While much of the attention since the liberation of Iraq has been occupied by the sectarian strife of the south, heightened tension between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad are increasingly the object of much focus.
Although international mediums have concentrated on the tense relationships in recent times, none of the issues are particularly new and too often have been merely brushed under the political rug for the sake of progress.
Time and again political agreements such as with the constitution and key laws have been fraught with protraction, acrimony and difficulty. On many occasions, Iraqi’s agreed to disagree under fierce pressure from the US, intent on showcasing a new democratic Iraq and political progress amongst the feuding elite, whilst in reality the problems were simply postponed.
Ironically, even when the Iraqis did find concord on political notions after what may be deemed as “classic compromise”, in the aftermath not all sides had the stomach to implement the measures it entailed. Article 140 is a prime example of a legal stipulation that has been overlooked and prolonged, for the simple reason that ultimately Baghdad does not want to implement the motions for fear of its underlying implications – Kurdish control of oil.
The Kurdistan Region since 1991 has been practically independent and as such reintegration with the rest of Iraq was never going to be easy. Kurdistan has been relatively stable and protected, while bloodshed and terror has ensued further south. It is evident that the Kurds have benefitted from the situation, economically and politically, becoming kingmakers in the new Iraq. Now voices in Iraq cry of overreaching and hostile actions.
A look across the 300-mile or so “trigger line” that spans from Syria to Iran covering disputed territories paints its own story of why friction is a common theme as the Arab-Kurd divide becomes murky. However, it’s hardly a secret that ethnic and historical pride aside, one can not overlook the simple fact that this line weaves through an immense amount of oil.
As compromise on issues such disputed territories, particularly Kirkuk and article 140, national hydrocarbon law and federalism has become more difficult to muster, both sides have seemingly dug their heels in.
On the one hand, a rejuvenated Baghdad is somewhat on a mission to rescind Kurdish powers, thwart their demands and form a new strong centre. This is best highlighted by the refusal of Baghdad to recognise oil contracts signed by the KRG and in reluctance to deal with the issue of disputed territories.
The fear is simple, Kurdish expansion in terms of land, power and economy will push the country further towards de facto disintegration, even if in reality it may have occurred long-ago.
With the US engaging in its elusive exit strategy and beginning its much anticipated withdrawal, its eyes are firmly on political reconciliation. Washington has placed much focus on reconciling both governments in fear of leaving an Iraq on the verge of all out war. The Pentagon has expressed it anxiety with what it calls as the “most dangerous” development in Iraq, but in reality these problems did not arise overnight but with the very foundation of the state.
Recently, influential senator John McCain and a number of aides visited Kurdistan on the back of a recent visit by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, with the easing of the current stand-off likely to be on the agenda.
The US must not overlook the very fact that the Kurds and Arabs have been at odds for decades over influence, autonomy and natural resources. Fear of Kurdish power and demands, is the very reason Saddam Hussein went to such great lengths to repress the Kurdish community.
In this historic land that houses different ethnicities and sects, only an all encompassing and “future proof” solution can work. This can be achieved by a loose federation, with borders decided via internationally recognised and legitimate referendums, which no sides can dispute. It is ultimately the people that should decide their fate, taking the argument around the importance of implementing article 140 a full circle.
Under US pressure, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki travelled to Kurdistan with hope of striking reconciliatory tones with Kurdistan President, Massoud Barzani, and the Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani. Although the meeting was symbolic, given that al-Maliki and Barzani had not spoken in over a year, smiles in public are unlikely to change moods in the background.
Both sides agreed to create committees to deal with disputes, however, such committees have proven ineffective in the past and in essence may change little if the appetite for such principles does not change from the top.
Iraqis need a roadmap and legal starting point to underline their negotiations and as such there is not better product than the blueprint of the country – its constitution. There should be room for compromise and negotiation, but primarily on the principles of this document. The sidelining of this document, the calls to deem key articles as void or attempts to make wholesale changes to the constitution is a prelude to the collapse of the “heart beat” of Iraq and thus its demise.
In all essence two national armies are employed in Iraq, with as much animosity for each other as ever. As the disputed borderline becomes cloudy, so do the lines of responsibility, engagement and control. As tensions have reached dangerous heights, this has pitted the Kurdish and Iraqi forces ominously on a collision course. A number of recent incidents have been averted, while clearly the message from the respective commanders was shoot on order.
Ill-feeling has not been helped by a string of bombings in the Nineveh province and disputed territories with al-Qaeda keen as ever to foster instability. This has led to a war of words between both sides as the KRG have warned about the increasing violence and has accused al-Hadba of fermenting the escalations. Sentiments are hardly aided by the fact that the Kurds boycotted the new Nineveh administration after been deprived of practically all key positions by al-Hadba.
Now, not only two armies roam this province but also now in essence two administrations. If Kurds are deprived of power as a minority in Mosul, then the Kurds may choose to do likewise in Kirkuk. The call for compromise on hypocritical foundations is recipe for future problems.
With key Iraqi parliamentary elections around the corner, this may provide room for a breakthrough as sides look to build alliances. However, all too often in Iraq it has been a case of one step forward and two steps back, simply because animosity has been masked by short-term tactical gains.
Kurds are ever-weary of a stronger revitalized Baghdad and anxious about the prospect of US withdrawal. Their stance has also served as a warning to their US counterparts that in spite of pressure and mounting friction, they are not going to be the ones that budge over what they deem as legitimate rights.
Focus on ethnic tensions further north, must not mask the sectarian bloodshed that still firmly grips Iraq, as recent bombings have ripped through the heart of Baghdad. The question of how the Iraqi cake can be affectively shared between the Iraqi mosaic is as pertinent as ever.