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Demonstration law must regulate not prevent a fundamental human right

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The crux of democracy is the overlying freedom of choice and existence of an individual and a system of government that is owned and controlled by the majority. The origins of the word democracy are derived from Greek, meaning “the people to rule” or “ruled by the people”. Therefore the simplest implication of the word democracy is the notion of power to the people.

On this basis, the ability of the people to openly express their views and organize protests or demonstrations is a fundamental part of modern society and the democratic principles that underpin effective governance.

As such whether in an election, via a petition or indeed a demonstration, the primary concept is the ability of the people to be heard.

Many of the freedoms expressed today, especially in European countries renowned for democracy, have come as a consequence of the desire and willingness of ordinary people to stand up especially at passages of times when many subjects were taboo, including woman rights and rights of workers.

Many laws and legislative measures have been introduced as a result of “people power”. Once the very people that elect governments come flooding to the streets in great numbers, in any true democracy no legislative power can ignore such a compelling message from its inhabitants.

In the Middle East, where democracy has been a longtime taboo, the ability to stage demonstrations are often forbidden and repressed with great force and where allowed to be formed are severely restricted.

In the Kurdistan Region, after years of repressive rule under a totalitarian regime, a fledgling democracy has taken shape that can serve as a symbol of tolerance in the region. However, while the current form of democracy is a milestone achievement, it is far from perfect with some accusing the ruling parties of curtailing the freedom of expression.

In this regard, it was somewhat unsurprising that the government received a backlash with the passing of the new law around the staging of demonstrations (Regulating Demonstration Bill). Although, the bill was met with resistance by some quarters of parliament particularly the Goran movement, it was essentially passed by the sheer numbers of the KDP and PUK in the assembly.

There has been growing disgruntlement in sections of Kurdish society, seeking greater reform and more transparency in government. Amidst such prevailing skepticism, the exact basis for the new demonstration law that has been passed has become murky and subject to misinterpretation.

For an affective understanding of this new bill, the question of why is a demonstration law is needed and what it is intended to achieve needs to be adequately understood. Any reservation from opposition party’s aside, regardless of the democratic basis of the right of the people to protest and be heard, any democratic principle still needs a framework and a measure of regulation.

This notion of control should not be intended to “prevent” but to regulate, which for example is the case in the UK. The reason is simple – allowing and facilitating the freedom of expression of a group of people, is finely balanced against ensuring and maintaining the daily freedoms of the greater sections of society.

The underlining basis of a demonstration is peaceful protesting. Unfortunately, sentiments can sometimes spill into aggressive and violent behavior, attracting the headlines for the wrong reasons but above all creating danger to the greater community.

Therefore, in the vast majority of Western countries, while protesting is a fundamental right, they do not necessarily have an exclusive hand to act, organize and proceed as they deem fit. For example, under the Human Rights Act in the UK, protestors have a great deal of freedom to protest but under the firm basis of “Non-violent direct actions” which has the clear objective of ensuring that the people can get their message across without the proceedings descending into violence, bloodshed or anti-social behavior. Therefore protests must not harm the person, group or element that is the subject of the protests, or the security forces and rival protestors.

One of the major concerns around the passing of the demonstration law is that it will allow the government to manipulate the bill to prevent demonstrations or restrict protests as a form of self protection. A new requirement means that any demonstrations that are intended to be held must be authorized by the government.

In most Western countries, depending on the nature and extent of the protests, some actions require consent from the authorities but no consent can ever be denied on the mere basis that the authority does not want you to speak out.

The current sentiment towards the Kurdish government is not strictly that a law to control demonstrations is undemocratic or a new phenomenon in a modern society, but owed largely to the distrust felt in sections of Kurdish society towards the ruling parties.

It is this general cynicism that needs to be addressed, with the ruling alliance providing the necessary assurances to its people. In this light, time will tell what demonstrations are held or prevented or how restrictive this bill will become in practice. The grounds for any rejection must be clear and on the basis of safeguarding the greater community, preventing violence or damage to property. The law itself as it stands is not an obstacle to democracy but the danger is the manipulation of this law to suit a particular side.

In most of the major European countries, organized marches by the people need approval and protests can be disbanded or disallowed from been run if they are deemed to incite racial hatred or against the interests of the greater public.

In this light, the Kurdish government must work transparently around the demonstration law and allow external monitors to assess any cases where demonstrations are rejected.

The passing of the bill has already placed the ruling government in a precarious position. Demonstrations against this bill have been held that have ironically already broken the law. It also begs the question of how the government would react if unlawful demonstrations are subsequently carried out.

Such is human nature that spontaneous protests can never be avoided and sometimes gatherings or rallies occur or gather pace depending on the sensitivity of an event or issue without any prior planning or intention.

Any heavy handed responses by the security forces will only backfire, whilst at the same time they cannot be seen to be idle while a law is been violated.

Clearly, the overlying message to the Kurdish government is not that some measures they undertake are necessarily undemocratic but that the people still require assurances and that the region will expand on democratic values and evolve and not contract.

The need for the government to reform and implement a more effective form of democracy is still very much an ongoing objective, in order for the region to grow, prosper and become a showcase for effective lines of communication between the government and the people who select the government to serve them.

Kurdish politicians must be in touch and be seen amongst the ordinary people, in the very quarters where the people go about their day-to-day lives. After all, it is down to the people to express their voice and vote but ultimately down to the politicians to listen and deliver.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

The end of the beginning as the Iraqi government gets to work

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After nine months of intense political jockeying and instability as major Iraqi factions struggled to reach a consensus on power-sharing, lawmakers finally approved the new cabinet headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in a special session, which is hoped to foster a new path towards rebuilding Iraq’s shattered economy and infrastructure and promoting national unity.

Bridging together deep mistrust and animosity amongst the socio-ethnic mosaic was never going to be a simple undertaking. However, inconclusive results from the national elections in March of this year made the task an even tougher nut to crack.

After a heated race for the right to form the next government, al-Maliki proved triumphant thanks to the key support he mustered from the Sadrist bloc and the Kurdistan Alliance.

This left the challenging task of convincing the al-Iraqiya list, headed by Iyad Allawi and the victors of the polls, to grudgingly join the new government. The critical task in the Iraqi political sphere remained ensuring that the Sunnis were not sidelined once again for fear of returning to the dark days of the past.

However, as the actual bargaining to form the government produced tentative results and was marred by resentment and mistrust, there was a great danger that the cabinet formation would be tainted by the same connotations.

Faced by a constitutional deadline to announce his new cabinet, al-Maliki only presented 29 permanent nominees which were all approved, with the remaining 13 filled by temporary stand-ins.

This was to give al-Maliki vital breathing space to assess the candidates for these roles that would have overall support of parliament.

With an air of distrust that stills looms over the political chambers, finding suitable candidates to fill key security based positions that would fit the criteria of all sides is a difficult undertaking. As such the influential positions of Ministers for interior, defense and national security are still undecided.

With the security forces often accused of sectarian favouritism, any controversial candidates in these positions would only fuel further suspicion and unrest.

The tough predicament that has often handicapped the Iraqi transitional road to democracy, was perhaps best highlighted by al-Maliki’s speech before parliament – “the most difficult task in the world is forming a national unity government in a country where there is a diversity of ethnic, sectarian and political backgrounds.”

