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Emboldened by local elections, Erdogan looks to the Kurds in presidential bid

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The local elections in Turkey were widely touted as a pivotal landmark and referendum on the 11 year rule of AKP and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Whilst Erdogan has been under great pressure of late and has endured much publicity, he was not only able to come out the elections fighting but emboldened to the contrary of expectations from opposition circles.

This goes to show that in democracy even if 1 million come to the streets in stern opposition, it is relative and not always a reflection of the sentiment of millions that decide not to take to the streets. His opposition cannot be taken lightly but his support is evidently greater.

In the end the Gülenists failed to demonstrate that they have the political clout to strike a real blow to Erdogan and the AKP. The resounding victory gave Erdogan renewed confidence to undermine and attack the Gülenists and Erdogan hardly hid his desire to root them out, holding them responsible for unrest in Turkey and smear campaigns against the government.

The election results provide a platform for Erdogan to pursue his long-time ambition of replacing Abdullah Gul as president at the presidential elections in August, where for the first time the president will be elected by popular vote and not by government.

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) had a decent showing at the elections even if they failed to woe their targeted number of votes, but AKP continued to fair strongly in Kurdish districts.

There is popular consensus amongst Kurds that Erdogan, who has been the instigator of much welcome reform of Kurdish rights and gradual steering away of nationalist hysteria against the Kurds, is the key to the continuation of the peace process.

Even though the pace and scope of the peace process has disappointed and not met Kurdish expectations, Erdogan has taken political risk amidst a backdrop of nationalist opposition.

In this light, dealing a blow to Gülenists and secular nationalists alike was a common agenda of the Kurds and the AKP.

Erdogan secured 46% of the vote but must now strive to build on this especially if he is to succeed in the presidential elections. An alliance with the BDP is a seemingly logical step for both sides.

The BDP (and their sister party HDP) mustered just over 6% of the vote having won 3 metropolitan municipalities, 8 provinces and 66 districts.

Kurds represent a signifiant portion of the elctroate and between those that voted for AKP and the BDP, a coming together to support Erdogan‘s candidacy will almost certainly tip the scales favourably.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

With Iraqi 2014 elections, security and national unity already under the strain, Iraqis may not see another election come 2018

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When the first free elections took hold in Iraq under the auspices of the U.S., it was certainly a milestone in the history of Iraq. Washington, hands deep in the Iraqi political and security picture at the time, accepted that the transitional road to democracy and national reconciliation was going to be rocky and protracted but hoped that with time Iraq would see much light under the tunnel.

In 2014 as Iraqis prepare for their third national elections on 30th April 2014, close to 11 years since the ouster of Saddam, Iraqi stability, security and national reconciliation remains dormant at best but certainly not a far cry from 2006.

Iraq is currently locked in the worst sectarian violence since the height of its crippling civil war. There were over 9000 deaths in 2013 and already 2000 this year. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has used an iron fist to quell a new Sunni insurgency, clearly reinvigorated by the Syrian conflict next door that has seen Sunni militants roam in large parts of the Anbar province and occupy the flashpoint town of Fallujah, on the doorstep of Baghdad.

Maliki’s response to mass Sunni protests at the political marginalisation by the Shiite led government drove a wider wedge in the sectarian divide but more importantly alienated moderate Sunni factions. It must not be forgotten, it was the Sunni Sahwa or Awakening Councils that ultimately drove al-Qaeda out of the Sunni heartlands at the height of the sectarian insurgency in 2007-2008, not direct American fire-power.

Maliki has even reverted to Tehran to purchase weapons, at the dismay of Washington, which threatens to extend the regional Sunni-Shiite battle clearly on display in Syria.

If the historic Sunni headache was not bad enough, Maliki has hardly created many friends in Kurdistan. Discontent between Kurds and Baghdad is not new especially over oil exports, national budget and disputed territories, but on the eve of the elections and with Maliki effectively putting Kurdistan under an economic siege by withholding national budget payments and refusing to compromise on Kurdish oil exports via Turkey, this is already making a future national unity government an arduous if not impossible task.

If this wasn’t proving a difficult enough backdrop, the entire members of the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) presented their resignation last week. If accepted by the government, it all but ends any chance of holding elections on schedule even as most parties insist on it been held on time.

