibility for security, with the U.S. possibly leaving a residual force to help train Iraqi troops and fight al-Qaeda.

The situation on the ground in Iraq has changed a great deal since the start of the presidential race. Largely owed to the U.S. surge established in early 2007 and the onset of Sunni Awakening Councils, the security situation in Iraq has improved markedly.

Obama’s new willingness to be more flexible on the assessment of Iraq has naturally led to accusations of inconsistency by the Republicans.

The Republicans, while pointing out that the surge strategy Obama opposed has worked, have accused him of “stubbornly adhering to an unconditional withdrawal” and say he threatens to undo the hard work of the past year.

Tying the hands of the next president?

The Bush administration has been vehemently opposed to setting a firm timetable for troop withdrawals from the outset and have instead emphasized that decisions should be made based on military assessments on the ground and Iraqi attempts to foster political reconciliation.

However, Bush has been criticized in many circles for seemingly tying the hands of the next administration. With the days of his tenure in office coming to an end, he is not expected to make any major decisions on troop numbers but is likely instead to pass the baton to the next president.

The negotiations on the Status of Forces agreement, highlighting the long-term legal status of American forces in Iraq, has proved highly contentious and is unlikely to be agreed upon by the original target date at the end of July. To avoid a legal vacuum in January 2009, when the last UN mandate expires, a “transitional” pact is envisaged, leaving the hard negotiations to the next U.S. president.

An increasingly confident Iraqi government has been pressing for a more definitive timeline and a less hazy role for the U.S. in the future Iraq, forcing Bush to somewhat grudgingly accept a “time horizon” for withdrawal, a notion he has long opposed.

Despite Obama’s bold assurance of a withdrawal within months of assuming the presidency, in the short term his hands may well be tied. Any major decision that has negative consequences may well hammer his image and credential before his job has even begun. In the short term, the principle cogs assembled by the Bush administration will continue without significant change.

Obama is aware that any move to dampen the delicate foundations set in Iraq could be catastrophic. With many political stumbling blocks remaining between fractious Iraqi groups, any hasty withdrawal to fulfil election promises may set Iraq back many years.

With a more optimistic climate, Iraq is becoming less of the nail to hammer the Republicans and may yet work strongly in their favor.

Contrast with McCain

The contrast of the first-term senator from Illinois with his established Republican presidential rival McCain could not be more distinct. Obama is already becoming a well-known international name and has attracted huge media attention.

McCain, however, has the experience to derail Obama’s election bandwagon and will use any perceived flaws or missteps on Obama’s trip to full advantage. McCain’s earlier visits to Iraq and elsewhere attracted much less attention, and he could argue that Obama’s background has played as much significance as his political merits.

McCain will also point to recent opinion polls in the U.S. suggesting he has more public trust as Commander-in-Chief.

With improving prospects for Iraq, coupled with a growing crisis over the state of the U.S. economy, Iraq has increasingly taken a back stage in the U.S. public’s concern, which may take the spin off of Obama’s campaign.

Need for new focus on Afghanistan

With a resurgent Taliban creating fear in parts of Afghanistan and pushing already limited coalition forces to the breaking point, Afghanistan is under threat of becoming a forgotten war.

Obama, upon visiting Afghanistan, claimed that the country should be the new “central focus” of the fight against terrorism and pledged to reinforce troop levels by a couple of brigades, by diverting troops no longer needed in Iraq to Afghanistan. Republicans would argue, of course, that this is just an adopted Republican surge tactic and is just masking another way to ultimately keep troop levels the same and U.S. forces strained.

All in all, the perception that Obama leaves as he carries on his foreign tour may well go a long way in deciding the next U.S. president.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

G8 Leaders Meet in Japan

G8 Summit gives world leaders much food for thought

The current global economic crisis, with runaway inflation, dominates 3-day annual summit of world-leaders.