Simply put, this cabinet or government does not satisfy all sides and under the wide-spectrum of agendas, objectives and viewpoints amongst the embittered groups it is ultimately impossible to appease all parties.

Therefore, this government is a “best fit” against the current backdrop of pressures, delays and common disunity.

There was always going to be a sectarian flavour to the makeup of the cabinet and this is next to impossible to avoid. Whether in the streets and villages, the national assembly or the cabinet, the disparate and fractured nature of the Iraqi landscape is difficult to evade.

The notable appointments include former Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani as Deputy Prime minister for Energy, which was viewed as a great relief as it provided some comfort that contracts signed under his stewardship would be honoured in the absence of a national hydrocarbon law.

Abdul Kareem Luaibi as the new Oil Minister will provide further reassurance to would be investors having played a key role in negotiations with international oil giants.

Rafie Al-Esawi was named Finance Minister with Hoshyar Zebari maintaining his long-held role as Foreign Minister. There was plenty of Sunni representation with a total of 11 posts, with Saleh al-Mutlaq, who ironically only several months ago was banned for alleged ties to the former Baath party, named as one of the Deputy Prime Ministers.

Finding the formulas for short-term concord and stability has been difficult enough. Finding a formula that will allow long-term national harmony and peace where Iraqis work towards a greater common vision will take much longer.

The current cabinet may close a lid on the ethno-sectarian cracks for now but this will likely be at the expense of an effective government.

As strenuous as it proved to glue the pieces of the political jigsaw together, the pieces are susceptible to falling off at greater ease.

Allawi gave his crucial backing to the new government which was seen as a major boost for instilling positivity but it is still unclear how much power he will be afforded as leader of the new National Council for Strategic Policies.

In the realm of executive decision making, it waits to be seen how much sway al-Maliki will endure if there are attempts at curbing his power.

Much in the same way, the support of influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr was critical in allowing al-Maliki to stand a second term. However, his support is far from unconditional and thus not only did he demand a key number of ministries but he will have a firm eye on the candidates enlisted for key security positions.

This has been one of the key reasons in delaying the announcement of the remaining 13 posts as negotiations ensue to find compromise candidates.

Away from the sectarian fault lines, the biggest danger to the stability of the new government is the long-term relationship between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad. The Kurds, whose support with the kingmaker status was crucial in sealing victory for al-Maliki, have been at loggerheads over many articles that have been allowed to brew and fester over the years and are now reaching boiling-stage.

The key areas of contention include the implementation of article 140 concerning Kirkuk and other disputed territories and ratification of oil contracts signed by the KRG.

The Kurds have been weary of more failed promises and submitted a 19-point precondition for joining the government, which was approved primarily by the National Alliance.

It remains unclear whether this will be explicitly signed by al-Maliki as the Kurds demand, and how legally binding it will prove in practice. It is more uncertain how al-Maliki may trade-off his partners in their respective goals. It may well come to the stage, where al-Maliki will have to decide which partners support is more crucial.

It is next to impossible, to satisfy all parties long-term without greatly forsaking another. The status of Kirkuk is the best example, where any agreement with the Kurds would be on al-Iraqiya’s doorstep.

Although, Luaibi as the new Oil Minister enjoys good relationships with the Kurds, al-Shahristani, may well maintain similar hard line rhetoric with the Kurds.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Online Opinion, Various Misc.

 

Let Iraqis stand up and be counted – enough of foot-dragging over the census

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In most countries, the conducting of a national census would be a logical and straightforward periodic exercise that provides governments with key data pertinent to its citizens, facilitating affective socio-economic planning, improved delivery of public services, forecasting of future growth and generally providing a better understanding of the very people they are elected to serve.

However, much owed to the disparate and fragmented nature of the Iraqi socio-ethnic horizon, the numbers game has huge significance in Iraq in more ways than one. Where normally a census would be a question of numbers and not politics, in an Iraq that houses a diverse and historically tense mosaic, results of any census are just the fuel for the political platform.

With each group entrenched in deep mistrust, numbers means power and a way for one side not become sidelined or subjugated by another. 

With the valuable substance that the census promises to provide, it has invariably become one of those elusive constitutional principles that have continually been sidelined for one reason or another in the new Iraq.

It was perhaps of little surprise when the Iraqi government announced its latest delay on the conducting of the census set for 5th December 2010. This was the fourth such postponement since its original date in 2007, where it was first canceled due to the crippling sectarian violence at the time.

While Iraqi leaders met this week to discuss the very issue, a new date has yet to be confirmed. As Iraqi President Jalal Talabani stressed the importance of carrying out this census in the soonest possible time, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki admitted that there were no longer security constraints in the way of implementing the census.

The leaders agreed to form committees with view to resolving the current issues.

The timeline for the census has been stretched for its undoubted effect on the status of disputed territories. In fact, as a key step under article 140 of the constitution, the census is a milestone step before a referendum can take place.

The crux of Baghdad’s discomfort is the undoubted ammunition that the results of the census will provide in the fierce political stakes, namely distribution of oil reserves and the status of Kirkuk.

As such, the census has become the staging ground for the struggle between Kurds and Arabs, as opposed to promoting any real inter-Arab friction. Simply put, there is a great fear that the census will make the Kurds the masters in their current disputes with Baghdad and firmly tip the scales in their favor.

If a census was to be held tomorrow without the three Kurdish provinces as was the case in 1997, there would be no hesitation, highlighting that that the reluctance in holding any census is fuelled at curbing Kurdish aspirations.

The US, Turkey and Baghdad have persistently tried to thwart the census, labeling it as a product that will dilute a sense of nationalism and unity. However, why should a principle widely conducted throughout the West be postponed only because it would appear that results would benefit one side and not another?

At this moment in time, the exact composition and nature of Iraq’s socio-ethnic framework is based on much guesswork. For example, due to immense Arabisation policies of the past and a process of ongoing normalisation with Kurds returning to Kirkuk, it is simply unclear who commands what portion of the Kirkuk cake. At various intervals, Turkomen, Arabs and Kurds have all claimed to be the majority.

A census would finally answer many burning questions about the countries breakdown. As much as it would be hard to stomach for the “losers” of the census, facts are facts. A census is an analysis of the reality on the ground and this reality whether confirmed officially or otherwise is still in fact reality.

Those who fear that the census will lead to the polarization of Iraq are short-sighted. Iraq was polarised from the moment it was artificially stitched together at the time of its creation.

Any census will only confirm the extent of the polarization of Iraq.

Furthermore, due to the segmented nature of the Iraqi landscape, the application of democratic values over the past several years has only serve to highlight this clear fragmentation.

In this light, the national elections are nothing short of a national census as opposed to a classic democracy. The Kurds will vote for the Kurds, the Shiites for the Shiites and so on. There are always going to be slight variations to this rule but the underlining facts remain the same.

One look at the victors of the recent polls in each province along with the breakdown of the provincial council seats will already indicate the ethno-sectarian breakdown of that region.

The Iraqi national assembly is another clear gauge of the makeup of the Iraqi mosaic. The number of seats won by each major group is generally reflective of the population breakdown.

