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The time to push for independence?

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Since the fall of Saddam Hussein and particularly in the latest sectarian storm as ISIS has swept through large parts of northern Iraq, many in the international arena point to the carving up and disintegration of Iraq. However, from a Kurdish perspective, it is a question of how can you break something that wasn’t whole to start with?

It is no secret that the dreams of the Kurds have always started and finished at an independent homeland. They gained nothing but genocide and repression under Saddam and they have little to gain now as part of an Iraq with a vicious cycle of violence and sectarian warfare that the Kurds want little to do with.

The booming, stable and prosperous Kurdistan Region was a reflection of anything but Iraq. Even before recent developments in Iraq, Kurdistan was virtually independent anyway. There were missing ingredients that the Kurds have worked hard to bridge. One of these was independent oil exports and control of their own revenues, as opposed to been at the mercy and goodwill of Baghdad for share of national budget.

With the Kurdish plains washed with so much oil, the revenues the Kurds could soon gain would far outweigh anything that Baghdad could ever give.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Nouri al-Maliki led Baghdad government have been at logger heads over oil rights for several years. Simply put, control of oil revenues and oil exports was a remaining noose that Baghdad had over Kurdistan. Kurdistan has tried to cut this remaining umbilical cord to Baghdad by working hard to build strong ties with Turkey, oil majors and building their own independent oil pipeline.

The second key ingredient to Kurdish push to independence was the status of disputed territories. Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution laid out clear steps and clear timelines for the resolution of such territories. Yet almost 7 years since the original deadline for its implementation, owed to a lack of appetite and constant foot dragging by Baghdad, article 140 was never implemented.

Now with the recent ISIS onslaught and latest turmoil in Iraq, not only can the Kurds press ahead and increase oil exports, they have now gained control of vast disputed territories, including Kirkuk, the symbol of the Kurdish struggle.

Depending on how and if the Sunni insurgency can be contained as well as well as the  time expended in doing so, Kurds may well fast-track their push to independence. But for now, they are willing to bide their time and crucially consolidate their newly expanded borders and bring stability to their areas.

Who can blame the Kurds, who never wanted to be a part of the Iraqi state in the first place, to push for separation when the country is yet again in sectarian flames?

Self-determination is a natural right at the calmest of times, let alone at times of war with bloodshed on your doorstep.

Even Turkey, traditionally a staunch opponent of Kurdish nationalism, has come to realise that not only is Kurdish independence a natural path that ultimately cannot be stopped, but they can gain tremendous benefit from a secular, oil rich, strategic partners in the tumultuous new age of the Middle East.

Kurdistan was always going to become an independent state, now the timelines have been greatly accelerated with the new crisis in Iraq.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

Counting on the Kurds

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Large shockwaves are reverberating across Iraq and the whole Middle East as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) continues its sweep through large parts of northern Iraq. While city after city falls, from populous Mosul to largely Ba’athist Tikrit, best known as the birthplace of Saddam Hussein, and now to Tal Afar, a strategic town west of Mosul, all the Iraqi armed forces have been able to muster so far is a faltering defense.

In contrast, in only two days the Kurds took control of some ISIS-threatened territories—ones that had been constantly disputed between the autonomous Kurdistan Region and the central government for the eleven years since Saddam Hussein fell from power. In the case of Kirkuk, the symbol of the Kurdish national struggle, the Iraqi forces hastily retreated and Kurdish forces, known as the Peshmerga, assumed control in a matter of hours. With Kurdish interests at great risk and a security vacuum to be filled, the Kurds were not about to remain idle.

The seeds of Sunni insurgency were sown long before ISIS came to town, and it is hardly the first time that the volatile Sunni plains and cities such as Mosul and Fallujah have been under the control of Sunni insurgents. Neither is it the first time the Kurds have had to step in to restore security. Indeed, it was the Peshmerga who helped bring control and stability to Mosul and the surrounding area between 2004 and 2005, and again in 2008, when the areas were threatened by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, one of the groups that would eventually merge to become ISIS.

Now, much like they were in the aftermath of the US invasion of 2003 that transformed Iraq’s sociopolitical landscape and sparked the fierce sectarian showdown that followed, the Kurds could yet become the main victors of the latest turmoil that has plagued Iraq. As the Kurds face off against ISIS on their doorstep, the Peshmerga are increasingly being viewed as key players against ISIS rebels and a main factor in the battle to secure stability. The price they could demand from Baghdad for this support in beating back an insurgency, however, could permanently alter the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s borders, its political status—and its fortunes.

Bailing out Maliki?

The ISIS attacks could not have come at a lower point for relations between Erbil and Baghdad. For years, there has been a fierce dispute between the autonomous region and the central government in Baghdad—over oil exports, the status of disputed territories, and the Kurdistan Region’s share of the national budget. Now, facing this growing insurgent threat, administering newly captured territory with significant minority populations, and hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the crises in Iraq and Syria, the Kurds must ask themselves if they should rush to bail out Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki. After all, it is Maliki’s policies the Kurds blame for stoking this latest sectarian fire.