Some Sunni groups have illustrated the IHEC position and the poor security condition in Sunni-dominated areas as reasons why polls should be delayed. If Sunnis are not adequately represented at the polls as in 2006 when they largely boycotted the vote, it will strike a blow to the credibility of any government before it has even started.

Ultimately, the IHEC will not be allowed to stand-down but such a move by the commission owing to their great frustration over political interference sums up the negative mood surrounding these elections.

The UN supported the IHEC and praised them for been technically well prepared and for their integrity. This sentiment was echoed by the US government.

The IHEC complained that it was caught in the middle of conflicting rulings between the legislative and judicial authorities particularly around the validity of certain candidates from the election.  A vague provision in Iraq’s electoral law that requires Iraqi candidates to be of “good reputation” has been manipulated and interpreted to suit political agendas. Critics of Maliki have waged that this provision has been abused to bolster Maliki’s quest for a third term in office.

At a local level in the Kirkuk province there was a similar divide over holding of elections in the province. Arabs have sought to delay elections with Kurds and most Turkmen groups insistent that it must be held on time.

Iraqis broke a world record to form a government after elections in 2010. Even then many of the agreements that underpinned the eventual breakthrough have not been implemented. Forming a government in 2014 will be even more difficult.

Either way, if the declining Iraqi political, economic and security spiral continues into the next government with Kurdistan and Baghdad failing to bridge the growing divide and Sunni-Shiite polarisation deepening, there may not be another election come 2018.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

As Russia claims Crimea, West struggles amidst threat of a new Cold War

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The growing crisis in Ukraine has threatened a new Cold War. Ukrainian civil unrest and protests gathered pace only recently leading to the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovyc, but in reality it had been on the cards for several months with the West reacting too slowly.

Ukraine’s pro-EU and pro-Russia split is hardly new and Russia remained determined since the break-up of the Soviet Union to ensure that Ukraine toed the Moscow line – with various economic and political sticks and carrots.

Now with the focus heavily on Crimea, the West is scampering to deescalate the crisis and calm the drums of war. However, Russia is seemingly two-steps ahead of the West. Whilst Western powers and Russia tried to find common ground on the negotiating table, Crimea was already preparing for its formal reunion with Russia and had set a 16th March referendum. Whilst Vladimir Putin claimed that only pro-Russia militias existed in Crimea, thousands of Russian troops were pouring in to besiege Ukrainian bases.

With historic emotional and strategic ties to Crimea, Russia did not need a second invitation to create a pretext – protecting its ethnic Russians. After all, this is the same Crimea that Russia deemed worthy of sacrificing hundreds of thousands of troops to safeguard in a bloody war against an alliance of European and Ottoman forces in the 1850’s.

Putin is an opportunist and knows that a chance to reclaim Crimea does not come every day.

Yet the ethnic pretext in Ukraine is the same one that saw the West stand virtually idle in 2008 when Putin invaded Georgia to protect its citizens, thousands of whom Russia had provided passports, and practically annexed the break-way provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

The crisis over Crimea has many more twists and turns. The Russia parliament has already promised to help their “brothers” with their nationalist wishes if they formally request this as part of the upcoming referendum.

Such a unilateral annexation is in violation of the Ukrainian constitution, Russian treaties with Kiev and international law and is unlikely to be recognised but is Russia really deterred? It has long calculated and presupposed Western reaction and positioning and limits of any repercussions. Threats of sanctions, visa restrictions etc is too predictable and do not carry enough substance.

Indeed as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned, any sanctions would certainly have a “boomerang effect” on the West. For a start, Ukraine already owes millions in gas payments to Gazprom. In 2009, a two week Russian suspension of gas supplies to Ukraine and in turn to the rest of Europe via transit pipelines crippled the Ukrainian population and countries that relied on Russian gas. All because Russia wanted to hike transit fees and extend the lease of its Black Sea Fleet and ensure that Ukraine remained in its sphere of influence.

Western rhetoric, in particular of the Unites States and its President Barrack Obama, however strong in nature, has become too predictable. War of words will not solve any crisis that turns into a war of guns.

The US has tried to “reset” ties with Moscow in recent years but Moscow has pursued its national interests first and has not hesitated to take action that alienates Washington.