The leaders of the world’s self-appointed steering committee, the G8 group of countries, commenced their annual summit this week in Japan. Previous summits including the last one held at Heiligendamm in Germany have proved contentious and have often been marred by anti-globalisation protests and civil violence.

This meeting was sparred the violence, perhaps only by its remote location on the island of Hokkaido.  The leaders of Britain, United States, Canada, France, Japan, Germany, Italy and Russia, could perhaps feel the global pressure and public fear in the ambience of their surroundings. 

Indeed, a year can prove a rather long-time, with the world changing much since the last summit.

At the head of current international concerns is the global economic downturn and rising inflation, threatening the onset of a damaging recession in US, Europe and beyond. In the advent of globalisation, the world has become exponentially smaller. With world markets intrinsically tied to one another, one economic downfall can have large ramifications throughout the world.

The US, with the world’s largest economy, is a prime example of this. The Federal Reserve has been desperately trying to ward off economic recession in the country. With a lack of money in circulation, particularly between banks lending to each other, this has led to a credit crunch that was immediately felt in the UK but also sent shivers across other dominant markets.

At the fulcrum of the current headache is without a doubt the runaway oil price. With oil prices reaching a record $140 a barrel, remarkably this means that prices have doubled since Heiligendamm a year ago. With a major reliance on fuels in the US and Europe, not to mention the fuel-thirst of fast developing economies such as India and China, the huge rise in oil prices has had a significant bearing on spending and economic confidence of the general public throughout the continents.

With prices threatening to reach $200 a barrel any time soon, there has been a major pressure on world leaders to work on ways to control prices and promote alternatives to carbon-fuels. Almost inevitably, OPEC have been pressured to increase supply of oil reserves, with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and other major oil producers benefiting greatly from the oil-surplus in their accounts.

More worrying than fuel perhaps, the price of rice and other grains has seen massive raises, threatening stability in Africa and Asia, and serving a massive blow to the much-publicised G8 commitment at tackling world poverty. Ban Ki-moon, the UN secretary general, claimed that high food prices are “turning back the clock on development gains”, under-pining fears of major powers.

Rising food prices has led to an increase in malnutrition in poorer countries and even in public protests by beleaguered citizens. There have been calls for doubling of food production in Africa, creating world stock-piles of food and increasing shipment of supplies to worst-affected areas.

However, often economic measures are beset by trade-offs. Lower oil prices, will undoubtedly run counter to reducing carbon dependency and tackling the greater issue of climate change.

In turn an energy crisis, may counter the drive against nuclear proliferation.  The much touted need for bio-fuels, conversely results in less land for food production, which will only increase food prices.

The so-called richer countries are determined to prevent economic recession, seemingly over their aim of tackling rising inflation. This trade off is a corner-stone of the functioning of regional economies and the global economy, and the balancing act is at best delicate.

Nonetheless, when that “balancing act” from the G8 countries and other global powers has such wide-reaching implications, such as inducing potential hunger in Africa and Asia, then the tables are turned. However, commitments and mere talk by major powers to help more vulnerable nations is not new and not enough. Some have warned that even development goals for the poorer countries set three-years ago by the G8 are at risk.

The current food and fuel crisis is augmented by the all-frequent motion of reducing carbon emissions. The final day of the 3-day summit, was dominated by carbon emissions and global warming. In addition to the 8 majors, the worlds other biggest emitters were invited to the table for discussions. The Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012, has been marred by controversy, with the world’s largest emitter, the US, reluctant to commit to CO2 emission targets. Amidst pessimism and criticism at the lack of genuine action, the G8 have reaffirmed their common vision of reducing carbon emission by 50% by 2050.

Here comes further trade-offs and economic-mongering that makes agreements and global targets so difficult to set, China and India, the most worrisome of emerging countries in terms of carbon emissions, will unlikely go beyond even verbal commitments without a return of money or incentives from the West.

The stance of India and China is clear, they will not sign-up to an inequitable method of dealing with current atmospheric problems, which was largely caused by earlier industrialisation. Why should their own much-delayed developments suffer, just because the Western belly is now full of industrialisation and advancement?

