For a country seemingly in transition and an ideological tangle between its historical roots and the reformists intending to drag Turkey into the new millennia, the vote over constitutional amendments held extra significance.
Many had perceived the vote as a referendum on Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself and the thermostat by which to gauge the ruling party AKP’s likely showing ahead of next years crucial national elections.
A hard-fought and contentious campaign was followed by a tense vote as the Turkish people voted ‘yes’ to the constitutional reform package on the table. The polarisation of Turkey could not be painted better than the fact that although 58% of the electorate voted in favour, large section of the Kurdish south east boycotted the vote or voted no. Elsewhere, large sections of Istanbul, a secularist bastion, were weary of government measures to dilute historical state principles and ideals.
The AKP, who stormed to power in 2002 with a tight-hold on the Turkish political arena, faced stiff criticism from nationalist and conservative circles, especially from the main opposition party, CHP, who accused the Islamist rooted AKP of a de-facto Islamist coup and aiming to seize control of the judiciary.
Since the AKP assumed political ascendancy, many key reforms designed to facilitate EU accession have been passed. This has included loosening laws around restrictions on freedom of speech, allowing landmark if not limited and state controlled broadcasting in Kurdish and slowly clipping the wings of the powerful Turkish army, the long-time guardians of the secularist ideology.
One of the key aims was to limit the power of the judiciary and the largely independent hand of the constitutional courts, whose status at times has afforded a free hand in upholding the now mystical secular and nationalist ethos of the state, and who were even close to banning the AKP only a couple of years ago.
The new measures provide the government greater influence over the selection of judges and also include steps to try army officers in civilian courts.
In many ways, the constitutional referendum pitted an old Turkey against an aspiring new one.
Over the past decades since foundation of the republic, certain blueprints of Turkey such as its strong secularism, nationalist ideals and the almost sacred role of the military were almost deemed untouchable.
While the AKP and Turkey has a long way to go, the sense of new if not highly contentious dialogue has been a strong development for Turkey as it tries to reshape its strategic role and identity both in the Middle East and Europe.
Admittedly, many of these reforms have been forced by EU accession demands than pure free will but the change in the air in recent years has certainly rocked the established elite.
The same ideals that engulfed Turkey in the 1920’s can not be merely applied indefinitely. The advent of globalism, a new world order and more transparent economic unions, means that Turkey must simply change with the times, or become stuck in out dated ethos that will only prove counter-productive to its advancement and standing.
Eventual entry into the EU is a major carrot and one that will ultimately see Turkey make further constitutional changes required, no matter how hard they may be to stomach in certain quarters, let alone discuss at this sensitive juncture.
As debate and a sense of anxiety in some nationalist circles continues to grip Turkey, perhaps it was fitting that the referendum was held on the day that marked exactly 30 years since a military junta took power 30 years ago and duly adopted the current constitution in 1982.
The current constitution drawn up by military influenced and ultra partisan actors with very specific objectives at the time is out-dated and simply incompatible with that of an EU aspiring country.
This common acceptance of the need for modernisation begs the question why all the fuss over the reform package? The answer is that although the reforms included only 26 amendments to the 1982 constitution, many which were widely expected and some now irrelevant, many hawks and nationalists fear that this may just be the tip of the iceberg as the AKP government manoeuvres further to imprint its ideology.
Critics will point to the way the reform package was rushed through earlier this year, and to the fact that citizens had a choice of ‘all or nothing’ over the proposed changes. While Erdogan has been heralded for spearheading economic and political advancement in Turkey, opposition camps point to his rigid style and view the Prime Minister with a degree of mistrust.
Ironically, while for some the constitutional amendments were too radical, for the impoverished Kurds struggling in the shadow of authoritarian and repressive laws and who largely abstained or voted “no”, the reforms simply do not go far enough. Many of the key laws and stipulations that continue to impinge Kurdish rights remain enshrined in legislature. For example, the key law that stipulates that any political party must attain a 10% threshold to enter parliament has continually blighted Kurdish political parties. Teaching and broadcasting in the Kurdish language are still limited and freedoms are still someway short.
Quite simply the changes simply do not quench the evident need of greater political reform in Turkey. However, particularly for the Kurds, who only decades ago were denied altogether, the gradual thawing of age-old mindsets is more significant than the limited reforms on the table at the current time.
It took many decades to usher even the notion of change and thus expectancy that the Turkish nationalist horizon will now suddenly tip upside down is optimistic at best. The democratisation of Turkey will continue, and as frustrating and tense as it has been, further changes will be painstaking, gradual and not wholesale.
For example the much anticipated ‘Kurdish opening’ ran out of steam as the government became paralysed by stiff opposition, perception of ‘succumbing’ to the PKK and also at the same time from instability and general mistrust in the south east, who argued the steps did not go far enough.
While disappointedly the iconic steps by the government to reach out to the Kurds never took any semblance of ascendancy, the channels of democratisation and dialogue are surely, if not slowly, taking root.
New democratic pages must be turned to ensure modernisation of Turkey’s south east and a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish question.
The EU must shoulder a lions-share of responsibility in carrying and pushing Turkey towards accession and prosperity, by loosening the nationalistic constitution further and particularly ensuring that Kurdish rights are advanced further. After all if Turkey joins the EU, it will be bringing its millions of Kurds with it.
While US President Barack Obama’s belief of “vibrancy” in Turkey’s democracy is exaggerated, in Erdogan own words, Turkey has at least “crossed a historic threshold”.