This could not be truer of Syria. Obama has tip-toed, repeated the same rhetoric against Bashar al-Assad and has drawn and redrawn “red lines” for 3 over years. Russia on the other hand, did not hesitate to go neck-deep in the conflict to protect its strategic interests in Syria and the Mediterranean.

Russia has single-handedly propped the Syrian regime and has done it with little regard to Western or regional pressure.

A lack of US muscle and more importantly a united Western stand in Syria has led to a disjointed foreign policy and an even more disjointed opposition movement.

Now in Ukraine, the West has to find a united position quickly. Western goals of seeking a diplomatic solution and continuing dialogue would certainly make Russia “smile” as they recently stated. After all, it just buys more time. Before the West finishes discussing Crimea, it may long have become a de facto part of Russia.

Any policy of appeasement is certainly going to back-fire. Western allies or Ukrainians do not have the appetite to fight Russia militarily so if sanctions and political pacts do not have the desired effect, will the crisis stop at Crimea? How about most of Eastern Ukraine which is pro-Russian and has been the subject of many protests?

Protecting its citizens becomes a template in which Russia policy can be repeated for its benefit.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Maliki’s economic siege of Kurdistan shows that the only true friend of the region is the Kurds himself

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As the Erbil-Baghdad crisis reached new lows, Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani warned that the actions of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki amounted to “a declaration of war against the people of Kurdistan.”

With an increasingly independent oil infrastructure, all that remains between practical independence is control of oil revenues. Baghdad knows this very well and has displayed this leverage it still possess by refusing to pay share of Kurdistan national budget and even refusing to let two small airlines operate from Kurdistan, until Kurdistan agrees to Baghdad control of revenues.

This shows that while the rise of Kurdistan, particularly since 2003 has been phenomenal, until the Kurds can truly control their own destiny and become self-sufficient, they will always be at the mercy of Iraqi and regional rulers.

The famous Kurdish saying once reverberated that “Kurds have no friends but the mountains”. While this saying doesn’t hold true as before, after all there are dozens of consulates, hundreds of foreign companies and several oil majors operating in a booming area with Kurdistan enjoying growing strategic importance, it does remind the Kurds to keep their guard up, not take anything for granted and hold the view that the first friend and guardian is the Kurd himself.

This is certainly true of ties with the US, who under Barrack Obama has not only taken a step back but has hastily retreated from Iraq and the region. As events in 1975 and 1991 have shown the Kurds, US foreign policy (and indeed foreign policy in general) can be fickle and cruel.

Kurds sought strong ties with Washington and the US was all for working with the Kurds but with their focus on Iraqi sovereignty and not alienating or upsetting Baghdad. The US is no stranger to resolving many crises since 2003, many with the help of the Kurds, but has stayed out of recent disputes between Erbil and Baghdad even as the Maliki’s economic siege on Kurdistan threatens the livelihood of Kurdish families and the region.

The Kurds believed that the strategic relationship with the US was there to stay but ironically Washington hasn’t even removed the KDP and PUK from their terror list. With an obsession of keeping a united Iraq, the US has grown uneasy at the new closeness between Erbil and Ankara – yet they initially encouraged stronger ties after years of tension and mistrust between the two sides.

As for Baghdad, the Kurds regrettably endorsed a second term for Maliki in 2010 in spite of numerous failed promises. The fact that many of the 19 points of the Erbil Agreement that allowed Maliki to come to power remain unresolved tells its own story.

With the Iraqi elections just months away, Maliki wants new leverage among defiant Sunnis and disenchanted Shiites and the show of strength against the Kurds is one tactic. But let it be no doubt that sooner or later, Maliki will need the Kurds and once he has finished his sabre-rattling, he has to reconcile with the Kurds and seek a resolution for the current crisis.

In return, Maliki is attempted to politically blackmail the Kurds into a third term. But the Kurds have to wisely avoid repeating the mistake of trusting Maliki or any other power in Baghdad.

The Kurds must show that they are not at the mercy of Baghdad, if Maliki wants to play hardball and hold the region to ransom, then the Kurds must have and play their own card and leverage.

Kurdistan can ill-afford to have their future tied to the goodwill of Baghdad but even that of Ankara and Tehran.  The Kurds have had their rights and a freedom abused and withheld and 2014 is not the time, with the Kurdish national renaissance and newfound prominence, to be revisiting days of hold.