The Kurdish leadership has long issued warnings about what in its view were divisive policies pursued by Maliki and his government. Instead, recurring themes in the Kurds’ post-2003 rhetoric were calls for national reconciliation and moves to bring Iraq’s Sunni community, which was feeling increasingly disenfranchised, back into the fold through political incentives and greater representation.

But if anything the sectarian divide only grew larger, especially during Maliki’s second term, when many Sunni political figures were exiled or ousted from government. Eventually, major Sunni protests in Anbar province at the end of 2013 were met with a violent crackdown. Now that those protests have mutated into a sectarian conflict exploited and exacerbated by ISIS militants, there are calls for all concerned—from Shi’ite militias to the Kurds and international parties such as the United States—to step in and help preserve the unity of Iraq.

The Kurds, however, have long aspired to the opposite of a united Iraq: they want an independent country for their nation formed, at least in part, out of the area of northern Iraq currently administered as the autonomous Kurdistan Region. As the ISIS crisis looms larger, they are not likely to step in to preserve anything other than their own interests—and certainly not to rescue Maliki or Baghdad from the mess that, in the Kurds’ view, they have created. Only a few weeks ago, after all, Erbil and Baghdad were at loggerheads about oil sales and arbitration, and Baghdad has failed to pay the Kurds their share of the national budget since January.

Now, if Baghdad wants the Peshmerga to step in as they have done in the past, it will have to promise something in return. Even if Baghdad met key Kurdish demands—for greater control over oil exports from the region, payment of the overdue portions of the national budget, and formal recognition of the territories the Kurds currently hold as part of the Kurdistan Region—it would likely not secure more than limited support from Kurdish leaders in the battle against ISIS.

While the contentious US invasion of Iraq in 2003 created something of a sectarian whirlwind that today continues to rip through Iraq, for the Kurds it marked the beginning of a national renaissance and the creation of a Kurdistan Region a world away from the dark years of oppression and genocide under Saddam. Their strong economy is underpinned by a rapidly growing energy sector and control of billions of barrels of oil that is serving as the fuel for independence—literally—and in recent fighting their security service has proven itself to be among the more effective and better-organized forces operating in Iraq.

Between economic growth and the longstanding pursuit of complete independence, the Kurds’ goals have been lofty. It is Baghdad that the autonomous region’s Kurds deem as the major impediment to their continued progress, with the ongoing oil dispute proving particularly damaging to the relationship.

Control of oil revenues and oil exports was in many ways the last umbilical cord that Baghdad had over the region. By agreeing lucrative energy contracts with Turkey, the Kurds called Baghdad’s bluff and pressed ahead with an independent oil sale, to Baghdad’s vocal consternation. The Iraqi government even filed for arbitration against the Kurdistan Region over the oil sale issue—in part because economic self-sufficiency would help propel Iraqi Kurdistan to greater autonomy and eventual independence.

But while even two weeks ago Kurdistan’s first independent oil sale, through the Turkish port of Ceyhan, was highly controversial, the tone has certainly changed now that Iraq is swept up in sectarian bloodshed and seemingly dependent on the Peshmerga for security support. It would be a bit rich for Maliki to dictate the terms of oil sales while he is fighting an enemy only the Kurds have won against so far.

On that platform of relative economic success, Kurdistan has prided itself on its rapid advancement and relative stability. At the same time, Iraq as a whole has suffered. But, the goalposts for the “Other Iraq” have now shifted substantially, due to the Kurds controlling territory outside their official autonomous region and with substantial minority populations. They must incorporate a large Arab minority and a number of smaller minorities, not to mention the many refugees, inside territory with a border shared not with the Iraqi state, but with a region now controlled by ISIS militants.

The price of an army

If they manage all this, the Kurds stand to gain a great deal, not least of which is control of the oil-rich Kirkuk region. They saw Kirkuk slip through their hands in 1991, the year of the Kurdish uprising against Saddam that saw their autonomous region first established. Again in 2003, Kirkuk fell just beyond their grasp as they succumbed to US and Turkish pressure. Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution aims to deal with Kirkuk and other disputed territories, and it should have been implemented by the end of 2007. Much to the frustration of the Kurds, Baghdad has had no appetite to address the issue, and even a national census—an important first step in dealing with the disputed territories—has been repeatedly put off. Today, the Kurds are not about to forego yet another golden opportunity to seize Kirkuk, said by many to be the “Kurds’ Jerusalem.”

To keep Kirkuk—and the entire Kurdistan Region—safe, the Peshmerga have formed what for now has been an effective security barrier against ISIS and its allied forces. For now, the Peshmerga are in defensive mode only: While there have been skirmishes, ISIS do not have endless forces or firepower, and it is unlikely they could wage and win a war against well-prepared Kurdish forces. And, where the Iraqi forces, which were organized along sectarian lines, swiftly retreated, the Peshmerga have stronger ties of loyalty—and would likely defend Kurdish lands to their last breath.

Perhaps even greater than the prospect of more territory in Iraq or greater control of oil revenues is the chance for increased unity with Kurdish populations living outside the autonomous region, namely in Syria and Turkey, and for improved ties with old enemies such as Ankara.