This clear disparity was one of the major reasons in the great delay in forming a government that satisfied the different the agendas of each group.

For the Kurds, one of their greatest fears was joining another coalition that would not fulfill its promises. The nineteen points that formed the terms of alliance were agreed by in full al-Maliki but it is not clear how keen Baghdad would be to implement certain measures, especially in light of the risk of upsetting the sectarian balance with their Sunni brethren who are on a collision course with key Kurdish demands relating to oil and disputed lands.

The holding of the census is the first crucial litmus test of the new coalition’s appetite to fulfill their vows. The Kurds may well be the main gainers from the census but this is no reason to indefinitely postpone constitutional principles.

It should not be forgotten that facts that the census will clearly portray can also be a factor for political reconciliation, for example, the allocation of the percentage of the national budget can be settled in a transparent way.

Clear statistics can also help Baghdad in formulating affective planning in the spheres of education, housing, public health and transportation, which are all essential for the government to serve its people in the best possible way. In addition, it will answer many key questions such as the number of orphans, widows and people forced to relocate.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Once bitten, twice shy

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While Kurds bring warring Arabs together, Kurdistan must ensure that the principles of co-existence are not sidelined

For a disparate country fuelled by common mistrust and a diverse ethno-social mosaic, finding a formula to satisfy all sides is never going to be plain sailing. How the Iraqi ‘cake’ is essentially shared and the mechanisms for doing so remain at the heart of Iraqi disputes. While analysts often talk about the distribution of power between the Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish counterparts, the basis for their respective “demands” is at times misunderstood.

There are essentially two deriving factors for the distribution of power in Iraq. The question around the division of power and key responsibilities between Shiites and Sunnis is essentially an Arab and sectarian based issue and a greater problem for Baghdad. There are of course various agendas for the balance of power and national ranking between Sunnis and Shiites, not least the great foreign interest in ensuring one side gets the upper hand over the other.

However, the Kurdish issue must not be judged on the same basis as the “Arab” problem. As far as Kurdistan is considered, it is a separate federal entity and as such the issue of ensuring equal representation and distribution of power should be based on ethnic grounds and on the basis of a voluntary union between the two main nationalities in Iraq.

Some Arab parties and foreign powers misapply the importance of dividing the top seats in Iraq. There was immense pressure from Washington and Ankara for the Kurds to relinquish their demand for the Presidency. This is democracy and normally electoral representation and thus the seats attained speak volumes. However, by the same token this is Iraq and democracy can never be applied on the basis of such simple mathematics. In theory, the Kurds came fourth in the election and thus top seats can be guzzled up by the so called victors of the polls. However, ultimately the argument is simple. As the second nation in Iraq, who affectively opted to become a part of a new federal Iraq on a voluntary basis, the importance of equal representation for the Kurds in Baghdad must not be mixed up with a quota based strictly on election results.

As such, when it comes to the distribution of power and key posts in Baghdad, the Kurds warrant a share of powerful positions based on equal partner status in Iraq and based on the plurality of the country. The Kurds warrant key roles that have influence in shaping the external character of Iraq and therefore the Kurds must hold onto the position of Foreign Minister. Then there are the key posts that decide the internal strategy and makeup of Iraq such as the ministries of oil, interior and security.

If the Kurds are denied positions that define and highlight the plurality of Iraq to the outside world or internal roles that define the direction of Iraq then this would provide evidence that age-old mentalities are hard to shake-off in Iraq and would certainly have the Kurds asking what direct benefit would they have  in any connection to Baghdad.

It would be ironic and somewhat contradictory if foreign powers and particularly Arab politicians assume that whilst constitutionally Kurds are the second nation in Iraq and in a voluntary union, that they would be happy with backroom political roles, especially to appease the likes of Allawi and al-Maliki.

This is the intrinsic nature of Iraq and no matter how you look at it, classic democracy can never be applied to Iraq. Regardless that they are outnumbered by Arabs in the greater Iraq, Kurds refuse to buckle to decisions imposed on their region or on their people by Arab politicians, lest some Arab chauvinists that prevail. Much in the same way that even though the Sunnis are far outnumbered by their Shiite rivals, they refuse to succumb to Shiite rule and moreover the majority of Western powers refuse to allow this reality to bear fruit. Ironically, the idea that Allawi and al-Iraqiya were triumphant at the elections is somewhat misleading. Firstly, Allawi is another Shiite using the Sunni bandwagon in his quest to reestablish power and secondly if all the Shiite parties combine, they have by far the most votes and could politically outmaneuver the Sunnis at ease.

Thus the new political mission in Iraq of distributing posts and forming a new cabinet will be based on the ideals of appeasement and a quota based system. The price extracted by political parties for supporting this new government will never be proportional to the number of seats attained at the polls, but based on meeting demands of political counterparts to keep them content and thus keeping the fragile political framework glued together.

As such, the perquisites of al-Iraqiya support hinge on them attaining powerful positions such heading the new National Council for Higher Strategic Policies. The contradictions are obvious, this council does not have constitutional support but based on the ‘goodwill’ of the leading Shiites and specifically al-Maliki when it comes to affording it executive decision making ability. As the head of the government, by far the largest coalition in the country and the overwhelmingly majority in Iraq, how far would al-Maliki go to share power with the Sunni’s purely based on the desire to appease their minority brethren who are yet a key component of the Iraqi framework?

The political uncertainty and instability can be best highlighted in the so called national army. The Sunnis distrust the national security forces that have a predominantly Shiite flavour, while the Kurds are not adequately represented and thus will always rely on their substantial and experienced regional Peshmerga forces, while other key Shiites such as the Sadrist fear that without their powerful militias that they would become sidelined militaristically by the likes of al-Maliki. Hence, Moqtada al-Sadr’s precondition for supporting his onetime nemesis in al-Maliki was that his Sadr forces obtain 25% of key positions within the security. Finally, there is the grand issue of fully integrating the Sunni Sahwa council forces into the official security apparatus.

Each of the aforementioned military factions is loyal to none but their political, sectarian or ethnic affiliations. Simply put, no side will accept a quota based on their populist representation in Iraq. Fuelled with great mistrust and a tainted history, no party will be willing to see another side with great military prowess assume the ascendancy.

As far as the Kurds are concerned, whilst they may have ironically helped Baghdad achieve a new government by acting as a strategic balancing body, of what benefit is seeing a strong and prosperous Baghdad and cross-sectarian Arab harmony if the key demands that form the underpinning of the voluntary union are continuously ignored?

Arabs have been dragging their heels over the implementation of the constitution particularly relating to Kirkuk and disputed territories and promises have been ignored countless times in the past. There is a great danger that Kurdish demands may be sidelined for greater Arab reconciliation somewhere down the line where Baghdad grows politically stronger. For example, all of nineteen Kurdish preconditions for support have been agreed by al-Maliki, which serve as a major victory on paper for Kurdistan. However, whether al-Maliki will be willing to underwrite some of these implementations in the backyard of al-Iraqiya is unclear. Most Sunnis within al-Iraqiya have been openly bullish in their opposition to potential KRG expansion. This will likely leave al-Maliki with a dilemma, stall the Kurds further or upset the Sunnis.