The cyclic dilemma intensifies as the US is unlikely to commit to emissions targets, if rapidly emerging economies are left to develop at will.

Clearly, the next year is a delicate period for the G8 and other major countries. Not dealing with such economic shortfalls can conceivably lead to a much more serious global crisis across the world. Therefore, it is understandable why runaway fuel and food prices have dominated the global agenda.

Economic concerns masked other global political unease such as dealing with the controversial governments in North Korea, Iran and Zimbabwe.

This entire global economic conundrum, begs the question whether this current crisis could have been anticipated, avoided or at least in part mitigated?

Although the doubling of prices and food shortages has caught the majority of analysts and world leaders by surprise, key factors indicate that this was brewing and may yet dominate the world scene for decades to come.

The global population is largely expected to reach a remarkable 9 billion by mid-half of this century. The current booming population has created a tremendous pressure on the limited resources of the world. With a growing population come more mouths to feed, the need for more land and the need for more fuel.

This need by a booming population is exasperated with new significant and rapidly expanding economies in India and China. This pushes what were already stretched global reserves to breaking point and only worsens global warming onset by the global powers before their time.

As the world has grown, the fight for reserves has become more crucial. In turn, it has made the delicate balance of maintaining a world order ever more difficult and with increasingly graver consequences.

If the current world population, excepted to grow by almost 50%, is unable to sustain stability today, then the generation of tomorrow, which will suffer from even-more depleted natural resources, less land for agriculture and greater demand for food, may reach critical a breaking-point unless significant motions are set in the years to come.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

‘Eternal Slavery’ or a Mutually Necessary Pact?

Iraqis look for an agreement respecting their rights and serving their interests 

Discussions between U.S. and Iraq authorities on a status of forces agreement, essentially a legal framework defining the rights and obligations of militaries operating on foreign soil, are deadlocked.

The intense US-Iraqi negotiations on the “status of forces agreement” (SOFA) has increasingly turned into an acrimonious public debate. As the details of the first draft were released, it was almost immediately met with wide condemnation by Iraqi politicians and aroused fears and uncertainly in the general public.

The brunt of the anger has been aired by Shiite politicians, particularly the Sadr movement, who have accused the US of wanting to colonise Iraq and labelled the pact as “eternal slavery of Iraq”. While Iraq’s most influential Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has urged for rejection of such moves.

Iraqi politicians have been much more public about description of the talks, which has been used to stoke popular anger at the agreement. The focus of the debate has turned into the question of who is actually in charge of the country, the US or Iraq.

This growing alarm has seemingly prompted Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to adopt a tougher and more decisive stance in the negotiations.

Al-Maliki’s stance can be compared with the new tough approach on Shiite militias, which has seen him make some ground as a “national” leader. Al-Maliki is stuck between winning the necessary support needed from the US to ensure Iraq’s stability and in turn perhaps even keep him in the political hot-seat, whilst at the same time acting like a strong-nationalist leader who can stand up for his country and the wills of the nation.

Even his visit to Iran was dominated by the US strategic agreement, with Iraq split further by its crucial Shiite neighbour who is vehemently opposed to any Iraqi security arrangement with the Americans.

The initial draft was strongly rebuffed by Iraq, who deemed many of the stipulations within the agreement as a gross violation of its sovereignty.

The harsh-line adopted by Iraqi leaders has in turned forced the US to adopt a more flexible approach to negotiations and vitally downplay fears that they would seek anything than an understanding that was in the best interests of the Iraqi nation. This view was reinforced by President Bush, who stressed respect for Iraqi sovereignty, the will of its people and his keenness to assist Iraq in the challenges ahead.

Despite the public rhetoric, inside the political chambers, the Iraqi leaders realise that the valuable gains to date, including improved security, heavy damage on al-Qaeda and crackdown on militias and insurgents, are as fragile as ever. Unable to self-sustain stability and with political reconciliation ongoing, in the absence of US firepower, Iraq could stand to erase much of these gains.