Amid cries that the Middle East’s borders are eroding, Syria’s Kurds have carved out their own autonomous territory in the northeast of that war-torn country, and in a symbolic move the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) forces fought side-by-side with the Peshmerga along the Syrian border in the effort to drive out ISIS rebels. At the same time, Syrian Kurds, bolstered by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), have built strong ties with the Turkish Kurds—and, of course, there is the fact that Iraqi Kurdistan’s recent unilateral oil sales could not have come without the cooperation of Turkey.

The Turkish government has fast realized that, far from being a threat, the Kurds are its natural partners and a newfound strategic player Turkey needs and can rely on in stormy regional waters. The ISIS onslaught has undoubtedly changed Turkey’s Iraq calculus, pushing Ankara closer than ever to Erbil. In a bizarre twist of fate, the US spent years and much effort bringing Ankara and Erbil closer together. Now that Turkey and Kurdistan are enjoying strong economic, political and strategic ties, they are viewing the developments with great caution. While in 2003 the Kurdish occupation of Kirkuk caused an outcry from Ankara, Turkey may now actively support it, especially with the protection it affords the Turkmens living in Kirkuk and the potential benefit to Ankara if Iraq’s Kurds control even more oil resources.

Of course, the ultimate goal of the Kurdish population has long been complete independence. As the Iraq crisis continues almost unchecked, the Kurds could be getting closer to outright independence. The short-term goal for the Kurds is about consolidation and stability. ISIS forces may not invade the newly demarcated line between the territory they hold and the expanded Kurdistan Region, but they can certainly wreak havoc on Kurdistan and its interests. The immediate goal for the Kurds, then, is to preserve the security and stability of the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdish populations in the greater Kurdish area.

The Kurds will keep a close, diligent eye on developments, and once Kurdish interests are secured, they will not jump in with both feet into the Iraqi quagmire. Depending on how the Iraq crisis unfolds—and the staying power of an alliance of ISIS, armed locals and old Ba’athists—the Kurds may well need to strike a deal with Baghdad in order to keep their own peace. Either way, the Kurds will need to maneuver carefully between Sunni militants and a weakened Maliki administration.

First Published On: Majalla (part of Sharq al-Awsat newspaper)

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

How the West and the Syrian opposition handed Assad another presidential term

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After thousands of deaths, hundreds of barrel bombs, millions of refugees, wide-scale destruction, starvation and even the use of chemicals, Bashar al-Assad somehow clung on to power.

The fact that after all the trials and tribulations of the Syrian civil war that Assad retains a firm grip on power, is as much about the resilience of the regime and the strong support it continues to retain at home and also abroad through Iran, Hezbollah and Russia, as the large-scale failing of the West and the Syrian opposition.

From the outset of the revolution, Western powers were indecisive and inconsistent in how they should encourage or support the revolution.

Foreign policy decision making, especially from the Unites States was so labored that by time external decisions were made, the picture on the ground had already fundamentally changed.

This is particularly true at the start of the war in 2011 when the Western position was slow and tentative. As the West wavered on their next steps, Islamist forces had long high-jacked the Syrian revolution.

Now from the brink of defeat, Assad awarded himself another 7 years in power. There is no doubt the recent presidential elections were tainted with corruption, but the even then no one can deny that Assad still enjoys support amongst a large section of Syrians.

If fully legitimate, fair and verifiable elections were to be held tomorrow across all of Syria, Assad would certainly not win anywhere near 87% of the vote but would still record a strong showing that cannot be discounted.

This is an ironic reality given Assad’s wide-scale destruction, starvation and reprisal and speaks volumes on the declining faith in the opposition.

Millions more Syrians support the revolution but discouraged by a disunited opposition seemingly too busy fighting amongst themselves or a West that they doubt would ever take real action, prefer the devil that is Assad than the literal ruins of today if it means return of their livelihood, homes or any sense of normalcy .

The elections were widely criticized by the US and EU powers whilst the opposition vowed to step up their campaign. Only last week US President Barack Obama stated that US would “ramp up” support for rebels. While National Security Advisor Susan Rice recently confirmed the US was offering both “lethal and non-lethal” aid to moderate rebels.

While the West implements measures, it is done with a sense of hesitancy and at a sluggish pace. It was clear since the failure of the Geneva talks in February that Assad would not relinquish power, nor would Russia accept his downfall just to open doors to the Western sponsored opposition.

The cue to change foreign policy should have come after a series of American red lines were nonchalantly crossed by the regime, let alone when the Geneva talks had failed.

Piecemeal gestures will not turn the tide and practical game-changing measures will not be endorsed by the West. Unfortunately, the end result is a de facto partition of Syria with the Kurds continuing with their newfound autonomy, Assad consolidating his hold on the Damascus, Homs and Latakia axis and the rebels continuing to fight amongst themselves over swathes of territory around Aleppo, Raqa and the Turkish border.

It was no secret that some western powers prefer a deal with Assad than an Islamist take-over of Damascus but how will Assad vacate power now? Why relinquish power when regime is in its ascendancy and regaining ground when it didn’t fold at its weakest point?