The Kurds must be unmistakably clear. The constitution is the basis for their co-existence and thus the Kurds are asking for nothing more than what is legally enshrined in legislature. If the Arabs pull together to thwart Kurds over the constitution demands or the principles of co-existence is sidelined once more, then the Kurds must stop working to establish unity and stable governance in Baghdad and resign from Iraqi politics altogether.

The signs this time around suggest the Kurdish leadership will not tolerate small talk or empty promises. However, it waits to be seen if the latest episode of Kurdish intervention between Sunnis and Shiites and their role as a key balancing force leaves them with their key goals and objectives distanced – once again.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

Now deadlock is over but hard tasks are ahead

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A political breakthrough is finally reached but after eight months of tiresome political jostling, in what shape does the new government get to work?

It was an arduous, protracted and tiresome journey at the best of times, but Iraqi politicians finally brokered a deal to form a new government. The announcement came as a result of days of intricate negotiations both in Baghdad and Erbil, were an elusive power-sharing formula that satisfied all sides was finally reached.

As it has became widely expected in recent weeks, Nouri al-Maliki would retain his position as Prime Minister, with the Kurds retaining the presidency. Iyad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya would assume the Speaker of Parliament position, along with the heading of the newly established National Council for Strategic Policy.

Although the basis for the new government is crucial, distribution of key ministries and the makeup of the new cabinet are still to be confirmed. Either way, the likes of al-Iraqiya and the Sadrist will exact a price for their support of al-Maliki with key roles in the new cabinet.

With a new journey that weary and dejected politicians must now assume, the crucial milestone of agreeing on the basis of a new government may soon be eroded by the many political cracks that Iraq will need to taper. The maintaining of such a delicate balance may prove more difficult than the onset of any agreement itself.

Facts speak louder than words. Any country that sets the world record for the longest period of time without a government after an election speaks volumes about its socio-political handicaps.

Eight months and twenty parliamentary session minutes later, the MPs have plenty of work to get started on. For every day the MPs bickered and the government forming stalemate ensued, the very people that these politicians were elected to serve suffered. Much progress remains to be made in Iraq and as far as the government is concerned the real work has yet to begin.

The problem in Iraq, a disparate country fuelled by historical mistrust is the thirst for power. No side is easily willing to relinquish power to another. And finding a power-sharing solution that will satisfy each side is much easier said than done as the facts clearly prove.

Amidst the current political frenzy, it is often forgotten that protracted negotiations and political stalemates is hardly a new phenomenon in Iraq. Often at critical junctures in the past, fervent pressure from the US ensured political progress and compromise amongst the main factions. As much as the US has encouraged and attempted to help muster an inclusive government, their lack of influence this time round is clear, as Kurds, Shiites and Kurds stuck to their guns.

As kingmakers, the Kurds had clear demands for their inclusion in any coalition and if all their preconditions have been met, then this serves to solidify the Kurdish strategic standing both in Iraq and the Middle East. In recent weeks, the Kurdish leadership has played a key role in facilitating negotiations and acting as the political raft in a gulf of political tension. This illustrates the vital role that the Kurds play, both in terms of commanding a share of seats that affords them the role of kingmakers but also as the key balancing piece in the jigsaw between the Sunnis and Shiites.

In theory, the biggest breakthrough for the Kurds was the commitment of other parties to the constitution. Whilst Baghdad often look to find solutions to political rifts, the constitution which already provides a roadmap for resolving a number of key issues such as disputed territories, hydrocarbon law and federalism is sidelined.

Simply put, as long as Baghdad abides by the constitution and acts on its promise in practical terms, then the vast majority of the Kurdish wish list is already covered.

Although, a number of breakthroughs had been prematurely announced in recent weeks, it became increasingly clear that Nouri al-Maliki had won his challenge to retain the premiership. His pan Shiite alliance already made formidable reading on paper and the strategic enticement of the Kurdish coalition was all that was needed to cross the line. With the Kurds mustering a tight grip on the demand for the presidency, it left al-Iraqiya with the Speaker of Parliament position.

The heart of the problem ultimately lies with the appeasement of the al-Iraqiya group and the idea of establishing an all inclusive government. Allawi held the view to the last moment of negotiations that as the victor at the polls, his group should play the lead role in government formation. In light of this stance, convincing him firstly to accept a role under al-Maliki and secondly as a “second” party was not going to be easy.

Ultimately, the application of democracy to Iraq is often like applying square pegs to circle holes. Regardless, of the elections results and the number of seats that parties are afforded, no side is happy to take proportional power in line with the seats attained.

Although on paper, al-Iraqiya came out on top at the polls, it was under a misleading reading. State of Law only came second as the major Shiites groupings initially failed to form a coalition. Once the Shiites groups announced a new alliance to create a Shiite super-party, this sent ominous danger signals to the Sunnis. However, the timing of Moqtada al-Sadr’s backing of al-Maliki was the real hammer blow to Allawi. Thus Allawi’s instance on a government which reflects the results of the elections is not so accurate, once the real votes in parliament are tallied up.

Whilst foreign powers have tried to push Iraqis along and have lamented the time taken to form government, ironically they have been at the core of the problems. Turkey, Iran, America and Sunni neighbours have each had their own ideals on a future vision of Iraq and the basis for power-sharing. For neighbouring Sunni countries and the Washington administration, a new Sadrist backed al-Maliki premiership tipped the scales firmly in Tehran’s favour, and they worked tirelessly to readdress this balance.

It may well have been pressure from Tehran above all other external parties that led to the current deal between the main parties.

The real question for a parliament who will get to work based on power-sharing and national unity on an undoubted bitter taste, where do politicians with an over flowing “in tray” of tasks go from here? Any compromise or power-sharing formed on delicate foundations or through gritted teeth will be prone to future splits and ultimately collapse. For example, one of Allawi’s conditions was that no political decision could be made without its agreement.

As a price for his inclusion, Allawi wanted roles with real power but this is in many ways in contradiction to the constitution. Any position that can rival the role of prime minister in executive powers spells trouble. However, the backdoor manoeuvring that has taken place to appease Sunnis comes from an evident desire to avoid a return of the dark days of insurgency. By the same token, although Allawi remained steadfast on his quest for power, other elements within his ranks could clearly see the reality of a new al-Maliki leadership and wanted to avoid the bare-cupboard nature of political exclusion that they witnessed before and as a result showed increased willingness to work with al-Maliki.

Either way, it appears that Allawi and al-Iraqiya commanded a high price for their endorsement. The presidency of the National Council for Strategic Policy was designed to keep Allawi in the frame as a key Iraqi leader. However, Allawi was far from happy with consultative or ceremonial roles and demanded real power in this role. It is still unclear how much authority this council will really have.

How al-Maliki will fare in an environment were his wings are essentially clipped will make interesting reading, especially as al-Maliki has often been criticized in the past for monopolising power and having too much of a direct influence on the security forces.

One thing is clear. The new government of 2011 will certainly be weaker and not stronger than the government of 2006, and in reality this new national partnership may pose more questions than answers.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: eKurd, Online Opinion, Peyamner, Various Misc.