Conversely, a lack of a long-term legal foothold in Iraq, places the US Middle-Eastern project, achieved to date with immense sacrifice in both costs and lives at great risk. In reality, both Iraq and the US need each other as much as ever.

Under continuing negotiations, some progress was made. Both the Iraqi and US officials have stressed importance of concluding a security pact before end of July as planned. It is hoped that a SOFA will be in place by 1st January 2009, where the current UN mandate expires, effectively putting the US involvement in Iraq under a legal vacuum.

The possibility of prolonged stand-off seemed high, when al-Maliki described the talks as reaching an “impasse” and emphasised multiple choices if no agreement was reached by the end of the year, including ominously even asking the US to leave outright. Iraqis have insisted that no agreement is affective without endorsement by the 275-member Iraqi parliament, which giving the hostilities to date may prove a challenge.

Iraq is insisting on the right to veto any U.S. military operations throughout its territory, maintain control of Iraqi air and sea space, place US contractors under Iraqi law, and has stated the importance of prior agreements before any US action. This in firm contrast to original US stipulations.

The agreement is reportedly only valid for 2 years, which would be aimed at removing ambiguity on US presence, although the US have continually emphasised that they do not envisage long-term bases.

For the US itself, the negotiations and their future course in Iraq is under intense spotlight. Many democrats have criticised Bush for the tying the hands of the next administration and view Bush’s insistence that no legislative approval is required with much scepticism. There are tough times ahead for the US as well as Iraq, while immediate withdrawal may certainly prove catastrophic, open-ended commitment is not a viable alternative any longer with increasing public displeasure and unbearable financials burdens.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Did the UN Really Stop the Clock?

In December 2007, as the deadline for the implementation of article 140 of the Iraqi constitution unsurprisingly passed, UN special envoy to Iraq Staffan de Mistura claimed: “…the question of Kikruk was a ticking time bomb. The United Nations has stopped the clock”. In reality however, the UN never stopped the clock, they only added more time to the “ticker”.

After Iraqi political figures agreed to “technical” assistance from the UN, it was hoped that a breakthrough could be finally reached on the hotly-contested territories including oil-rich Kirkuk. That aside, officially article 140, despite Turkoman and Arab rhetoric, is still the only legally binding paradigm for solving land disputes. The decision in December was to extend the deadline by another 6 months. However, only the deepest optimist would have thought that a referendum would be held by 31st June 2008.

The fact that Iraq is unwilling to follow democratic principles adopted by a clear majority speaks volumes about the level of mistrust and animosity gripping the national horizon and lack of genuine appetite for egalitarianism. Iraqis should never have allowed the interference of outside parties in internal affairs, let alone that of the UN. Simply, the UN lacks an adequate understanding on the level of differences rooted amidst the socio-political landscape.

The Kurds have never had representation in the UN and have been commonly persecuted while the UN Security Council has taken no action. Whilst 250,000 Kurds were kicked and beaten without remorse from their historical homes, “compromise” was not a word uttered by Baathist forces. Now those same Kurds, wishing to return home, are been told their legally-enshrined demands constitute overreaching and they must compromise.

In tandem with political progress on article 140, even the UN missed their own deadline to table suggestions to Iraqi leaders by weeks. Finally, those widely anticipated suggestions arrived in Baghdad last week.

Even the first phase of a methodology designed as a stepping-stone for dealing with Kirkuk by resolving less-contested areas was met with much apprehension. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) “first analysis” recommended putting Akra and Makhmour districts under Kurdistan Region control and with the districts of al-Hamadaniya and Mandali to be administered by central government.

The recommendations were based on “the administrative history of the areas and the change that have taken place after 2003 March along with the population structure and 2005 elections”. No matter what historical trajectory is analysed, UNAMI suggestions will always be based on approximations, until the people of every town are consulted in true democratic terms. This simply takes the argument a full circle – no technical agreement can formulate an all-encompassing basis for each region without an unambiguous consultation.