The only thing that will force Assad to negotiate is either a significant turning of the tide in the civil war which of course takes a significant empowering of the rebels by the West or any abandonment of the regime by Moscow or Tehran. None of these are likely to happen.

The end result is more suffering and more destruction as the civil war drags on.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

European tour amidst first oil exports highlight growing recognition and support of Kurdistan

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Almost as soon as the Kurds announced their first direct export of oil via Ceyhan in Turkey, Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani embarked on a tour of Europe starting in France before a visit to Rome, where talks were hosted between Pope Francis and Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini, with the Kurdistan flag in full view.

Last week Kurdistan Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani led a similar delegation on an official visit to the UK.

The interest and status of Kurdistan is growing and more EU partners clearly support the Kurdish position in Iraq but ultimately in its natural evolution towards formal statehood.

The first Kurdish crude was not purchased on the black market by some rogue state. It was purchased by Germany and Italy. It is no coincidence that oil majors from across Europe and the US participate actively in Kurdistan. Kurdistan would not embark on a bold move to export oil if it didn’t have prior support from European powers.

Kurdistan’s decades of attachment to Iraq was not through a marriage of choice but a forced pairing based on outdates imperial interests.

Most European powers realise that the Western leaning and secular Kurds, who open doors of economic and strategic interest, cannot be contained in an artificial state with little ideological or ethnic similarity with the rest of Iraq. Ironically, it is Washington that remains fixated with the principle of Iraqi territorial integrity and national reconciliation, even after their failure to bridge the Iraqi ethno-sectarian divide. The idea of a united and harmonious Iraq sharing power in a democratic and equal manner catches the imagination, but it is simply not going to happen.

Some analysts comment as though the first direct export of Kurdish crude was the reason for worsening of Kurdistan relations with Baghdad or indeed Turkey’s growing divide with Iraq. Turkish ties with Baghdad have deteriorated over a number of years with strong rhetoric exchanged between both sides on a number of occasions.

The poor state of relations between Erbil and Baghdad is a tale of over 10 years of foot dragging over previous promises and lack of implementation of constitutional articles. For example, a hydrocarbon law, first drafted in 2007, is still gathering dust on the Iraqi political shelf.

Years of disputes over oil exports, months of stalled negotiations and failed budget payments, not to mention disputed territories and many other constitutional issues, paint a much bigger story.

The decision to export oil by the Kurds was the straw that broke the camel’s back but it was a long time coming.

Control of oil and other key disputed issues between Erbil and Baghdad became a game of bluff. Baghdad wanted to impose its influence and control over all corners of Iraq whereas the Kurds insisted on autonomy and their constitutional rights.

Kurdish oil exports may not solve all of Kurdish budget issues. Of course, it takes more than one shipment and more than one pipeline to build a successful oil industry. But it served as a strong message that the Kurds would match threats with action if backed into a corner.

Furthermore, growing Turkish ties with Kurdistan is not merely underpinned on economic and energy grounds. Some question why Ankara would alienate Baghdad further to side with the Kurds. These viewpoints overlook the bigger picture.

Ankara’s ties with Baghdad have been weak over the past several years especially as Maliki continued to dominate power, sectarianism increased and Baghdad grew closer to Tehran. On the other hand, the Middle Eastern socio-political landscape is rapidly changing and Kurds have assumed a pivotal role.

Ankara is keen to resolve its own Kurdish dilemma and at the same time looks anxiously towards a Syria has broken into mini states. Sectarian is taken foot in the Middle East and the Kurdistan Region is a vital buffer and ally of Turkey in changing times.

In spite of legal action from Baghdad and objections from the U.S., Turkey confirmed that it would continue to export Kurdish oil. Kurdistan Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, in a defiant speech to parliament, expressed openness to dialogue but vowed to “…never give up control of our own oil”.

“We are open to dialogue, but if Baghdad chooses to close all the doors we will certainly not be standing there doing nothing,” the prime minister warned.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

First sale of Kurdish oil unveils a new era in the Kurdish national renaissance

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The Kurdish national renaissance has assumed a number of key milestones in a short but remarkable period of time. The onset of the first independent sale of Kurdish oil stored at the Turkish port of Ceyhan, was another critical milestone that gives Kurdistan a new political, economic and strategic gear as its enters a new phase in its evolution.

The decision to export its oil to the international market, much to the dismay of Baghdad, came as the official Iraqi election results saw incumbent Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki attain the front foot in his quest for a third term.

As Kurdistan has continued its ascendancy in recent years, control of oil became a significant factor of dispute between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad. Put simply, control of oil exports was the last remaining umbilical cord that Baghdad had over the Kurds.

This leverage was clearly on display when Baghdad failed to pay Kurdish salaries and the Kurdish share of the national budget as punishment for the Kurdish move to build and export oil to Turkey via its new independent oil pipeline.

Baghdad filed for arbitration against Ankara almost immediately at the International Chamber of Commerce, but in reality Turkey knew and openly accepted that the consequences with Baghdad were secondary to the strategic enhancement of their ties with the Kurds.