This is all the more reason for Kurdish leaders to finally form an elusive new cabinet, work in unity and put aside individual interest for the sake of the greater nation – after all, if the Kurds won’t help themselves, then certainly external forces cannot be trusted to come to their rescue.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Kurdish oil rift with Baghdad – not just a case of economy but political leverage and autonomy

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The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi federal government after months of negotiations failed to find a breakthrough over the issues of oil exports from Kurdistan, revenue sharing and the national budget.

The KRG was quick to refute claims by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister for energy Hussain al-Shahristani that Kurdistan had agreed to exports via SOMO, the federal government marketing vehicle. KRG spokesman Safeen Dizayee quickly downplayed such claims, “absolutely we have not reached any agreement to export oil via SOMO. The dialogue and discussions are still underway”.

Ahead of the all-important Iraqi national elections this year, Baghdad has politicised the issue of oil exports and withheld the Kurdish share of the federal budget as a show of strength.

Ultimately, it doesn’t come down to money and economics but down to control, autonomy and lack of trust. One must not forget that under the Iraqi constitution Kurdistan is only entitled to receive 17% of the budget. If 300,000 bdp or so has caused so much tension then imagine when it rises to 400,000 bpd and then the more ambitious targets set by Kurdistan of 1 million bdp by 2015 and 2 million by 2019.

Iraq reaps the benefit of over two-thirds of Kurdish output. Ironically, this is the same oil that Baghdad never really knew Kurdistan even had and is a lucrative bonus for Baghdad. The vast majority of the reserves discovered in Kurdistan have come in the period after 2003.

Does Baghdad rejoice that the national reserves have been boosted to such a large extent by Kurdish discoveries? Quite the opposite. Such discoveries have been met with doubt, lack of trust, threats and rifts. Why? Because such discoveries are literally the fuel for Kurdish independence and Baghdad loses one of the remaining nooses over the region.

What control would Baghdad have remaining on the region if they could export their own oil and receive funds in a non-Baghdad controlled bank account and actually receive much more than they ever could painstakingly get from Baghdad?

Hence, the new independent Kurdish pipeline to Turkey and the fact that 400,000 bpd is merely waiting to be sold at Ceyhan sent Baghdad’s anxiety into overdrive.

In reality, Baghdad would agree too many Kurdish terms. As already mentioned, they serve to receive the greater benefit anyway – just as long as Baghdad’s control is not compromised.

As we have seen with the failure to pay salaries and provide the regions share of the budget, Baghdad wants to be controlling the political shots. As long as Baghdad retains the upper-hand then Kurdistan will be under the mercy of Baghdad.

It came as no surprise that the Iraqi Finance Ministry has warned that it could not pay Kurdish salaries unless the region resumed oil exports. Of course, Baghdad will not have a “face a liquidity crisis” as they claim if they paid from such huge funds under their control. This is just for political leverage.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, wants to force the KRG into a deal. Withholding salaries or creating crisis in Kurdistan is a form of political blackmail to put the heat on the Kurds.

This is where the ironic twist only intensifies. There is literally millions of dollar worth of Kurdish oil ready to be sold and yet the Kurds do not have funds to pay their own salaries?

Turkey recently reaffirmed its commitment to the symbolic energy deals with the Kurds. The Kurds cannot continue to be bullied over what is their national treasure.

What Iraqi oil funds did Saddam use to build Kurdistan and boost its infrastructure? Actually, it used the oil funds to destroy Kurdistan and kill Kurds. Now, in the Iraqi democratic age, the Kurds are expected to handover Kurdish oil to boost Iraq.

This is a defining moment in Kurdish history. The Kurds dare not succumb to the wills of Baghdad again. The Kurds have played a role in the creation of the Maliki hand. After dozens of failed promises, they must think twice before any post-election agreement or future concessions in Baghdad.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Growing hope of elusive government formation in Kurdistan as the PUK internal crisis intensifies and endangers stability.

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As the Kurdish public grow increasingly frustrated and impatient at the lengthy delay and protracted negotiations around government formation, there were recent signs that the deadlock can be finally broken.

The onset of 3 strong parties was unprecedented in Kurdistan’s democratic experience. Although, this is an encouraging sign of political and democratic maturity, this new ground brought with it new challenges.