As weeks quickly pass, Iraqi politicians inch towards government formation

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As months have quickly accumulated since the national elections were held in Iraq, in contrast politicians only inch towards the much elusive milestone of forming a new government.

Whilst it is possible to provide a detailed overview of the current situation in Iraq and the key socio-political characteristics that have hampered a sense of nationalism let alone national unity since its inception, the facts provide the best summary.

Any government formation effort that breaks all previous records in terms of the time expended highlights the complicated social, ethnic, political and sectarian composition of Iraq.

Although hope of a breakthrough in government formation was prematurely conceived when Moqtada al-Sadr lent an arm of support around incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on his quest to hold on to the premiership, a plethora of hurdles, permutations, mistrust and personal agendas remain that have actually blighted the process even further than before.

With the Kurds now enjoying the decisive “kingmaker” role they have been afforded, at least in theory all that is left for the Kurds to do is “make their king” and break this impasse. However, this is Iraq and seldom are things as straight forward as this.

Not only does Iyad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya group which holds 91 seats stubbornly refuse to accept “defeat” to what has now become a highly entrenched and bitter rivalry with al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, but it still continues to actively and eagerly tout for support to attain the premiership, far from reluctantly taking part in a loose nationalist alliance with all other parties or assume the role of the opposition.

Further to the ongoing jockeying that leaves the race for the premiership at least in practice wide open, it is perhaps the lack of buy-in from the weary Americans and a host of neighbouring powers, each with their own distinct agenda that has prevented Iraq from going past the elusive post.

As negotiations have unfolded, it has become increasingly evident that al-Maliki’s alliance is more leaning to the acceptance of the 19 key Kurdish demands.  However, the US is far from happy to firstly see the pro-Iranian Sadrist’s inevitably receive a whole host of key posts in the new government as a reward for their support and secondly to see a repeat scenario of the last major elections in Iraq, the sidelining of the Sunnis leading to devastating consequences that took years to heal.

It is almost certain that Washington has waned heavily on the Kurds to ensure that they do not enter an exclusive government with Sadrist and al-Maliki as partners. Conversely, Tehran is putting increasing pressure on Ammar al-Hakim to loosen his steadfast resistant of al-Maliki with viewing to solidifying a Shiite stranglehold in Baghdad.

With the influential positions of Turkey and Iran in particular, Iraqi politicians have seemingly met with their neighbouring counterparts as much as their fellow Iraqi political competitors.

Almost inevitably the majority of Sunni dominated neighbours want to prevent a strong Iranian hand in Iraqi affairs and a sidelining of al-Iraqiya. While in theory the Kurds could still be sidelined if al-Iraqiya and State of Law were more inclined to work together, the Kurds could simply threaten to secede from Baghdad altogether. However, the danger is that if the Sunnis are sidelined what affective options would they have? They can hardly threaten to secede in the same way as the Kurds, meaning taking up of arms would be perceived as their only option.

The problem in Iraq has always been the same. How do a number of warring and embittered groups that have been essentially stitched together share a piece of the Iraqi cake?

If this cake could be shared exponentially based on a population breakdown then the solution is logical. However, the Sunni’s who in theory can muster around 20% of this cake would never accept a minority status under the Shiite shadow who in comparison can demand 60% of this cake. While the Shiites clearly warrant a bigger slice of this cake on paper, the Sunnis would never accept anything less than equal partnership.

By the same token, although the Kurds only form 20% of the population, they would passionately and vigorously resist any attempts that will ever see them as minors encapsulated by a Shiite majority or a pan-Arab alliance. For the Kurds, it is simply equal status within Iraq, an equal partnership to decide matters in Iraq and an equal say in the direction of the country or they would decide to opt with no partnership at all and pursue their own independent path.

So how affective can democracy become in a country where regardless of numbers all parties demand their share of power and representation? Or where no party will refuse to be sidelined, even if by the very nature of a healthy democracy that may be the case if another alliance outmuscles them in coalition efforts?

Even if al-Maliki holds onto power with the support of the Kurds, which has emerged as the most likely scenario, Allawi will refuse to play second fiddle in Baghdad especially when he considers himself as the real victor of the polls.

Furthermore, any al-Maliki deal with the Kurds would effectively be played on the al-Iraqiya doorstep. Would the Sunni nationalists in Kirkuk and Mosul, already at loggerheads with the Kurds over disputed territories, watch as they are firstly sidelined from power and secondly perceived to be cast off by Shiite-Kurdish deal making?

As arduous and painful the government formation has proven to be, any hailing of a new government once the dust finally settles will be premature as the real work begins.

Once coalitions have been formed, the next task which acts as the platform for the real tussle for power is the formation of the cabinet. This where the real key to power lies. Each group within a ruling coalition would need to be appeased sufficiently for their support by getting their returns on the positions of authority.

The real gauge on the political health of Iraq will be once the new government starts to work. As much as there was numerous permutations to forming power that have lengthened the process, there will be an equal number of permutations which may see the government become shaky, untenable and susceptible to stalling.

This is particularly true if a government is formed that is all inclusive and contains all major powers as the US and some Iraqi sides hope. The sharing of power will be tentative at best and decision making will be ineffective, quarrelsome and prone to divides. In other words, on paper an Iraq would exist that would look united with equal national representation, while in practice will hold back and hamper real economic and political progression.

Any inclusive government would not only result in a delicate balance of power within the cabinet, but would also see the power of the Prime Minister greatly diminish. The hands of the Prime Minister would be affectively tied by the consultation and necessary appeasement of all other “powerful” hands around his table.

As the political bandwagon stumbles on, the real people that suffer are not wealthy politicians in fortified enclaves but the very people that democracy is designed to sever and whom the politicians have been elected by – the people.

It is becoming increasingly common that politicians are more determined to serve their own goals than the goals of their people.

Not only does the Iraqi economy continue to decline and the standard of living suffer but the real threat of a new dawn of insurgency and terrorism grows by the day.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc.

After eight months of intense political tussling to form a government, the real work has yet to begin

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Whilst the advent of democracy in Iraq has often been hailed as historic, politicians embroiled in an ongoing and tense stalemate to form the next government, continued to set other unwanted records with the longest period of time taken to form a government after an election.

Fast approaching eight months since the Iraqi national elections were held, politicians gripped with deep mistrust and personal grudges have failed to negotiate their way to a new government, desperately needed to bring stability and security to Iraq.

With a closer view of the Iraqi track record, this is hardly a surprising or unexpected phenomenon, even if Iraqi politicians have outdone themselves by their own standards.

The national elections were first delayed by two months, followed by results that took another two months to ratify, and since then another five months or so have passed for Iraqis to make somewhat of an inroad into selecting a prime minister to spearhead government formation. Before the US or Iraqis get ahead of themselves, it may take well into 2011 to agree on the formation of a cabinet.

Democracy in Iraq has been painstaking at the best times owed largely to the fractured and historically tainted nature of the Iraqi socio-political horizon. However, with the promise of a first fully sovereign government in light of the US withdrawal and the need to plug the security gaps that the might of the US army have crucially covered at great expense for so long, these elections and a successful national unity government which has been a reoccurring and elusive pillar of Washington policy, were understandably seen as a major barometer of the things to come.