The storage capacity at Ceyhan was close to the limit, Baghdad appeared unwilling to give the Kurds the concessions it demanded and after months of negotiations a breakthrough was not about to take place anytime soon. All the while, the Kurds were in an ironic predicament. Kurdistan, with its billions of barrels of oil reserves and with millions of barrels stored in Ceyhan waiting to be sold to many international suitors, were at the mercy of Baghdad and couldn’t even pay salaries.

When you have masses of oil and wealth under your feet, which government in any part of the world would accept been dictated, undermined and held to ransom by a third-party?

Instead of waiting for hand-outs from Baghdad, the Kurds could soon surpass the value of their 17% share of the national budget with their own exports.

Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz confirmed that 1.4 millions of oil was loaded via tankers and crucially backed further export of Kurdish oil as more oil is inevitably pumped.

In the same way as threats to independent export of oil, Baghdad continuously warned against oil majors entering the region and threatening to punish and blacklist such companies. In the end oil majors accepted the risks and after Exxon-Mobil entered the fray in 2011, a flock of majors simply couldn’t sit on the sidelines and waste unique opportunities.

In reality, Kurdistan wouldn’t have taken such a bold step without support not just from Turkey but also European powers over its constitutional rights. The oil was not sold on the black market but in an international, open and transparent market and to European customers.

Almost immediately after the first independent export of Kurdish oil, Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani went on a scheduled tour of Europe. The message from Barzani was clear – if Baghdad did not change its policies towards the Kurds, the Kurds could deploy other options it has on the table.

France clearly supported the Kurds in their move to market oil independently and according to Falah Mustafa, the head of Kurdistan Region’s Department of Foreign Relations, France “showed their willingness to support us in the next stage”.

It’s the not the first time that Kurds have threatened to take action against the centralist policies of Baghdad. After continuous failed promises by Maliki, the timing of the move echoed through the Iraqi political chambers that Kurds mean business and will match action with rhetoric.

The oil exports were crucially done before the establishment of the next government in Baghdad, affording the Kurds a more powerful negotiating position. They will not be duped into a new coalition with promises of allowing Kurdish oil exports. Instead the right of the Kurds to export oil becomes a prerequisite as opposed to a demand.

The Kurdish historical move is all the more significant that it was supported by Turkey, marking a dramatic turnaround in fortunes from a time when any notion of Kurdish nationalism was met with threats, harsh rhetoric and red lines.

Oil exports can only increase from these levels and serves as the fuel for independence – literally. Of course, Turkey acknowledges what oil export pipelines and sales means for the future of Kurdistan.

Yet, Turkey has so much to gain from a Kurdish friend with growing strategic and economic importance than an uncertain Baghdad leaning more towards Tehran, especially as the sectarian fires continue to rage in Iraq.

The Turkish position is even more ironic giving the U.S. resistance and unease of growing Kurdish independence, export of its oil and the growing ties between Erbil and Ankara that the US tried so hard to foster in the first place.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

After two Maliki terms and broken promises, wary Kurds keep “all options on the table”

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With the much anticipated Iraqi election results yet to announced, it is certain that the next government formation will be as fraught as 2010 and that Iraq will struggle to stitch together its falling pieces.

For the Kurds, for all their criticism of incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Baghdad, they played a crucial hand in creating the Maliki monster. Complaint of Maliki’s centralist tendencies and lack of real intent to resolve key issues between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region goes back to Maliki’s first tenure at the helm.

After much hesitation and months of negotiations, the Kurds played a crucial role in the eventual breakthrough that saw Maliki secure a second term. The basis of the Kurdish partnership on both occasions was several firm demands and countless promises from Maliki.

Yet not only were most of these promises not kept in the first term but Maliki with growing power and dominance decided that the majority of the promises that underpinned the second term went openly unfulfilled as well.

Now as State of Law Coalition looks certain to secure most seats in the elections, Maliki is already attempting to piece together votes for a third term in power.

Kurdish support amidst failed promises the first time is unfortunate, for a second time unacceptable and now for a third time it would be unforgivable.

11 years since the fall of Saddam is hardly a small window of opportunity for progress and implementation of key steps. However, much of the key demands of the Kurds have failed to be implemented. Disputed territories remain unresolved, national budget continues to undermine Kurds, a national census continues to be postponed, a national hydrocarbon law does not exist and Baghdad continues to try and maintain the umbilical cord to Kurdistan.

This week Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani was unambiguous on his view of Maliki and the downward spiral in Iraq, labeling governance under Maliki as “totalitarianism” and with “no partnership”. “He is the number one responsible for it. He was capable of not allowing the whole process to go in that direction,” Barzani added.

Barzani warned that “all options are on the table,” for the Kurds, threatening to boycott the whole process.

The Kurdish patience is wearing thin and Barzani is clearly does not want entertain further waiting games for several more years but instead emphasised the time for “final decisions”.

Barzani’s statements come as Maliki attempted to reach out to the Kurds, ironically as debates over oil exports threaten to escalate and as the Kurdish share of the budget has been frequently withheld to pressure the Kurds.