As with any political or social landscape, the situation will constantly change and as such politics will have to follow suit. Finding a compromise on government formation has been difficult but this has been made even more difficult as the region and political parties became accustomed to new norms.

This is particularly true of the PUK. Since the tragic illness to their leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, they have struggled to agree a common roadmap and way forward. It has been evident ever since the first notable split, when Gorran was formed in 2009, that there was increasing disagreement and disunity with the ranks about the future and strategy of the party.

However, as long as a constructive and reconciliatory tone is maintained, evolution and vigorous debate over the future of the party can be healthy. It is a sign of changing times and adapting to the new local and regional climate. After all, no party or political leader can expect that the policy and approach of yesterday can merely continue indefinitely.

PUK’s internal instability has accelerated in recent weeks with a growing media war. The decision to postpone the party elusive party convention caused rifts to deepen among its main council leaders Hero Ibrahim Ahmed, Kosrat Rasul and Barham Salih. Salih resigned soon after the postponement of the party convention and was particularly vociferous in the need for reform in the aftermath of the disappointing parliamentary elections.

Amidst the growing rifts in a major political party and an emboldened Gorran on the scene as the second largest party, the recipe for prolonged political wrangling and delays was there. How difficult would discussions on a wider level be if the PUK did not have united front at home?

After 20 or so rounds of talks around government formation, there was a glimmer of hope that concord was finally struck. Gorran would relinquish role of Deputy Prime Minister to the PUK, accept the position of parliament speaker and would symbolically attain the post of Interior Ministry.

The position of interior ministry would be a coup for Gorran especially as it means they can play a more pivotal role in government affairs and upholding their election manifesto, and can oversee security forces that they allege lean to the major parties.

The PUK internal struggle harms Kurdish stability in the region and Kurdistan Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani warned the security of the region and the stability of Sulaimaniya was a red line. The KDP can play a vital role in soothing cracks in its ally.

The situation is not helped that in spite of diluted seats, the PUK has sway over most of the security forces in Sulaimaniya province. No doubt that even some of these security forces have allegiances to Gorran and also sentiment towards certain party leaders within the PUK.

So what does all the internal party rifts and constant delays in forming a government mean for Kurdistan. For a start, if the Kurds are not united at home, how can they be united away?

The Iraqi national elections are fast approaching and with the continued illness of Jalal Talabani, it is not clear who the Kurds will even propose for post of President. Distribution of posts amongst the Kurds in Baghdad could well be another item of contention.

With continued clouds over Kirkuk and disputed territories, a new sectarian war between Sunnis and Shiites, and the continued stand-off over oil exports, Kurdish disunity will greatly harm their greater goals.

The need for a united approach in external affairs is evident in the different stance towards Syrian Kurdish autonomy. The PUK and Gorran have publicly supported the onset of autonomous cantons in Kurdish areas whereas the KDP have refused to recognise the new administration. In such a case, what is the official position of the KRG?

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Failure to form new cabinet threatens to harm Kurdish interests home and broad

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The results of the Kurdistan legislative elections of 2013 changed the political dynamic of the region. The PUK-KDP dominance of the political arena was broken by the onset of Gorran as the second largest party with 24 seats. This placed the PUK into a difficult predicament with their diminishing influence as they claimed 18 seats.

For decades, the political cake was split roughly down the middle between the KDP and PUK as part of their strategic agreement. Now, faced with a new reality, the PUK has found it difficult to relinquish its partner status in government and historical control of Sulaimaniya province especially to its arch rival, Gorran.

In turn, this has placed the KDP in a difficult dilemma. The KDP cannot maintain its strategic relations and carry the PUK and at the same time appease Gorran and other opposition groups that have risen in ascendancy at the polls.

The PUK still holds considerable influence over security forces even if their political showing has been diluted. It is not ready to play second fiddle and relinquish political eminence where it previously enjoys several key ministries.

However, at the same time, any political accord that doesn’t place the electoral weighting of each party and the election outcome at the forefront of discussions is a setback to the political will of the people.

The PUK decline at the polls has coincided with the illness to their leader and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. In many ways, the PUK has struggled to adapt to the new political realities and evolve its strategy. Internal friction is one of the reasons the PUK has found it difficult to agree on a common position on cabinet formation.