With Ayad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya list narrowly winning the majority of seats to incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, the scene was already set for a turbulent battle in the Iraqi political chambers.

As soon as the final votes were ratified, the jockeying for political alliances and coalitions began. The very arduous, bitter and intense nature by which political groups have failed to find common ground speaks volumes about the very characteristics that have continually blighted the Iraqi transition to democracy.

The maths in principle is easy. A coalition with 163 seats is needed to form the next government. With al-Iraqiya on 91, State of Law on 89, Iraqi National Alliance on 70 and the Kurdistan list on 57, the permutations are varied but the denominations required to obtain the key threshold clear.

Once the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) and State of Law joined forces in the aftermath of the elections to create a seemingly new Shiite super party, at least on paper the formalities seemed obvious. Their combined total gave them 159 seats, thus leaving them only 4 seats short.

However, this is easier said than done with many personality clashes, historical animosity and different agendas even within existing alliances to factor in.

With the surprising decision of Moqtada al-Sadr’s list to back al-Maliki for the premiership, it was widely but prematurely hailed as the breaking of the deadlock.

However, as Iraq often takes one step forward and two back, the Sadrist’s stance all but fractured the Shiite coalition, with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (SIIC) and Fadhila hesitating to follow suite and grant al-Maliki a second term that many Shiite actors deeply oppose.

Much like pieces of a chessboard, the permutations and tides of power shifted once again.

The Sadrist’s move and the breaking of the Shiite coalition have more or less left the door widely open to the Kurds. With the SIIC still in the frame to form a counter coalition with al-Iraqiya, this has left the balance very finely in the Kurds favour with either of the major groupings.

There was initial hope that Allawi and Maliki could work together but given the ill feelings and growing disillusionment between the arch rivals, the chances of a direct al-Iraqiya and State of Law coalition remains bleak. This is increasingly leading to two entrenched camps with the yet undecided Kurds waiting on the wings to decide their fate.

From a Kurdish point of view, not only is this a position they have become accustomed to but also alleviates the danger that they could have been sidelined by a pan-Arab alliance. Given the strained nature of relationships between Erbil and Baghdad over the past years over a number of key issues including article 140, the status of disputed territories, oil sharing and revenue distribution, factors that are from a Kurdish perspective augmented with a bitter taste of broken promises emanating from the last Kurdish and Shiite alliance, this provides a valuable opportunity for the Kurds to tips the scales towards Erbil once more.

Many of the 19 points put forward by the Kurdish alliance as their key demands are hardly new and stem from the Transitive Administrative Law period as well as from the first coalition in 2005. Yet it begs the question why after all these years have these key demands, largely accepted in principle from the outset and reflected in the constitution, been continuously neglected?

The Kurds find themselves in a powerful bargaining position again and no matter how long it takes or what pressure they come under from the US, Baghdad or neighbouring countries to back down and compromise, their key points should be firmly etched in the political chambers.

After all, the Shiites bickered amongst themselves for many months were compromise was scarce, so why shouldn’t the Kurds be as ardent and persistent in their own goals?

Although, the Kurds could still strike accord with an Allawi boosted by an theoretical backing of SIIC and Fadhila, the chances of a Kurdish alliance with al-Maliki seem more likely.

It must not be forgotten that a number of al-Iraqiya political parties vied aggressively with the Kurdish parties in the key disputed territories including Kirkuk and the opposition to article 140 became almost one of the cornerstones of Allawi’s campaigning.

However, assuming al-Maliki musters the required majority to lead Baghdad once more, any Shiite deal with the Kurds particularly over the disputed territories at the doorstep of al-Iraqiya will hardly be the right tonic to soothe Sunni sentiments.

In fact, this is Iraq and regardless of electoral results, coalitions and agreements, any motion that does not cater for the appetite of all major groups will spell disaster.

Iraq is a disparate and historically scarred nation and any sharing of the Iraqi cake that does not satisfy all parties will almost certainly implode in violence.

Therefore, regardless of any future coalition, any sidelining of Allawi’s party will unleash certain doom. In the same way that if the Kurds were sidelined with a more unlikely Allawi and Maliki partnership, the Kurds could well have withdrawn from Baghdad all together.

This effectively means that while any agreement on the candidacy of Prime Minister would be a key milestone, it is essentially just another step. The actual formation of a cabinet will be even more delicate, as al-Maliki will almost certainly have no choice but to cede a number of key cabinet positions to al-Iraqiya and the Sunnis. Simply put, the chances of Allawi’s party accepting to play second fiddle to the main Shiite bloc having ironically been victors at the polls is next to zero.

To placate the stance of al-Iraqiya, they still firmly believe according to their interpretation of the constitution that they have the right to attempt to form government first as the party with the most votes.

On top of this, the Sadrist’s vote of confidence for al-Maliki will hardly come cheap and that they may yet demand at least 6 of the 34 positions on offer.

If the jockeying for the premiership was hard enough, getting the balance right in the sharing of the cake will be even more perilous.

Eventually a new government will be formed, but one with crumbling foundations, bitter taste in the mouth of politicians or parties who believe their returns were disproportionate, and the new Iraqi government will only stutter into a new political chapter. Such delicate alliances are always susceptible to problems and disintegration.

As political tussling, personal battles and ill feelings continue to run rife, politicians have seemingly forgotten the very people they have been elected to serve.

Violence in Iraq is steadily on the rise, reconstruction has all but been stagnant and much essential work to resuscitate Iraqi from years of sanctions, insurgency and economic ruin continues to linger.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

With the numbers game so prevalent in Iraq, the national census will rock the political horizon

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The upcoming national census due to be held on 24th October 2010 holds additional significance for an Iraq that almost seven months after the staging of national elections has still failed to form a new government. The importance of this elusive and milestone national census, the first across all of Iraq since 1987, can not be underestimated.

Iraq is a disparate nation where statistics have huge significance. While in most places this event would be a question of numbers and not politics, in an Iraq that encompasses an enthralling and tense mosaic as a result of its artificial formation by imperial powers, it’s almost impossible to discount the huge significance of this census in shaping and influencing the political arena.

The conducting of a census has proved controversial for a number of reasons, none more so than its undoubted direct affect on the status of disputed territories. Under article 140 of the constitution the implementation of the census is the milestone step before a referendum can be held in Kirkuk and other areas fiercely contested between Kurds and Arabs.

As Baghdad has dragged its heels on the implementation of article 140, clearly for fear of seceding power and territory to the Kurds and due to strong pressure from neighbouring countries, the census in turn has been delayed a number of times.

At a time when the formation of a new government has proved painstaking at best and security is deteriorating exponentially, voices from predominantly Arab circles calling for yet another postponement of this elusive census was predictable.

In reality, if the census was to be held without the three Kurdish provinces as was the case in 1997, Baghdad would not hesitate to hold the census even under the current tense climate. Simply put, the census directly pits Kurds against Arabs in the fierce political stakes, hence the long-term apprehension of holding this critical national poll.

While the principle of a census itself is not politically driven, in Iraq numbers means power and power is a prelude to wrestling as much influence and share of the national cake.