After months of delays and lack of progress with Baghdad, Kurdistan has decided to sell oil independently with Baghdad promising strong retaliation of their own. However, Barzani is not about to back down from this game changing and historical decision for Kurdistan.

For the Kurds, tangible and guaranteed actions are needed as opposed to the usual rhetoric and promises if they are to join the next government. If it takes several months to achieve these practical steps to convince the Kurds and delay government formation then so be it. It is better to waste months rather than more years.

The Kurds cannot be held accountable for the deepening disintegration of Iraq, Maliki’s centralist policies and failure to curb sectarianism and insurgency have already done plenty to ensure that.

Back home, the Kurds must quickly form a much delayed unity government. As Kurdish parties continue negotiations and consultations, Barzani stated “all Kurdish political parties now have a common stance on how to deal with Baghdad and the next steps in the Iraqi political process.”

A Kurdish position that is not endorsed by all regional parties will simply be exploited by Maliki and his backers in Tehran and greatly weaken the Kurdish hand.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

As Iraqis mark 3rd national elections and yearn for change – reconciliation, national unity and progress remains as elusive as ever

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With a high turnout amidst an ongoing threat of violence, the 2014 Iraqi parliamentary elections, the first since the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Iraq, were met with an air of optimism by Baghdad and international powers alike. However, any positive sentiment on the surface has to be taken with a big pinch of salt.

With the latest national elections marking the third such occasion, parliamentary elections are hardly new for Iraq and it has already surpassed 11 years since the overthrow of Saddam.

Fed up of rampant corruption, lack of public services, continued threat of terrorism and high unemployment in spite of the billions of dollars Iraq receives from oil revenues, people voted in high numbers with an eagerness for change and a new passage.

The burning question is whether Iraqis, with the exception of the Kurdistan Region, really enjoy a better standard of living and better services since 2003 and whether a new government will mean a change to their fortunes.

It says much about the escalating bloodshed in Iraq that Baghdad deemed it a success that “only” 14 people were killed on polling day.

A frequent theme of the post-Saddam period, especially under the taxing tenure of the US, was national reconciliation, enticing the disaffected Sunnis into the political fold and an effective sharing of power that would appease Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds alike.

In 2014, Iraq is probably as far as ever from national unity or reconciliation. Iraq was built around three distinct segments and effectively will always be fractured. It is a question of how to “glue” the constituents the best way possible knowing that there will never be a perfect fit.

For a start national unity governments based on a quota system are always going to fail. Due to the fragmented nature of the Iraqi ethno-social picture elections can feel like a national census than a real democratic passage.

For example, Shiites clearly form a majority of the Iraqi population and will dominate Iraqi elections even if you held the elections another 10 times over. Sunnis and Kurds will always dominate their local sphere but never at a national level and thus remain at risk of marginalisation.

Effectively, this mix makes a very protracted and arduous task of satisfying all parties.

Incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is a prime example of the Iraqi divide. He is reviled by Sunnis for sidelining them from politics, promoting a sectarian agenda, failing to address Sunni discontent and fuelling the revived Sunni insurgency. At the same time, he is been heralded in other circles as the strongman that can overcame the insurgency and keep Iraq intact.

The Kurdistan Region on the other hand has been at loggerheads with Baghdad right from day one and has frequently accused Maliki of centralist tendencies and policies that set to deliberately undermine Kurdish progress and keep the lifeline of the Kurds within Baghdad hands.

Yet, Maliki’s State of Law is likely to be triumphant at the polls.   Of course, he has is far from securing the 165 seats majority needed and his third tenure as Prime Minister is far from certain but he will start in the driving seat. Maliki’s first move would be to entice the other weary and cautious Shiite coalitions in the Citizen Coalition, led by Sayyed Ammar al-Hakim, the Ahrar coalition of Sayyed Muqtada al-Sadr and the National Reform Alliance led by former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari.

The four main Shiite coalitions alone represent 42 political entities, many with differing views and agendas, highlighting the disjointed and difficult nature of Iraqi politics.

With the Shiite alliances representing a significant portion of the seats, add to the considerable Sunni and Kurdish vote, the number of possible permutations to form government are considerable.

This inevitably means that political jockeying and negotiations may well run into many months as in 2010.

The Kurds were deemed the kingmakers at the past elections and are likely to muster close to the 57 seats secured in 2010. Having supported Maliki’s two tenures as Prime Minister in spite of numerous failed promises and Maliki’s continued stand against Kurdistan, the main Kurdish political parties will need to be certain that whoever they rubber stamp in Baghdad can give them their key demands of oil exports, share of the national budget and seemingly forgotten resolution to disputed territories.

If Maliki continues as premier and centralist policies against Kurdistan continue, or conversely if the Sunni insurgent fire is not contained, Iraqis may not see another national election come 2018.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

The rise of Kurdistan must not come to the detriment of future generations

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The new faceplate of Kurdistan is not an indicator of progress society still has to make

In most countries, extensive transformation of infrastructure, economy and society is a lengthy process over a considerable period of time. In Kurdistan, immense changes have taken place in little over a decade.

