There is no doubt that the relations with Kurds both withinTurkeyand also with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have improved under the auspices of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. However, one cannot help but see a man who appears shackled and incoherent, in the midst of reformists, Islamists and pioneers on the hand and secularists, nationalists and conservatives on the other hand.
As a result, the onset of the Kurdish issue or the ‘Kurdish opening’ as coined by Erdogan has been inconsistent and often prone to taking one step forward and two steps back.
Clearly, the Kurdish situation is a far cry from the dark days of the 1980’s and beyond. From sheer denial and second class status, Kurds have increasingly become a critical pawn on the Turkish sociopolitical board.
However, amidst a backdrop of controversy, political friction, ongoing battles with PKK, not to mention ideological battles in the Turkish parliament, to say thatTurkeyno longer has a Kurdish issue is an illusion.
Whether it is an ethnic problem or the problem of individual Kurdish citizens, it is still primarily a Kurdish problem that needs both short-term and long-term solutions more than ever.
However you label the problem, the measures, initiatives and remedies remain the same. As such, the Kurdish opening is as open as ever.
There is no doubt that Erdogan has taken some bold steps, starting in August 2005 when he openly admitted the presence of a Kurdish problem and the regretful way the Kurdish situation has been handled by previous governments. Some democratic reforms have progressively taking place which in a historical context may seem like significant concessions but in practice do not meet demands or expectations expected in the modern age.
At a time, when a breeze of change is happening across the Middle East,Turkeyas a strategic actor in the region does not need reminding that minority rights fall well short of those expected of a future EU country.
The Kurdish problem is real and needs to be addressed in wholesale measures and not piecemeal gestures. The longer such the Kurdish issue is sidetracked, mislabeled or neglected, the more the situation will fester and become the achilles heel ofTurkey.
The presence of millions of Kurds inTurkeyis a fact as is a war that has raged on for decades against PKK militants with no clear outcome. Whilst any armed insurrection or the death of any civilian, Turkish or Kurdish, is highly regrettable, successive governments have certainly manipulated the separatist tag and the more ardent Kurdish sentiment, while not filling the vacuum by reaching out to more liberal Kurds.
Not all Kurds are separatists or anti-Turkey lest supporters of violence. There is no reason why the Kurdish community cannot become a celebrated, diverse and symbolic part ofTurkeyif they are sufficiently tied into the makeup and future of the country.
All too often, the Kurds have become stuck between PKK camps of thought and repressive governments. This stalemate has lead to a vicious cycle of “no war, no peace”, where only the ordinary Kurds have suffered.
If the region had better investments, new infrastructure, expansion of cultural rights and economic prosperity, the very root of the PKK dilemma will be cut. You can cut the branches of your problem indefinitely, but without bold, ambitious and practical steps, only a policy of fire-fighting will ensue.
To give the greater Kurdish population a firm alternative, the Turkish government must encourage Kurdish political development in the region not try to cripple the onset of real interlocutors in the Kurdish issue.
In his recent speeches in the south east, Erdogan has been vigorously critical of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).
Amidst a backdrop of nationalist fever and general hawkish pressure, criticism of the PKK and its jailed leader Abdulah Öcalan is somewhat inevitable, but the measures to blight the credibility of the BDP, not to mention the dozens of closures of Kurdish parties in the past, only stoke tensions further.
While his speech was a strong emotive message about the fraternity of Kurds and Turks, the practical measures in the background do not always correlate with the essential sentiments of his speech.
AKP is desperate to win the Kurdish vote and this is by no means a foregone conclusion, especially if they continue to alienate the liberal or the yet undecided Kurds. While historically the AKP has fared well in the region, Kurdish sentiments have been increasingly swayed away from them as entity that can serve their needs.
Erdogan boldly stated “this land is our land. This is our motherland. There is no discrimination, no separatism. We are one, and we are together. We will be one, we will be united, we will be big and fresh”. Only with the right practical steps, incentives and implementation of real democratic reform will this truly happen and not be left to mere electoral rhetoric.
The idea that you can end decades of unrest, conflict, repression and ethnic grievance in a few years of limited reforms is a misnomer. Only in 2005 was the Kurdish issue officially highlighted and only in the past few years has a Kurdish opening or democratic reforms been discussed. As much as deep-rooted issues as those in the south east did not come about in a few years, the resolutions cannot be established as easily as limited reforms in few short years or without a proper roadmap or supports from all levels of society.
“Every tear shed in this region seeped into our hearts, conscience and soul…” proclaimed Erdogan. Tears may be wiped away but mental scars remain. Only with true co-existence and equal status, can Turks and Kurds flourish hand in hand. What the Kurds want is essentially no different to those of any Turkish citizen – employment, a good standard of living, education and a bright future.
Erdogan’s move to visit the KRG region in March of this year can only be commended. The Kurds are major players in the region and the need for new thinking, cross-regional harmony and mutual economic benefit overrides outdated nationalist ethos and Turkish fears.
The Kurds of Iraq rely heavily onTurkeyas a gateway in economic, cultural and political terms. As much as the Kurds needTurkey,Turkeyhas come to realize that it needs the Kurds both within their borders and also inIraq.
Meanwhile, as the PKK claimed responsibility for a deadly attack on a convoy ofTurkey’s ruling party, nationalist tensions were hardly eased, as Ocalan threatened a harsh response unless Turkey begins dialogue to end the conflict within six weeks.
Clearly, many discreet meetings have taken place with Ocalan, but efforts to lay down arms have been clearly inconclusive, with Ocalan blaming the AKP government for failing to respect an “agreement” to halt military operations.
However, the violence is increasingly used for political advantage and any concessions ahead of the elections are unlikely, whilst the way frequent protests which have been quelled by the government in the south east have hardly helped to bridge the divide.
If the Kurdish political parties increasingly operate under a PKK shadow on the one hand and government hostility on the other, the PKK will continue to threaten to be the only representative voice of the Kurds. Any democratic process or real political gain can only stall without true recognisable and widely respected Kurdish interlocutors on the ground.
The greatest goal of the Turkish government should be to isolate the PKK, not militaristically or economically but emotionally. Unless it continues to implement real and tangible solutions to its Kurdish problem, the vicious cycle will only continue unabated.