Those who believe that a census would be the source of the polarisation of Iraq are simply wide of the mark. This census does not lead to a polarisation of Iraq, for it merely confirms the extent of the existing polarisation of Iraq.

No matter how the matter is viewed, Iraq is a bitterly divided country that houses a number of ethnic and religious groupings who existence under the Iraqi banner has been fraught with historical mistrust and animosity.

Furthermore, although masked under a different light, this is hardly the first post-Saddam census in Iraq. With the fragmented nature of the social horizon, each of the national elections held thus far have been nothing short of a high-level census.

The formula is simple. Kurds vote for Kurdish parties, Arab Shiites for Shiite parties, Arab Sunnis for Sunni parties and so on. There are of course general exceptions to this rule in Arabic circles with more cross-sectarian political coalitions in the last elections but the post-ballot patterns remain essentially the same.

Analysis of the previous election results will broadly determine the nature of the outcome from the census. For example, the recent national elections in Kirkuk were a direct contest between Arabs and Kurds jockeying for power. The current distribution of seats in the Iraqi national assembly is affectivity a snapshot of the demographic breakdown of Iraq.

The census will have by far the greatest implication on the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. With the normalisation process incomplete to say the least, there is a great chance that Kurdish ranks will be swelled further. In this case, the census essentially becomes the de-facto referendum that most Arabs and Turkmens have long feared and proactively attempted to stall.

The results of the census merely confirm the results of a referendum in Kirkuk and disputed territories. In this respect, even if article 140 is stalled further and referendums are never held in Kirkuk, a census that clearly shows a Kurdish majority naturally provides the best political ammunition possible for the Kurds.

A census that shows a Kurdish majority in the disputed areas can almost be taken as the will of the people to become annexed with the KRG as opposed to remaining under Baghdad control.

One of the reasons why the census pits Kurds versus Arabs as opposed to promoting inter-Arab friction is the fact the census omits sectarian based questions. It will show how many Arabs there are but crucially it steps a major landline in not providing a breakdown of Sunnis or Shiites within Arabic sphere.

Ironically, the census does propose the Yezidi’s and Shabbak’s as separate groupings so there is a danger this may harm Kurdish representation.

In addition to the all important step of deducing a rundown of Iraq’s ethnic identity, the census will also ascertain many other keys answers from the nation such number of widows, disabled people and orphans and those who have been forced to move.

While most parties point to the census as something that will further stoke tensions at a delicate tenure in the new Iraq, it is often forgotten that the census can actually be a factor for reconciliation.

After all, as long as the census count is vigilantly analysed and prepared by Iraqis with representation from all major groups and with key UN input and monitoring, facts do not lie.

Kurds and Arabs have bickered at length over the distribution of the national budget with the KRG receiving a portion that they deem equal to their numbers in Iraq which Baghdad has ubiquitously contested. However, no politician should doubt this breakdown on the back of clear evidence from the census.

In a similar vain, if the census shows clearly how the vote is going to be swayed in any future referendum on disputed territories, this provides no excuse to delay the implementation of the constitution forever.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

A referendum on the taste for change and the historical foundations of Turkey

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For a country seemingly in transition and an ideological tangle between its historical roots and the reformists intending to drag Turkey into the new millennia, the vote over constitutional amendments held extra significance.

Many had perceived the vote as a referendum on Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself and the thermostat by which to gauge the ruling party AKP’s likely showing ahead of next years crucial national elections.

A hard-fought and contentious campaign was followed by a tense vote as the Turkish people voted ‘yes’ to the constitutional reform package on the table. The polarisation of Turkey could not be painted better than the fact that although 58% of the electorate voted in favour, large section of the Kurdish south east boycotted the vote or voted no. Elsewhere, large sections of Istanbul, a secularist bastion, were weary of government measures to dilute historical state principles and ideals.

The AKP, who stormed to power in 2002 with a tight-hold on the Turkish political arena, faced stiff criticism from nationalist and conservative circles, especially from the main opposition party, CHP, who accused the Islamist rooted AKP of a de-facto Islamist coup and aiming to seize control of the judiciary.

Since the AKP assumed political ascendancy, many key reforms designed to facilitate EU accession have been passed. This has included loosening laws around restrictions on freedom of speech, allowing landmark if not limited and state controlled broadcasting in Kurdish and slowly clipping the wings of the powerful Turkish army, the long-time guardians of the secularist ideology.

One of the key aims was to limit the power of the judiciary and the largely independent hand of the constitutional courts, whose status at times has afforded a free hand in upholding the now mystical secular and nationalist ethos of the state, and who were even close to banning the AKP only a couple of years ago.

The new measures provide the government greater influence over the selection of judges and also include steps to try army officers in civilian courts.

In many ways, the constitutional referendum pitted an old Turkey against an aspiring new one.

Over the past decades since foundation of the republic, certain blueprints of Turkey such as its strong secularism, nationalist ideals and the almost sacred role of the military were almost deemed untouchable.

While the AKP and Turkey has a long way to go, the sense of new if not highly contentious dialogue has been a strong development for Turkey as it tries to reshape its strategic role and identity both in the Middle East and Europe.

Admittedly, many of these reforms have been forced by EU accession demands than pure free will but the change in the air in recent years has certainly rocked the established elite.

The same ideals that engulfed Turkey in the 1920’s can not be merely applied indefinitely. The advent of globalism, a new world order and more transparent economic unions, means that Turkey must simply change with the times, or become stuck in out dated ethos that will only prove counter-productive to its advancement and standing.

Eventual entry into the EU is a major carrot and one that will ultimately see Turkey make further constitutional changes required, no matter how hard they may be to stomach in certain quarters, let alone discuss at this sensitive juncture.

As debate and a sense of anxiety in some nationalist circles continues to grip Turkey, perhaps it was fitting that the referendum was held on the day that marked exactly 30 years since a military junta took power 30 years ago and duly adopted the current constitution in 1982.

The current constitution drawn up by military influenced and ultra partisan actors with very specific objectives at the time is out-dated and simply incompatible with that of an EU aspiring country.

This common acceptance of the need for modernisation begs the question why all the fuss over the reform package? The answer is that although the reforms included only 26 amendments to the 1982 constitution, many which were widely expected and some now irrelevant, many hawks and nationalists fear that this may just be the tip of the iceberg as the AKP government manoeuvres further to imprint its ideology.

Critics will point to the way the reform package was rushed through earlier this year, and to the fact that citizens had a choice of ‘all or nothing’ over the proposed changes. While Erdogan has been heralded for spearheading economic and political advancement in Turkey, opposition camps point to his rigid style and view the Prime Minister with a degree of mistrust.

Ironically, while for some the constitutional amendments were too radical, for the impoverished Kurds struggling in the shadow of authoritarian and repressive laws and who largely abstained or voted “no”, the reforms simply do not go far enough. Many of the key laws and stipulations that continue to impinge Kurdish rights remain enshrined in legislature. For example, the key law that stipulates that any political party must attain a 10% threshold to enter parliament has continually blighted Kurdish political parties. Teaching and broadcasting in the Kurdish language are still limited and freedoms are still someway short.