The suggestions were almost immediately criticised by Iraqi lawmakers on both sides of the Arab-Kurdish divide. There was general Arab census that the recommendations were “unconstitutional”, complicated the issue and had no legal basis. The Kurds themselves are unlikely to be happy without the prize asset of Kirkuk returning.

For the Kurds, this is a historical juncture. This is a chance to correct the wrongs of the past in a democratic and legal manner. If Kurds were unwilling to compromise in 1975 over Kirkuk, then any deal in the “new” Iraq of 2008 not involving its rightful return would represent a huge setback. The UN is an international yet generic taskforce when it comes to fiercely-contested regional matters. They will adopt a formula to try and please all parties, regardless of the weight of historical argument. If the UN is truly a taskforce capable of ensuring equal rights and safeguarding stability, then Kurdistan would have been independent long-ago.

The UN formula seemingly side-steps the fact that article 140 is synonymous with Kirkuk. A solution to deal with other less-emotive areas under dispute does not alter the picture a great deal.

Recently, Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, stated his administrations willingness for power sharing. If realised, such concessions are likely to be weighted with many caveats. Possibly, for greater compromise by Baghdad on the hydrocarbon-law or the return of all other disputed lands without question. Concessions would give Kurds productive short-term gains as well as a major boost of ties with the Turkish administration, yet the sense of regional defeat may be unavoidable.

Kirkuk has been a historical red-line and remains a future icon of Kurdish prosperity and survival. The will of the majority must not be sacrificed as a political token or gesture.
Regardless, the ticking time-bomb continues its countdown.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

The Enduring US Presence in Iraq

Long-term US occupation in the “midst of a frail Iraqi landscape” was always likely

As Iraq and the U.S. continue negotiations, long-term strategic ties have never been more critical for both parties.

Five years of a contentious occupation, thousands of US casualties, billions dollars of expenditure, and unabated battles against insurgents mixed with ever-elusive national reconciliation, paints its own picture. 

However, despite the heavy price that the US has continued to pay, their vision of Iraq as a pluralistic, stable and democratic bastion to act as a model for the volatile Middle-East is far from been realised.

In truth, amidst all frequent calls amongst some Iraqi factions, Iraqi neighbours and rivals in the US Senate to end the occupation, the long-term presence of US troops in Iraq has never been more inevitable.

Simply, a significant troop cut let alone complete US withdrawal at the current time would spell disaster. The US is far from executing its project in Iraq and the short-term goals alone may require 7-10 year of active US military presence. Indeed, any hasty withdrawal in the next 24 months would undo much progress that US has painstakingly attained.

The US without a long-term legal foothold in Iraq, is in danger of seeing the pack cards it has implemented with immense sacrifice, topple at a glance.

Critical issues remain as tentative as ever. Despite, the losses inflicted on al-Qaeda and the small but sturdy strides towards national unity, Iraq remains a magnate for foreign terrorists. The general animosity within the patchwork that is Iraq runs high and radical figures continue to execute influence. More importantly, Iran, Syria and its proxy forces throughout the region continue to pose the greatest danger to the strategic-objectives of the US, its national security and to undoing all the hard-work in Iraq.

Declaration of Principles

In late 2007, George Bush and Nouri al-Maliki signed a somewhat controversial “declaration of principles” to serve as a basis for current talks with view to defining the legal basis for the long-term relationship between the two countries.

The proposed agreement to be completed by a deadline of July 31st, is designed to augment the final UN mandate for the presence of multinational forces which expires at the end of 2008.

The framework of the initial deal included the basis for deterring foreign aggression against Iraq, assisting Iraq against terrorism, and encouraging much-needed foreign investment, primarily American, into Iraq.

With an insurgency fuelled by the presence of “foreign occupiers” and a battle, sometimes violently by Iraqi groups to end the occupation, the idea of such a deal naturally caused much of a stir. 