New high-rise buildings, luxury restaurants, 5-star hotels and dozens of malls now dot the Erbil landscape and the change in a short-period of time is remarkable. However, do society, the attitude and understanding of people and general skills and education really advance in parallel?

Evidently, transformation in the faceplate of the city is not enough for Kurdistan as a whole to really advance. In western countries, it took centuries for infrastructure and society to get where it is today.

The trials and tribulations and sufferings of the Kurds to get to the stature of today are taking for granted, especially amongst the youths.

In Kurdistan it is now common to see families own two or more cars in a single household or enjoy multiple incomes. People carry with them the latest smart phones and continuously strive for the next best thing. Just 5 years ago, old cars even from the 80’s were still prevalent, internet and technology was enjoyed by the few and there was hardly a mall or luxury hotel in sight. But while a rapidly growing city may belie its tender years in terms of real modernisation, it can be misleading in the progression of greater society.

A prime example is the attitude towards waste and litter. Kurdish families stock up on all sorts of food and dress in their glittering traditional Kurdish outfits and leave their homes in the early morning, spending much time securing a beautiful spot amongst the great landscape of Kurdistan to savour their day off. The trip is dominated by expressions of how comfortable, enjoyable and scenic the surrounding is. Yet after several hours of enjoyment and feasting, most Kurdish families leave a tale of destruction – litter and waste.

Rubbish and waste literally dot the surrounding area where the family sat. The blasé attitude employed amongst the masses is a detriment to the future generations. Why not allow another family to revel in the enjoyment you tasted another week?

As materialism grows in Kurdistan, so does the seemingly selfish nature of some people. Without working together, improving bonds within communities and an appreciation for the future amongst the masses, the advancement of Kurdistan will be hampered.

A selfish personal drive to attain fortune and enjoyment will see future generations suffer. Take to the road in Kurdistan and rarely does one give way to another or give thanks to other drivers.

Kurdistan beauty lies in its millennia old heritage, in its culture that is passed from generation to generation for thousands of years, in its immense hospitality and warm hearts and in the ability of the people to stick together and triumph against the odds.

As capitalism take grip and consumerism and new buildings rise, this must not dilute Kurdish culture. With the exception of the newly renovated Kurdish Textile and Cultural Museum in Qalat, museums and centres where culture can be preserved, displayed and celebrated are rare.

Foreigners and tourists must get a taste of the privilege to live amongst the Kurds and Kurdish culture and not just enjoyment in the best hotels and restaurants.

Education must be enhanced in Kurdistan so it is the Kurds who dominate highly-skilled jobs and technical and medical profiles. Above all else, the people must obtain an understanding of the importance of hard-work and putting real effort in achieving their goals without shortcuts.

Some people want to work as few hours as possible, put minimal effort and still become rich. A key action is promote and strengthen the private sector and reduces the strong dependency on the government for jobs.

The ability to combine the needs of today with the needs of tomorrow is essential. The growing pollution in Erbil can never be a good thing. The lack of a public transport system is detrimental as the road network cannot accommodate all these cars no matter how fast the Kurdish government builds new roads.

People continue to waste immense amounts of electricity and water and complain about lack of services. The appreciation for saving electricity and energy should not be valued on monetary means alone but on the benefits of the future generation.

This is the same case with recycling. Tons of wastage does not just miraculously disappear. It needs go somewhere and unfortunately with great effect on the future environment. Tons of plastics and metals could be recycled than end up in landfill sites.

The moral of this story is not to downplay the phenomenal rise of Kurdistan. It is to build a Kurdistan that will be sustained for hundreds of years and that many generations can continuously enjoy. The current selfish lifestyle and disregard for greater society, environment and the wellbeing of others, can only last a certain course.

The bottom line is that no disregard and neglect today is without future pay pack tomorrow.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

After many false dawns, Kurdistan finally forms new government

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Just shy of 7 months since the Kurdistan Parliamentary elections in September. An agreement to form a new government was finally reached. After shifting of the political landscape and breaking the status quo, forming a government was always going to be difficult and protracted, but even by this token the lengthy delay was a disappointing blemish for Kurdistan.

Throughout the past few months, there have been many false dawns. Only last week there was growing hope that an inclusive government incorporating all the five main parties would be formed. Less than week later, this proved to be a false expectation as the political picture took another twist but at least a government will now be formed.

KDP and Gorran announced an agreement for a new coalition government along with the Islamic League (Komal). Crucially, this left the PUK on the sidelines with the official line that the PUK is still mulling over it options but clearly the PUK would be disappointed at developments with its options now to swallow pride and accept what it is given on the table or declare its opposition.

The Islamic Union (Yekgirtu) also remained undecided on its participation in the new coalition government.

Either way, the prospect of a parliament session reconvening next week is a welcome boost for Kurdistan just days before the Iraqi national elections and Kurdistan provincial elections.

In democracy, any political party has its ups and downs and the idea of pleasing every party is a non-starter.

If the cabinet is going to be divided in manner to appease all parties then why hold elections in the first place? Why would a political party care if takes a blow at the polls if it is able to secure its desired number of positions anyway?