It has been trying to convene the party’s forth congress since the last elections in Kurdistan but this was recently postponed. Prior to holding its 4th General Assembly, it has announced that Talabani will be replaced by a three-member council consisting of PUK Deputy Secretary General Kosrat Rasul, Second Deputy Secretary General Barham Salih and Talabani’s wife Hêro Ibrahim Ahmed. This will help alleviate the leadership debate that has intensified since the last elections, but does not provide the long-term remedy needed.

Distribution of ministry posts was never going to be easy with a key debate around the role of Deputy Prime Minister contested by both Gorran and PUK. The solution is to seemingly create 3 deputy positions for each main party but this brings with it other drawbacks. Gorran, whose stock has risen since 2009 as the PUK’s rival, was not about to accept a stronger PUK hand in the cabinet, having attained more votes.

Even in an opposition mode in a future government, Gorran would have a significant influence on political proceedings that may hamper the passing of laws that the KDP cannot ignore.

A national unity government may be in the best interest of the Kurdistan Region but it has led to months of wrangling and accusations amongst parties over the failure to reach an agreement. Such is the stakes of cabinet representation on a regional level that Iran has tried to exert pressure to ensure PUK retains relative standings.

Kurdistan is going through a crucial juncture amidst a reviving war between Baghdad and Sunni militants that threatens the security of the Kurdistan Region, fast approaching general elections in Iraq and heated debates between Erbil and Baghdad over national budget and exporting of oil via Turkey.

Solidarity, compromise and agreement are important to serve the interests of Kurdistan and its people aside from any partisan interests.

Such delays affect the confidence of the people who set out in their millions to cast their vote. At the same time, it places parliament in great limbo.

At the upcoming Iraqi national elections, Kurdistan must strive for unity especially in Kirkuk province and to maintain leverage in its many disputes with Baghdad.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Prospects of Geneva 2, Syrian Kurdish Autonomy and why Syria will never be whole again

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As representatives of the Syrian regime and the Syrian National Coalition met in Geneva, the prospects of an agreement to end the bitter 3 year civil war that has killed over 130,000 and displaced millions were dim.

The fiery exchanges at the opening of the conference in Montreaux and the deep reluctance to even meet face-to-face, never the mind the entrenched positions over the fate of Bashar al-Assad, underscored the challenges of securing any meaningful agreement.

Yet in so many ways, getting the opposing sides in the same room was an accomplishment in itself. With every bullet fired, every air strike launched and every death recorded, the animosity only deepens and reconciliation is pushed a step further. The profound emotional scarring cannot be patched in a few days in Geneva, but let there be no doubt, the regime and opposition have no choice but to reach a peaceful settlement sooner or later.

If there was a military solution it would have been achieved months ago. 3 years on, with the forces in a stalemate and with most of Syria lying in ruins and blood, no matter the eventual outcome, how can anyone truly feel victorious? What will they govern with some cities in literal ruin and billions of dollars needed to reconstruct the country?

More importantly, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that Syria can ever be whole again. Too much damage has been done and the polarization is now too great for Syria to ever return to any sense of unity.

In this light, it was symbolic and largely missed due to the intense focus on Geneva, that the Syrian Kurds declared administrative autonomy and a provincial governance on the eve of the conference.

The Kurds who have had relative self-rule since July 2012 are increasingly working towards safeguarding and formalizing their new found autonomy. The Kurdish area in Syria, or Rojava as most proudly refer to, is set to be ruled under 3 cantons, Kobani, Efrin and Jazira with an Autonomous Governing Council in each region.

Kurds are already preparing a local constitution and have their eyes on holding elections early this year as well as taking many steps to resume normal life in the region. Anyone would think this is taking place in a distant land, but this is taking place in the same country ruled by Assad and gripped by a deadly civil war.

The growing Kurdish confidence and assertiveness having successfully warded off Islamist forces, naturally unnerves Turkey and other regional players. The Syrian Kurdistan region is effectively governed by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) with links to the PKK and protected by the People Defense Units. This only adds to Turkish anxiety.

Yet with the Syrian Kurds stamping their authority, it was ironic that in Geneva the Kurds were refused a separate delegation or had any specific mention. Regardless of any political deal in Geneva, the Kurds are not about to take a step back into the dark days of the past and relinquish their hard fought gains.

With Alawites weary of Sunni backlash in any post-Assad era, there will almost certainly be a de facto sectarian delineation in Syria to add to the ethnic lines that the Kurdish self-rule promises.