Ongoing Negotiations for Security Agreement

Negotiations have been ongoing between the Bush administration and the government led by Nouri al-Maliki on two key accords, with view to reaching a final framework which will take affect from 2009.

The first accord is referred to as a “status of forces agreement” (or SOFA), which will serve as a legal framework for the status of the US military in Iraq. As part of this accord, it would allow US forces to launch unilateral military operations, to detain Iraqis and would provide immunity to US contractors from Iraqi law.

The scope of agreements on these articles is unclear. Iraq has in the past month, stressed the need for US compromise on “sensitive issues”.

Although, it is was agreed that specific troop numbers will not be stipulated as part of any accord, it is expected that negotiations will indirectly determine how many of the existing 160,000 troops will remain in Iraq. Giving the current plight of the Iraqi government and future reliance of Iraqi forces, it is likely that at least 50,000 troops will be needed in the years to come. As such, it is unlikely that the agreements will contain timetables for the withdrawal of US forces, which is sure to fuel sentiments in some Iraqi circles.

The second agreement is seen as a long-term “strategic framework”, which will outline US cooperation in the key fields of security, politics, culture and economy.

It is widely believed that the Iraqi government accepted the accord on the basis of certain conditions. The US would need to recognise Iraqi right to secure deals with other countries, US should avoid using Iraqi territories for military campaigns and no large scale bases should be established.

In the coming years it is likely that the US troops will be out-of the public limelight but will serve to support and train Iraqi troops.

Permanent Bases

The idea and in-turn definition of ‘permanent bases’ has caused much debate. The majority of Iraqis have frequently objected to the idea of a full-time military presence in Iraq.

However, although a much looser definition of the word ‘permanent’ will be adopted in the agreements, in all likelihood the agreements that both sides hope to sign envisage just that.

In the same manner as Japan and South Korea in the past, it is unlikely that the US would have cut all its military ties in Iraq and withdrawn all forces. In fact, for the US it would have been a little short of strategic suicide.

Despite, the US seemingly in search of an exit strategy once Iraq has stabilised and democracy has been established, in reality US dreams in Iraq, let alone the Middle East, will take decades.

The US was never likely to wash its hands all together. Iraq is part of a wider picture that is crucial for long-term security and regional stability. Giving the scenario that US forces leave, in the current climate with sectarian tensions high and lack of a strong national army, Iranian agents would have a field day. The country will be at the mercy of its neighbours, with Turkish aggression only exasperated in the north and Syrian elements keen to complement Sunni influence.

US backing in the long-term is intended as a message to neighbouring countries that the US sees Iraq as a vital factor in regional stability. However, the risk is that this will induce a vicious cycle – the US are in Iraq to keep Iranians and other foreign forces in check, whilst foreign agents will not leave Iraq until such Western “occupation” has ended.

Even if no military presence was advocated in the rest of Iraq, in the Kurdistan Region the idea of fermenting long-term US bases would have been highly-popular and a strong possibility. The Kurds strongly encourage US presence and protection, to safeguard their hard-fought gains.

Iraqi Objections

Unsurprisingly, the onset of such deals with the Americans was bitterly opposed in some Iraqi circles. The idea of a long-term US presence, for groups such as the Sadr Movement who based their following on ending foreign occupation, is a testimony to their claims that US wants to “colonise” Iraq.

It seen as a move that would violate the countries sovereignty and would put the country under de-facto US hegemony.

Senior clerics, including Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Haeri and Iraq’s most revered Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have strongly objected to a ‘security accord’ between the US and Iraq. According to some sources, the Grand Ayatollah has insisted he would not allow Iraq to sign such a deal with “the US occupiers” as long as he was alive.

The Sadr movement, fresh from deadly battles against government forces, accused the government of unnecessarily turning Iraq in a battle front with many countries.