Quite simply the changes simply do not quench the evident need of greater political reform in Turkey. However, particularly for the Kurds, who only decades ago were denied altogether, the gradual thawing of age-old mindsets is more significant than the limited reforms on the table at the current time.

It took many decades to usher even the notion of change and thus expectancy that the Turkish nationalist horizon will now suddenly tip upside down is optimistic at best. The democratisation of Turkey will continue, and as frustrating and tense as it has been, further changes will be painstaking, gradual and not wholesale.

For example the much anticipated ‘Kurdish opening’ ran out of steam as the government became paralysed by stiff opposition, perception of ‘succumbing’ to the PKK and also at the same time from instability and general mistrust in the south east, who argued the steps did not go far enough.

While disappointedly the iconic steps by the government to reach out to the Kurds never took any semblance of ascendancy, the channels of democratisation and dialogue are surely, if not slowly, taking root.

New democratic pages must be turned to ensure modernisation of Turkey’s south east and a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish question.

The EU must shoulder a lions-share of responsibility in carrying and pushing Turkey towards accession and prosperity, by loosening the nationalistic constitution further and particularly ensuring that Kurdish rights are advanced further. After all if Turkey joins the EU, it will be bringing its millions of Kurds with it.

While US President Barack Obama’s belief of “vibrancy” in Turkey’s democracy is exaggerated, in Erdogan own words, Turkey has at least “crossed a historic threshold”.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Peyamner, Various Misc.

Will Iraq experience ‘withdrawal symptoms’

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A sight of departing US forces was a long-time dream for sections of the Iraqi population opposed directly and indirectly to the American occupation. However, as the remaining US combat forces trickle over the desertous border, ahead of the 31st August deadline as per their strategic agreement with Baghdad, what kind of an Iraq will they be leaving behind?

Back in April 2003 amidst short-lived euphoria, the ambition and vision for the new Iraq was bold and inspiring. Not only did the US overthrow a brutal dictator but aimed to induce a sense of western values and democracy to Iraq that at the same time would serve as a model for the greater Middle East. 

Seven battle-hardened years later with over 4,400 troops dead, 30,000 wounded and not to mention war costs that now run into trillions of dollars, the Iraqi adventure will always remain a blot on US foreign policy and one that will symbolise the contentious tenure of George W. Bush.

While the US was seemingly bogged in a quagmire and stuck in a vicious cycle between insurgents on the street and bickering politicians in parliament, the situation in Iraq was averted from a total failure with Iraq finally turning a corner, the appeal of sectarianism slowly waning and security improving dramatically.

However, the situation in Iraq is by no means irreversible and the crunch period for the stability and future of Iraq is yet to be seen. No better way sums up the continual frailties that remain than the current circumstances that encompass the US withdrawal.

Almost six months after the milestone national elections that was hoped to foster the first genuine post-war national government, Iraqis still bicker on the choice of prime minister lest forming a new government to deal with the decisive issues that loiter on the parliamentary shelf.

While Iraq may not necessarily make the front pages of the news as it used to, this shouldn’t mask the fact that Iraq is still tentative and has great strides to make. As such, even as Washington can breathe a sigh of relief after almost a decade of two brutal wars that stretched even the might of the world’s greatest army to its very limits, Iraq is far from a “job done”.

While certain circles have been all too frequently keen to highlight US deficiencies in Iraq, Iraqi politicians must take a lion share of the blame for protracted progress and slow reconciliation. The US is hardly responsible for every Iraqi misfortune and the controversy over the US occupation merely masked key issues on the ground that was tapered for decades by totalitarian rule.

The huge US presence particularly in the aftermath of the surge campaign was designed to offer Iraqis crucial “breathing space” that was hoped to cement political progress. However, much of the benchmarks set by the US failed to be achieved by the Iraqi government.

Even as Baghdad has progressively moved towards full sovereignty in recent years and become more confident to stand on its own feet, the same fundamental handicaps continued to undermine the Iraqi mission.

Iraq is a disparate nation with a deep history of mistrust amongst its ethnic and sectarian mosaic. Too often direct US influence in the Iraqi political chambers allowed key legislation and government forming to ensue. More strikingly, whilst progress and milestones were often hailed over the years to showcase Iraqi path to success, many achievements could only be ushered by brushing key political hot-potatoes under the political rug.

For example, seven years later, enmity and ideological divides on the running of the country plague relationships between Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite camps. The Iraqi oil industry, which on paper has the power to propel Iraq to great economic heights, continues to linger behind with a lack of a census amongst groups on a true way to share its immense oil wealth.

Years after the onset of the constitution, the implementation of key terms such as article 140 continues to gather dust. While for many years, the spotlight was on the Sunni-Shiite showdown resulting in almost all out civil war, the strategic differences between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad were not as relevant. However, one of the greatest dangers that continue to gather pace is the simmering tension in the disputed border regions in the north, particularly in Kirkuk.

Although, relatively calm for now, the growing issue is yet to bear its full fruit owed to years of foot-dragging in resolving key standoffs between Arabs and Kurds.

In reality, the US has invested too many lives, money and foreign policy to wave good bye just yet. Far from the end of an era, the presence of 50,000 full armed US soldiers is hardly a meagre figure. The US with its eyes on the growing menace of Iran and its ongoing war in Afghanistan, can not afford an Iraq that slips into deeper infighting and insurgency and drags the rest of the Middle East down with it.

In essence from the 1st September 2010 under its new label of Operation New Dawn, all that may be happening is a rebranding of the American escapade. Remaining “non-combat” troops have the legal jurisdiction to continue counter-terrorism operations, assists Iraqi forces and act in self defence.

Owed to the fractured nature of the state, Iraqis are very much susceptible to foreign meddling and without a strong government in Baghdad Iraq may well play a role of a client state for neighbouring countries in the years to come. Iran continues to exert strong influence on Shiite parties, Turkey continues to build and strengthen its ties with Kurdistan and Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan observe diligently to ensure that Sunni interests do not succumb to a new wave of Shiite revolutionaries on their eastern borders.

Political frustrations aside, security in Iraq is hardly clean-cut. One only has to point to the notion that there are now “only” 50 or so deaths a week. That is still 50 lives too many that Iraqi families have to endure. Although, Iraqi forces numbering over 600,000 are formidable on paper, by their own admission they are not ready to assume full responsibility for all aspects of security without US assistance.

Furthermore, just where loyalties lie within the forces is open to question. Until the security forces broadly comprise all three groups, sentiments will be cautious to the effectiveness and impartiality of the forces.

Above all else, as at least a phase of the US adventure comes to a close, people have lost sight of the overall picture. The new Iraq and foreign actors must realise that a brutal dictator, who killed thousands of his own civilians with chemical weapons, launched deadly wars, drained national resources and repressed three quarters of the population was removed thanks to the US. Just ask the Kurds in north at their gratitude towards the Americans.

The new Iraq can in theory excel economically and strategically. However, as the US has come to terms over seven years, they can only push Iraqis so far, the rest of the journey only Iraqis can assume whilst Americans anxiously watch. Iraqis must start to look at key differences that continue to blight progress and realise only they can muster a new dawn. There is nothing the US can do but hope that their grand and costly excursion in Iraq comes to fruition.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Epoch Times, Peyamner, Various Misc.