The only way Syria can be truly patched is a loose federation where Sunni, Kurds or Alawites govern their own regions.

The problem in Syria is that the opposition is not represented by one group but a spectrum of forces with differing agendas. Take the SNC, they only agreed to attend the peace talks after dozens of their members walked out in protest and even if anything is agreed long-term, they have insufficient sway with the fighters on the ground.

This introduces the likely scenario that if a broader peace agreement was achieved, it would never be comprehensive and thus there is every chance that the opposition and regime forces may turn their guns on other forces, in particular the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and other Islamic groups that will never accept or recognize any agreement.

Unfortunately for Syria, the fighting has a long way to go before it reaches its course, regardless of any symbolic breakthrough in Geneva.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Familiar dispute over Iraqi federal budget in 2014 but the Kurds are armed with new leverage

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Perennial disputes over the Iraqi federal budget between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad are almost expected.  According to the Iraqi constitution, the Kurdistan Region is entitled to a 17% share, but Kurds argue this is never the true figure.

It was hardly surprising therefore that the Iraqi cabinet recently passed a budget bill in spite of Kurdish withdrawal and rejection.  This scenario is no different to the previous year when the cabinet again approved the budget without the consent of the Kurds, before it was later approved in parliament.

The 2014 bill sets the KRG a lofty target of 400,000 barrels per day and insists that all revenues are sent to Baghdad, threatening to cut the KRG share of the federal budget otherwise.

On the surface, Baghdad is continuing in its ethos of calling the shots, setting the expectations and a threatening rhetoric against the Kurds. However, the 2014 budget is drafted and passed with the new Ankara-Erbil oil contracts and new independent Kurdish pipelines firmly in mind.

Baghdad has been ratcheting the rhetoric against both Kurdistan and Ankara in recent weeks with Abdul Kareem Luaibi, Iraqi Oil Minister, even stating that the government was preparing legal action against Turkey and would blacklist companies implicating in such agreement without the consent of Baghdad.

Baghdad has already summoned Turkish consul in Baghdad to voice their displeasure and accused Turkey of preventing Iraqi oil ministry representatives of supervising exports at Ceyhan.

Luaibi further threatened to boycott Turkish companies and cancel contracts if oil exports went ahead. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki had already threatened to cut Kurdistan’s share of the federal budget if oil exports via Turkey went ahead.

Exports from Kurdistan in recent years have been stop-start to say the least owed to frequent disputes with Baghdad over payment of expenses to oil companies and share of revenues.

The current budget dispute may be along familiar lines but is certainly against a fresh backdrop. Kurdistan has new options and new leverage to use against the government. Its capacity from new oil pipelines are set to rapidly increase and before long Kurdistan could receive a lot more from their own revenue sources than Baghdad could ever give via the 17% share.

This new arrow in the Kurdish bow empowers the Kurds to have control over the destiny.  KRG deputy finance minister, Rashid Tahir, warned that “action begets reaction; if Baghdad cuts the budget then KRG…the Kurdish leadership will make their own decision.”

 

Exports from crude through the new pipeline were on track to start by the end of month and KRG were inviting bidders to register with Kurdistan Oil Marketing Organisation and not the State Oil Marketing Organisation as demanded by Baghdad.

What would KRG do if Baghdad cut their share of the budget, failed to pay Peshmerga salaries or amounts due to foreign oil companies? Simple – they deduct owed amounts from revenues set to go to Baghdad.

It remains to be seen how Turkey would react to prospect of lawsuits from Baghdad, but Turkey is already neck deep in Kurdistan with billions of dollars of trade and is not about to abandon the KRG. It knew the drawbacks of upsetting Baghdad, strategic repercussions and is aware of the hand afforded to the Kurds with the new ventures.