Objections at Home

The elusive battle for stability and success in Iraq has turned Iraq as a centre stage for growing US public discontent. Clearly, the presidential race has been by-far dominated by the Iraq war blamed on sky-high fuel prices and economic recession.

With President Bush under the firing line for tying the hands of the next administration by passing his mistakes, the long-term arrangements have been criticised by Democrats and some Republicans and raised fear amongst the public.

Although the deals, claimed as ‘non-binding’ by the Bush administration, are within the executive powers of the president, congressional Democrats have called for Senate ratification.

U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker moved to dampen fears by describing the framework as a “political document” and reassuring Congress that they will be fully briefed on all negotiations.

The Bush administration have emphasised, that any deal will not tie the next US administration or commit the US to defend Iraq, as either side could cancel the deal at any time.

However, some members of Congress, criticised the administration for making obligations without understanding the consequences of not fulfilling assurances, regardless of whether they are legally binding.

Conclusion

Despite the focus and controversy such security deals may receive, in reality it was a necessity for both the US administration and particularly the new Iraq.

Although, conspiracy theorists will be working overtime, long-term US occupation in the midst of a frail Iraqi landscape, the current regional mire and the greater US Middle-Eastern project, was always very likely.

Although, the US have tried to played down the agreement by pledging it will not stipulate specific U.S. troop numbers or “permanent” military bases, reality and not definition of terms, will determine their future role in Iraq.

With an already volatile and disenchanted nation who has suffered immensely, the provisions of the agreements were always going to be introduced with a degree of ambiguity, as transparency would have fuelled an outcry at the worst possible time for the Iraq regime.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Sadr City at peace… for now

After weeks of intense fighting in the Shiite district of Sadr City in eastern Baghdad, the Iraqi government and forces of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr reached a jittery truce, believed to have been brokered with the mediation of Iran.

The bloody conflict was a byproduct of a highly contentious crackdown on Shiite militias by the Iraqi government that began in Basra in late March.

The deadly street-to-street fighting, aided by U.S. firepower, proved costly for both sides. Weeks of fighting led to hundreds of deaths, countless wounded, and a population of over 2 million largely isolated and without basic commodities.

Under the ceasefire between the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and the Sadrist bloc, a list of 14 points were agreed upon, which in essence gave both sides much-needed breathing space in a rapidly unpopular encounter.

After a period of hostility post-2003, the Sadrists were initially swayed into the political fold and formed a shaky alliance with other majority Shiite powers, but later boycotted their six ministerial positions.

The Mehdi Army, which in the past has waged fierce battles against U.S. forces on a number of occasions, has enjoyed a mostly unchallenged role in the new Iraq as the Shiite-dominated government is weary of inducing Shiite-on-Shiite violence while reliant upon the Sadrist bloc in the ruling coalition. Unfortunately, the long-term dilemma of dealing with the Mehdi Army was only delayed.

The controversial ideals of al-Sadr and his bitter stance toward the U.S. presence in Iraq have often proved a nasty thorn in an already-fractious political landscape. The decision by the Iraqi government to launch operation ‘Knights Assault’ was formulated for a number of key reasons.

With the Sadrist movement enjoying substantial influence in the Shiite south, Nouri al-Maliki’s tough approach was designed to undermine the group with the pivotal upcoming provincial elections in October fast approaching.

The well-armed Mehdi Army is widely known to receive training, arms, and funding from Tehran. With an Iranian regime intent on derailing U.S. forces, a proxy war has been raging in Iraq. Efforts by Baghdad to drive out al-Sadr, under pressure from the U.S. administration, is designed to send a warning message to Iran and show that Baghdad will no longer tolerate free spirits hampering national reconciliation.

As al-Maliki launched his assault on outlaws and militias to many a surprise, it introduced much hope that Baghdad may finally have the valor to deal with core issues.

Al-Sadr’s form of Shiite radicalism coupled with Arab nationalism has often formed a political barrier. Sidelining al-Sadr from the political fold may consolidate support of Kurds, whose key demands of federalism and a referendum on Kirkuk was heavily opposed by the Shiite cleric.