This is particularly true of the PUK who finished third in the elections. The PUK must now regroup, change its strategy and win back lost voters. This is the trace of a true democracy and happens in every major western country. The PUK remains influential but cannot cling on outdated strategic agreements or demand an equitable distribution of posts.

As for Gorran, participation in the new government completes a remarkable transformation. They stood for change, for transparency, for reform and for a different Kurdistan. A substantial number of voters signed up to their manifesto, but can Gorran now deliver?

Playing the opposition or running a joint government are different matters. Politics can be very fickle and Gorran is now in a position where it can continue its ascendency or find itself in the opposition shadows come the next election.

Gorran has been the given the platform to implement change and its election programme with the ministries it has secured. It has secured the vital ministries of Peshmerga, Economy and Finance, Trade and Industry, Endowment & Religious Affairs, Chairmanship of the Investment Board as wells as the speaker of parliament.

Control of the Peshmerga ministry was vital for Gorran. Historically the Peshmerga forces have been dominated by the KDP and PUK. In fact the PUK still has strong influence over security, even if its voter base has dwindled. Gorran can now play a leading role in creating state security forces.

The KDP and Gorran have agreed on a set of principles that bodes well for Kurdistan. Timely and measured implementation of these reforms is now vital. A bold and encompassing strategy should be matched with real action and not just rhetoric and lengthy implementation

With Kurdistan holding its first provincial elections in eight years, this will further placate changes in the Kurdistan political landscape.

Changes in legislature mean that provincial councils will have more power. As such provincial elections have taken on much more significance for Kurds than the Iraqi national elections that are unlikely to result in any real change in Baghdad from a Kurdish perspective. This is demonstrated by election campaigns throughout Erbil focusing on candidates securing provincial votes.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc

With cabinet formation, Iraqi national elections and Kurdistan provincial elections, April set to prove a crucial month for Kurdistan Region

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April will prove to be a pivotal month for Kurdistan. Campaigning is well underway for the Kurdistan provincial elections as well as the Iraqi national elections on 30th April 2014. Meanwhile, there is a renewed sense of optimism that the disappointing 6 month deadlock over government formation will be finally broken this month ahead of those elections.

This view was affirmed by Kurdistan President Massaud Barzani who expressed optimism that the 8th cabinet would be announced before the upcoming elections.

The onset of a new government in Kurdistan will end a bitter stalemate that threatened broader Kurdish interests in Baghdad and the region.

The formation of a new government and the distribution of ministerial seats to please all parties amidst the breaking of a long-established status quo and a power shift were never going to be easy. The KDP were the clear victors at the polls but it was the escalating political battle between Gorran and the PUK that proved to be achilles heel.

The PUK is already suffering internal strain and a power struggle and has failed to accept Gorran as a stronger power after decades of PUK domination of the Sulaimaniya province and a strategic sharing of power with the KDP.

Crucially, there is growing momentum that the next cabinet will be an inclusive government that will include the five main political that won the most votes in the Kurdistan legislative elections. That is at least one positive prospect from the growing frustration over the political stalemate.

It would have been easy to form a majority based government but the KDP in particular encouraged the participation of the PUK and Gorran in the new cabinet to strengthen the Kurdish hand in the region.

In recent weeks, there was a growing danger that the PUK would boycott the government all together. In fact rhetoric between the PUK and KDP slowly turned sour as parties blamed each other for the failure to form government. The rift highlighted that the KDP was not willing to unconditionally prop-up its former strategic ally and would turn to Gorran if necessary to spear-head the next government

According to recent speculation, the KDP will receive the interior ministry, in addition to the ministries of natural resources, education, municipalities and planning. Gorran was to receive the ministries of Peshmerga, finance, trade and religious affairs.

The ministry of Peshmerga was crucial for Gorran as it tried to exert influence on security forces historically dominated by the KDP and PUK.

Meanwhile, the PUK was to assume the post of deputy prime minister after Gorran relinquished this post as well as the ministries of culture, higher education, reconstruction and health.

The speaker of parliament was to be given to Gorran with the deputy speaker from the KDP. The Islamic Union (Yekgirtu) and the Islamic League (Komal) will also receive some ministries with minority groups also receiving some posts.

The Kurdistan provincial elections will be a crucial litmus test of the Kurdish political landscape. It may well underline the demise of the PUK in the Sulaimaniya province. In this light, Kurdistan government formation could have logically concluded after the provincial elections when the local factors were clearly on view.

Of course, such delay was made difficult by Iraqi elections taking place at the same time. The cabinet formation stand-off was in the middle of a fierce despite between Kurdistan and Baghdad over oil exports and the national budget. It is vital that the Kurds have a strong united hand in Baghdad and as such a cabinet formation ahead of the Iraqi national elections is of symbolic importance as they fight for a strong voice to protect Kurdish interests.

A weak Kurdish position in the post-election Iraqi cabinet formation period will greatly dilute Kurdish goals of protecting the region against growing centralist policies and as well as the general development of the region.

First Published On: Kurdish Globe

Other Publication Sources: Various Misc