However, growing economic, political and strategic ties with Kurdistan is win-win for Turkey.  Ankara realises that ultimately the independence dream of Kurdistan cannot be held-back or ignored forever, but it serves to gain, not lose from the Kurdish national renaissance.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Commentary for Vo Tima Newspaper (Greece)

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Greek Version (English version below)

Ο πετρελαιοκίνητος εθνικισμός των Κούρδων

Τούρκοι και κούρδοι ηγέτες έθεσαν σε εφαρμογή μια ενεργειακή συμφωνία που υπόσχεται να ενισχύσει την ημιαυτόνομη περιοχή του ιρακινού Κουρδιστάν με μια ανεξάρτητη ροή εσόδων από το πετρέλαιο

«Καύσιμο για την ανεξαρτησία» Δημοσιογράφος και αναλυτής του Ekurd.net μιλάει στο «Βήμα»

«Τα εκατομμύρια βαρέλια του πετρελαίου από το Κιρκούκ χρησιμεύουν, κυριολεκτικά, ως καύσιμο για την ανεξαρτησία των Κούρδων του Ιράκ» λέει μιλώντας στο «Βήμα» ο Μπασντάρ Ισμαήλ, δημοσιογράφος και αναλυτής στο Ekurd.net.

«Οι πρόσφατες πετρελαϊκές συμβάσεις με την Τουρκία έχουν προκαλέσει σάλο στη Βαγδάτη και στην Ουάσιγκτον, που φοβούνται νέα αποσταθεροποίηση στο Ιράκ. Αλλά η Αγκυρα έχει καταλάβει ότι οι Κούρδοι είναι φυσικοί εταίροι της και αναδυόμενοι στρατηγικοί παίκτες στη νέα Μέση Ανατολή. Για τους Κούρδους, η Τουρκία είναι μια πύλη ζωτικής σημασίας, χωρίς την οποία δεν μπορεί να ανθήσει η οικονομία τους. Από αυτή την άποψη, η Αγκυρα γίνεται, με πολύ παράδοξο τρόπο, ο καταλύτης του κουρδικού μετασχηματισμού» τονίζει ο Ισμαήλ.

«Συνειδητοποιεί η Τουρκία ότι ο δρόμος προς την ανεξαρτησία είναι ο φυσικός προορισμός για το Κουρδιστάν; Φυσικά. Αλλά ένα ισχυρό ιρακινό Κουρδιστάν θα είναι παράγοντας ειρήνης και σταθερότητας για την Τουρκία, και για τη δική της ταραγμένη κουρδική μειονότητα. Στην Τουρκία, στο Ιράκ, στη Συρία και στο Ιράν οι Κούρδοι είναι εδώ για να μείνουν, και η Αγκυρα έχει καταλάβει ότι η ξεπερασμένη πολιτική της που βασιζόταν στον στενό εθνικισμό ήταν μια αυταπάτη, που δεν την προστάτευε. Ακόμη και η Τουρκία δεν μπορεί να αγνοήσει το τεράστιο στρατηγικό, οικονομικό και πολιτικό βάρος που έχουν αποκτήσει οι Κούρδοι σήμερα» καταλήγει ο Ισμαήλ.

English Version

The Kurdish national renaissance is underscored by a booming Kurdistan Region that is far cry from the dark days of the past. A booming economy is underpinned by a rapidly growing energy sector and billions of barrels of oil that is serving as the fuel for independence – literally. Recent Turkish oil contracts with Kurdistan have caused a stir in Baghdad, but in truth Ankara is already neck deep in Kurdistan with billions of trade and hundreds of companies. In many ways Turkey has seemingly chosen Erbil as its partner over Baghdad and these oil contracts placate growing strategic ties. Yet ironically just a few years ago, Turkey was ever-anxious at Kurdish national developments and setting red-lines for intervention.

With a fast unravelling and conflict strewn Middle Eastern, Turkey has fast realised that far from a threat, the Kurds are its natural partners and newfound strategic actors that Turkey needs and can rely on in stormy regional waters. At the same time, Turkey is the vital gate that Kurdistan cannot flourish without. Ankara in many ways is the enabler of the rapid Kurdish transformation. With a win-win situation for both sides, it’s no wonder that new pipelines and contracts are been signed.

Does Turkey realise the independence path that is a natural destination for Kurdistan – of course. But a strong Kurdistan Region actually helps brings peace and not instability to Turkey and its own restive Kurds, and also helps influence Kurds elsewhere.

Whether in Syria, Turkey, Iraq or Iran, the Kurds are here to stay and Ankara has realised that its out-dated policies based on a narrow nationalistic mind-sets were a delusion that hampered Turkish nationalism, not protect it. Even Turkey cannot ignore the sheer strategic, economic and political weight that the Kurds now bring.