On their part, Sunnis naturally welcomed the advent of an impartial administration. The Sunnis have often complained of a lack of protection and bias from a largely Shiite security force. Such a move is seen as vital to strengthening the political arm of the administration.

However, contrary to the new atmosphere of optimism, the recent battles have also highlighted the fractious nature of the armed forces. With Iraqi armed forces dominated by Shiites and pockets of al-Sadr sympathizers, hundreds of troops deserted fighting on the first day in Basra alone.

Although the crackdown was a positive turning point, it also highlighted that Iraq was not ready to fight its own battles and was forced to rely on indirect U.S. airpower to overcome militants.

The cease-fire may also in essence reflect the fact that the Iraqi army, which only just launched a crucial new offensive in Mosul against al-Qaeda militants, is unable to fight on multiple fronts.

In Sadr City, an ever-present battleground, sporadic clashes continued. Further suffering will unfortunately persist regardless of any truce. Militias continue to act as a time bomb, which will take more than weeks of infighting to clear. In either case, however deadly, Baghdad may have no choice but to carry on the battle if Iraq, let alone the U.S., can escape the current quagmire.

The U.S. surge, which has resulted in greater security, is owed to a large extent to the cease-fire declared previously by the Mehdi Army, and long-term peace is tied to the fate of Sadrist forces.

Whether the new calm is a result of the deadly storm or just a deadly calm before a new storm is open to debate. A revered religious figurehead or a 60,000-strong militia cannot be dislodged all too easily.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Kurdish Authorities Welcome CPJ Report on Kurdish Press

While the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has received much praise and attention as an oasis of peace and economic prosperity, particularly in contrast to an Iraq blighted by turmoil, one of the criticisms has been a lack of a fully liberal press.

Although a blossoming media has been witnessed in a relatively short period, with hundreds of publications in circulation at the present time, certain obstacles have tainted what is in essence a remarkable turna­round from the highly repressed state of the media un­der Baathist rule.

Reports on the state of journalism in Kurdistan have often criticized the government for harassment, de­tainment, and even physical abuse of journalists. Some widely reported cases have somewhat tarnished the overall image of the press. The government has been criticised for applying press laws from the Saddam era and for the general lack of independent publications. 

At the present time, most of the funding for the press is provided by political entities and the regional gov­ernment. With a lack of alternatives for funding, pub­lications are often under the de-facto hegemony of the government.

In recent developments, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), after conducting a fact-finding mis­sion, called on the Kurdistan Region leadership to immediately adopt a number of recommendations. In essence, it called for public condemnation of acts of violence or intimidation, the end of detainment of jour­nalists, to eradicate cases of threats and interference and ensure proposed KRG press laws abide by Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, where Iraq is a state party.

The recommendations also called for the suspension of the penal code that criminalizes defamation, insult, slander, and the publication of “false” information.

The suggestions by the CPJ were designed to press the Kurdish government not to pass or sign into law any bill that contains aforementioned measures or that may contravene established international press stand­ards.

Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani wel­comed the report by the CPJ. While acknowledging shortcomings, he highlighted the progress toward “greater liberties” and the ongoing evolution “…to­ward complete freedom.”

While acknowledging the government’s role in facili­tating a free press, he reiterated the importance of clear guidelines which the new bill, currently under discus­sion by the Kurdistan National Assembly, must serve to journalists and the responsibility of journalists on their part in ensuring a high level of professionalism, ethics, and also understanding and respect of the cli­mate in which they write.

Clearly, while it is easy to blame the government, the overall standard of reporting also requires focus.

Journalism has come a long way in Kurdistan, but the progression toward a Western-style press, particularly in the volatile Middle Eastern sociopolitical climate, will undoubtedly take time.

In conclusion, CPJ representatives credited the Kurdistan Region for taking positive steps toward es­tablishing greater freedoms.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.